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Abstract 
In the design of process plants safety has assumed an Increasingly high. profile. One of the 
techniques used in hazard identification is the fault tree, which involves first the synthesis of 
the tree and then Its analysis. The construction of a fault tree, however, requires special 
skills and can be a time-consuming process. It is therefore attractive to develop computer 
aids for the synthesis stage to match those which already exist for the analysis of the tree. 
A computer based system for fault tree synthesis has been developed at Loughborough 
University. This thesis Is part of a continuing programme of work associated with this facility. 
The starting point for fault tree synthesis Is the piping and instrumentation diagram for the 
plant. The analyst converts this to a configuration diagram consisting of a set of units and 
the connections between them. Each unit Is described by a model, which may be called 
down from the model library or, if not available there, configured by the user. The unit models 
consist of sets of mini-fault trees which are then linked together under a special top event 
model to form the main fault tree. 
This thesis is concerned primarily with the generation of the unit models and, in particular, 
the formulation of rules for the modelling and the creation of various model units. The 
methodology uses propagation equations, initial event statements and modified decision 
tables to model fault propagation in, and failure modes of, Individual items of process plant. 
These are then converted to a set of mini-fault trees. 
A technique has been devised to decompose a large system so that smaller parts of it can 
be studied separately. The flow and pressure relationships for vessels have been defined 
In detail and a taxonomy of vessel connections created. This has allowed a set of aids to 
vessel model generation to be developed, Including a set of core propagation equations, 
model templates and a model generation routine. A taxonomy of units has been defined 
and a unit model library based on this has been created. Core models have been created 
for other common units such as heat eXChangers, Including a model generation routine, and 
chemical reaction vessels. 
Fault trees have been synthesised for example systems and other improvements have been 
made both to the modelling and the synthesis. These Include improvements to the modelling 
of recurring but difficult features such as dividers and headers and control and trip systems 
and the development of a method for creating models which produce fault trees comparable 
to those used in hazard assessments. 
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PART 1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction To Fault Tree Synthesis 
In the design of process plants handling hazardous materials safety has assumed an 
increasingly high profile and the design effort which must be devoted to it has grown. 
Formal systems are used both for the identification and the assessment of hazards. The 
most widely used method of hazard identification is the hazard and operability (hazop) 
study. A hazard so identified may then be selected for further study. One ofthe techniques 
used is the fault tree, which involves first the synthesis of the tree and then its analysis. 
A fault tree is a graphical representation showing failure logic between events. A single, 
undesired event, the top event, is broken down into its primary causes. These, in turn, 
can then be broken down into their own causes and so on until the causes terminate in 
base events which can be Interpreted easily. Between each layer a logic gate links an 
event to its causal events. 
Such a fault tree may then be analysed qualitatively, giving combinations of base events 
(minimum cutsets) which may cause the top event, or quantitatively, using failure dab for 
the base events giving a probability for the top event. For example, an explosion, for 
which a probability is not readily available, has primary causes of a release of an explosive 
mixture and an ignition source. While It may be possible to give a probability for an ignition 
source being available the release is not as simple. Therefore it is necessary to break 
this event down further. The eventual cause of a release may be the failure of a control 
loop component which allows low temperature embrittlement of a pipeline resulting in a 
leak. The failure rates of such components may be provided by the manufacturers or 
derived from reliability studies thus allowing the probability of an explosion to be calculated. 
The formal procedures used for fault tree analysis lend themselves to an automatic 
approach and there are currently many computer programs available to carry out this 
task. This has greatly reduced the amount of time required to carry out an analysis which 
may evolve thousands of minimum cutsets. 
The construction of a fault tree, however, requires special skills and can be a 
time·consuming process. There are no formal gulde·lines laid down for the construction 
of a fault tree and much of the skill relates to the Interpretation of the analyst in the design, 
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operating procedures and failure modes of the plant. Indeed two independent analysts 
may derive different results forthe same plant. IUs therefore attractive to develop computer 
aids for the synthesis stage to match those which already exist for the analysis of the tree. 
1.2 The FAUL TFINDER Package 
A computer based system for fault tree synthesis, FAUL TFINDER, has been developed 
at Loughborough University over several years (1 - 5). This thesis is part of a continuing 
programme of work associated with this facility and represents Version 3 of the package. 
Kelly (4) created the first version and Mullhi (5) developed Version 2. 
The starting point for fault tree synthesis is the piping and instrumentation diagram for the 
plant. The analyst converts this to a configuration diagram consisting of a set of units and 
the connections between them. Each unit is described by a failure model, which may be 
called down from the model library or, if not available there, configured by the user. An 
additional model, the top event model, is used for the undesired event forming the top of 
the fault tree. The unit model consists of sets of mini-fault trees (hereafter referred to as 
minitrees) which are then linked together, during synthesis, to form the main fault tree. 
The FAULTFINDER package is a suite of computer programs written in the'Fortran 77 
programming language based on a DEC Microvax 11 computer system running VMS. It 
is possible, with a minimum of alterations, to install the programs on any other'computer 
system or personal computer (PC). The basic directory structure is shown in Figure 1.1. 
The programs in the package are; 
MODGEN3.EXE - Unit model generation program 
EVTGEN3.EXE - Event model generation program 
MASTER3.EXE - Configuration data input program 
FAULT3.EXE 
PLOT3.EXE 
FTAP3.COM 
- Fault tree synthesis program 
- Fault tree drawing program 
- Command procedure to run the fault tree analysis program FT AP 
The user developed models are held in the '[.MDAT]' directOries for reference but the unit 
model and event model libraries are contained in the '[.M]' directories from where the 
MASTER3.EXE program retrieves its information. The files of interest to the analyst are 
contained in the '[.DRAW]' and '[.CUTSET]' directories. 
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[.FAULT] 
I 
FAULT3.EXE 
[.RESULTS] [.DRAW] [.CU+SET] 
S)'f'Ilnesia Foult tree Fault tree 
. 
output m. plotting file analysis mes 
I I 
PLOT3.EXE FTAP3.COM 
I I 
Foult tree "'inimum 
text fiI. cut.lllt. file 
[.MASTER] 
I 
MASTER3.EXE 
[.DATA] [.RESULTS] 
Configuration Configuration 
doto flle. output files 
[.EVTGEN] 
I 
EVTGEN3.EXE 
[.DATA] [.MOAT] [.MOD] 
I 
[.M] 
Event model Event model Event mode' Ewnt model 
dolo file. t.xt fit,. t,'lft mlnltr ••• numerical 
[.MODGEN] mlnltrees 
I 
MODGEN3.EXE 
[.DATA] [.MOAT] [.MOD] 
I 
[.M] 
Unit model Unlt model Unit model Unit model 
doto m •• text file. text mlnltrees numerical 
[.GENDAT] mlnltrees 
General doto files 
Figure 1.1 - FAULTFINDER Directory Structure 
In order to check the correctness of the synthesised fault trees the fault tree analysis 
program FTAP (6) Is used. This program offers a top-down or bottom-up method of 
processing or a combination of the two using prime implicants called the 'Nelson' method. 
The non-minimal cutsets produced initially are reduced using either a modular 
decomposition technique or a 'dual' algorithm to increase the code's efficiency. The 
program has considerable flexibility and the user is able to control the processing and 
output. 
1-3 
1.3 The Work In This Thesis 
This thesis is concemed primarily with the generation of the unit models and, in particular, 
with the formulation of rules for the modelling and creation of various modelling units. The 
aim of this is to produce a more user-friendly methodology and a higher degree of 
automation. The methodology uses propagation equations, initial event statements and 
modified decision tables to model fault propagation in, and failure modes of, individual 
Items of process plant. These are then converted to a set of minitrees which are linked 
together to form the fault tree. 
When analysing a large process plant it may be necessary to create several new models 
and, as is often the case, the resultant fault tree may be correspondingly large. Should 
this fault tree tum out to be incorrect, it may be difficult to determine where the fault lies. 
However, a technique has been devised to decompose a large system so that smaller 
parts of it can be studied separately. The advantage of this is that the fault trees are 
smaller and the section being studied may only contain one new model making it easier 
to determine where the fault is. 
The model library forms an important part of the synthesis process and an iII-equiped 
library will reduce the acceptance of the package. For this purpose a taxonomy of units 
has been defined and a unit model library based on this has been created. However, the 
library will not contain every possible unit so it is necessary to provide the user with suitable 
aids to ease the creation of new models. 
Experience has shown the vessel to be the most likely unit to require a new model. 
Therefore the methodology for the flow and pressure relationships In vessels has been 
revised. This was necessary because the previous methodology was unstructured and 
It was unclear how to approach the development of a new model. 
The new methodology for vessels incorporates a taxonomy of vessel connections allowing 
a set of core propagation equations to be produced. From this it has been possible to 
develop aset of rules and further aids for vessel model generation such as model templates 
and a model generation routine. 
Other units often requiring new models are heat exchangers and reaction vessels. The 
new methodology has allowed rules to be formalised and a heat exchanger model 
generation routine has been produced resulting in a set of core models .. The problems 
of chemical reaction vessels are complex but rules have been developed to aid the user 
In the creation of such a model. Example models have been produced as an illustration. 
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A common approach to this type of work is to select unconventional examples from the 
literature and synthesise fault trees for them. As a result Improvements, shown by these 
studies to be needed, have been made both to the modelling and the synthesis. These 
include, in particular, changes to the modelling of dividers and headers and their 
combinations, and of control and tnp loops. Further work has been earned out developing 
a method for creating models to produce fault trees comparable to thos_e found in hazard 
assessments. 
1.4 The Structure Of This Thesis 
This thesis Is essentially divided Into three parts. The first section looks at other work in 
the field and deals with the existing methodology, the second deals with new 
methodologies, developments and improvements, and the third sums up the work with 
examples and gives recommendations for future work. In more detail this is: 
Part 1 
Chapter 2 is a survey of available literature on the subjects of fault tree synthesis, 
Qualitative modelling and model representation. 
Chapter 3 gives an Introduction to the methodology used by the FAULTFINDER 
package. 
Part 2 
Chapter 4 specifies the rules pertaining to the decompOSition stage and configuration 
data Input. It also details a facility to break up the configuration into 
manageable sections. 
Chapter 5 gives an Introduction to the vanables and deviations used. A new fault 
and event library is presented and a taxonomy of unit models, top event 
models and secondary failure models is given. 
Chapter 6 presents a new methodology for modelling flow and pressure in vessels 
using a taxonomy of vessel port connections to produce a set of core 
propagation equations. 
Chapter 7 specifies the rules for modelling vessels and presents a vessel model 
generation routine and a set of vessel model templates which can be 
manipulated by the user. 
Chapter 8 specifies the rules for modelling heat exchangers and presents a heat 
exchanger model generation routine and a set of example models. 
Chapter 9 gives an outline of the rules necessary to generate reaction vessel models 
and two example models are presented. 
Chapter 10 gives additional rules and Improvements made to modelling dividers, 
headers, their combinations and other asSOCiated units. 
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Chapter 11 is an investigation of over-determined control loops and problems with 
combined control and trip valve systems. 
Chapter 12 is a study of fault tree stability and presentation, a facility to generate risk 
assessment type fault trees and dimensionality aspects. 
Part 3 
Chapter 13 presents some worked examples studied in the course-ofthis project. 
Chapter 14 concludes the work In the project and gives recommendations for future 
work. 
1.5 Terminology Used In Fault Trees 
In the developing field of fault tree synthesis and related work many types of symbol are 
used (7, 8). These include AND, OR, EXCLUSIVE-OR, PRIORITY AND, NOT and INHIBIT 
gates and base, conditioning, diamond, extemal and intermediate events. In order to 
prevent confusion, those used within this thesis and by the FAULTFINDER package will 
be defined here. 
The logic gate which Is used to link events and their causal conditions may take one of 
the following forms: 
AND gate 
r-OUT-OF-n gate 
OR gate 
All input conditions must exist for the output event to occur 
SpeCial AND gate implying that 'r' input conditions must 
exist for the output event to occur 
Only one input condition must occur for the output event 
to occur 
However, on a fault tree it is not necessary to separately identify the two types of OR gate 
and the special AND gate simply has a 'rln' symbol inside the gate symbol. These are 
shown in Figure 1.2. 
The other symbols used refer to the event type. In this case there are three separate 
representations, also shown In Figure 1.2. These are: 
Transmissive/lntermediate event 
Diamond event 
Base event 
an event requiring further development 
a variable deviation not developed any further 
because it crosses the system boundary or It is 
developed elsewhere. 
an event which represents a primary fault. 
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Standard Symbol 
6 
~ 
-'-
EXT-
~O~ 
Thesis Symbol 
I 
AND 
I 
I 
2-0UT-OF-3 
I 
I 
OR 
I 
I 
LO-PRESS 
I 
I 
P 1 NONE 
I 
PART -BLK 
Representation 
AND gate 
2·0UT·OF·3 gate 
OR gate 
Transmissive/intermediate event 
Diamond event 
Base event 
Figure 1.2 • Fault Tree Symbols 
The logic used in the FAULTFINDER package is such that the NOT gate is unnecessary 
and the INHIBIT and conditioning combination is superfluous because it is assumed that 
any variable deviation event is sufficient to cause the top event. The use of 
EXCLUSIVE·OR gates has been defined (9) as unnecessary from an engineering view 
point and results only in an added level of complication. 
The gate and event symbols used by the package correspond to those approved by the 
British Standards Institute (8). 
Minitrees represent the simplest form of a fault tree because they contain oniy one level 
of development and consequently one logic gate. An example minitree is shown in Figure 
1.3. 
1·7 
IT 6 LO I 
Q \§) 
~ 
IT 5 LO I 
I 
T 6 LO 
I 
EXT-COLD 
I 
OR 
I I 
T 5 LO 
I 
Figure 1.3 - A Simple Minitree 
Some of the symbols used in this thesis are of non-standard type. Those likely to cause 
confusion are given in Figure 1.4. 
~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ 
Control Valve Trip Valve 
(operating) (closed) 
~ h] ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Centrifugal Type Pump Positive Displacement Type Pump 
eg. reciprocating. rotary 
Figure 1.4 - Definition Of Some Symbols used in Thesis 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Survey 
2.1 Introduction 
There are currently many workers involved in the research of fault propagation in chemical 
process plant and in particular the subject of fault tree synthesis and analysis. As a 
consequence a large literature exists. Two previous workers (1, 2) in the department 
have carried out reviews of the subject. Therefore, only a brief introduction into the origins 
of this work is given. A more detailed account is given of recent publications and work 
related specifically to process plant. The review is restricted to the following areas: 
- Fault tree work 
- Qualitative modelling 
- Model representation. 
2.2 Fault Tree Origins 
A fault tree is a sequence of events linked together by logic gates. The undesired event, 
or top event, is specified by the analyst and appears atthe top ofthe tree structure. Events 
that may cause this event are linked to it and these in turn have their own causes linked 
to them. The whole structure can then be analysed to identify relationships between the 
top event and the factors that contribute to its occurrence. 
Faulttrees were first used for reliability analysis during the development'of the Minuteman 
missile launch control system in 1961. They were confined to electronic systems in the 
aerospace and nuclear industry for many years due to the simple binary operation of 
working/not working. Later fault trees were adopted by the process industry as part of 
their hazard analysis work. 
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2.3 Analysis Of Fault Trees 
The term 'fault tree analysis' Is usually applied to the overall procedure of defining a 
system, developing a fault tree and then evaluating this to produce a set of results (3). 
However, it is also often used to mean just the evaluation process. In the context of this 
thesis fault tree analysis refers to the evaluation of the fault trees. 
Faulttree analysis produces the results required to assess the reliability or hazard potential 
for the plant. These may be qualitative or quantitative. A qualitative result may give a 
series of blockages or closed valves as a cause of an emergency cooling system failure 
or give a particular power supply utility as an important fault location. A quantitative result 
gives the probability of a top event or the unreliability/unavailability of certain items of 
plant, thus identifying the weakest links. 
The process of analysis of a fault tree, as expected, can be very time-consuming and 
requires a good deal of skill. However, the logic involved is well documented and from 
an early stage investigations were carried out into computerising the process. There 
exists a number of computer packages specifically designed to carry out fault tree analysis 
and these have been reviewed by Lee et aI (3). The package listing is broken down into 
five sections 
- qualitative evaluation for minimal cutsets 
- qualitative evaluation for common-cause analysis 
- qualitative evaluation for measures of importance 
- quantitative evaluation for probabilities 
- quantitative evaluation for measures of importance 
where importance is a technical term relating to the relative contribution of a particular 
fault. 
The intricacies of fault tree analysis are beyond the scope of the project and will not be 
considered any further. 
2-2 
2.4 Synthesis Of Fault Trees 
In order to carry out fault tree analysis a suitable fault tree is required. Again, like the 
analysis process the construction of a fault tree is very time-consuming and requires the 
analyst to have a detailed understanding of the operation and failure modes of the system 
under study. 
In the ear1y 1970's Fussel (4) Introduced a formal methodology for the construction of 
fault trees in electronic systems. This was made possible by the simple working/not 
working functionality of electrical components. 
In the process industry the ability to construct a fault tree for a system is an art and takes 
many years of experience. This informal approach can result in different results from two 
independent analysts as each Interprets the system in his own way. 
A formal approach to fault tree construction in the process industry was not considered 
necessary because fault trees did not form a standard part of the design procedure for a 
process plant and at that time the industry had a comparatively good safety record. Other 
reasons put forward by Powers and Tompkins (6) can be summarised as: 
- process plants were too Simple and robust to warrant a formal safety technique and 
failure often only resulted in shutdown, followed by a restart. Compare this with the 
aerospace industry where failure can result in spectacular losses, and, 
- hazards in process plant relate to chemical reactivity under certain conditions making 
It difficult to predict the behaviour and hence time-consuming to model the situation. 
At that time the process industry was developing more and more complex plant as 
technology allowed, and for economic reasons these plants were growing larger. Then 
the Flixborough disaster happened and raised public concern about the process plants. 
This brought to light the fact that it was now necessary to carry out a hazard analysis. A 
widely used technique for this was fault tree synthesis and analYSis. 
As fault trees became an acceptable part of the design procedure for process plant ways 
had to be found to reduce the amount of time spent on the construction. Since then 
several groups of workers have been Involved in the computer aided synthesis of fault 
trees for process plants. The recurrent authors of papers, the methodology used and the 
programs produced are shown in Table 2.1. The methodology is explained in later 
sections. 
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Table 2.1 - Synthesis Programs 
Authors Date Methodology Program 
Fussel • (4, 5) 1973 Failure Transfer Functions DRAFT 
Powers, Tompkins (6, 7) 1974 Information Flow Diagram (no name) 
Salem, Apostolakis (8 -11) 1975 Decision Tables CAT 
Caceres, Henley (12) 1976 Block Diagrams (no name) 
Lapp, Powers (13 - 17) 1977 Digraphs FTS 
Alien (18,19) 1980 Digraphs (no name) 
Poucet (20, 21) 1981 Modular Ust Processing CAFTS 
Taylor (22) 1982 Cause-Consequence RIKKE 
Relationships 
Kelly, Lees (23 - 27) 1986 Functional Relationships FAUL TFINDER 
Kumamoto, Henley (28) 1986 Digraphs (no name) 
Napier, Palmer (29) 1988 Modularisation (no name) 
Sang Hoon Han (30) 1989 Decision Tables AFTC 
Bossche (31 - 33) 1991 Propagation Relationships FTSA 
and Causal Trees 
Although not applicable to process plant this work has been Included to show its 
Importance In the field of fault tree synthesis. 
However, the efforts to develop a fault tree synthesiS algorithm have encountered many 
problems. These Include attempts to model the flow and pressure relationships and the 
difficulties in modelling control loops. A paper by Andow (34) explores the problem areas 
and reaches the following conclusions: 
- The concept of two-way flow of information Is important in situations such as fluid 
flow. 
The accuracy of failure models is low due to the effort spent developing algorithms. 
- The failure models do not have to be comprehensive, only a credible set of events 
is necessary. 
Control loops pose particular problems to all published algorithms due to the effect 
of time. In these cases a different technique may be appropriate such as 
cause-consequence diagrams where time can be modelled. 
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- Fault tree methodology uses simple models but some system failures are complex 
which may result in incompatibilities. 
- Algorithms must be carefully examined and validated. 
The final conclusion has far reaching implications for all workers involved In fault tree 
synthesis because unless this Is done the widespread use of computer ~odes for this work 
will fall into disrepute if any errors are found. 
The problems of control loops were Investigated by Shafaghl (35, 36) who addressed the 
opaqueness of the fault tree. Rather than using a unit model approach this method uses 
a structured fonnat based on control loop failures and other associated protective devices. 
This gives an ordered fault tree which is comparatively easy to understand. The 
methodology described is a manual one but a combination of unit models and control loop 
structure is used in the work presented in this thesis. 
2.5 Extent Of Automation 
Many of the computer algorithms have been designed to aid the construction of fault trees. 
Various methodologies are used but as concluded by Kohda and Henley (37) they all 
require a certain amount of human interaction and skill to prevent the generation of 
Incomplete, Inconsistent and incorrect fault trees. This may occur in the modelling of the 
units or system, or in compiling and editing the draft fault tree. 
Methodologies which use a unit based process are those of Salem (8 - 11), Poucet (20, 
21), Taylor (22), Lees (23 - 27), Napier and Palmer (29) and Sang Hoon Han (30). These 
decompose the plant to a unit based structure and the models, if necessary, are created 
manually and stored in a unit library. There Is a certain degree of automation in this 
process as the data entered by the user is converted to the required mini-fault tree fonnat. 
The fault tree Is then synthesised automatically by linking together the appropriate 
mini-fault trees using the entered configuration data. 
The remaining methodologies synthesise a fault tree based on the system configuration. 
The digraph technique (13 - 19, 28) uses a manually drawn digraph of the system which 
encompasses all the control and trip loop Infonnation as derived by the analyst. Although 
the task is Simplified by the availability of a library of digraphs for various components the 
user is still left to fonn the connections and effects of the protective devices. 
The work of Bossche (31 - 33) uses the configuration topology to construct a macro-fault 
tree and Caceres uses path tracing through the system. Both these are automatic but 
the resultant tree must be edited to include the control loops. 
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All the methodologies require time and skill to produce a correct fault tree whether it is in 
creating unit models, defining the system digraph or adding In the control loop affects. 
However, the workers concemed are striving to make their algorithms more user friendly 
with more automated processes. 
As can be seen, there is still much work to be carried out in the field of computer aided 
fault tree synthesis. 
2.6 Qualitative Modelling 
There are two broad categories of model which can be developed for a system, quantitative 
and qualitative. The former consists of a complete set of algebraic and differential 
equations with numerical values asSigned as parameters for the model. However, it may 
be more convenient In certain situations, or necessary where numerical values are not 
known, to use qualitative modelling. This uses equations describing a qualitative 
relationship. For example, 
a= f( b, -c) 
which means 'a' is a function of 'b' and 'c', such that 'a' increases if 'b' increases or 'c' 
decreases, and vice-versa. 
Accounts of qualitative modelling or 'naive physics' as it is sometimes known include those 
of De Kleer and Brown (38, 39), Kuipers (40, 41) and Forbus (42). 
Qualitative models are built up from an understanding of how a system functions based 
on a description of its structure and Its normal operation but without the need for specific 
numerical values. There is a need for qualitative modelling because a method based on 
an empirical association has serious limitations in the scope It can cover. De Kleer and 
Brown (39) go on to say that with a qualitative approach some loss of information cannot 
be avoided. This stems from the adoption of a pre-determined set of values such as -, ° 
and + or low, normal and high. 
When developing a qualitative model Brown and De Kleer (38) propose that the model 
must: 
- deal with all possible faults producing unexpected behaviour and accurately model 
behaviour in regions not tested (this implies an adheSion to certain principles) 
- portray under1ying mechanisms and cause and effect relationships common to the 
entire class 
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- be robust and leamable. 
However, Kuipers (41) states that there are conflicting requirements necessary for a 
qualitative approach: 
- the model should express what we know about the mechanism" 
- the model should not require assumptions beyond what we know 
- from the model it must be mathematically and computationally feasible to derive 
predictions 
- from the model it should be possible to match predictions against observations. 
Despite this, much work has been carried out on the subject of qualitative modelling mainly 
in the field of artificial intelligence. Various theories and methodologies have been put 
forward including Qualitative Physics (39), Qualitative Reasoning (40, 41) and Qualitative 
Process Theory (42). 
Forbus (42) sets out a series of reasoning tasks which must be followed when using 
qualitative dynamics to model a situation: 
1. Determining Activity - deduce what Is happening in a situation at a particular time. 
2. Prediction - deduce what might happen in the future or futures of some situation. 
3. Postdiction - deduce how a particular state of affairs might have come about. 
4. Skeptical Analysis -determine if the description of a physical situation is consistent. 
5. Measurement Interpretation - given a particular description and observation, infer 
what else exists and is happening. 
6. Experiment Planning - given knowledge of observations, plan actions to yield more 
information. 
7. Causal Reasoning - compute a deSCription of the behaviour. 
Once a model theory has been created the model so created, according to Brown and 
De Kleer (38, 39), should obey five fundamental principles: 
1. Structure in Function - the structure of a device is described in terms of its 
components and inter-connections. 
2. No Function in Structure - the laws of the parts of the device of a particular class 
may not presume the functioning of the whole that are not made about the class 
in general. 
3. Class Wide Assumption -assumptions for a particular device must be distinguished 
from those generic to the entire class. 
4. Locality - a part can only act on, or be acted on by, its immediate neighbour. 
5. Causality - each event has an explicit cause. 
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These can be illustrated using the example shown in Figure 2.1. 
V1 P1 
... 
P2 V2 
Figure 2.1 - Schematic Of Two Connected Vessels 
It can be said that there will be fiow from vessel V1 to vessel V2 if V2 is at a lower pressure. 
However, this assumes that V1 is connected to V2. 
If the principles are to be enforced then the model must be localised. Therefore, there 
will be flow from vessel V1 if the pressure at the outlet P1 is lower than the pressure inside 
V1. There will be flow along the connecting pipe if P2 is lower than P1 and there will be 
flow into vessel V2 if the pressure at the inlet P2 is higher than the pressure inside V2. 
To maintain the locality approach a connection topology is necessary to Indicate 
communication and shared information (structure to function). The class wide assumption 
and no function in structure principles are applied by modelling, for example, every pipe 
In the same way. The causality principle provides the leamability factor as each 
cause/event relationship unfolds. 
2.7 Automatic Qualitative Modelling 
Once a methodology for determining the format of a model has been devised it is then 
necessary to create the models. The traditional approach (43) has been to determine 
what happens physically, develop a set of equations to describe this physics and then 
put them into a computer to solve. The problem here is that the computer is only used 
to solve an already built model. Catino et al (43) present a method for automatically 
building qualitative models in which a computer chooses the relevant physical and 
chemical properties from a library. The approach to modelling is based on the qualitative 
process theory of Forbus (42). 
Starting with the plant diagram the model builder selects the desired equipment and its 
connectivity. A decision is made on the level of detail required and a set of assumptions 
about the operating conditions Is applied. The computer then constructs a causal 
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qualitative model of the entire plant. As with all modelling programs the choice of detail 
and assumptions is very important and too little constraint can result in multiple models. 
If the right application is supplied a single model may be possible in some cases. 
Only the physical and chemical properties are stored in a library and large plants are split 
into small sections containing two or three process units. The complete plant is made up 
of these sections with the output from one being the Input to the next. 
Based on a physical and chemical library the authors (43) give three capabilities necessary 
to build general models of chemical plant: 
- build a basic library of phenomena that occur In chemical systems which can be 
used to describe the behaviour of many different types of plant 
- model plug flow in pipe-type vessels 
- focus on particular aspects of behaviour so that fewer solutions are produced 
allowing a quicker result. 
These highlight the problems encountered when trying to develop a package to adequately 
model a chemical plant. The package must be adaptable and versatile enough to be 
applied to any chemical process plant. Without this the package would have only a limited 
use. 
Modelling flow propagation in a chemical plant is a two-way process. If a pipe develops 
a leak then flow upstream will increase and flow downstream will decrease. A method 
had to be found to model this correctly but without allowing a continuous looping effect 
or Inconsistencies as described by Martin-Solis et al (44). The solution was to use two 
variables, one for tracing causes upstream and one for tracing causes downstream, and 
a set of boundary conditions and not allowed faults. This process was adopted by Lees 
and co-workers (23 - 27) and a similar method using two variables by Taylor (22). 
The focusing aspect depends on the use for the particular package. For a simulation 
process the user is interested in the behaviour of the plant under different process 
conditions and for a hazard analysis the user Is interested In deviations from the normal 
operating condition and faults that may cause this. 
A disadvantage of this method Is that the number of different predicted behaviours 
increases exponentially as the number of sections increases. The growth can be limited 
by a focusing technique but it has to be re-applied every time the model Is altered and 
the result is not stored in a library for use with other suitable plants. Other programs (8 
- 11, 22, 23 - 27) use a component or unit base which allows the models to be stored in 
a library for further use. 
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2.8 Model Representation 
This section deals with the types of model representation used by various workers in the 
field of fault tree synthesis of chemical process plant. A brief listing is given in Table 2.1. 
2.8.1 Failure Transfer Functions 
The component failure transfer function used by Fussel (4, 5) describes one mode of 
failure for a component. The functions are made up from the following parts: 
- the output event and logic gate give the mode of failure being considered and the 
logic with which the failure transfer function Is coupled into the fault tree 
- an internal event and logic gate represent a fault requiring further logical development 
within the failure transfer function 
- an 'input event' may be either a primary or an undeveloped fault event and represents 
the furthest development possible by considering the isolated component 
- the 'discriminator' is a flag designating which failure transfer functions may co-exist 
in the final fault tree 
- the 'co-ordinator' is a flag indicating which failure transfer function, in a set, Is to be 
used for a given initial condition. 
The failure transfer functions can be represented as mini-fault trees and may contain more 
than one level of development. They are considered independent of the system being 
analysed and are designed to be catalogued into a component library. The use of the 
flags allows the exclusion of certain failure transfer functions from the fault tree increasing 
its transparency. Synthesis is achieved by linking together the failure transfer functions 
because an Input event to one is an output event of another. 
This methodology marked the beginning of the development of computer programs for 
computer aided fault tree synthesis. The author states that although the methodology 
has been developed for eiectrical systems it can be applied to any fau It tree construction 
work. Many existing programs still use a component based technique. 
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2.8.2 Information Flow Diagrams 
The information flow diagram (6) for a unit is a mapping of how each component affects 
another. The information, for example, indicates that a particular output variable may be 
dependent on several input variables. A process flow sheet gives the linkage between 
units from which it is possible to trace the failure pathways for hazardous events. 
This technique formed the basis for the Boolean equations (7) and later the digraph work 
of Lapp and Powers (13· 17) . 
. 2.8.3 Decision Tables 
A decision table, as used by Salem et al (8 • 11), is an extension of the binary logic of 
true or false in truth tables. The logic has been expanded to a1iow more states. The 
principle was developed for use in electrical systems but can easily be applied to chemical 
plant. The fault tree is synthesised by starting at a particular state and tracing through 
the appropriate decision tables for each component. 
The decision table consists of an input state, an internal mode and a resultant output 
state. The example cited and shown in Table 2.2 is an overload fuse and the input and 
output states are defined as; 0= no signal, 1 = normal and 2= overload. The intemal modes 
are; 0= good, 1= failed open and 2= failed closed. The number of rows in the deciSion 
table is a product of the input states and the intemal modes (in this case 3 x 3 giving 9). 
Table 2.2 • Decision Table Representation 
Row Input State Internal Mode Output State 
1 0 0 0 
2 0 1 0 
3 0 2 0 
4 1 0 1 
5 1 1 0 
6 1 2 1 
7 2- 0 0 
8 :? 1 0 
9 2 2 2 
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The process has been further modified by using a 'don't care' logic. This Involves checking 
the decision table and, if the output state is indifferent regardless of the internal mode or 
the input state, then condensing the rows as applicable. The modified version is shown 
in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3 • Condensed Decision Table Representation 
Row Input State Internal Mode Output State 
4 1 0 1 
6 1 2 1 
7 2 0 0 
9 2 2 2 
10 0 . 0 
11 . 1 0 
where '.' represents a 'don't care' state or mode. 
This method has been illustrated in the literature using electronic systems but the authors 
state that it is adaptable to mechanical and hydraulic systems and, therefore, may be 
suitable to chemical processes. Indeed the technique has been used by Sang Hoon Han 
(30) for the development of another algOrithm. 
2.8.4 Block Diagrams 
The block diagrams used by Caceres and Henley (12) consist of blocks and nodes 
. interconnected by directed lines. The blocks represent process units and the nodes are 
the junctions between then. A path·finding algorithm is used to find all the routes In reverse 
order (ie. output node to Input node) and then converting these to a set of minimal paths. 
Fault tree generation is then possible by using Boolean expressions for the paths. 
The process Is very simple and the fault tree events only represent the failure of the block 
or unit. It does not, for example, allow for different failures of the same unit which may 
have different probabilities. However, this procedure is based on fault tree generation for 
electrical systems which have simple success or failure of units and has formed a base 
for process plant fault trees. 
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2.8.5 Digraphs 
The use of directed graphs or digraphs was Initially made by Lapp and Powers (13 - 17). 
A digraph consists of a set of nodes, representing the process variables and faults, 
connected by directed edges, representing the influence of one node on another. 
The degree of influence or gain, representing the possible deviation states, is given by a 
number In the range -10, -1, 0,1 and 10 on the directed edge. The 0 is a normal state, 
the ±1 a moderate disturbance and the ±1 0 a large disturbance. An edge may also have 
a dependent relationship giving the required fault for a particular gain. 
The models are represented in the form of a table giving the value of the independent 
node and the corresponding resultant value of the dependent node. Table 2.4 shows a 
link between pressure and flow rate for a pneumatic value such that as the pressure 
increases the flow is reduced (a gain of -1). 
Table 2.4 • Digraph Representation 
Pressure Flow Rate 
-10 +10 
-1 +1 
0 0 
+1 -1 
+10 -10 
The fault tree is produced by first representing the entire system as a digraph and then 
entering this data Into the computer. 
The Lapp and Powers algorithm has had a new dimension added by Shaeiwitz (17) in its 
ability to handle sequential operations. The only other published work on this type of 
situation has been by Kelly and Lees (26) for a pump change-over system. 
The digraph method has proved very popular amongst workers in the safety field. Alien 
(18, 19) and Kumamoto and Henley (28) both favour a digraph approach rather than the 
component based transfer functions. They declare a better handling of complex system 
with loops. However, a disadvantage is the need to develop a digraph forthe entire system 
although this itself may be made up of component digraphs. Such a system is used by 
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Andrews (45. 46) where each unit has its own digraph and these are linked together to 
form the whole system. This process requires a certain degree of skill because it is carried 
out manually and also requires the identification of each control loop. 
The use of digraphs is not limited to fault tree construction codes and sQme workers have 
sought to by-pass the construction stage and go from system digraph to failure modes. 
lri (47. 48) uses the digraphs to determine cause-effect relationships using an appropriate 
algorithm to produce the failure modes and Chung-Chien Chang (49) processes them to 
provide on-line fault diagnosis information. 
Further work on the Lapp and Powers algOrithm has resulted in a system for on-line fault 
diagnosis as described by Ulerich (50). The process starts with a system digraph 
encompassing all the control loop and operational procedures information. From this a 
causal fault tree is derived by computer which is then supplemented by real-time hazard 
calculation trees and fault detection trees. The cutsets of the causal tree and hazard tree 
are compared to determine if a hazard is imminent and the cutsets from the causal tree 
and detection tree are used to determine likely faults. This has provided an entree into 
the work of alarm diagnosis. 
2.8.6 Modular List Processing 
This technique. used by Poucet (20). provides Information about a component or group 
of components such that a macro-fault tree can be constructed. During synthesis these 
trees are connected together and pruned as necessary. The program makes use of the 
list processing provided by the PU1 language. 
The models are stored as a set of tables representing the macro-fault trees as shown in 
Table 2.5. 
TOP 
OR 
p2 
p3 
p4 
Table 2.5 - Us! Processing Representation 
p1 I G1 
AND 
pS 
p6 
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p3 I E1 
E 
p2 I 
The table consists of a variable and a pointer (eg. p1, p2) giving the address for the 
variable. The variable is made up of three parts; the first is the node name (eg. TOP -
top event, G1 - gate one, E1 - event one), the second is node type (eg. OR - OR gate, 
AND - AND gate, E - event) and the third is a list of pointers giving the addresses of all 
the elements connected to that node. 
2.8.7 Cause-Consequence Relationships 
The models used by Tayior (22) are stored as mini-fault trees consisting of an output 
event or state change above an AND gate, below which there is an input event and a 
component condition or state. The fault tree is synthesised by connecting together these 
mini-fault trees. 
Each of the mini-fault trees describes the effect, in terms of component state change or 
output event, resulting when an input or a spontaneous event occurs. An event is 
expressed as <variable> BECOMES <value>, ego PRESSURE BECOMES HIGH (P ~ HI), and 
a condition as <variable> IS <value>, ego VALVE POSITION IS LOW. The mini-fault trees are 
represented in table form as shown in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6 - Cause-Consequence Table Representation 
Transition Table For Output Pressure Po 
stem is stem is stem is stem is stem is stem is 
ZERO LO DISTLO NORMAL DiSTHI HI 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Pi~ZERO 
-
ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO ZERO 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Pi~LO . LOor LOor LOor LOor LO 
DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Pi~DISTLO 
-
DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO DISTLO 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Pi~DISTHI 
-
DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Pi~HI . Hlor Hlor Hlor Hlor HI 
DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI DISTHI 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Pi~VHI - VHI VHI VHI VHi VHI 
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Each row represents a possible input event and each column a possible condition. The 
elements of the table represent the component state change or output event. The example 
in Table 2.6 is for a control valve, the rows are for the input pressures, the coiumns are 
the valve stem positions and the elements are the output pressures. The deviations are 
given in an increasing order of severity as used by this methodology. 
2.8.8 Functional Relationships 
Functional relationships are the starting points for unit models as used by Lees and 
co-workers (23 • 27). The functional information contained in propagation equations, 
initiating event statements and modified decision tables is converted to a set of minitrees 
for each unit. The fault tree is synthesised by linking together the appropriate minitrees 
from the models. 
The information takes the form 
TOUT = F( T IN) propagation equation 
F EXT·COLD: TOUT LO initiating event statement 
F EXT·FIRE F NOSPRINK T T OUT HI modified decision table. 
which mean: output temperature is a function of the input temperature, low output 
temperature may be caused by an extemal cold source and high output temperature may 
be caused by an extemal fire AND no sprinkler system. 
These are converted to the minitree format shown in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7· Minitrees Derived From Functional Representation 
IOR TOUT LO T IOR TOUT HI 
L...-f----+-I T lAND L....;..+-__ -+-I DTROW1 T 
TIN LO B TIN HI B EXT·FIRE F 
EXT·COLD F DTROW1 D NOSPRINK F 
Further detail of the modelling can be found in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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2.8.9 Modularisation 
The method proposed by Napier and Palmer (29) is a modularisation technique. The 
process involves decomposing the plant to a unit level and then synthesising sub-trees 
for these items. The final fault tree is made up by linking together the sub-trees from a 
storage library. 
The authors place much emphasis on developing an algorithm which allows different 
methods of fault tree synthesis to be used in conjunction with one another. The overall 
plan is to be able to integrate the procedures into a design package as an aid to the design 
engineer. 
2.8.10 Propagation Relationships And Causal Trees 
The fault tree synthesis algorithm of Bossche (31 - 33) uses a two step approach to obtain 
the fault tree. First a causal tree is built showing the propagation paths of all the events 
giving rise to the top event deviation. Then all the control loops are traced in the causal 
tree to determine which paths may be corrected and from this the fault tree is abstracted. 
The component models are made up of propagation relationships, these give the effect 
of one variable on another and the severity of this effect. It is similar in approach to the 
digraph method but uses a tabie format shown in Table 2.8. 
Table 2.8 - Propagation Relationship Representation 
State Relationship 
+1 
Normal CO2 H CO, 
+1 
CO2 ~ CO. 
0 
Stuck CO2 ~ CO. 
Closed CO2 (-10) 
Open CO2 (+10) 
-I 
Reversed CO2 ~ CO. 
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The representation is for a control valve. The flows in (CO,) and out (C02) always have 
the same amplitude and so there is a direct propagation relationship between the two in 
both direction. The control signal (C03) regulates the valve throughput and can be 
represented by a single propagation relationship to either the Input flow rate or the output 
flow rate. This gives the normal operation of the valve but the effects of failures can also 
be included. For example, a valve stuck failure represents a break It! the relationship 
between control signal and output flow rate giving a zero relationship. 
2.9 Software Packages 
With the increasing availability of computer hardware and software for various stages of 
safety and reliability analysis it is inevitable that packages will appear on the market that 
will take the design engineer through the stages of the process and Instrumentation 
diagram (P & ID) , plant layout, hazard Identification and qualitative analysis. 
Many authors of computer codes have striven to make their work compatible with existing 
programs. Fault tree construction packages make available data files which can be 
interpreted by many analysis programs and the analysis programs In turn can adapt to 
read in various outputs from construction packages. With an aim to reduce the keyboard 
work necessary In the Input stage of construction packages, links are also being forged 
with the data structures used in computer aided design (CAD) packages which hold the 
P&ID. 
There are at present some packages which encompass both the synthesis and the analysis 
offaulttrees. One such package is the STARS (Software Tool forthe Analysis of Reliability 
and Safety) expert system (21). This Is different from the normal format of the computer 
packages in that rather than just automating the routine and repetitive tasks it is able to 
manipulate knowledge and give computer support. The aim of the system is to Identify 
potential hazards, events and event sequences leading to hazards, construct event trees 
and fault trees and then analyse them. 
The process proceeds in a series of phases. Firstthe plant configuration has to be entered. 
This is similar to any other package except that a CAD tool is included which enables the 
layout to be drawn graphically on the screen. The data is taken directly from this. This 
is an advantage over other packages which rely on tabled data. From this topology a 
macro-fault tree is constructed based on the functionality of the plant. The process is 
interactive and the user may be prompted for additional information. The macro-fault tree 
is then expanded by taking into consideration component characteristics and control and 
instrumentation. An editor allows the users to alter the fault tree as necessary. The final 
phase Is logical and probabilistic analysis of the tree. 
2·18 
2.10 Summary 
This chapter has presented an outline of the work carried out in the field of fault tree 
construction for chemical process plant. The areas covered are fault tree analysis and 
synthesis, qualitative modelling and model representation. 
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Chapter 3 
Outline Of Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the basic methodology underlying the computer-based interactive 
facility FAULTFINDER for the representation of fault propagation in process piants and 
for the fault tree synthesis for such plants. The overall philosophy behind this facility has 
been described by Andow, Lees and Murphy (1). This description includes previous work 
and work carried out during this project. Accounts of detailed work carried out in earlier 
projects are given by Martin-Soils (2), Kelly (3, 4) and Mullhi (5). 
The basic approach is: 
- Start with the flow diagram of the plant and decompose this into an equivalent 
configuration diagram and a set of context-independent unit models. 
- Each unit model is developed separately using propagation equations, initial event 
statements and decision tables from which a set of mini-fault trees or minitrees can 
be created. 
- Specify the terminal event or fault condition of interest. 
Using the connectivity of the units it is possible to synthesise a full fault tree for the plant 
from the individual minitrees. The process is systematic but templates are used for certain 
model combinations and consistency checks are carried out. 
Where parts of the methodology are covered by later chapters only a brief description is 
given. 
3.2 System Decomposition 
The synthesis methodology employed in this project is for use in the study of plants 
operating in continuous conditions. However, it is possible to model batch operations to 
a certain degree but the methodology does not take into account effects of time on a 
process. The default assumption is that the process is in steady state continuous operation 
and the faults are deviations from this normal state. 
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The initial step in the modelling of fault propagation is to decompose the plant line diagram, 
process flow diagram, piping and instrumentation diagram or any other representation 
into a form which can be interpreted by the package. This diagrammatic form is called 
the configuration diagram and consists of units and connection lines. 
3.2.1 Configuration Diagram 
The configuration diagram is a block diagram which gives information on which unit models 
should be used and what connections exist between them. The units are the physical 
entities that make up the plant such as vessels and sensors and the connections are the 
links that exist between units such as the fiow lines and signal lines. The connections 
have arrows on them to indicate the normal direction of information transmission. 
The decomposition process is important because this determines the representation 
obtained on the finalfaulttree. The configuration diagram may conSist ofthe basic process 
operations such as mixers, reactors and separators at one end of the spectrum right down 
to the individual components which go to make up the valves and sensors at the other. 
The level of decomposition is entirely at the discretion of the user. 
3.2.2 Supplementary Information 
The configuration diagram gives the individual units and their connectivity but many units 
form groups designed to carry out specific operations. Those identified are the control 
loops and trip systems which form an important part of the plant. Using an atomistic 
approach and simply 'stringing' together the minitrees involves a loss of information on 
the effects these units have on the plant operation and each other. 
The synthesis package has a facility to handle these sub·systems but it requires 
supplementary information about them. The information consists of the units making up 
the control loop or trip system and which variables are affected in which connections. 
There is also some information required on the particular type of sub·system. 
The systematic approach used by the synthesis package may also run into problems 
where information is looped. For example, a divider·header combination occurs when a 
process stream splits and then rejoins further downstream. This, however, results in the 
possibility of a loop which gives the causes of one deviation as a different deviation of the 
same variable at the other end of the divider-header combination. It is easy to prevent 
this happening in a single unit but not in a group of units. In order to prevent these 
inconsistencies the synthesis program treats divider-header combinations as special 
SUb-systems. A search facility has been incorporated into the configuration data input 
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program MASTER which automatically identifies dividers, headers and their combinations. 
The user is only required to enter the flow capacities of each of the legs of the dividers 
and headers. 
This is a brief description of the decomposition process and a more comprehensive 
explanation is given in Chapter 4. 
3_3 The Modelling Of Fault Propagation 
Generally a variable deviation In a unit will have propagated from causes in units upstream 
and/or downstream. For example, a high temperature In a vessel may be caused by the 
faulty operation of a heat exchanger further upstream. Therefore an important part of 
fault tree synthesis is the propagation of variable deviations or faults from where the 
initiating fault occurs to the point of interest. 
Fault propagation is complicated by the presence of protective systems such as control 
loops and trip systems which may only allow the fault to pass if the system itself Is faulty. 
This is why protective systems have to be identified in the configuration. 
The propagation is further complicated by the presence of two possible directions of 
information transmission, particularly in process flow streams. For example a leak to the 
atmosphere In a high pressure pipeline may cause high flow propagation upstream and 
low flow propagation downstream. The pressure in the pipeline may also be affected by 
low pressure propagation in both directions. Other variables such as temperature and 
composition will only propagate upstream if accompanied by flow In the reverse direction. 
Two-way fault propagation Is achieved by using pairs of variables, one propagates 
downstream In the normal direction of Information transmission and the other propagates 
upstream against the normal direction of information transmission. 
Fault propagation Is achieved by using the connectivity between the units and the unit 
models. 
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3.4 The Modelling Of Units 
, 
The unit models enable faults to propagate through the unit and faults to be initiated In 
the unit. All unit models are made as context-independent as possible so that the models 
can be used in as many situations as required. 
The units are broken down into ports. The ports represent entities via which information 
flows to or from the units. Consider the model for a simple pipe unit shown In Figure 3.1 . 
• 2 
Figure 3.1 - Schematic Representation Of A Pipe 
Faults propagate through the unit by entering at one port and leaving at another. For 
example, high temperature entering the unit at the inlet port leaves through the outlet port. 
Spontaneous failures or initiating basic faults are causes of faults that propagate out of 
the unit. A basic fault that may cause high temperature to propagate out of the unit is an 
extemal hot source near the unit. 
This information can be represented graphically in the form of a minitree as shown in 
Figure 3.2. 
High Temperature 
Through The 
Outlet Port 
I 
High Temperature 
Through The 
Inlet Port 
dR 
I 
I 
External 
Heat Source 
Figure 3.2 - Minitree For High Temperature Out Of A Pipe 
3-4 
The minitreeforms asimple and convenient way of representing the information. It consists 
of a mini-top event under which a logic gate, such as an AND or OR, is placed. The input 
to the logic gate consists of all the causes of the mini-top event. There is just one level 
of causes in any minitree. 
The unit models are made up of one minitree for each variable deviation that may 
propagate out of the unit. A list of variables, deviations and possible combinations along 
with some of the Initiating faults Is given In Chapter 5. 
3.4.1 Unit Model Format 
Information about the failures and fault propagation in a unit can be defined in any of three 
ways. These are: 
- propagation equations 
- Initial event statements 
- modified decision tables 
The variable descriptions used have the following format 
VNTYPE DEV 
where 
V component letter of the variable 
N port number In the unit 
TYPE port type in the unit 
DEV abbreviation of the deviation 
This is explained more fully In Chapter 5. 
3.4.1.1 Propagation Equations 
Propagation equations are a method of transferring variable deviations from one port to 
another and to pass on their effects to other variables. They are based on steady state 
conditions and can be derived from algebraic or differential equations or arrived at 
heuristlcally. They take the form 
a= f( b, -c ... ) 
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This equation is interpreted as 
'a' becomes high if 'b' becomes high OR 'c' becomes low, and 
'a' becomes low if 'b' becomes low OR 'c' becomes high. 
The propagation of most of the variable deviations can be modelled in this fonnat. 
Two-way propagation of flow is modelled using a convention involving the flow variable 
o and the pressure gradient G. The advantage of this pairing over the others is that the 
deviations of one have a direct correspondence with the deviations of the other. This also 
allows a unique methodology to be empioyed to achieve efficient two-way faultpropagation 
for fiow. The propagation equations for flow are: 
G1IN= F( 011N, 020UT) 
020UT= F( G1IN, G20UT) 
It should be noted that flow 0 is a function of the pressure gradient G and vice-versa. 
Both equations are used in the unit model to propagate flow in both directions. For 
example, the second equation gives the causes of high flow out of the unit (0 2 HI) as 
high pressure gradient into the unit (G 1 HI) or out of the unit (G 2 HI). The causes of 
high pressure gradient into the unit (G 1 HI) are found in the first equation and are high 
flow into the unit (0 1 HI) or out of the unit (0 2 HI). The second occurrence of 0 2 HI is 
deleted. The causes of G 2 HI are found in the next downstream unit and those of 0 1 
HI are found in the next upstream unit. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
Q 2 HI G 1 HI Q 2 HI I (Q20UT) (G1IN) OR 
I I 1 
OR + OR -7 G 11 HI G d HI I I I OR 
1 I 1 Q 1 HI 1 G 1 HI G 2 HI Q 1 HI 
Q 11 HI ~ (G1IN) (G20UT) (QlIN) (Q20UT) Q I 
Figure 3.3 - High Flow Propagation In A Unit 
The variable names in brackets indicate which part of the propagation equation is used. 
It should also be noted that the port type identifier is omitted from the minitrees during 
processing by the model generation algOrithm because it is not required. 
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This modelling approach is unique for flow because both G and Q are used for fault 
propagation in both directions. A more detailed account is given in Chapter 6. 
Two-way propagation of pressure is achieved using the absolute pressure variable P and 
the pressure relief variable R. Only one variable is used for fault propagation in one 
direction because the deviations of the two variables are not matched In the same way 
as G and Q. Separate propagation equations are required. 
R1IN= F( R20UT) 
P20UT= F( PlIN) 
The absolute pressure P is used to propagate pressure and relief deviations In the normal 
direction of flow and relief R Is used to propagate pressure and relief deviations against 
the normal direction of flow. A more detailed account of pressure modelling is given In 
Chapter 6. 
Two-way propagation of temperature is not as important as that for flow and pressure. It 
Is also restricted by the need for flow against the normal direction in order for temperature 
deviations to propagate upstream. The variable T is used for temperature in the normal 
direction of flow and the variable U for temperature against the normal direction of flow. 
The propagation equations are: 
UlIN= F( U20UT) 
T20UT= F( T1IN) 
Two-way propagation of composition is identical to temperature. The variable X is used 
for composition in the normal direction of flow and the variable Y for composition against 
the normal direction of flow. The propagation equations are: 
Y1IN= F( Y20UT) 
X20UT= F( X1IN) 
The other variables such as level L and signal S do not require two-way fault propagation 
and are much simpler to model. They only require one propagation equation each. Some 
examples are: 
L3VES= F( G1IN, -Q20UT) 
S2SIG= F( S1SIG) 
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There are some restrictions on the format of propagation equations. The variable on the 
left hand side of the equation ('a') must be one which occurs within or propagates out of 
the unit. The right hand side variables must be ones which propagate into the unit, except 
in two circumstances. The first is In flow equations which require one variable to be an 
outlet variable due to the way two-way fault propagation is achieved. The second is when 
it Is permissible to have a single outlet variable provided this Is the only variable on the 
right hand side. For example, the propagation equation forthe signal from the temperature 
sensor unit is a function of the outlet temperature from the unit. 
S3SIG= F( T20UT) 
This prevents confusion about the direction of variable deviations that propagate into the 
unit necessary to cause the output deviation. 
3.4.1.2 Initiating Event Statements 
Initiating event statements, or simply event statements, are used to model the way In 
which basic faults in units affect the variables that propagate out of the unit and to include 
the effects of variable deviations that cannot be modelled using propagation equations. 
They take the form 
I cause: effect 1, effect 2, 
The cause identifier 'i' gives the cause type of each cause in the event statement. These 
can be: 
V variable deviation 
Intermediate event 
F spontaneous failure or basic fault 
o operator action or inaction 
S state (normal or impossible) 
The cause may be a fault from the basic fault and event library (Appendix B.1) or a variable 
deviation. The effect is always a variable deviation. 
They can also be used in certain situations to include AND gates and r-OUT-OF-n (r/n) 
gates In models. These take the form: 
I cause 1 AND i cause 2 AND ... : effect 1, effect 2, ... 
I cause 1 AND r i cause 2 AND r ... : effect 1, effect 2, ... 
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The AND r Is part of an r/n gate where 'r' is the number of causes that must exist for the 
event to happen. The 'n' is derived Implicitly from the number of causes in the event 
statement. 
Using the basic pipe model (Figure 3.1) which consists of a single Inlet, port 1, and a 
single outlet, port 2, the two event statements for extemal temperature sources can be 
given as: 
F EXT-HEAT: T20UT HI 
F EXT-COLD: T20UT LO 
which state that high temperature at the outlet may be caused by an external heat source 
and low outlet temperature may be caused by an external cold source. 
These event statements can be combined with the propagation equation for temperature 
In the normal direction of flow in Section 3.4.1.1 to give the outlet temperature minitrees 
for the pipe model shown in Figure 3.4. 
I 
T 2 HI 
(T20UT) 
I 
OR 
I 
T 1 HI 
I 
EXT-HEAT 
(T1IN) 
a) 
I 
T 2 LO 
(T20UT) 
I 
OR 
I 
T 1 LO 
I 
EXT-COLD 
(T1IN) 
b) 
Figure 3.4 - Outlet Temperature Minitrees For A Pipe 
3.4.1.3 Modified Decision Tables 
Modified decision tables, or simply decision tables, are used when It is necessary to 
introduce AND logic or to combine OR and AND logic. They take the form 
i cause 1 I cause 2 ... T effect 1, effect 2, ... 
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where the 'i' is the cause type identifier as used in the event statements. The 'r is used 
to separate the causes and the effects. The effect of the decision table is to AND together 
all the elements to the left of the T. 
The main use of decision tables is for simple AND logic but more powerfully they can be 
used to combine OR and AND logic. Consider the case for high temperature propagating 
out of a valve which Is normally closed. For this to happen there must be a high inlet 
temperature AND the valve must be open. For optimum efficiency while still maintaining 
the correct logic use must be made of decision tables. The following are used: 
V T1IN HI F HV-F-OP T T20UT HI 
V T11N HI 0 HV-D-OP T T20UT HI 
This states that there are two cause combinations for high outlet temperature. Either high 
inlet temperature AND the valve failing open OR high Inlet temperature AND the valve 
being directed open. This produces three minitrees, one for each decision table and one 
which combines the effects of the two. When combined they give the structure in Figure 
3.5. 
1 T l HI 
1 ~R 1 
rT-i-- l r-=i-il I DTROW 1 I DTROW 2 I 
1 L + - - I- -1- - + ---.J 1 
I A~D I I A~D I 
I I I I 
LT_1 H_I HV-F-Olj LT_1 H_I HV-D-O~ 
Figure 3.5 - High Outlet Temperature Partial Fault Tree For A Closed Valve 
The DTROW 1 and DTROW 2 are intermediate events used to indicate from which decision 
table the causes are derived. 
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3.5 The Modelling Of Terminal Events 
Terminal event, or top event, modelling deals with the termination of fault propagation. It 
is carried out independently of the units for three reasons 
_ there are many top events and to include them in every unit model is inefficient. 
- it allows a top event model library to be set up. 
_ it allows the top event to be changed quickiy and easily. 
Top event models consist of a text string describing the terminal event, for example 
HIGHTEMP, and a set of event statements or decision tables giving the variable deviations 
which may cause the event. The decision tables for high temperature are: 
V T20UT HI V Q20UT SOME T HIGHTEMP 
V U11N HI V GlIN REV T HIGHTEMP 
Therefore, for the high temperature top event to occur there must be either high 
temperature out of the outiet port AND some flow out of the outlet port OR high temperature 
out of the Inlet port AND flow In the reverse direction through the inlet port. 
Although these decision tables are very similar to those used for high outlet temperature 
(section 3.4.1.3) the top events are different because they are necessary to initiate the 
fault trace in both directions. 
A top event model is generally not specific to a particular unit but it may be specific to a 
class of units. In the above example, the relevant class is that of units with port 1 as an 
inlet port, port 2 as an outlet port and any other ports as non-flow ports. 
Top event models are dealt with in Chapter 5. 
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3.6 Fault Tree Synthesis 
Once the configuration has been specified and all the unit models and the top event model 
have been created the synthesis process is automatic. The procedure is to start with the 
top event and then synthesise the causes for each and every branch until they all terminate 
In a basic fault or diamond event. A diamond event is a variable deviation which crosses 
the system boundary and is developed no further. 
The minitrees generated by the model generation algorithms are ideal for this method of 
fault tree synthesis. The basic principle Is to link together the appropriate minltrees since 
the event that propagates into one unit model is simply an event which has propagated 
out of another unit model. 
The process can be illustrated with reference to the HIGHTEMP top event In the previous 
section. This event has four variable deviation causes, T20UT HI, Q20UT SOME, U11N 
HI and G 11 N REV. The initial causes of these are all found in the unit where the top event 
occurs. Each Is developed in turn. If the top event unit is a pipe type unit, then the event 
T20UT HI has causes given by the minitree in Figure 3.4a. In the synthesised fault tree 
the port type identifier Is omitted, therefore T20UT HI becomes T 2 HI. The causal events 
are T 1 HI OR EXT-HEAT. The EXT-HEAT event is a baSic fault and Is developed no 
further. The event T 1 HI does not have any causes in the current model but since It Is 
an Input event it is also an output event of the next unit upstream. Therefore the event 
is changed to T 2 HI in the next unit. The appropriate minitree is retrieved from this unit. 
This very simple approach works well but checks are required to ensure the conSistency 
of the resultant fault tree. Several sets of conSistency checks are carried out both during 
and after the synthesis process. 
The synthesis process is also constrained by the presence of SUb-systems as mentioned 
in the decomposition. Control loop templates are added during synthesis to model the 
failures of these systems and trip loop templates are added during a rationalisation stage 
at the end of the synthesis. The divider-header combination effects form part of the 
consistency checks and may also impose certain tree structures. 
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3.7 Consistency Checks 
Consistency checks are used to remove variable deviations and basic faults from the fault 
tree both during and after construction. They also cover consistency in branches and 
between branches. There are two types of check carried out: 
- series checks refer to the consistency of events within any given-branch 
- parallel checks refer to the consistency of events between different branches. 
The sub-divisions for the events operated on are: 
variable deviation - variable deviation: Boundary Conditions 
variable deviation - basic fault Not Allowed Faults 
basic fault basic fault Duplicated Events 
There are four series checks and one parallel check. 
3.7.1 Series Consistency Checks: Boundary Conditions 
At each level of development a note is made of the plant condition. Any variable deviation 
event which violates this plant condition is stored in a list of boundary conditions and 
subsequent occurrences of the event are deleted. 
For the pipe model in Figure 3.1 the fault tree developed from the two propagation 
equations with the addition of two event statements for high flow is given in Figure 3.6. 
I 
LK-HP-EN 
I 
LK-LP-EN 
Q 2 HI 
I 
OR 
I 
G 1 HI 
I 
OR 
I 
Q 1 HI 
Figure 3.6 - Fault Tree For High Flow 
3-13 
I 
G 2 HI 
The basic principles for the boundary conditions are: 
- no other deviations of the current variable can occur at the current location 
- the occurrence of the same deviation for the current variable will add nothing to the 
fault tree. 
From the boundary conditions the second occurrence of a 2 HI in Figure 3.6 is deleted 
for violating the second condition. 
3.7.2 Series Consistency Checks: Not Allowed Faults 
Certain combinations of basic fault events are not allowed. For example, In Figure 3.7 
the basic fault LK-HP-EN (leak from a high pressure environment) forms part of the minitree 
for a 2 HI and the fault LK·LP-EN (leak to a low pressure environment) forms part of the 
minitree for G 1 HI. However, the fault LK-LP-EN Is inconsistent with the fault LK-HP-EN. 
The consistency checks note that LK·LP-EN is added to the fault tree after LK-HP-EN 
and consequently LK-LP-EN is labelled a not allowed fault of a 2 HI. 
Q 2 HI 
I 
LK-HP-EN 
ILI_I~ ~-LN 
I 
OR 
I 
G 1 HI 
I 
OR 
I 
I 
Q 1 HI 
Figure 3.7 - Fault Tree For High Flow 
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I 
G 2 HI 
3.7.3 Series Consistency Checks: Duplicated Events 
Now consider the low flow fault tree for the pipe model shown In Figure 3.B. 
I 
PART-BLK 
Q 2 LO 
I 
OR 
I 
G 1 LO 
I 
OR 
I I Q 1 LO 
Figure 3.B • Fault Tree For Low Flow 
I 
G 2 LO 
The second occurrence of PART-BLK is a duplicated event and adds nothing new to the 
fault tree so it is deleted. 
3.7.4 Series Consistency Checks: Port Changes 
In certain types of unit, ego dividers and header, development of the fault tree can lead to 
looping around the ports and different deviations of the same variable in different branches. 
The port change consistency check is intended to deal with this problem. It is applied to 
units with more than two flow ports, for example, a divider with one Inlet port and two 
outlet ports or a header with two Inlet ports and one outlet port. 
Consider a header model which has port 1 for one of the inlets and port 3 for the other. 
Port 2 is for the outlet. 
The partial fault tree for high flow In the port 1 inlet is shown in Figure 3.9. A cause of 
high flow at one Inlet port, G 1 HI, may be high flow at the outlet port, a 2 HI, or low flow 
at the other inlet port, G 3 LO. The modelling of two-way propagation means that the 
causes of high outlet flow are high flow at one Inlet port, G 1 HI (deleted because it occurs 
higher up the branch), or high flow at the other Inlet port, G 3 HI. Similarly low flow at the 
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second inlet port may be caused by high flow at the first inlet port, a 1 HI (deleted because 
it occurs higher up the branch), or low flow at the outlet port, a 2 LO. This is clearly 
incorrect because there are conflicting deviations at ports 2 and 3. 
I 
o 1 HI 
G 1 HI 
I 
OR 
I 
02 HI 
I 
OR 
,.'....-r' I G.,........., .. G 2 HI 
I 
G 3 LO 
I 
OR 
,.. u. "u. ",L.,; I r .. I ~ .. I ~ ... O 0 3 LO 
Figure 3.9 • Fault Tree For High Flow At Port 1 
By limiting the number of port changes in any unitto just two the problem can be eliminated 
because the G 3 HI event and the a 2 LO event represent the third port change and are 
deleted. 
3.7.5 Parallel Consistency Checks 
This process can only be carried out once the entire tree has been synthesised. It is used 
to ensure that all the branches under an AND gate are consistent with each other. 
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3.8 Structural Features 
As mentioned previously fault tree synthesis is not just a matter of linking together the 
minitree from the unit models. The presence of protective devices such as control loops 
and trip systems resulted in problems as noted by Kelly (3). These were basically 
- incorrect fault trees, due to the atomistic approach used in decomposition, when 
dealing with the respective failure modes 
- opaque fault trees since no formal structure was applied. 
By defining the protective devices as special SUb-systems it is possible to model the overall 
failure modes as well as the Individual component failures. 
3.8.1 Control Loops 
There are two basic types of control loop, a feedback loop and a feedforward loop. Figure 
3.10 shows a feedback control loop. 
Worm 
Water 
Hot Aci1, 
r Cool Acid 
• 
r 
~ 
Cooling Water f 
r 
Figure 3.10 - Feedback Control Loop With Separate Manipulated Stream 
This control loop regulates the downstream temperature of the process stream by 
manipulating the cooling water input to the heat exchanger. The control loop is a feedback 
type because it is able to sense the results of its manipulative action on the coolant stream 
and, therefore, Is able to make further adjustments based on this feedback information. 
Figure 3.11 shows a feedforward control loop. 
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Stream A 
Stream B 
Mixer 
Figure 3.11 • Feedlorward Control Loop With Separate Manipulated Stream 
This control loop regulates the downstream composition Irom the mixer unit by 
manipulating the flow In stream A according to the value 01 the flow In stream B. The 
control loop Is 01 the leedlorward type because It is unable to sense the results 01 its 
actions. 
Both the above types have separate manipulated streams. That is to say, the stream in 
which the control valve manipulates the flow is separate Irom the stream where the sensor 
Is. 
However, there are some control loops which do not have a separate manipulated stream 
and the distinction is important. An example is shown in Figure 3.12. 
Figure 3.12 • Feedback Control Loop Without A Separate Manipulated Stream 
ThiS control loop manipulates the flow according to the sensed value 01 the pressure, thus 
regulating the pressure. 
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These three distinctions are Important because the type of the control loop determines 
how the loop can fail. Forthls purpose the synthesis algorithm applies one of three control 
loop templates to structure the fault tree according to the type of control loop under 
consideration. 
For a regulated variable deviation In a feedback or feedforward contro\Joop the template 
applied is shown in Figure 3.13. The terminology is explained later. 
Regulated 
variable deviation 
OIR 
-,. 
loop Misleading/ Spontaneous Overloading 
inaction undetectable failures faults 
A~D faults I I 00,. I 
Sensed latent 
variable failures 
~eviation I I 
Figure 3.13 - Control loop Template For A Regulated Variable Deviation 
For flow deviations in the manipulated stream of a feedback control loop the template 
applied is shown in Figure 3.14. 
I Manipulated I 
variable deviotion 
6.R 
Loop Sensed spantaneousl 
inaction variable failures 
A~D deviatian I I 
Manipulated I Latent I 
variable failures 
deviation I I 
Figure 3.14 
Feedback Control Loop Template For A Manipulated Variable Deviation 
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For flow devlatfons In the manipulated stream of a feedforward control loop the template 
applied is shown in Figure 3.15. 
Manipulated 
variable 
deviotion 
I 
Manipulated 
variable deviation 
dR ~,' 
Sensed 
variable 
deviation 
I 
Figure 3.15 
Spontaneous 
failures 
Feedforward Control Loop Template For A Manipulated Variable Deviation 
The spontaneous and latent failure branches represent the basic failure modes of the 
control loop due to malfunction of any of its components. The spontaneous failures are 
those which give rise to an erroneous increase or decrease In the control valve aperture. 
The two states are mutually exclusive but only one is used in any particular application 
of the template. 
The latent failures are those which render the control loop Invariant and consequently the 
control valve aperture remains stuck in the plant steady state position. 
The over1oading faults are deviations in the manipulated stream for which the control loop 
is unable to compensate. An example of this Is complete loss of flow. 
The misleadinglundetectable faults represent events such as a leak in the pipe between 
the sensor and the control valve which causes high flow through the sensor but low flow 
through the control valve. The control loop will interpret this to mean there is too much 
flow and will inappropriately close the valve. 
In feedback control the sensed variable is the same as the regulated variable. In Figure 
3.13 the sensed variable deviation branch traces the causes of this deviation from the 
sensor. This event is correctable by the normal action of the control loop and is therefore 
ANDed with the latent failures branch. 
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The sensed variable deviation branch in Figures 3.14 and 3.15 represents the causes of 
the deviation in the sensed variable traced from the sensor. A deviation in this variable 
is correctable by the control loop and consequently is a cause of the manipulated variable 
deviation. 
The manipulated variable deviation branch in Figures 3.14 and 3.15 represent causes of 
the deviation other than those due to the control loop. For a feedback control loop the 
manipulated stream deviation has an effect on the sensed variable and is ultimately 
detectable by the control loop. Therefore, it Is ANOed with the latent failures of the loop. 
A feedforward control loop cannot detect deviations in the manipulated stream, therefore, 
there is no latent failures branch. 
3.8.2 Trip Loops 
There are two basic types of trip loop, a closed valve trip and an open valve trip. A closed 
valve trip has the trip valve normally closed but opens on demand and an open valve trip 
has the trip valve normally open but closes on demand. 
An example of a closed valve trip Is shown in Figure 3.16. The pump protection consists 
of a klck·back leg which normally has no flow but if the flow at the outlet of the pump 
should fall to zero the trip operates opening the valve and allowing flow . 
... ... ~ 
-
.,.~ 
.. 
... 
FZ ~ ~ , r 
r 
.. .. .. 
'I ~ • ... 
)... 
....< 
Figure 3.16 • Closed Valve Trip Loop 
The open valve trips can be broken down Into two sub·groups, those which act on the 
sensed variable are feedback trips and those which do not are feedforward trips. 
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A feedback open valve trip loop is shown in Figure 3.17. The pressure is normally 
controlled by a control system (not shown) but should the pressure exceed a certain value 
the trip activates to shut off the flow and consequently the pressure source. 
~ 
--~~~~~---.--~--+---
Figure 3.17 - Feedback Open Valve Trip Loop 
A feedforward open valve trip loop is shown in Figure 3.18. The temperature of the acid 
is normally controlled by a control system (not shown) but should the coolant flow fall to 
zero then the trip activates to shut off the flow of acid. 
Warm 
Water 
Hot Acid ~ 
~ Cool Acid r 
FZ 
F' ~ Cooling 
Water tl 
Figure 3.18 - Feeclforward Open Valve Trip Loop 
There are two types of failure mode that can occur in trip loops. Trip loop operational 
failure (TL-OP-F) is where the trip operates without a demand from the process. This can 
be adequately modelled in an atomistic approach because this is simply an altemative 
branch in the fault tree. The trip loop is not designed to prevent, for example, no flow in 
the pipeiine of Figure 3.17 but its operational failure is a cause of this. 
3-22 
Trip loop functional failure (TL-FN-F) is where the trip fails to operate when there is a 
demand from the process. This requires special treatment for determining which events 
may be protected against and for the structure of the failure branch. The basic approach 
used is: 
- synthesise the fault tree as normal, noting any events that propagate through the 
trip valve. These may be ANOed with TL-FN-F later. 
- synthesise a 'should activate' or SHAC tree for each loop to define the range of 
con.ditions under which the trip system Is designed to operate. 
- synthesise a TL-FN-F tree for each loop to define the failures which will cause the 
trip to fail to operate. 
- compare the SHAC tree and the events noted in the normal tree, any events the 
system can detect and prevent are ANOed with the TL-FN-F branch. 
The difficulty in this process is In determining which events the trip can protect against. 
For example, in Figure 3.17 the trip can protect against high pressure propagating into 
the trip valve from upstream but cannot protect against a leak from a high pressure 
environment In the pipe between the trip valve and the sensor. Some rules have been 
developed by Mullhl (5) for Identifying the events to be ANOed with TL-FN-F. 
For a closed valve trip (Figure 3.16) there are no restrictions. The causes of deviations 
through the sensor are compared with the SHAC tree to see if they should be AN Ded with 
the TL-FN-F branch. For example, no flow through the sensor is ANOed with TL-FN-F. 
For a feedback open valve trip (Figure 3.17) the event is ANOed with TL-FN-F if it 
propagates through the trip valve and forms part of the SHAC tree. In this case high 
pressure Into the trip valve is the appropriate event. 
For a feedforward open valve trip (Figure 3.18) there are no restrictions. Any event which 
can cause the top event and forms part of the SHAC tree is ANOed with TL-FN-F. This 
. is not restricted to events which propagate through the trip valve. For example, high outlet 
temperature from the heat exchanger may be caused by no flow of coolant into the heat 
exchanger. The no flow event Is ANOed with TL-FN-F. 
Once the trip failures have been synthesised and ANOed into the main tree a rationalisation 
process Is carried out. This Is necessary because the simple ANDing together of the 
protected events leads to a large and opaque tree. The rationalisation process moves 
the poSitions of the AND gates allowing excess occurrences to be removed and a more 
comprehensible tree to be built without changing the logic of the tree. 
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3.8.3 Divider-Header Combinations 
The detection of divider-header combinations is' automatic and the user is only required 
to enter the flow capacities of each leg. More detail on this process is given in Chapter 
4. There are three types of divider-header combination 
- by-pass with flow (eg. excess flow around a heat exchanger) 
- by-pass without flow (eg. by-pass around a control valve) 
- parallel flow systems (eg. multiple pump banks) 
The structure Imposed on the fault tree with respect to the divider-header combinations 
is minimal. There is just one divider and one header model used by the package to model 
all the types. These models have either two outlets and one inlet or two Inlets and one 
outlet. However, distinctions are made during synthesis. 
For a non-flow leg the only meaningful deviations are SOME and REV, all other deviations 
In this leg are deleted or replaced by SOME. A check is also made to ensure only one 
direction of propagation is traced. 
In systems with more than two legs of parallel flow, groups of dividers and headers are 
used to produce the required number of legs. The synthesis package is able to identify 
these from the capacities entered for each leg of the dividers and headers. 
Consider a two leg system with 100% capacity legs, for low flow to propagate out of the 
header there must be low flow in both legs (AND gate). This also applies to a three leg 
system. However, now consider a two leg system with 50% capacity legs. For low flow 
to propagate out of the header, low flow in either leg may be a cause (OR gate). However, 
for a three leg system low flow must occur in two ofthe three inletiegs (r-OUT-OF-n gate). 
The structure in Figure 3.19 is applied. 
I 
Low Flow 
In Leg 1 
Low Flow 
At Outlet 
I 
2-out-of-3 
I 
Low Flow 
In Leg 2 
I 
Low Flow 
In Leg 3 
Figure 3.19 - Minitree For Low Flow In A 50% Parallel System 
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It is also necessary to distinguish between blockage type faults and leakage type faults. 
This is because they have different influences: a blockage will simply reduce the flow due 
to an increase in resistance but a leakage represents a loss of fluid for which the system 
may not be able to compensate. Consequently blockage faults for each leg are grouped 
under an r-OUT-OF-n gate and leakage faults under an OR gate. 
The faults that occur within the divider-header combination system are also kept separate 
from those which occur outside of it. The imposed structure for low flow in a three leg 
parallel divider-header combination (DHC) system is shown in Figure 3.20. 
I 
External 
I 
OR 
I 
low Flow 
Into OHC 
I 
I 
leg 1 
I 
OR 
I 
Low Flow 
Causes 
No Flow 
Ccuses 
Low Flow 
Out Of OHC 
I 
OR 
I 
Blockage 
I 
R-OUT-OF-N 
I 
I 
Leg 2 
I 
OR 
i I 
Low Flow 
Causes 
No Flow 
Causes 
I 
I 
Internal 
I 
OR 
i 
Leg 3 
I 
OR 
I I 
I 
Leakage 
I 
OR 
i 
Low rlow 
Causes 
No Flow 
Causes 
, 
Leg 1 
I 
OR 
I I 
Leg 2 
I 
OR 
I 
Low flow 
Causes 
No Flow 
Causes 
low Flow 
Causes 
No Flow 
Causes 
I 
Leg 3 
I 
OR 
I 
Low Flow 
Ccuses 
No Flow 
Causes 
Figure 3.20 - Tree Structure For Low Flow In A3-Way Parallel System 
3-25 
3.9 Advanced Features 
As well as synthesising fault trees for basic steady state plant operation it is also possible 
to model the failure modes when the plant undergoes a series of sequential operations. 
There is also a facility to model secondary failures which allow additional events to be 
added to an existing model without altering the model. 
3.9.1 Sequential Operations 
This facility allows the failure states of a plant to be modelled as it undergoes a change 
in operation. For example, consider a pair of pumps in parallel, one operating and one 
stopped and isolated. A sequence of operations must be carried out to affect a change 
over of pumps 
initial state: pump 1 operating, pump 2 stopped, pump 1 valves open, pump 2 valves 
closed 
step 1 
step 2 
step 3 
step 4 
final state: 
open pump 2 valves 
turn on pump 2 
turn off pump 1 
close pump 1 valves 
pump 1 stopped, pump 2 operating, pump 1 valves closed, pump 2 valves 
open. 
After each step has been carried out the failure mode of the plant has changed. Therefore, 
it is necessary to change the plant configuration. This is achieved by identifying which 
units change and giving the new unit model library numbers for them. It is also possible 
for the user to specify a different top event at each step. 
For each step In the sequence the algorithm synthesises a separate sub-tree. The process 
has remained unchanged since its application by Kelly (3). 
3.9.1 Secondary Failures 
Secondary failures were introduced in order to model specific faults only applicable in 
certain situations. For example, a low temperature in a pipeline may result in a blockage 
due to freezing ofthe fluid. While it would be very easy to model low temperature deviations 
causing blockages in the pipe model this is undesirable because not all pipes are liable 
to freezing. 
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The solution was to set up a library of secondary failures which could be applied to particular 
sections of plant in specific applications. The failures are incorporated by specifying the 
units or streams which are susceptible and the particular effects of the failure. This allows 
different effects to be modelled for different situations. The causes ofthe secondary failure 
are contained in the model itself. 
The process has remained unchanged since its introduction by Kelly (3). 
3.10 Summary 
This chapter has given a brief introduction to the detailed methodology used for fault 
propagation modelling and fault tree synthesis. The following chapters look in more detail 
at certain aspects and deal with some of the problems encountered. 
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PART 2 
Chapter 4 
Rules For Problem Decomposition And Data Input 
4.1 Introduction 
The first stage in any fault tree synthesis study is to tum the section of plant or whole plant 
into a suitable fonn. In the methodology this Is called a 'configuration diagram'. This 
diagram contains infonnation on which unit models are to be used and what connections 
exist between individual units. 
Additional infonnation is required on certain systems to enable their effects on the plant 
to be modelled correctly. These systems are 
- dividers (where a stream splits), headers (where two streams join) and their 
combinations (eg. a by-pass around a control valve) 
- control loops 
- trip loops. 
It is also possible to define particular types of failure that are to be included in the plant 
model. 
The configuration diagram can be derived from any representation of the plant. The usual 
fonns are a process flow diagram or piping and instrumentation diagram. The procedure 
for generating the configuration diagram is called decomposition. 
4.2 Decomposition 
The degree of decomposition depends on how much detail is required on the fault tree 
synthesis output. At one end it may be sufficient to identify complete process systems 
such as a reactor or separation system. These units are linked together without the 
interconnecting items such as valves and pipes. This is minimal decomposition. At the 
other end individual units such as valves can be broken down into their constituent parts 
like the housing, gate, stem and handle. This is full decomposition. 
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4.2.1 Minimal Decomposition 
The purpose of minimal decomposition is to carry out a simple modelling approach without 
losing the functionality of the plant. If a particular process plant transfers a fluid from a 
storage vessel to another plant but increases its pressure and temperature on the way 
then the configuration diagram in Figure 4.1 will be sufficient for minimal decomposition. 
1 2 3 4 
LI V::e::.ss~e~"I-1.~1-t.1 ::Pu~m:..:!p~~rH-e-a-t -E-xc-h-a-n g-e-'r ~rp-Ia-n-t -8-' 
Figure 4.1 - Minimal Configuration Diagram 
This shows the storage vessel, pump, heat exchanger and plant B. Any integral safety 
systems, redundant systems or the process supplies for the pump power or heating fluid 
are not shown. However, the functionality of a transfer from storage through a pressure 
raising device and heating system to the other plant is maintained. 
Clearly this representation is very limited in its use. It may be more applicable to modelling 
an entire plant system where an overall approach is required. The advantages of minimal 
decomposition is that modelling is much easier and requires less time. 
4.2.2 Full Decomposition 
The purpose of a full decomposition is to carry out a detailed study of the individual 
components that make up the equipment found in a process plant. A flow sensor based 
on an orifice plate is made up of several components. Each side of the orifice plate has 
an outlet to a pipe. This is split in two with one end connected to an open hand valve and 
the other to a closed hand valve. The two ends passing through the open valves are 
connected to opposite ends of a differential pressure transducer which sends a signal to 
a controiler or trip switch. The single closed valve forms a by-pass around the transducer. 
The full decomposition configuration diagram for the flow sensor is shown in Figure 4.2. 
This type of decomposition gives fault trees with failures of the individual components that 
make up process equipment. However, this much detail requires a much greater 
understanding of the modelling methodology and model development can be very time 
consuming. There is no advantage in using this type of decomposition for large sections 
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of process plant because the number of models is greatly Increased and the amount of 
time Involved in modelling far outweighs the benefits. The full decomposition approach 
should be used to study the failures of individual units or small sections of plant. 
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Figure 4.2 - Full Decomposition Of A Flow Sensor 
4.2.3 Established Level Of Decomposition 
The current level of decomposition used for modelling process plant lies between the two 
extremes. Using the piping and instrumentation diagram It is possible to get an almost 
one-to-one correspondence between the items of equipment. 
For example, shell and tube heat exchangers are shown as a single unit with an inlet and 
outlet for the coolant and an Inlet and outlet for the process fluid. There may also be relief 
or drain ports. The decomposition does not model individual tubes but does model the 
control system maintaining a constant outlettemperature forthe process fluid. The failures 
of the heat exchanger are modelled as an intemal leak between streams, external leak 
to the environment, fouling and partial blockage plus variable deviations caused by other 
deviations entering the unit. 
Flow sensors, in contrast, are modelled as single units. Pipe mounted sensors are placed 
next to a pipe unit in what can be considered as the process flow stream. The failures 
are simply kept to the sensor giving a false high or low signal output. 
Controllers and trip switches are modelled as two units. There is the actual logic unit, the 
controller or trip switch and there is the set pointfor the unit. In process plant some failures 
can be attributed to an incorrectly asSigned set point. Therefore a separate unit is used 
for this. 
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This level of decomposition can be illustrated using the traditional nitric acid cooler system 
first used by Lapp and Powers (1). The piping and instrumentation diagram is shown in 
Figure 4.3. Hot nitric acid is cooled in a heat exchanger using water. A temperature 
sensor on the acid outlet sends a signal to a controller which manipulates a control valve 
on the water inlet stream. A trip valve on the acid inlet stream operates should the flow 
of cooling water fall to zero. The configuration diagram is given in Figure 4.4. 
Hot Acid 
Cooling 
Water 
.... ..... 
Warm 
Water 
Cool Acid 
o 
Figure 4.3 - Nitric Acid Cooling System 
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Figure 4.4 - Configuration Diagram For Nitric Acid Cooling System 
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4.3 Rules For Generating The Configuration Diagram 
When considering generating a configuration diagram for a section of plant a few rules 
have been developed. These will be illustrated using Figure 4.4 as an example. 
The configuration diagram Is made up of two types of item. Units are the physical entities 
that make up the plant. These are the individual blocks which the user has identified as 
components such as reactors and valves. 
Connections are the logical links that exist between units. These are not necessarily pipes 
but may be any type of link between units. It should be noted that process pipes, signal 
lines and electric cable can be units and are then Included in the configuration diagram 
as such. 
It is often the case that process lines cross the boundary of the plant section to be studied. 
The process is not concemed with causes from outside this boundary so a marker must 
be used to identify the section boundary. To do this dummy heads and dummy tails are 
used. A dummy head represents an input to the plant section. It Is often the source of 
the process streams and has no inputs only outputs. A dummy tail represents an exit 
from the plant section. It is often the sink for the process streams and has no outputs 
only inputs. These units have no failure modes but allow the variable deviations to exist 
as diamond events in a fault tree, ie. the causes are not developed any further because 
they occur outside the section boundary. 
The revised model library contains supply units such as a process nitrogen supply and 
sink type units such as a flare or drain. These can be used to replace the dummy head 
or dummy tall units to give a specific source or destination to the stream. They also contain 
some basic faults. 
The majority of a process plant is made up of piping between units. It is very 
straight-forward to place a pipe unit between every unit where a pipe connection exists. 
However, this can generate a very large number of units which takes time to enter into 
the computer and to run. The same pipe model is used each time and this creates multiple 
occurrences of the same fault which makes the fault tree generated large and opaque. 
The number of pipe models used can be reduced by only using the unit at strategic places 
where blockages or leaks can have a profound effect. In Figure 4.4 the pipe is placed at 
the heat exchanger inlet for the water and the outlet for the acid. 
Every unit in the configuration diagram must have a corresponding unit model in the unit 
model library. This is often the same model, for example, the pipe model and the set 
point model. 
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Each unit has a number of interfaces called ·ports'. These allow connections to other 
units. The models for each unit contain the links between ports. For example, a pipe unit 
has two ports, one for the Inlet flow and one for the outlet flow. A heat exchanger has 
four ports, an inlet and outlet for the cold stream and an Inlet and outlet for the hot stream. 
The flows of the two streams are independent but the temperature is cross-linked in the 
model. 
The ports for each model are numbered sequentially and should be marked in the 
configuration diagram if confusion is likely. This enables the correct units and ports to be 
linked together. It is important that the correct ports are used otherwise the wrong minitree 
will be used from the unit model. 
Each port on a unit must be connected to another unit. This is necessary because for a 
variable deviation to appear In the fault tree It must be associated with a connection 
number. Problems do not arise with Inlet, outlet and signal ports because these are always 
connected to units as a matter of routine. The problem occurs with vessel ports. A user 
may have a vessel type unit which does not have any measurement device attached to 
it and quite rightly will not connect a unit to its vessel port. However, when the synthesis 
package finds, for example, high level causes high flow out of the vessel it will not have 
a connection number for the level deviation. This causes the package to label the level 
deviation as impossible. Dummy heads and dummy tails are convenient for connecting 
to this type of port to prevent this happening. An exception to this rule is the utility port. 
Many units have utility ports built into them which are often not required. If the user does 
not connect a dummy unit to this port the synthesis package ignores it and the deviations 
associated with it. 
The units and connections are numbered sequentially and independent of each other. 
The unit numbers appear at the top left hand comer of the unit block and the connection 
number appears either above the arrow giving the normal direction of flow or to the right 
of the arrow on a vertical line. Using this system prevents confusion. The numbering 
should generally go from left to right in the same way as a piping and instrumentation 
diagram. It should start with the process flow streams, then the control and trip systems 
and finally the utilities. 
From Figure 4.4 it can be seen that the power utility, unit 18, is connected to both the 
controller and the trip switch. This allows for common mode failures and each utility unit 
can be connected to up to nine different units. The same would be expected of the 
instrument air utility, IAR. However Joining the control valve and trip valve to the same 
unit will over-crowd the configuration diagram so in this case the IAR unit has been given 
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twice but with the same unit number. This only affects the diagram because the data 
input file will have the same format for the two utilities. It should be noted that different 
port numbers must be used for the two valve connections to the utility. 
Common mode susceptibility due to maintenance errors can also be modelled. This, for 
example, may take the form of a Single set point unit for all, or a group of, controller and 
trip units. 
4.4 Rules For Defining The Configuration 
The configuration diagram is entered using the configuration data input program MASTER. 
Once the data has been entered it is not necessary to repeat the process unless the 
configuration is changed dramatically because the data is stored in a file specified by the 
user. This file can be edited to change things such as model library numbers or correct 
errors during the input 
A more detailed account of the rules for defining the control and trip loop data and the 
various types of loop is given by Mullhi (3, 4). 
The following sub·sections are divided according to the prompts given by the program for 
the user to respond to. The separate sections deal with the basic dimensions of the 
configuration such as the number of units and the number of control loops and then a 
more detailed analYSis of the individual items such as the model library numbers of each 
unit and the make-up of each control loop. 
4.4.1 Basic Data 
The first section requires the total number of individual units along with the total number 
of connections between these units. 
The process of fault tree synthesis is very complex and it is necessary to identify certain 
combinations of units which act together as protective systems. These are the control 
loops and trip systems. 
The basic constituents of a control loop are a sensor, controller and a control valve. Any 
one of these may be shared with others but each combination must be identified as a 
separate control loop. The total number of loops must be given. 
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The basic constituents of a trip system are a sensor, trip switch and a trip valve. Anyone· 
of these may be shared with others but each combination must be identified as a separate 
trip system. Trip systems are sub-divided into open valve trips and closed valve trips. 
The open valve trip has an open trip valve which slams shut on a trip signal. Closed valve 
trips have a closed trip valve which opens allowing flow on a trip signal. The total number 
of each type of system must be given. 
The final data required in this section is for the secondary failures. These allow additional 
causes of specified variable deviations or faults to be used. A Type I secondary failure 
deals with variable deviations and a Type 11 failure deals with basic faults. The total number 
of Type I failures and the total number of Type 11 failures must be entered. More detail 
on the secondary failures is given in section 5.B. 
4.4.2 Unit Model Library Numbers 
This section requires the units given in the configuration diagram to be given the 
appropriate unit model library reference number. The program gives each unit number 
and the user supplies the library model number. The library listing Is given in Appendix 
B.2. 
4.4.3 Connection Topology 
In this section the connections are required. For each connection number, the start or 
upstream unit and port number and the end or downstream unit and port number are 
entered. 
The first three connection specifications for the hot nitric acid cooler in Figure 4.4 are 
given below. 
Upstream Downstream 
Unit Port Unit Port 
1 1 2 1 
2 2 3 1 
3 2 4 1 
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4.4.4 Control loops 
The control loops are identified as a unique combination of sensor, controller and control 
valve. The number of these combinations has been identified and the input order should 
be determined by considering the importance of each loop. The primary control loops 
should be given first. In the case of a cascade control loop the mast~r loop should be 
entered before the slave loop. 
The synthesis algorithm requires the sensor unit number, the sensed variable and the 
control valve unit number. In order to determine which unit failures will result in loop failure 
the other units in the control system must be identified. This includes the controller, set 
point and any utilities. 
There are two types of control variable that can be used. Manipulated control involves 
flow only. This always occurs because the control valve manipulates the flow passing 
through it. All the streams that the flow can be manipulated in must be specified. The 
general principle is to give all the stream connections upstream and downstream of the 
control valve up to a flow changing unit. A flow changing unit is defined as one where 
there can be an accumulation of fluid such as a vessel, a splitting or joining of streams 
such as in a divider or header or where the flow is manipulated by another control valve. 
It is up to the user to use discretion when a long list of connections is encountered and 
only give a reasonable number. The maximum permitted by the program is ten 
connections. 
The regulated control variable is usually the sensed variable because this is ultimately 
what the controller is aiming to control. Usually the manipuiated flow stream affects the 
value of the sensed variable. All the connections in which the regulated variable can be 
influenced by the controller must be specified. This will include connections upstream 
and downstream to units where the variable can be changed. For example, temperature 
can be changed in a heat exchanger and compoSition in a mixer. If the regulated variable 
is sensed at a vessel mounted sensor, it may be such that the variable does not occur 
outside the vessel, eg level. In this case there are no connections where the variable is 
regulated. Therefore the connection refers to the connection between the vessel port and 
the vessel mounted sensor. 
In some cases two variables are very closely related in a unit. An example which has 
been referred to by Mullhi (3) is the temperature and composition in a distillation column. 
The approach used by Mullhi was to model both the variables as regulated variables in 
the same control loop. The loop sensed the temperature in the column and adjusted the 
flow of heating medium to the reboiler. This not only affected the temperature at the 
bottom of the distillation column but the composition as well, so both variables are 
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regulated. However, this requires the user to have additional knowledge on the properties 
of the system. A more suitable method is to model the effects of temperature on the 
composition in the distillation column itself. Once the column has been modelled in this 
way the user will only have to consider the sensed variable as the regulated variable. 
The final information about the control loop is whether it is a feedforward or feedback 
loop. A feedback loop is one where the effects of the control manipulation is sensed by 
the sensor, hence, information is 'fed back' to the controller about its actions. This is the 
normal format because the loop is less susceptible to outside influences. A feedforward 
loop cannot sense the results of its actions. The sensor and control valve are in separate 
streams with no upstream interaction. 
Using Figure 4.4 as an example the temperature control loop has the following data input. 
CONTROL LOOP 
SENSED VARIABLE: T 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 5 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 10 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL LOOP: 13 14 18 19 
VARIABLE T REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 3 4 5 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 6 7 8 9 10 11 
LOOP IS NOT OF FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
4.4.5 Open Valve Trip Systems 
The open valve trip systems are identified as a unique combination of sensor, trip switch 
and open trip valve. The number of these combinations has been identified and the input 
order should be determined by considering the order in which they would act. The final 
protective system should be given first because this will then appear near the top of the 
fault tree with the others appearing lower down. 
The synthesis algorithm requires the trip valve unit number to be given separately from 
the list of other units in the system. The other units will include the sensor, trip switch, 
set point and utilities. 
The other piece of information deals with feedback or feedforward systems. A feedforward 
trip has the sensor in a different stream to the trip valve. 
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Using Figure 4.4 as an example the open valve trip system has the following data input. 
OPEN VALVE TRIP SYSTEM 
TRIP VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 2 
OTHER UNITS IN TRIP SYSTEM: 9 15 16 18 19 
TRIP IS OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
4.4.6 Closed Valve Trip Systems 
The closed valve trip systems are Identified and numbered in the same way as the open 
valve trip system. 
Again the trip valve unit number Is given separately from the list of other units in the 
system. The other units will include the sensor, trip switch, set point and utilities. 
The feedback orfeedforward difference is not required butthe synthesis algorithm requires 
the connections which will have flow when the valve opens to be identified. This includes 
all connections both upstream and downstream of the valve. 
There is not a trip system of this type but an example Is given to show the layout. 
CLOSED VALVE TRIP SYSTEM 
TRIP VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 25 
OTHER UNITS IN TRIP SYSTEM: 20 23 24 30 34 
CONNECTIONS HAVING FLOW WHEN VALVE OPENS: 27 28 29 
4.4.7 Dividers And Headers 
Dividers are units which split one process stream into two. Headers are units which join 
two process streams into one. Divlder·header combinations are mixtures of dividers and 
headers which fonn possible flow loops. They may be simple, such as a by-pass around 
a control valve, or more complex, such as an excess flow relief system for a pump bank. 
The identification of dividers, headers and their combinations has been automated, a 
detailed account is given by Mullhl (2). The information required for these units Is the 
relative flow capacities of each leg. The capacities can be given as 0%, 50% and 100%. 
For a divider the flow capacity is a percentage of the inlet flow. If both outlet legs have a 
capacity for allowing all of the inlet flow through either of them, then a 100% capacity is 
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used. If, for example, on a pump bank the two pumps can only provide SO% of the flow 
each, then the legs should be given as SO% capacity. For legs connected to closed valves 
resulting in no flow, then the capacity is 0%. 
For a header the flow capacity Is a percentage of the outlet flow. For full capacity the 
value Is 100%, for split capacity the value is SO% and for non-flow legs the capacity is 
0%. It should be noted that dividers and headers connected in a divider-header 
combination must have the same flow capacities. 
These percentages are used by the synthesis package to determine which type of logic 
gate should be used when combining the flow and pressure deviations of the two legs. 
This process of using numbers may be confusing to a user In some cases. For example, 
If the dividers and headers form part of a divider-header combination for a three way pump 
bank where each pump delivers 33% of the capacity the user may be inclined to give the 
capacity as 33%. However the package will not accept this. 
A solution to this is to remove any reference to the numbers and replace it with text. The 
format adapted is to define the capacities as 'none', 'shared' and 'full'. The program 
converts these to the numerical form of 0, SO and 100 respectively. 
4.4.8 Secondary Failures 
Each secondary failure has to be entered separately. Afterthe name of the failure is given 
the connections or units in which the failure can occur are specified. The effects of this 
secondary failure are simply the combination of a variable letter and a deviation or a basic 
fault. The port number and port type are not required. Multiple effects can be used, for 
example, T HI and U HI for high temperature In the normal direction of flow and the reverse 
direction. More detail on secondary failure modelling is given in Section S.B. 
For the nitric acid cooling system given in Figure 4.4 two secondary failures can be used. 
If the heat exchanger gets an intemal leak then water may enter the acid causing an 
exothermic reaction and rise in temperature. The Type I secondary failure used Is 
DILUTION which Is caused by high concentration of water. The connections affected by 
this are 1 to S and the variable deviations are T HI and U HI. 
The other failure deals with the acid entering the cooling water stream causing leaks in 
the pipe work. The Type 11 secondary failure used is CORROSN which is caused by high 
concentration of acid. The units affected by this are 3 and 7 to 12 and the basic fault Is 
a leak to a low pressure environment LK-LP-EN. 
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The secondary failures are entered in the following form 
TYPE I EFFECTS 
NAME: DILUTION 
EFFECTS: T HI, U HI 
CONNECTIONS: 1 2 3 4 5 
TYPE" EFFECTS 
NAME: CORROSN 
SUSCEPTIBLE FAULTS: LK·Lp·EN 
UNITS: 3 7 8 9 10 11 12 
4.5 Automatic Identification 
This chapter has dealt with the development and data input of the configuration diagram. 
It can be seen that the amount of work required from the user is considerable. Therefore, 
studies have been carried out to reduce this. 
4.5.1 Divider-Header Combinations 
The identification of dividers, headers and their combinations has been developed by 
Mullhi (2). This process searches the connection topology array (created in section 4.4.3) 
for units which either have one inlet and two outlet connections or two inlets and one outlet 
connection. The former is identified as a divider unit and the latter as a header unit. Next 
the models of the units are checked and if the port types of the two outlets or two inlets 
do not match the unit is discarded because it cannot be a divider or header and is more 
likely to be a valve or sensor. The system has had to be modified because the process 
not only picked out dividers and headers for process flow streams but also signal lines. 
The next step is to identify the divider-header combination loops. The connection topology 
identified as part of a divider or header is transferred to a new array such that this array 
only contains connections at these units. This removes all the flow-through units and 
intervening connections. Divider-header combination loops are identified by tracing from 
the outlet of each divider around the connections until it returns to the other outlet of the 
same divider. If it encounters a connection already crossed, the search terminates and 
starts on a new one. The loops identified are sorted and the duplicate ones removed. 
Loops are required because they form routes where flow and pressure deviations can 
travel. They are used to alert the synthesis program to possible inconsistencies in 
deviations of the same variable. This is normally dealt with by the unit models but in these 
cases more than one unit is involved. An example is low flow out of a divider-header 
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combination by-pass around a control valve. The low flow deviation may be caused by 
reverse flow through the by-pass leg of the header unit ANDed with the normally closed 
valve failing open. A cause of reverse flow in the by-pass is reverse flow into the 
divider-header combination. However, reverse flow into the divider-header combination 
cannot be a cause of low flow out of it. The ability to identify loops alerts the program to 
the possibility of this inconsistency and the trace of reverse flow is stopped at the divider. 
4.5.2 Control And Trip Loops 
The principle for traCing along connection pathways for divider-header combinations has 
been used to test the feasibility for automating part of the control and trip loop specification. 
The study was carried out on control loops by Mullhi (3) but can equally be applied to trip 
loops. The work involved Identifying the sensors and control valves. Then for each sensor 
a signal path is traced to a control valve. Each different sensor to valve route produces 
a new control loop. This tracing sequence will also identify the other units in the control 
configuration. 
The sensed variable can be identified by examining the sensor model to determine which 
variable the signal Is a function of. The connections where this variable is regulated can 
be determined by tracing upstream and downstream from the sensor. However, 
complications arise when dividers, headers, mixers, reactors and other vessel type units 
occur due to their influences on certain variables. The manipulated connections can be 
determined in a similar way but the restrictions placed on the units only apply to those 
influencing flow. 
4.5.3 Input Of Configuration 
Studies have also been carried out on using the output from a computer-aided drawing 
package. A similar configuration storage system Is used for the units and the connectivity 
between them. The major difference is the representation of the unit type. The drawing 
package, for example, may use a single symbol for a shell and tube heat exchanger but 
for fault tree synthesis distinctions must be made for the different types. 
Work is currently proceeding on the automated facilities. 
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4.6 Reduction Of Data Input Repetition 
Currently the procedure adopted for analysis is to study a small section of plant and then 
enlarge this to cover all the plant. This procedure is used because it is easier to test new 
models in small configurations than it is in larger configurations. This results in the user 
having to enter the configuration diagram more than once because ea~h individual plant 
section requires a new configuration data file. Most of the terminal work occurs at this 
stage of the synthesis. 
Ideally it would be more acceptable if the entire plant configuration could be entered all 
at once in one data file and then certain sections be isolated for study. This would eliminate 
the need for multiple configurations for the different sections. 
A break point system has been developed which allows the user to create imaginary 
boundaries around specific sections of plant and therefore isolate itlor study. Only models 
of units within this section have to be contained in the model library which enables one 
user to develop a fault tree for one section of the plant while another is developing models 
for another section. 
4.6.1 Break Points 
The current format of the programs uses a system of dummy head and dummy tail units 
to mark the boundaries of a configuration beyond which the user is not interested. It 
seems sensible, therefore, to use dummy heads and tails to mark the new boundaries of 
the section of configuration of interest. 
These two units are treated as special cases when encountered during synthesis of the 
fault tree because they are not items of equipment and, therefore, do not contain any 
basic faults. When a variable deviation is being traced along a flow stream and a dummy 
head or dummy tail unit is encountered the package labels the deviation relating to the 
current stream as a diamond event. When this type of event is drawn on a fault tree it 
informs the user that the cause of that variable deviation appears outside the bounds of 
the configuration. 
4.6.2 Choosing A Break Point Unit 
The dummy head and dummy tail units are also special types of model and cannot be 
used to replace just any type of unit. A dummy head has only one port leaving it and a 
dummy tail has only one port entering it. Units analogous to dummy units are the utilities 
and the termination units. 
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The next degree of complexity of a unit Is one with two ports, one for the inlet and one for 
the outlet. Such units include pipes, hand valves and sample points. These units usually 
appear in abundance in configuration diagrams and, therefore, it seems ideal to use these 
units as break point units. 
If the choice of break point unit is expanded to cover units with more than two ports then 
the programming required to alter the data files becomes complicated. Since the two port 
unit is common in a configuration diagram it is reasonable to limit break point units to this 
type. Therefore, break point units have been defined as those units which have one Inlet 
port and one outlet port and no other type of port. 
A point to note is that connections must not cross the boundary line. This means that 
control and trip loops must be entirely contained within the boundary or entirely excluded 
from it. It is permissible, however, for regulated, manipulated or flow streams to be 
truncated by the boundary line with a break point unit. 
4.6.3 Data Alteration 
Once the break point units have been identified some of the data on the configuration has 
to be altered to afford the same special treatment to these units as the dummy head and 
dummy tail units. The break point units are defined as either a new dummy head or a 
new dummy tail. 
For the new dummy heads the unit model library reference number has to be changed to 
that of the dummy head unit. This assigns the minitrees for the dummy head unit model 
to the new dummy head unit. Next the array containing the list of connection numbers 
coming from a dummy head unit is modified to contain the outlet connection number from 
the new dummy head unit. This array alerts the synthesis package that special treatment 
is required for this connection number. The new dummy head unit is still connected to a 
unit upstream so to release this link the connection number at the inlet to the new dummy 
head unit has Its downstream unit number (ie. the new dummy head unit number) set to 
zero In the connection topology array. This prevents the automatic divider-header 
combination search tracing outside the new section boundary. The new dummy head 
unit is now isolated from events outside the boundary but its port numbers are wrong. 
The dummy head unit has a singie outlet port numbered port 1 but the outlet port on the 
new dummy head is port 2. In the connection topology array the connection number for 
the outlet from the new dummy head unit has the upstream unit (ie. the new dummy head 
unit) port number changed to 1. To complete the change the connection for the inlet to 
the new dummy head unit has its downstream unit (ie. the new dummy head unit) port 
number changed to 2. 
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This completes the installation of the new dummy head unit. 
A similar process is carried outforthe new dummy tail unit. The unit model library reference 
number is changed to that of the dummy tail unit model. The array containing a list of 
connection numbers going to a dummy tail unit is modified to contain the inlet to the new 
dummy tail unit. The connection number at the outlet of the new dummy tail unit has the 
upstream unit (ie the new dummy tail unit) set to zero in the connection topology array. 
The port numbers do not need to be changed. 
This completes the installation of the new dummy tail unit. 
Having defined the new boundary points It Is necessary to prevent the configuration data 
input program MASTER reading in the unit models of those units which no longer take 
part in the configuration. This is achieved by specifying which units are to be excluded 
and then setting the library reference number of the units to zero. The program sets up 
an array of markers for each library number used and it only retrieves models of those 
units. The lowest model number is one so although there will be a marker for model zero 
the program will ignore it. 
4.6.4 Subroutine Flowsheet 
Figure 4.5 is a schematic representation of the subroutine flowsheet used to carry out the 
break point application. The code used for the subroutine is given in Appendix A.l. 
4.6.5 Alterations To The Code 
In order to implement the break point system into the fault tree synthesis code the following 
alterations have had to be carried out. 
The call for the new break point subroutine has to be Inserted immediately aiter the 
configuration data has been entered Into the program and before any operations are 
carried out on the data. This is because some operations involve dummy head and dummy 
tail units so the definition of the new dummy units have to occur before this. 
Since the library reference number has been set to zero for the redundant units it is 
necessary to change the dimensions of the array which marks whether the unit is used 
from 1 :500 to 0:500. This allows the program to mark the model numbered zero as being 
used but the rest of the program only uses marks between 1 and 500. 
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Figure 4.5 • Break Point Subroutine Flowsheet 
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The divider-header combination search identifies dividers and headers by searching the 
connections array for streams with the same unit numbers. A problem occurred here 
initially because there was nothing in the array to indicate where the new boundaries were 
and the searches went outside of them. This was remedied by setting the unit number 
of the redundant stream connected to the new dummy units to zero. A check was then 
placed in the divider unit and header unit search routines that abandons the search if a 
unit number of zero is encountered. 
4.6.6 Example Of Break Point Use 
Consider the section of plant shown in Figure 4.6. 
}-------{L 
Figure 4.6 - Feed Control System 
It consists of a long length of pipeline to a buffer tank whose level is controlled by means 
of a control valve at the Inlet to the vessel. The outlet is pumped through a flow control 
system but there is a kick-back leg to the vessel to divert excess flow and protect the 
pump from over-pressure. All the lines have a capacity for 100% of the flow. The 
configuration diagram is shown in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7· Configuration Diagram 
The top event chosen Is high level in the vessel. 
Figure 4.8 shows part of the fault tree synthesised for the entire configuration. The fault 
tree shows the level control loop (loop 1) as the primary protection system. If this loop 
sticks then other causes of high level are searched for. These are high flow Into the vessel 
or low or no flow out of the vessel. Most of these can be attributed to failures in the flow 
control loop (loop 2). 
Only the start of the control loop failure branches is given (for example branches B. C and 
E). Branches with a continuation line appear elsewhere in the fault tree (for example 
branch G). Branches ending in a variable deviation with no continuation line (for example 
branches A. D and F) represent variable deviations entering the plant section at the section 
boundary. These are diamond events. Branches ending in an event and unit number 
represent basic faults. Other intermediate events and variable deviations have been 
removed for clarity. 
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Figure 4.8 - Fault Tree For The Entire Configuration 
The section of plant being studied can be reduced using the break point system. In this 
example units 3 and 9 have been chosen as break point units. Unit 3 is the sampler and 
removing this will eliminate the faults of the long length of pipe. Unit 9 is the pipe section 
and removing this will exclude the flow control loop from the configuration. The user is 
allowed to remove this control loop because it occurs entirely outside the new boundary 
even though connection 8 is defined as being regulated in the control loop specification. 
The faulttree for the reduced configuration is shown in Figure 4.9. The branches removed 
are labelled as A, 6, C, 0 and E in Figure 4.8. This eliminates all the fiow control loop 
failures except for the 'misleading fault' in branch H. 
The reason this control loop failure occurs in the fault tree is that only the units of the loop 
are removed, its specification and influences still remain in the configuration. The event 
does not cause any incorrect deletions in the fault tree even though It is a loop which has 
been removed from the configuration. Rather than trying to remove this occurrence from 
the fault tree it has been decided to leave it In. The advantage of this is that it marks in 
the fault tree where the protection from the fiow control loop would occur. 
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Figure 4.9 • Fault Tree For The Reduced Configuration 
Since connection 3 and connection 8 are the boundary points of the configuration the 
propagation of flow deviations terminate at these connections. For this reason branches 
F, G and J on Figure 4.9 become diamond events. 
The break points Introduced Into this example have reduced the section covered by the 
configuration. One of the control loops has successfully been removed from the fault tree 
apart from a single reference which indicates where the loop protection would occur. 
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4.6.7 Rules For Break Points 
This is a list of rules that must be followed when using the break point system to reduce 
the size of the configuration being considered. 
I. A break point unit must have only two ports, an inlet port and ar:' outlet port. 
11. A break point unit that fonns an entry to the configuration must be specified as a 
new dummy head unit. 
iil. A break point unit that fonns an exit from the configuration must be specified as a 
new dummy tail unit. 
iv. All units outside of the new configuration must be specified as redundant units. 
v. Control and trip loop signal lines must not cross configuration boundaries. 
vI. Each new dummy head unit has its model library reference number changed to 
that for a dummy head unit, the outlet stream from the unit is labelled as coming 
from a dummy head unit, the inlet and outlet port numbers of the unit in the 
configuration are reversed and the inlet streams end unit number is changed to O. 
vii. Each new dummy tail unit has its model library reference number changed to that 
for a dummy tail unit, the inlet stream from the unit is labelled as going to a dummy 
tail unit and the outlet streams start unit number is changed to O. 
viii. Each redundant unit has its model library reference number changed to O. 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter has given a guide for decomposing the piping and instrumentation diagram 
into the configuration diagram from which the data required for fault tree synthesis can 
be obtained. Rules are given for defining this configuration at the data input stage. A 
new process has been introduced to reduce the number of times a configuration has to 
be entered. 
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Chapter 5 
Specification Of Lists And Model Libraries 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks In more depth at the different libraries used for computer aided fault 
tree synthesis. These libraries contain all the variables, deviations, faults and models 
that can be used. Information is also held on which combinations of variables and 
deviations are valid. The methodology used to describe the elements of the lists is based 
on the work of Keily (1) and Muilhi (2). 
5.2 Variables 
The variables used by the package are Identified by a single upper case letter. They are: 
a volumetric or mass flow 
G pressure gradient causing fiow, used In conjunction with a for two way propagation 
T temperature 
U temperature under reverse fiow conditions 
X composition 
Y composition under reverse fiow conditions 
P absolute pressure source above or below atmospheric or accumulation in gas 
systems 
R relief sink, used in conjunction with P for two way propagation 
L level of liquid in a vessel 
S Instrument signal transmitted between units 
W set point on a logic unit 
In addition to these, two new variables have been added. 
M mass 
E electric current 
Variables P, T and X are used to trace deviations to a cause upstream. 
Variables R, U and Y are used to trace deviations to a cause downstream. For the last 
two the deviation must be accompanied by reverse fiow. 
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5.2.1 New Variables 
The two new variables were introduced after problems were encountered with some of 
the examples. 
The mass M Is used to model the accumulation of material in a vessel and is associated 
with the vessel port. It is similar to the level variable since they are both dependent on 
the amount of material In the vessel but it can be used for gases. This variable was 
created for a problem where the flow rate of material out of a suspended buffer tank was 
governed by the mass of fluid In the vessel. A control valve was used to control the inlet 
to this tank to maintain a constant mass of fluid via a mass controller. Previously the level 
variable was used but was felt to be unsatisfactory. 
The electric current E is used to model the variation in energy supplied to a unit. The 
situation which required this variable was a batch distillation process where the reboiler 
boil-up rate was controlled by adjusting the power supplied to the electric heater using a 
variable resistor. The utility units cannot be manipulated In this way and using the 
instrument signal variable leads to confusion. 
No other variable names are used. 
5.2.2 Variable Subscripts 
There are three subscripts associated with the variable description. The first one is optional 
and applies to multiple component situations. The second gives the port number and the 
third defines the port type in the mOdel where the variable occurs. 
5.2.2.1 Component Subscript 
This subscript is used with the composition variables X and Y to distinguish components 
In a multiple component system. It is a single alphabetic character between the letter 'A' 
and the letter or and acts as an extension to the single character variable name. The 
subscripts should be used in order, starting with' A', with the same subSCript used for the 
same component for both X and Y. 
If these subscripts are used the model must be defined as a multi-component model to 
prevent problems converting it into numerical mlnitrees. Multi-component minitrees can 
be used with single component minitrees because in a single component model all the 
Individual components behave in the same way and the same minitree can be used. 
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Component subscripts are only necessary if it is impossible to model the components 
using only one Identifier. Examples of this are streams with multiple components which 
undergo a selective mass transfer between phases (eg. distillation columns, partial 
reboilers or condensers) or the mixing of different component streams (eg. reactors). 
Component subscripts are not necessary if the different component streams do not 
normally mix. If a fault occurs which allows mixing then the single component variable 
can be used to model the effects of the 'impurity' in either stream. 
5.2.2.2 Port Num~er Subscript 
This subscript refers to the port number on the unit in question where the variable occurs. 
The possibilities are any of the digits 1 to 9. When a unit Is modelled, its ports should be 
numbered sequentially starting at 1. 
5.2.2.3 Port Type Subscript 
The final subscript refers to the port type under normal conditions, where the variable 
occurs. The possibilities are 
IN where flow into the unit exists 
OUT where flow out of the unit exists 
SIG where a signal enters or leaves a unit 
YES where Information about the intemal variables of a vessel type unit are 
modelled 
UTL where a utility, such as electrical power, enters or leaves the unit 
These subSCripts are used to determine which variable names and deviations can be 
associated with each port. The variable names which can be combined with the port types 
are given in Table 5.1. Those in bold indicate where the variable Is defined as an output 
from the unit. The others show where the variable is defined as an input to the unit. Those 
with a '-' are not valid. Only those in bold should be used In event statements or decision 
tables. 
The flow a when connected to a vessel port is used to model the flow of material from 
one phase to another in a vessel type unit. It is of particular interest in condensers and 
reboilers (see Chapter 8). 
The mass M is only defined at the vessel port because it is similar to the level variable 
and has no meaning in a pipe. 
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Table 5.1 - Port TypeNariable Name Combinations 
Q G T U X Y P R L S W M E 
IN Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - - y - y 
OUT Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y - - y - y 
SIG - - - - - - - - - y - - -
VES Y 
-
Y 
-
Y 
-
Y 
-
Y 
- -
y 
-
UTL - - - - - - - - - y - - -
The electric current E is used to model the variation of electrical power to a unit. This 
'flow' of electric current Is modelled In the same way as fluids. Therefore, electric current 
is defined at the same ports as the flow variable, ie. the inlet and outlet ports. This allows 
the variable to be used to replace, for example, a flow of steam to a reboiler and control 
loops to be used to model its control system. 
Typical variable descriptions are R1IN, Q20UT, Y31N, XA20UT, L4VES and S5UTL. 
5.3 Deviations 
A deviation is applied to a variable and represents a change from the normal of that 
variable. The normal is not necessarily constant, for example the set point of the slave 
control loop in a cascade loop system changes all the time, but its value represents the 
normal for that instant. The deviations used are 
HI 
LO 
NONE 
SOME 
REV 
NCHA 
SHAC 
NOP 
NOR 
the value of the variable Is higher than normal 
the value of the variable Is lower than normal 
the variable has a negligible value 
the variable has a finite positive value 
the variable has a negative or reversed value 
the signal has not changed, when a change Is expected 
the trip should activate 
there is no pressure source downstream 
there is no sink for pressure relief upstream 
Forthe HI and LOdeviations no attempt is made to distinguish different degrees of severity, 
ego high and very high. The deviation is considered sufficient to cause the top event to 
happen. 
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When combined with variables, some deviations do not have obvious meanings. 
Forsignal S, NONE and SOME can be interpreted In two ways, either as the unltfunctioning 
correctly as required, or by the unit being faulty or operating without need. 
For pressure P, REV means a large pressure loss. It implies the unit is connected via a 
large aperture to a lower pressure system, usually to atmosphere, and thus has a more 
drastic effect than LO. 
For relief R, REV means a pressure gain, or that the unit is connected via a large aperture 
to a higher pressure system and thus has a more drastic effect than HI. 
The deviation NCHA is used only with signal S. It is associated with control loops which 
have a functional failure attributed to the sensor, controller or valve. 
The deviation SHAC Is used only with a signal on a trip system to Indicate its functional 
failure. 
Table 5.2 summarises which deviation can be used with which variable. The 'Pv' variable 
name refers to a pressure with the port type vessel. 
Table 5.2 - DeviationNariable Name Combinations 
a G T U X Y P R L Pv S W M E 
HI Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
LO Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
NONE Y Y 
- - - -
y y y y y 
-
y y 
SOME Y Y - - - - y y - - y - - y 
REV Y Y 
- - - -
y y 
- - - - - -
NCHA - - - - - - - - - - y - - -
SHAC 
- - - - - - - - - -
y 
- -
-
NOP 
- - - - - - -
y 
- - - - - -
NOR 
- - - - - -
y 
- -
y 
- - - -
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5.4 Fault And Event Library List 
The fault list is a compendium of all the initiating and intermediate events that can be used 
in the unit models or during synthesis of the fault trees. It Is not an exhaustive list and 
new ones can be added at any time. 
Initiating events are basic faults that occur in previously healthy units which result in the 
propagation of a fault deviation out of the unit. Examples of these are a partial blockage 
and a control valve failing stuck. 
Intermediate events are events which link up parts of the fault tree but are not variable 
deviations. Examples are control loop failing high and the dummy events. 
The events are limited to eight characters in length and their position in the fault array 
gives the index number for the fault. The length limitation means that the fault name has 
to be abbreviated. Kelly (3) developed a list of standard abbreviations and this list has 
been updated to form Table 5.3. Using these abbreviations the user should be able to 
generate most of the faults associated with common equipment. 
Table 5.3A - Equipment, etc. 
HV- hand valve BD- bursting disk 
CV- control valve BLK- blanked flange 
RCV- remote control valve CNT- controller 
TV- trip valve TSW- trip switch 
CTV- controlltrip valve ACT- activator 
SV- solenoid valve OP- operator 
ESV- emergency shutdown valve COM- computer 
RV- relief valve SEL- selector 
w- vent valve SW- switch 
3WV- three way valve REL- relay 
NRV- non-retum valve SEN- sensor 
SMP- sampler valve ALM- alarm 
. PRV- pressure reducing valve CL- control loop 
GOV- governor valve TL- trip loop 
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Table 5.3B - Utilities, etc. 
SIG- Instrument signal line ING- inert gas supply 
SET-P- set point NIT- nitrogen supply 
UTIL- utility supply CWT- cooling water supply 
POW- power supply PWT- process water supply 
STM- steam supply VAC- vacuum pressure 
IAR- Instrument air supply FWT- fire water supply 
PAR- process air supply C02- carbon dioxide supply 
Table 5.3C - Operations, etc. 
-0- directed -OR- operational 
-F- fails -FN- functional 
-FT- fails to -AT- at 
Table 5.30 - Conditions, etc. 
-SH shut -ON on 
-OP open -OF off 
-STK stuck -MAN on manual 
-HA with high aperture -OIS disabled 
-LA with low aperture -PB partial blockage 
-NA with no aperture -CB complete blockage 
-HI high -LOSS loss 
-LO low -F fails 
-BROKN broken -OK working as normal 
Table 5.4 is a brief list of the more common faults and the intermediate event names used. 
The intermediate events are those assigned by the programs during the synthesis of the 
fault tree. 
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Table 5.4 • Common Faults And Intermediate Events 
LK·Lp·EN leak to a low pressure DUMMYn intermediate dummy events, 
environment a (DUMMY) numbers and letters 
LK·Hp·EN leak from a high INTERNAL causes are internal to a DHC 
pressure environment (divider· header combination) 
INT·LK internal leak EXTERNAL causes are external to a DHC 
PART·BLK partial blockage LEAKAGE leakage faults in a DHC 
COMP·BLK complete blockage BLOCKAGE blockage faults in a DHC 
EXT·HEAT external heat source NO·FLOW no flow causes in a DHC 
EXT·COLD external cold source LO·FLOW low flow causes in a DHC 
NORMAL normal event HI·FLOW high flow causes in a DHC 
IMPOSS impossible event ·PRESS pressure causes in a DHC 
SEQ·F·AT sequence fails at COMPLOOP compensating loop events 
SEQ·F·AF sequence fails after OTH·CAUS other causes 
The complete list of basic faults and intermediate events is given in Appendix B.1. This 
is a revised list with the elements grouped together. 
5.5 Basic Fault Library List For Automatic Generation 
A facility has been developed by Mullhi which allows some of the basic faults to be 
generated automatically. The algorithm is incorporated into the unit model generation 
program MODGEN as part of the unit model input feature. Initially this was set up for the 
six basic faults associated with pipe type units. These are 
F LK·Lp·EN 
F LK·Hp·EN 
F PART·BLK 
FCOMp·BLK 
F EXT·HEAT 
F EXT·COLD 
The full names are given in Table 5.4. 
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The process allows a user to generate the event statements for the fault by simply 
specifying the ports affected. A file contains a list of faults which can be generated 
automatically and for each fault another contains the variable name, port type and list of 
deviations that can be coupled together to form the effects of the fau It. A condensed form 
of one of the files showing only the variables with deviations is 
F LK-LP-EN 
Q OUT LO NONE REV 
G IN HI SOME 
P OUT LO NONE REV 
R IN HI SOME NOP 
L VES LO NONE 
P VES LO 
M VES LO NONE 
This file has been modified to Incorporate the new variable for mass. The LK-LP-EN fault 
is the only fault from the initial list to affect the variable. The electric current variable is 
not affected by any of the faults. 
The method by which the program generates the event statements can be illustrated by 
using an example. If the event statement for a leak to a low pressure environment is to 
be generated for inlet port 1 the program carries out the following tasks. It scans the 
propagation equations to determine which variable deSCriptions are defined in the model. 
This is essentially the left hand side of the equations and should normally yield 'G11N', 
'U11N', 'Y11N' and 'R1IN'. Considering each row in tum it tries to match the variable 
description with the first two columns. If a match Is found the remaining columns give 
any deviation which is caused by the fault. The event statement generated is 
F LK-LP-EN: G11N HI, G11N SOME, R1 IN HI, R11N SOME, R11N NOP 
5.5.1 Inclusion Of States And A New Fault 
Four new files have been added to the existing ones. 
The introduction of a vessel model generation routine (Chapter 7) has resulted in the need 
for the NORMAL and IMPOSS state event statements to be generated automatically. 
Although not a faultthe normal state Is required to deal with some of the variable deviations 
started by the templates applied by the synthesis package. This event statement prevents 
variable deviations which would normally occur from being labelled as impossible. The 
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impossible state is required to prevent certain deviations from propagating through the 
units. Examples are reverse flow and no relief into a vessel. A condensed form of the 
files showing only the variables with deviations is 
S NORMAL 
a OUT SOME 
G IN SOME 
P OUT SOME REV 
R IN SOME NOP 
SIMPOSS 
P OUT NOR 
R IN NONE REV 
The other two files are used by the heat exchanger model generation routine (Chapter 
8). This generates the intemal leak INT-LK fault for both sides of a heat exchanger. 
Clearly with fluid passing from one side to another the effects will be different for each 
side. One file is used to model the higher pressure side and the other for the lower 
pressure side. The two files are 
F INT-LK HIGH PRESSURE SIDE 
a OUT LO NONE REV 
G IN HI 
P OUT LO NONE REV 
R IN HI 
L VES LO 
P VES LO 
M VES LO 
F INT-LK LOW PRESSURE SIDE 
a OUT HI 
G IN LO NONE REV 
P OUT HI 
R IN LO NONE REV 
L VES HI 
P VES HI 
M VES Hi 
It is planned to expand this facility to cover other faults which can be grouped together. 
To do this it is necessary to determine links between types of port for fault characteristics. 
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5.6 Unit Model Library List 
A basic unit model library was developed by Kelly (4) with the first version of the synthesis 
package. This consisted of a list of process units, instrument units and special units 
required for modelling. The list was not very comprehensive and each model was only 
developed when it was required for a particular situation. Once developed it remained in 
the library. 
The content of the library was built up by a process of adding new units as and when 
required. This resulted in an erratic development and inconsistent numbering system. 
For a user to find a model in the library requires him to search through the entire list each 
time. 
Using the current library as a base a new taxonomy of units has been devised to give a 
more representative library. This includes a new numbering system which groups types 
of units together and should a new model be required also allows these to be added to 
the group. 
The current unit model library list Is given In Appendix B.2. 
A group by group list of the library appears In the following pages with a brief deSCription 
of particular features of the models. 
5.6.1 Pipe And Pipe Type Units 
Short Length of Pipe 
Long Length of Pipe 
Divider, 2 Outputs 
Header, 2 Inputs 
These units are propagation models used to join units or streams together. 
The short length of pipe contains the normal blockage, leak and external temperature 
faults. This is primarily for use as a connection between pieces of equipment. This model 
is the base for all models with flow. 
The long length of pipe is used to model sections of pipe where it is possible to get surges 
of flow and water-hammer effects. The model has the basic pipe type faults and the 
water-hammer fault. 
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The divider provides a method of splitting a flow stream into multiple streams. For three 
or more streams the dividers must be nested because the new methodology allows only 
binary splitting. 
The header unit provides a method of combining two streams into one. The unit does 
not have any spare capacity so if one Inlet stream has high flow then the other must have 
low flow. They can be nested to combine multiple streams. 
5.6.2 Pipe End Units 
Dummy Head 
Dummy Tail 
Process Air Supply 
Process Steam Supply 
Process Water Supply 
Cooling Water Supply 
Fire Water Supply 
Process Nitrogen Supply 
Inert Gas Supply 
Fuel Gas Supply 
Drain 
Vent 
Flare Relief 
These are the start or end models used in the configuration diagram. 
The dummy units are used to mark the boundaries of the plant section being studied. 
They allow initiation and termination of all combinations of pipeline variables and 
deviations. They do not Initiate basic faults but when encountered result in the fault tree 
branch being traced ending in a diamond event. 
The supply units are not utility units because they act similarly to the dummy head but 
they have initiating faults for supply failures. The models contain flow and pressure 
equations and the port types allow them to be connected to valves and pipes. 
The drain, vent and flare relief are all dummy tail type units but have been given specific 
names and their own initiating faults. 
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5.6.3 Valve Type Units 
Hand Valve - Open 
- Closed 
Solenoid Valve - Open 
- Closed 
Remotely Controlled Valve - Open 
Pressure Relief Valve 
Non-Return Valve 
Excess Flow Valve 
Pressure Reducing Valve 
Governor Valve 
Control Valve, Fails Open 
- Closed 
Control Valve, Falls Closed 
3-Way Control Valve, Fails Open 
3-Way Control Valve, Fails Closed 
Trip Valve, Fails Open - Open 
- Closed 
Trip Valve, Fails Closed - Open 
- Closed 
Closed Emergency Shutdown Valve, Fails Open 
Open Emergency Shutdown Valve, Falls Closed 
Vent Valve - Open 
- Closed 
Manual Vent Valve - Open 
-Closed 
Control/Trip Valve, Operating 
Control/Trip Valve, Not Operating 
Variable Resistor 
- Fails Open 
- Fails Closed 
-Open 
- Closed 
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This group contains all the valve models. There is no distinction made between pneumatic 
and electrical valves. The faults of the two types are similar apart from the Signal blockages 
in the air pipes. To convert to a pneumatic unit, the instrument air pipe model should be 
used in conjunction with the valve. 
Hand valves are the Simplest valves and they can be open or closed. Their failures result 
in the valve being closed or opened respectively. 
The solenoid valve is a simple electrically operated valve. Failure of utility results in the 
valve position not changing. 
The remotely operated or automatic valves are similar to hand valves butthey are operated 
from the control room. They can be either open or closed and should the utility supply 
be lost they will remain in that position. 
The relief valve has a built-in set point unit and the faults are the set point being too low 
or too high. It can also fail to open or fail open and can be blocked or be undersized. 
The non-retum valve can fail open allowing reverse flow to occur. 
The excess flow valve closes should it sense a higher flow than there should be. The 
valve can fail to operate. 
The pressure reducing valve and govemor valve fault is its failure to prevent the 
propagation of high flow or pressure. 
The control valves are modulating and their position depends on the Signal from the 
controller. If the utility supply is lost they can fail open or closed. 
The 3-way valves are special valves which have three connections for flow, one inlet port 
and two outlet ports. The valve operates In a similar manner to the control valve except 
that the excess flow is diverted through the second outlet port. This second outlet fomns 
a by-pass around the unit through which the flow is being controlled. It can fail stuck or 
fully open/closed to give full flow through the next unit or by-pass system. 
The trip valves and the emergency shutdown valves are similar in operation and failure 
but the signal is received from the trip switch and control room respectively. They can 
fail stuck or operate unnecessarily. 
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The vent valve allows a control signal to pass unaltered until a signal is received from a 
trip switch. The control signal is then vented and prevented from reaching the control/trip 
valve. There are two versions depending on the required logic. 
The manual vent valve is similar to the vent valve but is opened or closed by the operator. 
The control/trip valves are control valves which slam shut or fully open on a signal from 
a trip switch. They should be used with the vent valves. 
The variable resistor is specifically for use with the electric current variable. It is modelled 
in the same way as a control valve receiving a signal from a controller and manipulating 
the 'flow' of electric current by varying the resistance. It replaces the control valve when 
the manipulated variable is electric current. The resistor fault is failure to change when 
directed. 
5.6.4 Pipe System Units 
Local Sensor 
Sample Point 
Flushing Unk 
Drain Point 
In-line Filter 
Steam Trap 
Blank Flange 
Bu rsting Disc 
This group contains small units or systems found on pipelines. They are situated between 
pipe sections but are not required to be connected to any other model. 
The local sensor is a sensor unit that has been disconnected or Is used for local 
observations. It does not transmit any signals. The fault is leakage through the gauge. 
The sample point is a single unit to replace the divider, closed hand valve and dummy 
tail set of units. It is used where a sample point appears in the pipeline. The faults are 
leakage and valve open. 
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The flushing [ink is a single unit to replace a header, a closed hand valve and a dummy 
head set of units. These are found mainly around pumps and are the connections which 
would be linked to the pump flushing system on a plant The fault is leakage from the 
system. 
The drain point is the same as the sampler point but is used as the drain for the flushing 
system or simply as a pipeline drainage point 
The in-line filter is a unit sited in the pipeline which is used to catch any debris that may 
be in the fluid. The fauits are blockage and failure to stop the debris. 
The steam trap collects and prevents condensate in a steam line from continuing along 
the pipe. The faults are blockages caused by debris caught by the built-in filter,leaks and 
failure to prevent the condensate passing. 
The blank flange is often found blocking off a pipeline and is more secure than a closed 
hand valve. The failures are the flange breaking or being removed. 
The bursting disc is the same as the relief valve with a set point built in and similarfailures. 
5.6.5 Sensor Units 
Multi-purpose Pipe Mounted Sensor 
Multi-purpose Dead Leg Sensor 
Multi-purpose Vessel Mounted Sensor 
Potentiometer on Valve Stem 
This group contains all the sensor models. No distinction is made between electronic and 
pneumatic types. 
The faults deal with the sensor failing with a high, low or no output signal. 
The pipe mounted sensor converts the output deviation of the flow, pressure, temperature 
and composition variables from port 2 of the unit to signal deviations from ports 3, 4, 5 
and 6 respectively. The port to which the signal link is connected determines the variable 
which the sensor records. The seventh port is for the utility. 
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The dead leg sensor converts the Input deviation of the pressure, temperature and 
composition variables from port 1 on the unit to signal deviations from ports 2, 3, and 4 
respectively. The port to which the signal link is connected determines the variable which 
the sensor records. There is no flow through the unit. The fifth port is for the utility. 
The vessel mounted sensor Is placed on the vessel port of a vessel and it converts the 
vessel variables of level, pressure, temperature, composition and mass to output signals 
from ports 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively. The port to which the signal link is connected 
determines the variable which the sensor records. The seventh port is for the utility. 
The potentiometer Is mounted on a valve stem and gives the position of the stem. 
5.6.6 Controller And Switch Units 
Regular Controller • Direct Acting 
• Reverse Acting 
Cascade Controller • Direct/Direct 
• DirectlReverse 
• Reverse/Direct 
• Reverse/Reverse 
Double Output Controller· Direct/Reverse 
Controller on Manual 
1·out-of-1 Trip Switch - High 
-Low 
- None 
1-out-of-2 Trip Switch • High 
-Low 
• None 
1·out-of-3 Trip Switch - High 
-Low 
• None 
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2-out-of-3 Trip Switch - High 
-Low 
Flow Switch 
Pressure Switch 
Temperature Switch 
Level Switch 
Umit Switch for Valve 
- None 
This group contains the decision-making units. 
It is assumed that the controller and trip switch are electronic decision-making units. Other 
units in the system will determine if the operation is partly pneumatic or all electrical. They 
have their own utility connection. 
The direct acting controller transfers the Signal from the sensor directly to the valve. 
The reverse acting controller reverses the sensor signal before sending it to the valve, ie. 
a high sensor reading produces a low valve signal. 
In a cascade controller, the master loop receives a signal from one sensor and takes 
either direct or reverse action, this is then used as the set point for the slave loop which 
receives a signal from the other sensor. The outputto the valve is either direct or reversed. 
The double output controller is where one input signal is transferred to two valves one 
direct and one reversed. In the case where the outputs are transferred in the same mode, 
le. direct or reversed, the regular controller can be used with the output Signal split by a 
signal splitter. 
The controller on manual only allows a control signal to pass to the control valve if the 
controller has been set back to automatic in error. 
A very large number of combinations of trip switch are possible so only the lower order 
ones have been given. The user will be able to compare the logic used in these to determine 
the correct way to formulate other combinations. They send a signal to a trip valve when 
the appropriate deviation is received. 
The variable switches are similar to the trip switches but they do not involve a separate 
sensor unit. 
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5.6.7 Other Instrument Units 
Electric Cable 
Instrument Air Pipe 
lIP Transducer 
PII Transducer 
Signal Splitter, 2 Outputs 
Vessel Port Splitter, 2 Outputs 
Signal Header, 2 Inputs 
High Signal Selector, 2 Inputs 
Low Signal Selector, 2 Inputs 
Set Point Unit 
Process Operator 
Process Control Computer 
High Alarm 
Low Alarm 
This group is used for electrical, pneumatic and signal type units. 
The electric cable model contains faults particular to wires and cables. 
The instrument air pipe is for use on pneumatic control and trip loops. It is used to convert 
an electrical model loop to a pneumatic model loop. It has failures of partial and complete 
blockage of the signal transmitted through it. 
The transducers convert an electrical signal to a pneumatic signal or vice versa using the 
instrument air utility. 
The splitter models are methods of producing two outputs of the same deviation and type 
as the input. One divides the signal deviation and the other divides the vessel variable 
deviation. 
The signal header produces the same output Signal as either of the input signals. 
The selectors compare two input Signals to produce one output. One produces the higher 
deviation to the output and the other gives the lower. 
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The set point unit is used on the controllers and trip switches and initiates the high and 
low set point faults during loop failure. 
The process operator unit is used to model the responses of humans. The input or inputs 
is from the alarm unit and the output goes to a remotely controlled valve. 
The process control computer is used to model the responses of computers. It is similar 
to the operator model. 
The alarm units are linked to sensors and operate when the signal is high or low. The 
faults deal with failures to operate or operation when there Is no alarm. 
5.6.8 Pump And Compressor Units 
Redprocating Compressor - Running 
- Stopped 
Centrifugal Compressor - Running 
- Stopped 
Redprocating Pump - Running 
- Stopped 
Centrifugal Pump - Running 
- Stopped 
Centrifugal Pump With Water Seal - Running 
- Stopped 
The pump group gives the units used to mechanically induce a flow or pressure increase 
In the stream. 
Redprocating pumps and compressors do not allow reverse flow through them, even 
when stopped. Rotary pumps can be modelled as reciprocating pumps. 
Centrifugal pumps and compressors include axial systems and allow reverse flow through 
them. The centrifugal pump will be the most common type required. 
The water seal pump Is a special case and has been developed to account for the faults 
that occur should the high pressure or low pressure seals become faulty. 
The running and stopped versions have been given so that complete pump banks can be 
. modelled rather than having dormant pump lines blanked off with dummy tails and heads. 
5-20 
5.6.9 Heat Exchanger And Heater Units 
Single Phase • Shell and Tube, Hot Fluid in Shell 
• Shell and Tube, Hot Fluid in Tubes 
- Frame and Plate, Hot Fluid in Side A 
- Frame and Plate, Hot Fluid in Side B 
- Double Pipe, Hot Fluid Inside 
- Double Pipe, Hot Fluid Outside 
- Finned Tube, Air 
Condenser - Shell and Tube, Partially Condensing Vapour in Shell 
- Shell and Tube, Condensing Vapour in Shell 
- Shell and Tube, Condensing Vapour in Tubes 
• Frame and Plate, Condensing Vapour in Side A 
- Frame and Plate, Condensing Vapour in SidEj B . 
• Double Pipe, Condensing Vapour Inside 
- Double Pipe, Condensing Vapour Outside 
- Finned Tube, Air 
Reboiler • Shell and Tube, Partially Boiling Uquid in Shell 
- Shell and Tube, Boiling Uquid In Shell 
- Shell and Tube, Boiling Uquid in Tubes 
- Frame and Plate, Boiling liquid in Side A 
- Frame and Plate, Boiling Uquld in Side B 
- Double Pipe, Boiling Uquid Inside 
Pipe heater 
Boiler 
Vaporiser 
Furnace 
Burner 
This group is used for basic heat transfer systems where the thermal properties of a stream 
are changed. 
There is no distinction made between heat exchangers containing gases/vapours or liquids 
that do not change phase because the fault properties and propagation equations are the 
same. 
Due to modelling restrictions on the number of ports, it is not possible to model phase 
changes on both sides of the heat exchanger. 
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Four types of heat exchanger are given as illustration. The shell and tube and the finned 
tube types can only be blocked on one side. The frame and plate and double pipe types 
can be blocked on both sides. This is the only characteristic which separates the type of 
heat exchanger otherwise their propagation and fault characteristics are the same. 
The pipe heater is a Simple pipe type unit with a utility supply, steam or electricity, that 
heats the contents of the pipe. Should the utility fall below normal rates or fail the exit 
temperatures will be low. 
The boiler is an extension to the pipe heater. It is a vessel with a utility supply to boil the 
liquid. The failures are low exit temperature and low flow out. 
The vaporiser and fumace are Similar to the boiler except they have a process supply link 
for the heating medium as opposed to a utility connection. 
I 
The bumer unit can be used for a more detailed study of a fumace unit or can be placed 
on a relief system to Simulate a flare or vent stack. The failures are poor buming or no 
flame which allows material to continue through the unit. This could then be detected in 
a top event as a cause of flammable material being present. 
5.6.10 Utility Units 
Instrument Air Supply 
Electrical Power Supply 
Steam Power Supply 
These are the utility units used to power or operate other units. The utility list has been 
revised and these are the only units grouped in this category. The process supply units 
fall into the pipeline end units category. These units are connected to other units via the 
'UL T' port type. 
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5.6.11 Containment Vessel Units 
Template Models - Open Uquld Containment Vessel 
- Closed Uquid Containment Vessel 
- Closed Pressurised Gas Containment Vessel 
- Closed Vacuum Gas Containment Vessel 
- Closed Pressurised Gas and Uquid Containment Vessel 
Gas Storage Vessel - Closed, Pressurised 
- Gas Holder, Floating Roof 
Uquld Storage Vessel, Atmospheric - Open 
- Fixed Roof 
- Floating Roof 
Uquid Storage Vessel, Pressurised 
Containment vessels are those where fluids can accumulate and represent storage or 
buffer vessels. 
The template models are multi-purpose units whose characteristics can be varied 
according to the ports that are connected. They can be used to develop the users' own 
specific model or can be used as they appear (see Chapter 7). 
The storage vessel is like a pipeline end unit because it either has inputs or outputs only. 
A large capacity means there will always be capacity for more flow in or out. 
5.6.12 Solids Handling Units 
Storage Silo 
Containment Hopper 
Power Cylinder 
Screw Feeder and Motor 
Feeder Belt and Motor 
Conveyor Belt 
Grinding Mill 
This equipment is specifically for solids handling units. 
The storage silo is a large capacity solids handling vessel. There are no inputs and an 
empty vessel is considered an impossible condition. The faults are blockages and solid 
hold-up. 
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The containment hopper is a smaller version of the storage hopper and can be used for 
intermediate storage. It is different from the storage hopper because it has input ports 
and output ports and has the additional fault of being empty. 
The power cylinder is a valve used to maintain the flow of solids from a hopper. A utility 
supply is connected. The valve can be blocked or become stuck. 
The screw feeder transfers the solids from the hopper. It is powered by a motor with a 
utility supply. Failures can be caused by loss of utility. blockages and overioad on motor. 
The feeder belt transfers the solids from the hopper to the main transportation device. It 
is powered by a motor connected to a utility supply. Failures can be caused by loss of 
utility or the gears system. 
The conveyor belt transfers the solids over large distances. A utility supply powers the 
motor. The failures are a broken or jammed belt in addition to the feeder belt failures. 
The grinding mill crushes the solid to a particular size of granule. It can fail due to overload 
or impediment by large objects. 
5.6.13 Reaction Vessel Units 
Tubular Reaction Vessel - Gas Phase 
- Uquid Phase 
Continuous Stirred Tank Reaction Vessel 
Packed Bed Reaction Vessel - Gas Phase 
- Uquid Phase 
Fluidised Bed Reaction Vessel - Gas Phase 
- Uquid Phase 
Catalytic Gauze Reaction Vessel - Gas Phase 
Semi-Batch Reaction Vessel - Filling 
- Reacting 
- Emptying 
Batch Reaction Vessel - Filling 
- Reacting 
- Emptying 
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This group contains the basic reaction vessel types. More research needs to be carried 
out Into the effects of the stoichiometry of the reaction and the thermal properties. 
The tubular reaction vessels are continuous and are similar to shell and tube heat 
exchangers. The reactants are pre-mixed and fed into the tubes where they are 
immediately brought up to the reaction temperature. The fluid on the shell side serves as 
a heat transfer medium. 
The continuous stirred tank reaction vessel has two reactant input streams. The reactants 
mix immediately on entry into the vessel. There is a single product outlet and ports for 
heating/cooling coils. 
The packed bed or catalytic reaction vessels have two inlets, which mix together, and an 
outlet stream. Failures can be blockages caused by foreign bodies or collapse, or changes 
In reaction rate caused by temperature changes or poisoned catalyst/reactants. 
The fluidised bed reaction vessels are similar to the packed bed reaction vessels but there 
is only one Inlet and outlet stream, ie. the reactants are pre-mixed. Failures are blockages 
caused by foreign bodies, collapse of the packing caused by low inlet flow, changes In 
reaction rate caused by temperature changes or poisoned catalyst. 
The catalytic gauze reaction vessel has two inlets and an outlet stream. The failures are 
blockages and poisoned catalyst. 
The semi-batch reaction vessel model has to be considered in three stages. The first 
stage is filling with the first reactant. The second stage is continuously adding the second 
reactant while taking off a product stream. Over the period considered the concentration 
of the second reactant remains constant giving a constant reaction rate and temperature 
under steady state. The final stage is where the vessel contents are emptied out. There 
Is also an inlet and outlet port for the heating/cooling coils. 
The batch reaction vessel model system is similar to the semi-batch model but both 
reactants are added in the first stage. They are then brought up to the reaction temperature 
and pressure to Initiate the reaction. The contents are then discharged in the final stage. 
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5.6.14 Mixing Vessel Units 
Binary Mixer, 2 Inputs 
The binary mixer combines two streams of different components into asingle outlet stream. 
The two inlet flow legs do not affect each other which is the case with the header unit. 
The two components do not have to be contained in the same solvent as long as the two 
solvents are completely miscible. 
5.6.15 Separation Vessel Units 
Gas-Gas Separation • Absorption Column, Packed 
- Absorption Column, Plate 
- Adsorption Column 
Gas-Liquid Separation - Wet Scrubber 
Liquid-Gas Separation - Steam Stripper 
Liquid-Liquid Separation - Steam Stripper 
- Distillation Column, Superheated Vapour Feed 
- Distillation Column, Saturated Vapour Feed 
- Distillation Column, Boiling Liquid Feed 
- Distillation Column, Sub-cooled Liquid Feed 
- Rectifying Column 
- Stripping Column 
- Decanting Vessel 
- Ion Exchanger 
- Flash Drum 
Gas-Solid Separation - Cyclone 
- Filter 
- Wet Scrubber 
- Electrostatic Precipitator 
Liquid-Solid Separation - Thickener/Clarifier 
- Hydrocyclone 
- Centrifuge 
- Filter 
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Solid-Liquid Separation - Rotary Dryer 
- Crystalising Evaporator 
- Concentrating Evaporator 
Solid-Solid Separation - Cyclone 
The packed absorption column has two Inlet and two outlet streams which are free to mix. 
There is some correlation between the pairs of streams. The failures are blockages due 
to foreign bodies and disintegration of the packing. There may also be carry-over of 
impurity due to excessive flow rates. 
The plate absorption column is similar to the packed column but only contains blockage 
failures due to foreign bodies. 
The adsorption column has a single inlet and outlet stream but Is packed with adsorbent. 
The failures are blockage and inefficiency due to saturated packing. 
The scrubbing column has two inlets and two outlet streams which can be considered to 
be independent. Only the composition of the pairs changes as the Impurities move from 
the gas to the liquid. 
The steam stripper has two inlets and two outlets. The streams can be considered to be 
independent because only the compositions change as the more volatile component 
moves to the steam stream. Failures are inefficiency and saturation. 
The distillation columns have a single feed inlet, two return inlets and two product outlet 
ports. They are assumed to be tray columns and have failures of blockage and inefficiency. 
They are categorised according to the state of the feed. 
The rectifying column and stripping column have a feed input and two outputs. One output 
stream is for the desired product and the other is for the residue. Failures are the same 
as for the distillation column. 
The decanting vessel has a single inlet and two outlet ports. The failure is inefficiency 
caused by high inlet flow. 
The ion exchange vessel has two Inlets and two outlets one of each being dead legs under 
normal operation. The failure Is saturation of the ion exchange beads. 
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The flash drum has a single inlet and two outlet ports, one for liquid and one for vapour. 
It has faults due to leaks. 
The cycloneJhydrocyclone has an inlet and two outlets. High inlet flow causes a deviation 
. in performance. I . 
The filter has an inlet, two outlets and a utility port. One outlet can be linked to the inlet 
and the other is for the removal of any solids collected. The failure is blockage caused by 
too much solid. 
The electrostatic precipitator has an Inlet and an outlet. Since it is used to separate small 
quantities of material which take a long period of time to build up it is thought unnecessary 
to have an outlet for the solids. There is a utility port for the electricity and the failure is 
the loss of this utility. 
The thickener/clarifier has an inlet and two outlets. Failure is inefficiency due to high flow. 
The centrifuge has an inlet and two outlets and a utility supply to produce the spinning 
motion required. High inlet fiow causes inefficiency. 
The rotary dryer has an inlet and two outlets, one for the dried stream and one for the 
moisture driven off. There is also a utility port and the failure is the loss of this. 
The evaporators have an inlet, two outlets and a utility port for the evaporating media. 
Failure is loss of utility. 
5.6.16 Note 
It should be noted that a particular condition of a unit may be either a fault or a functional 
state. For example, a controller may be set to manual control in error, in which case this 
is a fault condition, or intentionally, in which case it is in a desired state. For each situation 
a different model is required, respectively, a regular controller and a controller on manual. 
Other examples are a running pump and a stopped pump. 
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5.7 Top Event Model Library List 
The top event models are kept separate from the configuration data because then it is 
very easy to use different fault tree top events for the same configuration. The models 
consist of a named top event which has a set of event statements and/or decision tables 
describing its causes. The model usually has just one level although it is possible to have 
more. 
5.7.1 Top Event Models For Vessels 
There was a problem developing within the top event model library which could have 
resulted In the library becoming full. The problem was due to the wide variety of vessel 
models studied and the different variables looked at. 
Top event models for pipe type units have port 1 as the inlet and port 2 as the outlet. This 
poses no problems because the top event can be applied to any unit which has port 1 as 
the inlet and port 2 as the outlet such as sensors and valves. 
However, top events for vessels are different because these are linked directly to the 
vessel ports. This means a new model has to be produced for each vessel which has a 
different vessel port number (the vessel port number Is determined by the number of inlet 
ports plus the number of outlet ports plus one). A brief listing of some of the top event 
names highlights this point. 
UNDRTEMP IMPBHI OVERTEMP PRESTEMP EMPTY 3 
OVERPRES UNDRPRES OVRFLOW3 IMPAHI FLOWLO 
FLOW HI SEQ-ABRT LEV-LO-6 LEV-HI-6 EMPTY 6 
TANK-RUP RUP-TANK LEV-LO-8 LEV-LO-5 LEV-HI-4 
LEV-HI-3 LEV-LO-3 LOPRES-8 HIPRES-8 HIPRES-5 
SPHERRUP VES-RUPT REV FLOW NO FLOW . SOMEFLO 
Those names with a number in them refer to top events specific to vessel models and in 
particular to vessel models with the vessel port number the same as the number in the 
name. This is because the top event Is linked to a variable deviation which has the port 
number contained In It. An example of a typical top event for a vessel model Is shown In 
Figure 5.1. The Vessel port is port 3, and there is a single inlet port, port 1 and a single 
outlet port, port 2. The vessel can be emptied by no flow in AND some flow out. 
To prevent the top event model library from becoming full and without the need to delete 
models no longer in use a way was needed of making the models for vessels independent. 
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I 
G11N NONE 
EMPTY 3 
I 
AND 
I 
I 
020UT SOME 
Figure 5.1 • Old Top Event For Empty Vessel 
The proposed solution uses context or port independent models. The idea is to create a 
library of template models for the top event which contain no port numbers. These contain 
just an event statement linking the event to the variable index, port type, variable deviation 
and a blank where the port number normally is. 
An example of this type of top event Is given in Figure 5.2. 
1 EMPTY -"'1- Top Event 
I I I Model 
I OR I 
.1 I L Unit Model 1_ -+-- -1..--, 
I ~nvEsl NON~ I 
I AND I 
I I I I 
., G11N NONE Q20UT SOME, 
'-----------' 
Figure 5.2 • New Top Event Model For Empty Vessel 
It can be seen that the main difference between this and the one in Figure 5.1 Is that the 
Inlet and outlet ports are not used as part of the top event. The new models simply give 
the corresponding variable deviation for the top event name. The causes of the top event 
are then retrieved from the vessel model by the synthesis program. 
The top event model generation program EVTGEN, which converts the text Into a 
numerical form, was modified to accept this blank character and instead of assigning a 
positive integer corresponding to the text number it assigns '·1 '. 
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As an additional extra of this method the component letter, when defining a composition 
deviation, can be left blank for both pipe type events and vessel type events and the 
program will treat this In the same way. This is advantageous because there can be up 
to twenty components. 
This gives the top event model library a component and port independent set of models. 
The configuration data input program MASTER reads in the top event speCified by the 
user. If it is a context Independent model, the user must enter the component letter and/or 
port number required. The program then substitutes the correct index number into the 
model. 
The component letter system also adds the component letter chosen by the user to the 
end of the top event name which appears in the text at the top of the fault tree. This allows 
fault trees to be drawn for different components without confusion. 
5.7.2 Top Event Models For Pipes And Pipe-Type Units 
While working on the project it was noted that there was a difference in the formats used 
for top event models. The majority of the models used variable descriptions such as 
020UT and T20UT. This is expected because 0 and T are normally defined at the outlet 
ports (see Section 5.2.2.3). However, the models forthe pressure events used the variable 
descriptions P11N and R20UT. Although the methodology permits this it is not a normal 
occurrence because P is defined at outlet ports and R at iniet ports. 
Clearly it is desirable to maintain a consistent methodology so a study was carried out to 
determine if there were any reasons for using this format and if there are any reasons for 
not using the standard methodology. To help with this the configuration in Figure 5.3 was 
used. 
This is a simple flow control loop but due to the relationship between flow and pressure 
the configuration is sufficient for this example. The top event low pressure in unit 4 will 
be examined. 
It should be noted that pressure P is used to trace deviations to causes in upstream units 
using the outlet ports of each unit. However, since relief R is transmitted against the 
normal direction of flow it is used to trace deviations to causes in downstream units using 
the inlet ports of each unit. 
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5 
6 
Figure 5.3 - Configuration For Flow Control 
Using the original methodology for the causes we have P1lN LO and R20UT HI. The 
former translates to the event P 3 LO which is the inlet connection to the pipe unit. The 
minitree for this is found in the next unit because the pressure deviation is associated with 
outlet ports and the connection forms the outlet from the control valve. The latter translates 
to R 4 HI which is the outlet from the pipe unit. The minitree for this is found in the next 
unit because relief is associated with inlet ports and the connection forms the inlet to the 
dummy tail unit. The synthesised fault tree is shown in Figure 5.4. 
I 
R 4 HI 
I 
Spontaneous 
failures 
I 
OR 
I 
Cl-f-lA 
lOy 1 
lOW PRES 
Unit 4 
I 
OR 
I 
I 
lK-lP-EN 
Unit 3 
I 
PART-BlK 
Unit 3 
I 
P 3 lO 
I 
OR 
I 
P 2 lO 
I 
OR 
I 
P 1 lO 
Figure 5.4 - Fault Tree For Low Pressure Into The Pipe 
However this system by-passes the unit where the top event occurs. 
5-32 
Next the standard fonnat was used with RI IN HI and P20UT LO as the causes of the top 
event. These are translated to P 4 LO and R 3 HI, respectively, from the configuration 
diagram. The fonner is the outlet from the pipe and the latter is the inlet to the unit. 
Therefore the minitrees for these events are found in the unit model for the pipe and have 
causes P 3 LO and R 4 HI, respectively. As can be seen these events are on the other 
side of the unit and effectively the low pressure deviation has passed through the unit. 
The fault tree Is shown In Figure 5.5. 
I 
R 3 HI 
+ R ~ HI lK-J.-EN 
Unit 4 
lOW PRES 
Unit 4 
I 
OR , 
, I 
Spontoneous lK-lP-EN 
rORr" Unit 3 
OR 
I 
CL-r-LA l1' 1 
I 
PART-BlK 
Unit 3 
P ~ lO 
OR 
I 
P 2 LO 
I 
OR 
I 
P 1 LO 
I 
P 4 lO 
JR 
I LK-LP-EN 
Unit 4 
Figure 5.5 - Fault Tree For Low Pressure Out Of The Pipe 
I 
PART-BlK 
Unit 4 
By comparing Figures 5.4 and 5.5 it can be seen that the use of the nonnally defined 
models Introduces the failures of the pipe unit, unit 4. It is also found that there are no 
differences In the lower sections of the fault tree and this has been verified using a larger 
configuration. 
Since there are no reasons for keeping the original fonnat and it appears to be 
advantageous to change it to the standard fonnat, this has been carried out. This also 
maintains a rigid adherence to the methodology. 
However, it should be pointed outthatthe original fonnat gave top event causes for variable 
deviations entering the unit, whereas the new fonnat gives causes for variable deviations 
leaving the unit. This Is In compliance with the rest of the top event models which use 
variable deviations leaving the unit. Should a user wish to examine the causes of variable 
deviations entering a unit the new standardised fonnat of the top event model library will 
make it easier to develop the model. 
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5.7.3 Event Library 
The modified top event model library is shown in Table 5.5. Each model number has the 
prefix UE for undesired event. 
Table 5.5A - Top Event Models For Pipe Type Units 
Event Event Name Cause 
Number 
1 HIGH FLOW 020UTHI 
2 SOMEFLOW 020UT SOME or G11N SOME 
3 LOW FLOW 020UTLO 
4 NO FLOW 020UTNONE 
5 REV FLOW 020UTREV 
6 HIGHPRES P20UT HI or R11N LO or 
R11N NONE or R11N REV 
7 SOMEPRES P20UT SOME or R11N SOME 
8 LOWPRES P20UT LO or R11N HI 
9 NO PRES P20UT NONE or R11N NOP 
10 NORELlEF R11N NONE or P20UT NOR 
11 REVPRES P20UT REV large pressure sink upstream 
12 REVREL R11N REV large pressure source downstream 
13 HIGHTEMP T20UT HI and 020UT SOME or 
U11N HI and G11N REV 
14 LOW TEMP T20UT LO and 020UT SOME or 
U11N LO and G11N REV 
15 HIGHIMPa Xa20UT HI and 020UT SOME or 
Ya11N HI and G11N REV 
16 LOWIMPa Xa20UT LO and 020UT SOME or 
Ya11N LO and G11N REV 
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Table 5.5B - Top Event Models For Vessel Type Units 
Event Event Name Cause 
Number 
20 OVERLEVL LvVESHI 
21 UNDRLEVL LvVESLO 
22 EMPTY LvVESNONE 
23 OVERPRES PvVESHI 
24 UNDRPRES PvVESLO 
25 OVERTEMP TvVESHI 
26 UNDRTEMP TvVESLO 
27 OVERCONa XavVESHI 
28 UNDRCONa XavVES LO 
29 OVERWT MvVES HI 
30 UNDRWT MvVESLO 
. 
Table 5.5C - Other Top Event Models 
Event Event Name Cause 
Number 
50 TANK-RUP Complex 
51 VES-RUP Complex 
99 SEQ-ABRT SEQ-F-AT or SEQ-F-AF 
Notes: 
1. The 'a' in the composition events show the position of the blank in the model where 
the component letter has been omitted. 
2. The 'v' In the vessel events show the position of the blank In the model where the 
vessel port number has been omitted. 
3. The top events under other models are models used for specific configurations and 
the SEQ-ABRT event is for the sequence facility. 
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5.8 Secondary Failure Model Library List 
A secondary failure Is an additional failure caused by a variable deviation. An example 
Is low temperature in a pipe causing a blockage by freezing. This effect could be contained 
within the unit model but it then makes the model less context independent. Hence, the 
secondary failures are modelled separately in a similar way to top event models. 
The original methodology dealt with two specific types of secondary failure. The first 
involved physical properties and phase change effects. An example is low temperature 
in a pipe causing low flow due to Increased fluid viscosity. The second involved materials 
failures. An example is a leak in a pipe caused by corrosion as a result of an impurity. 
This terminology is no longer applicable as the scope ofthe secondary failures has widened 
beyond simple physical properties and phase change effects and materials failures. 
New definitions of the secondary failures has been Introduced to reflect this increased 
functionality. The effects of a secondary failure can be modelled in two ways, either as 
a basic fault or a variable deviation. Effects which use variable deviations are called Type 
I failures and those which use basic faults are called Type 11 failures. However, the models 
for the secondary failures are still given the 'PP' or 'MF' file prefixes In the library. 
5.8.1 Type I Failures 
Consider a heat exchanger used to cool a nitric acid stream with water. If an intemalleak 
occurs acid may enter the water stream or water enter the acid stream. In either case 
the result is an Impurity In the stream. Considering water in the acid stream then this may 
cause an exothermic reaction resulting in an increase in stream temperature. The 
secondary failure in this case is DILUTION and its causes are high concentration of the 
impurity and its effects are high temperature. 
This will appear in the fault tree as a secondary branch under a high temperature deviation. 
The first branch Is labelled 'Normal Causes' and traces the temperature deviation to other 
causes. The Second branch Is labelled 'Type I DILUTION' and traces causes of a high 
concentration. 
Some example models with the prefix PP are given in Table 5.6. It should be noted that 
names are limited to eight characters. 
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Table 5.6 - Type I Failure Models 
Event Event Name Cause Example Effects 
Number 
1# DILUTION X20UT HI and 020UT SOME THI 
Y11N HI and G11N REV UHI 
2 FLASHING P20UTREV TLO 
R11N HI and G11N REV ULO 
3 VAPORISE T20UT HI and 020UT SOME PHI 
U11N HI and G11N REV 
4 CONDENSE T20UT LO and 020UT SOME PLO 
U11N LO and G11N REV 
5 UOUEFY P20UTHI THI 
R11N REV and G11N REV UHI 
6 THICKEN T20UT LO and 020UT SOME OLO 
U11N LO and G11N REV GLO 
The secondary event models contain just the causes of the event linked to specific port 
numbers and port types. When the secondary failure is identified by the configuration 
data input program MASTER the user is prompted for the effects of the event. This input 
consists of the variable letter and the deviation only. The port numbers and types are not 
required for the effects because they are dealt within a plant context rather than a unit 
model context. Some example effects are given in Table 5.6. 
The event with the '#' already exists in the model library. The others have been given as 
examples of the type of event that can be used. 
5_8_2 Type 11 Failures 
This is used to extend the fault events from a simple base event to its variable deviation 
causes. It was initially used to represent leaks due to failures in materials of construction 
by corrosion (hence the MF prefix) but has been extended to cover all basic faults. 
Consider a simple pipe line containing a liquid which is close to its freezing point. Should 
the temperature drop then the liquid freezes and causes a partial blockage. The secondary 
failure in this case is FREEZING and its causes are low temperature and its effect is 
PART-BLK. 
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This will appear in the fault tree as a secondary branch under the PART-BLK fault. The 
fault becomes an intermediate event with a branch to the basic fault of the same name 
and a branch labelled 'Type" FREEZING'. The latter branch traces causes of low 
temperature. 
Some example models with the prefix MF and are given in Table 5.7. It should be noted 
that names are limited to eight characters. Again the models contain just the causes. 
The effect is entered by the user in the form of a basic fault. Some example effects are 
given in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 - Type" Failure Models 
Event Event Name Cause Example Effects 
Number 
1 # CORROSN X20UT HI and 020UT SOME LK-LP-EN 
Y11N HI and G11N REV 
2 # FREEZING T20UT LO and 020UT SOME PART-BLK 
U11N LO and G11N REV COMP-BLK 
3 # FREEZE1 E31N LO PART-BLK 
4# FREEZE2 E31N NONE COMP-BLK 
5 POLYRISE T20UT HI and 020UT SOME PART-BLK 
U11N HI and G11N REV 
The events with the 'I' already exist in the model library. The other has been given as 
an example of different causes of the same effect. 
5.9 Summary 
This chapter has given an inSight into the library lists used by the synthesis package. 
Discussion has been given on changes and improvements made during the project. These 
include the addition of two new variables for mass and electric current, the standardisation 
of the unit model library, the standardisation of the top event model library and a revision 
to the secondary failures model library. 
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Chapter 6 
Rules For Modelling Flow And Pressure 
. 6.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at the current methodology used for modelling flow and pressure. This 
fonns the base upon which fault propagation is achieved. 
6.2 Review Of Flow And Pressure Modelling In Pipes 
The basic principles for modelling flow and pressure were developed by Andow (1), 
Martin-Solis (2) and Kelly (3, 4). This has remained unchanged but additions have been 
made to deal with problems and situations which have occurred since the initial conception. 
6.2.1 The Modelling Of Flow 
The effects of flow faults propagate both upstream and downstream from the location of 
the fault. For example, a leak in a pipe will result In high flow into the pipe and low flow 
out of the pipe. This will cause high flow out of a unit upstream and low flow into a unit 
downstream of the pipe. 
The variable Q can only propagate the flow deviations in one direction, so another Is 
required for the other direction. Initially pressure P was chosen but confusion was 
encountered in the size of the absolute pressure required to cause no flow and reverse 
flow. However, pressure gradient G is ideal because it has a direct relationship with flow. 
For example, high flow is accompanied by a high pressure gradient and reverse flow (flow 
against the normal direction) is accompanied by a reverse pressure gradient. 
The two equations used to model flow in a pipe type unit are 
G1IN= F( Q11N, Q20UT) 
Q20UT= F( G11N, G20UT) 
The first equation gives the pressure gradient at the inlet port as a function of the flow 
rate Into the unit and of the flow rate through the outlet port. The second equation gives 
the flow rate through the outlet port as a function of the pressure gradients at the inlet 
port and at the outlet port. It is necessary to use both the inlet and the outlet ports because 
of the way two-way fault propagation is obtained. 
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This pair must be used in all pipe type units where the inlet flow is linked directly to the 
outlet flow of the unit and where there is no accumulation of mass. Additional variable 
names may be used inside the function part to simulate other effects such as a signal 
from a controller. 
For low flow the minitrees will take the form shown in Figure 6.1. 
G 1 LO 
(G1IN) 
I Q 1 LO 
(Q1IN) 
(a) 
I 
OR 
I 
Q d LO 
(Q20UT) 
Q 2 LO 
(Q20UT) 
I 
OR 
I 
I 
G 1 LO I G 2 LO 
(G1IN) (G20UT) 
(b) 
Figure 6.1 • Minitrees For Low Flow In A Pipe 
The port type identifier is not used in the fault tree. The characters in brackets are the 
propagation equation names so that the link between the minitree and the equations can 
be seen. 
To show how the two-way fault propagation is obtained consider the four units linked 
together as shown in Figure 6.2. 
4 
• 
10 
5 
• 
11 
6 
• 
12 
7 
• 
13 
Figure 6.2 • Simple Flow Section Of Plant 
8 
• 
The top event is low flow out of unit 11. The outlet variable is Q. therefore the top event 
translates to Q 6 LO. The relevant minitree is found in the model for unit 11 and is 
equivalent to Figure 6.1 (b). The port numbers used in the minitrees are changed to the 
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appropriate connection number. In this case port 2 is connection 6 and port 1 is connection 
5. The two events under the tree at this stage are G 5 LO and G 6 LO as shown in Figure 
6.3. 
Q 6 LO 
I 
OR 
I i I 
G 5 LO G 6 LO 
I I 
L OR OR I I 0 0 vc: Q 5 LO Q 7 LO Q LO I I 
/ OR OR I I vc: 0 0 G 4 LO G 7 LO G LO I I 
/ OR OR I I ~ 0 0 Q 4 LO 08 LO Q LO I I 
Branch tracing low flow deviations to Branch tracing low flow deviations to 
upstream causes downstream causes 
Figure 6.3 - Fault Tree For Low Flow In Connection 6 
It can be seen that the branch for G 5 LO has started to trace the deviation to an upstream 
cause. The G variable is defined at Inlet ports so the relevant minitree (Figure 6.1 (a)) 
will also be found In the model for unit 11. This will place the events a 6 LO and a 5 LO 
under an OR gate. However, the event a 6 LO already exists higher up the branch. This 
is therefore immediately deleted by the synthesis program, leaving just a 5 LO. The a 
variable is defined at outlet ports and therefore the relevant minitree will be found in the 
model for unit 10. Assuming the two propagation equations are the same in each model, 
then the next row of the branch will be G 5 LO and G 4 LO. In this case the G 5 LO term 
exists higher up and is therefore deleted. 
The G 6 LO term Is used to trace the deviation to a cause downstream. The G variable 
is defined at inlets so the minitree will be contained in the model for unit 12. This provides 
the events a 7 LO and a 6 LO. However, the a 6 LO term already exists further up the 
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branch and must be deleted. The Q 7 LO term is developed using the appropriate minitree 
from the model for unit 12. The next events are G 7 LO and G 6 LO of which the latter is 
deleted because it exists further up the branch. 
For tracing deviations to upstream causes the Q11N and G11N terms are used from the 
propagation equations. For tracing deviations to causes downstream the Q20UT and 
G20UT terms are used from the propagation equations. The daisy-chain effect between 
input and output variables and G and Q continues in both directions until termination. 
6.2.2 The Modelling Of Pressure 
Deviations of pressure, like flow, propagate upstream and downstream, therefore here 
again two variables are needed. In this case the pressure variable P and the relief variable 
R are used. Pressure is a presence of a pressure source and relief is a presence of a 
pressure sink. However, the deviations of the P and R variables are not related in the 
same way as the deviations of the G and a variables for flow. Therefore, the daisy-chain 
effect is not used on this pai r. 
In a process plant flow is from a point of high pressure to one of low pressure. Thus 
pressure deviations are transmitted in the normal direction of flow. A particular unit will 
experience pressure effects from units upstream. Relief deviations are transmitted against 
the normal direction of flow. A particular unit will experience relief effects from units 
downstream. 
In order to model pressure the variable P is defined as propagating out of normal outlet 
ports and the variable R is defined as propagating out of normal inlet ports. The POUT 
variable is used to trace pressure and relief deviations that are in units downstream, to 
causes upstream. The R IN variable is used to trace pressure and relief deviations that 
are in units upstream to causes downstream. This is used because a deviation propagating 
upstream from a downstream cause will propagate out of normal inlet ports. The two 
equations used to model pressure in a pipe type unit are 
R11N =F( R20UT) 
P20UT =F( P1IN) 
The first equation gives the relief at the in let port as a function of the relief into the unit. 
This is linked to the relief at the inlet of the next unit downstream. The second equation 
gives the pressure at the outlet port as a function of the pressure at the inlet port. This 
is linked to the pressure at the outlet port of the next unit upstream. 
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The possible deviations for the variables are given in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 - The Deviations Of Pressure And Relief 
Deviation Description 
POUTHI source of pressure upstream is high 
P OUT LO source of pressure upstream is low 
POUTNONE source of pressure upstream is negligible 
POUTSOME source of pressure upstream is significant 
POUT REV a pressure relief sink exists upstream 
POUTNOR no pressure relief sink exists upstream 
RINHI sink for pressure relief downstream is high 
RINLO sink for pressure relief downstream is low 
RIN NONE sink for pressure relief downstream is negligible 
RINSOME sink for pressure relief downstream is significant 
RIN REV a pressure source exists downstream 
RIN NOP no pressure source exists downstream 
It can be seen that certain combinations have the same effect. These are 
Some relief is present if the deviation R11N SOME or P20UT REV occurs. 
Some pressure is present if the deviation R11N REV or P20UT SOME occurs. 
No relief is present If the deviations R1 iN NONE and P20UT NOR occur. 
No pressure is present if the deviations R11N NOP and P20UT NONE occur. 
There is no linkage between the variables P and R in individual models. The propagation 
of pressure P is traced upstream from the point of interest and the propagation of relief 
R is traced downstream from that point. Hence, both must be specified in the top event 
model in order for pressure faults to be traced in both directions. For example, the top 
event HIGHPRES, representing high pressure in a pipe, involves the following elements 
events upstream - there exists a connection to a high pressure source, represented 
by P11N HI 
events downstream - there exists insufficient relief, no relief at all or a back pressure 
from downstream (R20UT LO, R20UT NONE or R20UT REV) 
These must be linked together under an OR gate from which the deviations can be traced 
to their causes in the appropriate direction. 
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6.2.3 The Modelling Of Total Component Flow 
It is sometimes necessary to model the flow of a particular component as opposed to the 
overall flow. Consider the reaction vessel shown in Figure 6.4 which has a diluted oxygen 
feed. 11100 much oxygen enters the reaction vessel a runaway reaction may occur. Causes 
of too much oxygen may be a high concentration of oxygen or a high flow rate Into the 
reaction vessel. The oxygen is diluted by an inert gas. Therefore, a low flow of inert gas 
may cause a high oxygen concentration or a high flow of Inert gas may cause a high flow 
rate into the reaction vessel. Neither, however, results In too much oxygen entering the 
reaction vessel. 
Oxygen 
I Reactont Inert Gas 
Reactor 
"T Product 
Figure 6.4 • Simple Reaction Vessel 
Total component flow is designed to overcome this problem by removing the contradictory 
events. It Is the product of the flow rate and composition of a component in a stream. 
The total component flow operator '181', takes the form 
T3VES= F( G11N 181 X1IN) 
The propagation equation is resolved into minitrees where G11N and X11N have the same 
deviations. The total component flow term can also be used In event statements which 
take the form 
V G11N 181 X11N LO: effects 
However, the algorithm used to resolve the event statements and decision tables into 
numerical minitrees means that the total component flow operator cannot be combined 
with an AND gate because this results in all the other terms being affected by the operator 
as well. 
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6.3 Pressure Deviations In Vessels 
The version 2 methodology of Mullhl (5) for modelling pressure uses the same set of 
deviations for vessels as for pipe type units. This gives the set of variable and deviation 
combinations for vessels given in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 • The Old Deviations For Pressure In Vessels 
Deviation Description 
PVESHI high pressure inside vessel 
PVESLO low pressure inside vessel 
PVES NONE no pressure inside vessel 
P VES SOME some pressure inside vessel 
P VES REV reverse pressu re inside vessel 
PVESNOR no pressure relief sink inside vessel 
Not all of these combinations are appropriate to vessels. The 'some' deviation can be 
removed by assuming that a vessei will normally always have a certain degree of pressure. 
The 'none' deviation is a more extreme form of low pressure. When applied to vessels 
the 'reverse' deviation has no physical meaning and should be removed. The 'nor' 
deviation is a more extreme form of high pressure. 
The methodology for pressure in vessels has been modified to remove these anomalies. 
The new deviation list is given in Tabie 6.3. 
Table 6.3· The New Deviations For Pressure In Vessels 
Deviation Description 
PVESNOR no pressure relief sink inside vessel 
PVESHI high pressure Inside vessel 
PVES LO low pressure inside vessel 
PVES NONE no significant pressure inside vessel 
In order for the new methodology to be incorporated some alterations had to be made to 
the synthesis package. A separate file forthe vessel pressure deviations had to be created. 
This simply contains a list of deviations which can be coupled with the pressure variable 
and vessel port type. The general reference files giving pointer information had a new 
line added to them giving pointer numbers specifically for the vessel pressure. The 
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programs were updated to make use of this new Information. This involved changing the 
index number for pressure to the index number for vessel pressure if the port type of the 
variable deviation was a vessel port. 
This has eliminated some of the problems encountered when pipe type deviations for 
pressure were applied to vessel ports. 
6.4 The Relationship Between Flow And Pressure In Vessels 
Vessels are defined as units in which there is an accumulation of mass and/or energy. 
This may affect the deviations of variables at the inlet and/or outlet ports. For example, 
the liquid level may affect the flow in and the flow out of the vessel. 
To model vessels it is necessary to be able to model certain internal variables. By definition, 
variables can only exist at ports, so an internal port is required. This Is called the vessel 
port since It is mainly used on vessels. Variables associated with this port are pressure, 
temperature, composition, level, mass and flow between phases. The latter is used in 
reboilers and condensers and is described In Chapter 8. 
Due to the accumulation effects deviations do not propagate directly from the inlet port 
to the outlet port or vice versa. The incoming variable deviations are transmitted to the 
vessel port variables and these affect the out going variables. 
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6.5 Original Methodology For Modelling Flow And Pressure In Vessels 
The original methodology for modelling vessels was very sketchy on which variables affect 
what. The next four sub·sections give a brief account of the principles involved for four 
types of vessel. These describe an open vessel and closed vessels containing liquid, 
gas/vapour or both. 
The variables used for modelling were the level and the intemal pressure. The level 
represented the accumulation of liquid in the vessel and also the pressure on a port below 
the liquid surface equivalent to the head of liquid above that port. The intemal pressure 
was simply the gas/vapour pressure above any liquid level in the vessel. 
6.5.1 Open Vessel For Liquids 
Open vessels only contain liquid. Flow Into and out of the vessel was modelled using the 
level. These vessels do not have an Intemal pressure butthe liquid above the port opening 
exerts a pressure equivalent to the head of liquid. Therefore, the pressure Into and out 
of the vessel was modelled using the level of liquid. The level was modelled using the 
flows in and out of the vessel. The following propagation equations were used in the 
original model 
G1IN= F( Q11N, L3VES) 
R1IN= F( -L3VES) 
Q20UT = F( G20UT, L3VES) 
P20UT = F( L3VES) 
L3VES= F( G11N, -Q20UT) 
6.5.2 Closed Vessel For GasesNapours 
A closed vessel containing only gas/vapour does not have a level term. The flows and 
pressures into and out of the vessel were modelled using the intemal pressure. The 
intemal pressure was modelled using the gas/vapour flow In and out of the vessel. 
However, this caused problems when modelling pressures in a plant. 
It is clear that high flow rate of gas into the vessel may cause a high intemal pressure but 
also if the gas entering the vessel Is at a high pressure then this may also cause high 
intemal pressure. The model containing just the propagation equation for pressure 
adequately modelled the effect of flow on the intemal vessel pressure but not the incoming 
gas pressure. In order to model pressure effects more fully It was necessary to use an 
event statement and a decision table. The event statement simply related high inlet 
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pressure to high intemal pressure and the decision table gave the effect of no relief into 
the vessel and out of the vessel as a cause of high intemal pressure. The following 
propagation equations, event statement and decision table were used in the original model 
G1IN= F( 011N, -P3VES) 
R1IN= F( -P3VES) 
020UT= F( G20UT, P3VES) 
P20UT = F( P3VES) 
P3VES= F( G1IN, -020UT) 
V P11N HI: P3VES HI 
V P11N NOR AND V R20UT NONE: P3VES HI 
6.5.3 Closed Vessel For Liquids With·A Confined Vapour Space 
A closed vessel containing a liquid and a confined vapour space only has ports for the 
liquid leaving the vapour trapped. This vessel has both a level term and an intemal 
pressure term. The flows and pressures into and out of the vessel were modelled using 
the intemal pressure because the level tenn was incorporated in the pressure tenn. The 
level was modelled in the same way as the open vessel, as a function of the flows of liquid 
Into and out of the vessel. There are no gas flows but it was assumed that the intemal 
pressure was dependent on the level of liquid and the temperature of the vessel. The 
level was used because as the level rises the vapour will be compressed increasing the 
intemal pressure. The temperature was used because the vapour above the liquid is 
usually the gaseous phase of the liquid. This means that the quantity and pressure of 
the vapour will be dependent on the temperature of the vessel. As the temperature rises 
the vapour pressure of the liquid will increase. The following propagation equations were 
used in the original model 
G1IN= F( 011N, -P3VES) 
R1IN= F( -P3VES) 
020UT= F( G20UT, P3VES) 
P20UT = F( P3VES) 
L3VES= F( G1IN, -020UT) 
P3VES= F( L3VES, T3VES) 
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6.5.4 Closed Vessel For Liquids With GasNapour Space Connections 
A closed vessel containing both liquids and gases/vapours has five ports, an Inlet and 
outlet for the liquid, an Inlet and outlet for the gas/vapour and a vessel port. The liquid 
ports were assumed to always be below the level of the liquid and the gas/vapour ports 
always above it. Again the flows and pressures of all the ports were modelled using the 
intemal pressure. The level was modelled as before as a function of the flows of liquids 
into and out of the vessel. The intemal pressure was modelled using the flows of the 
gas/vapour in addition to the level and temperature. The same event statement and 
decision table was used to model the pressure effects as in the gas/vapour vessel. The 
following propagation equations, event statements and decision tables were used in the 
original model 
G1IN= F( Q1IN, -P5VES) 
R1IN= F( -P5VES) 
Q20UT = F( G20UT, P5VES) 
P20UT = F( P5VES) 
G3IN= F( Q31N, -P5VES) 
R3IN= F( -P5VES) 
Q40UT = F( G40UT, P5VES) 
P40UT= F( P5VES) 
L5VES= F( G11N, -Q20Un 
P5VES= F( G31N, -Q40UT, L5VES, T5VES) 
V P31N HI: P5VES HI 
V P31N NOR AND V R40UT NONE: P5VES HI 
6.5.5 Problems With The Original Methodology 
The four vessel models described in the previous sections use a different methodology 
for the different types of vessel. The level is used to model liquids and the internal pressure 
is used for gases/vapours. In tum these intemal variables affect either the liquid flows or 
the gas/vapour flows. The relief and pressure deviations are also affected by either the 
level or pressure. 
Clearly it is desirable to combine these differences Into a single term such that a systematic 
approach can be used for automatic vessel model generation. 
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6.6 The Effective Pressure In Vessels 
It Is possible to simplify the methodology by redefining the pressure tenn in a vessel. 
Instead of using the internal pressure, which refers to the gaslvapour space, the 'effective 
vessel pressure' is used and is applied to both liquids and gases/vapours. 
The principles used are similar to the original methodology for a vessel containing both 
liquids and gases/vapours. The internal pressure was used for gases/vapours and 
represented the pressure exerted by this phase. The effective vessel pressure 
incorporates the effects the liquid in the vessel has on a port. There are three sets of 
tenns used in the effective vessel pressure propagation equation 
- the flows of gases/vapours into and out of the vessel, if these ports exist 
- the level of the liquid in the vessel, if liquid is present 
- the internal temperature of the vessel, if a there is a gas/vapour space 
These translate to 
P5VES= F( G31N, -Q40UT, and/or -L5VES, and/or T5VES) 
The level is still defined as a function of the flow rate of liquid into and out of the vessel. 
L5VES= F( G11N, -Q20UT) 
The flows and reliefs into the vessel are negative functions ofthe effective vessel pressure, 
if this applies, for all port types. 
GlIN= F( Q11N, -P5VES) 
G3IN= F( Q31N, -P5VES) 
R1IN= F( -P5VES) 
R3IN= F( -P5VES) 
The flows and pressures out of the vessel are positive functions of the effective pressure, 
if this applies, for all port types. 
Q20UT = F( G20UT, P5VES) 
Q40UT= F( G40UT, P5VES) 
P20UT = F( P5VES) 
P40UT = F( P5VES) 
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This makes all the flow and pressure propagation equations identical for all the vessels 
and the level propagation equation is the same for all vessel with liquids. The only 
changeable propagation equation is for the effective pressure and this is made up from 
a combination of four variables which should be used for different situations. 
In the following sections it is convenient to consider ports to be either in the gas/vapour 
space or at the bottom of the liquid space. A port in the liquid space but above the bottom 
simply has an effective pressure equal to one at the bottom of the liquid space less the 
effective pressure equivalent to the height of the port above the bottom. However, 
deviations of the level will cause the same deviations in the pressure regardless of the 
positions of the port providing it remains submerged. 
Some important distinctions on effective pressure for any inlet or outlet port are 
Vessel open, liquid only: liquid level 
Vessel closed, liquid plus gas/vapour space: liquid level + 
gas/vapour temperature 
Vessel closed, gas/vapour only: 
Vessel closed, liquid and gas/vapour 
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gas/vapour pressure + 
gas/vapour temperature 
liquid level + 
gas/vapour pressure + 
gas/vapour temperature 
6.7 Rules For Modelling Flow And Pressure In Vessels 
The previous sections have shown that modelling flow and pressure in vessels is quite 
complex. The introduction of the effective vessel pressure has reduced the problem and 
the next sections deal with simplifying the process by grouping the vessels under different 
headings. SpecifiC propagation equations can then be applied along with their associated 
event statements and decision tables. 
In order to describe the flow and pressure relationship it is necessary to make distinctions 
between various types of vessel and port. These are 
Vessel fluid • Uquid 
• Gas/Vapour 
• Uquid and Gas/Vapour 
Vessel closure • Vessel open (to atmosphere) 
• Vessel closed 
Vessel port location • Uquid space, at bottom 
• Uquid space, above bottom 
• Gas/Vapour space 
Flow to connecting unit • Dependent 
• Independent 
Dependent is defined here to mean that flow is affected by the effective pressure of the 
vessel. 
6.7.1 Unit Connections 
For flow into or out of the port of a vessel the driving force is the pressure difference 
between the vessel and the next unit. Two types of unit have been considered, another 
vessel and a pressure raising device (compressor or pump). The next unit may be 
upstream or downstream. This gives rise to the arrangements of unit connections given 
in Table 6.4 and Figure 6.5. 
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Table 6.4 - Basic Unit Connections 
Upstream Unit Downstream Unit 
Vessel Vessel 
PRC Vessel 
PRR Vessel 
Vessel PRC 
Vessel PRR 
Notes: 
PRC = Pressure raiser, centrifugal 
PRR = Pressure raiser, reciprocating, rotary 
I-I Vessel • • • 
Vessel Vessel 
• • ~rp-RR··~------}-~·---
Vessel 
--··~------}-~·~~PR: 
Vessel 
Figure 6.5 - Basic Unit Connections 
The difference in pressure also determines if the flow into or out of the unit is affected by 
changes in the effective pressure of the vessel. Therefore it is necessary to define the 
connections which are based on the vessel and port types and the unit connections. The 
distinctions made give rise to the arrangements of flow connections shown in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5 • Flow Connections 
Case Upstream Unit Downstream Unit Fluid Flow Connection 
1 Open vessel Open vessel Uquid Dependent 
2 Open vessel Open vessel Uquid Independent 
3 Open vessel Closed vessel Uquid Dependent 
4 Closed vessel Closed vessel Uquid Dependent 
5 Closed vessel Closed vessel Gas/vapour Dependent 
6 Closed vessel Open vessel Uquid Dependent 
7 Closed vessel Open vessel Uquid Independent 
8 PRC Open vessel Uquid Dependent 
9 PRC Open vessel Uquid Independent 
10 PRC Closed vessel Uquid Dependent 
11 PRC Closed vessel Uquid Independent 
12 PRC Closed vessel Gas/vapour Dependent 
13 PRR Open vessel Uquid Independent 
14 PRR Closed vessel Uquid Independent 
15 PRR Closed vessel Gas/vapour Independent 
16 Open vessel PRC Uquid Independent 
17 Closed vessel PRC Uquid Independent 
18 Closed vessel PRC Gas/vapour Independent 
19 Open vessel PRR Uquid Independent 
20 Closed vessel PRR Uquid Independent 
21 Closed vessel PRR Gas/vapour Independent 
In some cases the flow can be dependent or independent. This occurs with open vessels 
where the elevation of the downstream unit can be above or below the upstream unit. In 
cases 10 and 11, the effective pressure difference between the pressure raiser and the 
closed vessel may be small or large and consequently changes in the effective pressure 
of the vessel mayor may not affect the flow. Further information is given in Section 7.2.2. 
6.7.2 Propagation Equations And Associated Event Statements 
Having defined the arrangements to be considered, it is now possible to develop the 
corresponding propagation equations. The equations of interest are those for flow C, 
pressure gradient G, pressure P, relief R and level L. 
For a vessel with one inlet, one outlet and a vessel port, the propagation equations may 
involve the following terms. 
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Inlet port 
GlIN= F( QlIN and -P3VES) 
RlIN= F( -P3VES) 
U1IN= F( T3VES) 
Y1IN= F( X3VES) 
Outlet port 
Q20UT = F( G20UT and P3VES) 
P20UT = F( P3VES) 
T20UT= F( T3VES) 
X20UT = F( X3VES) 
Vessel port 
L3VES= F( GlIN, -Q20UT) 
P3VES= F( GlIN, -Q20UT and/or L3VES and/or T5VES) 
T3VES= F( T11 N) 
X3VES= F( X1IN) 
Notes 
1. These do not Include the terms for pressure raising devices. 
2. The temperature and composition equations have been included for completeness, 
they are the same for all types. No further references to them are made. 
3. The P3VES term is the effective pressure. 
Event statements have to be used to supplement the propagation equations. Those used 
depend on the type of vessel and the type of port. The event statements are given in the 
sections for each port type. 
6.7.2.1 Inlet Ports 
The inlet port of interest is on the downstream unit. This is connected to the outlet port 
on the upstream unit. The flow characteristic between the two units depends on the units 
themselves and is given in Table 6.5. Cases 16 to 21 are not used because these are 
pressure raising devices. 
The basic equation for pressure gradient G is 
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G1IN= F( Q1IN) 
This is applied to units which have independent fiow. 
If there is a dependence on the effective pressure the propagation equation is 
G1IN= F( Q11N, -P3VES) 
The propagation equation for relief R is the same for all the vessel type units. It shows 
that the relief and pressure into the vessel is dependent on the effective pressure. 
R1IN= F( -P3VES) 
An event statement is used to give the causes of no or reverse flow or pressure as high 
effective pressure. 
V P3VES HI: G11N NONE, G11N REV, R11N NONE, R11N REV 
In the cases considered in Table 6.5, the propagation equation for G at the inlet port of 
the downstream unit is shown in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 - Inlet Ports 
Case Propagation Equations 
1 G1IN= F( Q11N, -P3VES) 
2 G1IN= F( Q1IN) 
3 G1IN= F( Q11N, -P3VES) 
4 G1IN= F( Q11N, -P3VES) 
5 G1IN= F( Q11N, -P3VES) 
6 G1IN= F( Q11N, -P3VES) 
7 G1IN=F(Q1IN) 
8 G1IN= F( Q11N, -P3VES) 
9 GlIN= F( Q1IN) 
10 G1IN= F( Q11N, -P3VES) 
11 G1IN= F( Q1iN) 
12 G1IN= F( Q11N, -P3VES) 
13 GlIN= F( Q1IN) 
14 GlIN= F( Q1IN) 
15 GlIN= F( Q1IN) 
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6.7.2.2 Outlet Ports 
The outlet port of interest is on the upstream unit. This Is connected to the Inlet port on 
the downstream unit. The flow characteristic between the two units depends on the units 
themselves and Is given In Table 6.5. Cases 8 to 15 are not used because these units 
are pressure raising devices. 
The basic equation for flow Q is 
Q20UT = F( G20UT) 
This is applied to units which have Independent flow. 
If there is a dependence on the effective pressure then the P3VES term must be added 
to give 
Q20UT= F( G20UT, P3VES) 
The propagation equation for pressure P Is the same for all vessel type units. It gives the 
pressure at the outlet port as being dependent on the effective pressure. 
P20UT = F( P3VES) 
In the cases considered in Table 6.5, the propagation equations for Q at the inlet port of 
the downstream unit is shown in Table 6.7. 
There is one event statement that is necessary to supplement the propagation equations 
in some of the cases. This deals with no pressure causing reverse flow and pressure into 
the vessel. 
V P3VES NONE: Q20UT REV, P20UT REV 
The cases with the '(ES)' indicate that the event statement is optional because reverse 
flow may not be possible through a reciprocating pump. 
There are also two decision tables that are necessary to deal with the causes of no level 
and the consequences of no level. These are 
V G11N NONE V Q20UT SOME T L3VES NONE 
V G11N NONE V L3VES NONE T Q20UT NONE, P20UT NONE 
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The right hand column of Table 6.7 indicates whether the event statement or decision 
tables are necessary for the particular case number. 
Table 6.7 - Outlet Ports 
Case Propagation Equation Event SlatemenV 
Decision Table 
1 020UT= F( G20UT, P3VES) DT 
2 020UT = F( G20UT) DT 
3 020UT= F( G20UT, P3VES) DT 
4 020UT= F( G20UT, P3VES) ESand DT 
5 020UT = F( G20UT, P3VES) ES 
6 020UT = F( G20UT, P3VES) ESand DT 
7 020UT = F( G20UT) ESand DT 
16 020UT = F( G20UT) DT 
17 020UT = F( G20UT) ESand DT 
18 020UT = F( G20UT) ES 
19 020UT = F( G20UT) DT 
20 020UT = F( G20UT) (ES) and DT 
21 020UT = F( G20UT) (ES) 
6.7.2.3 Vessel Ports 
The vessel of interest in this section is the downstream unit and contains either liquid or 
gas/vapour, as defined in Table 6.5, but not both. Only cases 1 to 15 are considered 
because the others are pressure raising devices which do not have vessel ports. 
The temperature and composition variables are the same for all cases. They are 
T3VES= F( T11 N) 
X3VES= F( X1IN) 
These propagation equations only deal with flow in the normal direction. In order to use 
flow in the reverse direction the equations have to be supplemented with the following 
decision tables 
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V 020UT REV V U20UT HI T T3VES HI 
V 020UT REV V U20UT LO T T3VES LO 
V 020UT REV V Y20UT HI T X3VES HI 
V 020UT REV V Y20UT LO T X3VES LO 
For a liquid only vessel the level is a function of the liquid flows into and out of the vessel. 
The propagation equation is 
L3VES= F( G11N, -020UT) 
This can only produce minitrees for events which are directly linked. Therefore it is 
necessary to supplement it with event statements forthe more extreme variable deviations 
of the flows and the level. The following event statements are required 
V G11N NONE: L3VES LO 
V G 11 N REV: L3VES LO, L3VES NONE 
V 020UT NONE: L3VES HI 
V 020UT REV: L3VES HI 
The second column in Table 6.S indicates whether the level equation and associated 
event statements are needed in the model. 
The effective pressure term depends on the type of unit being considered. 
For vessels with gas/vapour only the propagation equation is a function of the gas/vapour 
flows Into and out of the vessel and the temperature of the gas/vapour. 
P3VES= F( G11N, -020UT, T3VES) 
Event statements and a decision table are required to deal with the extreme deviations 
of the flows and additional causes of high vessel pressure. 
V G11N NONE: P3VES LO 
V G11N REV: P3VES LO 
V 020UT NONE: P3VES HI 
V 020UT REV: P3VES HI 
This is set A in Table 6.S. 
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For open vessels which will contain just liquids the propagation equation is 
P3VES= F( L3VES) 
An additional cause of low pressure is no level which requires an event statement 
V L3VES NONE: P3VES LO 
This Is set B in Table 6.B. 
For closed vessels containing just liquids the propagation equation also has the 
temperature term. 
P3VES= F( L3VES, T3VES) 
The leveVpressure event statement is also required for this vessel type. 
V L3VES NONE: P3VES LO 
This Is set B again. 
This section has dealt with three types of vessel, open containing liquid, closed containing 
liquid and closed containing gas/vapour. This is sufficient for modelling individual phases. 
However, if a vessel contains both a liquid and a gas/vapour it is necessary to change 
the port numbers. The propagation equations and associated event statements are the 
same apart from this. In the following example the vessel layout has an Inlet and an outlet 
port for the liquid (ports 1 and 2, respectively) and an inlet and an outlet port for the 
gas/vapour (ports 3 and 4, respectively). The level equation is 
L5VES= F( G1IN, -Q20UT) 
and has the following event statements 
V G11N NONE: L5VES LO 
VG11N REV: L5VES LO, L5VES NONE 
V Q20UT NONE: L5VES HI 
V Q20UT REV: L5VES HI 
The pressure equation is 
P5VES= F( G3IN, -Q40UT, T5VES) 
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with the following event statements 
V G31N NONE: P5VES LO 
V G31N REV: P5VES LO 
V 040UT NONE: P5VES HI 
V 040UT REV: P5VES HI 
V L5VES NONE: P5VES LO 
If this layout is used In the model it should be noted that the port numbers must be changed 
accordingly in the other propagation equations and event statements used in the model. 
Table 6.8 • Vessel Ports 
Case Propagation Equations Set 
1 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES) B 
2 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES) B 
3 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES, T3VES) B 
4 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES, T3VES) B 
5 · P3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT, T3VES) A 
6 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES) B 
7 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES) B 
8 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES) B 
9 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES) B 
10 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES, T3VES) B 
11 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES, T3VES) B 
12 
· 
P3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT, T3VES) A 
13 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES) B 
14 L3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT) P3VES= F( L3VES, T3VES) B 
15 
· 
P3VES= F( G1IN, ·020UT, T3VES) A 
6.8 Summary 
This chapter has given a revision of the methodology used for modelling flow and pressure 
In pipe type units. A new methodology has been given for the modelling of flow and 
pressure in vessel type units. This process has been adapted in the next chapter on 
automatic generation of complete vessel models. 
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Chapter 7 
Rules For The Generation Of Vessel Models 
7.1 Introduction 
In an ideal situation any computer aided fault tree synthesis package would contain a unit 
model library or minitree database sufficient enough to cover every possible situation. 
However, this is very unlikely due to the large variety 01 different units lound in the process 
industry. Experience gained lrom studying different plant systems indicates that the most 
likely unit requiring a new model to be developed is the vessel or tank storage unit. For 
this particular class 01 unit the wide variety is due to the multiple combinations 01 inlet and 
outlet ports and the particular types 01 port used. This results in the user requiring an 
understanding ofthe complex methodology used lorvessel models. Hence the processing 
required in developing a new model can be time consuming. 
Two approaches have been used to make the process easier lor the user, a vessel model 
generation routine and a set of vessel model template examples. They were developed 
in parallel so that the generation routine produced the same result as the template and 
the template was used to check that each vessel type and port type produced was correct. 
7.2 Vessel Characteristics 
In order for a systematic approach to be used to generate vessel models it is necessary 
to categorise the different vessels. Once the characteristics have been identified, any 
vessel can be sorted and modelled appropriately. 
The data required to model the vessel is collected in two sections, the lirst is the general 
information about the overall vessel layout and the second is information about each port. 
All 01 this information is available on a normal piping and instrumentation diagram. 
7.2.1 Overall Vessel Layout 
The overall vessel information deals with the basic vessel type and its contents. These 
include atmospheric influences and the number and type 01 ports. Although there are 
numerous vessel types as given in Perry (2) and Coulson (4), lor the purpose of fault 
modelling they can be grouped into either an open or a closed vessel category. 
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The vessel contents can be either liquid, gas/vapour or both. It Is assumed that any solids 
that may be contained In the fluid will not affect the modelling for which this information 
is required. For a liquid only container it is necessary to determine if the vessel is open 
to the atmosphere (this includes floating roof vessels) or if it is a closed container. All 
vessels containing gas/vapour are assumed to be closed to the atmosphere since the 
gas/vapour pressure Is likely to Introduce pressure Influences. This Information Is shown 
in Figure 7.1. 
Open Vessel I Liquid Closed Vessel 
Fluid Gas/vapour Closed Vessel Type 
Both Closed Vessel 
Figure 7.1 - Overall Vessel Layout 
It has been assumed that a closed vessel containing liquid only is not filled to the top and 
therefore contains a certain amount of vapour or gas above the liquid surface. The design 
of the vessel is such that this vapour is unable to escape through any of the ports and 
must remain inside until it condenses (or dissolves in the case of a gas). For the purpose 
of modelling It Is assumed that the mass of gas/vapour remains constant A vessel of this 
type has no gas/vapour ports. 
This information Is required for modelling the flow through the ports and for modelling the 
pressure within the vessel. Since the characteristics cover open and closed vessels for 
liquids and gases/vapours the vessel pressure term used is really an effective vessel 
pressure. It deals with the pressure exerted atthe ports by the liquid and/or the gas/vapour. 
It may depend on any combination of the gas/vapour flows In and out, the level of the 
liquid and the temperature of the gas/vapour in the gas/vapour space. The liquid level is 
considered because this will exert a pressure directly at the liquid ports proportional to 
the head of liquid. An increase In level will result in an Increase in the effective vessel 
pressure. The temperature of the gas/vapour in the gas/vapour space is considered 
because as the temperature rises, the gas/vapour pressure rises Increasing the vessel 
pressure. 
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The reason for the large numbers of different vessels is due to the enormous variations 
in numbers and combinations of inlet and outlet ports. The ports must be defined as either 
an inlet port or an outlet port. In some cases there may be situations where the port on 
the vessel is a non-flow port under normal operating conditions, ie. there will be normally 
no flow through the port. In these cases it must be decided if the port could act as an 
inlet port, for example the port may be connected to a redundant inlet pump, or an outlet 
port such as a drain line. There may, however, be instances where it is impossible to 
determine the port type and in these cases the port should be treated as an outlet port 
because it could become the source of a leak. Care should be taken with this assumption 
because on a vessel which operates under vacuum pressure a port which leaked would 
become an inlet port but if above atmospheric pressure it would become an outlet port. 
7_2.2 Port Information 
The information required about each port is whether it has flow or not, if it is in the 
gas/vapour or liquid side and how the fluid is or would be transported to or from the vessel. 
In order to determine if the no flow variable deviation is a fault condition or a normal 
condition the port must be specified as having flow or not having flow under normal 
operating conditions. The latter case will probably be due to a closed hand valve further 
upstream, or downstream, as appropriate. 
Port opening above 
--{any liquid level 
Norma"y no flow 
Port opening below 
any liquid level 
Port 
Type 
Norma"y flow 
[Port used for gas/vapour 
Port used for liquid 
Figure 7.2 - Port Types 
The flow properties of liquids and gases/vapours are modelled differently and their effects 
on the vessel properties are different, therefore, the type of fluid passing through the port, 
under normal conditions, must be specified. In situations where the stream connected to 
a port has two phase fiow it is necessary to determine whether the fluid contains mainly 
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liquid or mainly gas/vapour and must be defined accordingly. An option for defining a 
port with two phases has not been used because this complicates the modelling required 
since varying degrees of saturation will result in varying effects on the level and pressure 
and the flow rate. For non-flow ports, the port opening may be defined as above or below 
the level of the liquid. This is used should a leak or flow occur through the port. This 
information is shown in Figure 7.2. 
The flow behaviour through each of the ports is dependent on two factors. These are the 
vessel pressure and the ability for reverse flow. As a means of illustration three modes 
of transportation have been used. There is reciprocating pumping, centrifugal pumping 
or gravitationaV back-pressure effects. The assumptions used to categorise the pumping 
systems are based on information in Perry (1) and Coulson (3) and design data contained 
In Coulson (4). No distinction has been made between a pump and a compressor. 
A reciprocating pump can generate very large pump pressures, therefore, it is assumed 
thatthe flow at this type of port is not dependent on the vessel pressure. It is also necessary 
to indicate if this port can have reverse flow through it. It has been assumed that this type 
of pump has been designed such that reverse flow through them is very unlikely if not 
impossible. It is, therefore, reaSonable to assume that reverse flow through the port is 
also impOSSible. However, leaks may occur between the pump and the vessel which could 
result in reverse flow. If the port has been defined as a reciprocating pump, it is necessary 
to determine if reverse flow can occur. There are some rules which can be applied. An 
open vessel may have reverse flow at the inlet port because liquid will run out of the 
vessel. On this principle reverse flow cannot occur at the outlet ports as a result of a leak 
because flow would be in the normal direction. The same reasoning is used for a closed 
vessel where the intemal pressure is above atmospheriC pressure in that flow will be out 
of the vessel should a leak occur. For vessels at lower than atmospheric pressure (ie. 
vacuum vessels) the flow will be into the vessel, therefore, it is possible for an outlet port 
to have reverse flow. 
Centrifugal pumps are more complicated because the modelling depends on the fluid and 
port type. All outlet ports to a centrifugal pump are assumed to be independent of the 
vessel pressure. Inlet ports for gases/vapours will usually be connected to a compressor 
and can be assumed to be affected by the vessel pressure. For liquids at inlet ports, the 
effect depends on the difference between the maximum pressure the pump can generate 
and the vessel pressure. For systems where the maximum pump pressure greatly exceeds 
the vessel pressure then clearly it will behave similarly to a reciprocating pump and flow 
will not be affected by the pressure. This is defined as a high pressure centrifugal pump. 
If the difference between pressures is small then fluctuations in the vessel pressure could 
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affect the flow so in this case there is a dependence on the vessel pressure. This is 
defined as a low pressure centrifugal pump. All centrifugal pumps are assumed to allow 
reverse flow. 
The final category is for flow which is not induced mechanically, this may be liquids which 
flow under gravity or gases/vapours which flow due to a pressure difference between the 
vessel and another unit. In these cases there is obviously a dependence on the vessel 
pressure and reverse flow is possible. 
The information required for each port is summarised in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 - Port Information 
Port Type Pressure Effects Reverse Flow Mode used 
Gas/vapour inlet Yes Yes Back-pressure 
Gas/vapour inlet Yes Yes Centrifugal 
Gas/vapour inlet No Yes Reciprocating 
Gas/vapour inlet No No Reciprocating 
Gas/vapour outlet Yes Yes Back-pressure 
Gas/vapour outlet No Yes Centrifugal 
Gas/vapour outlet No Yes Reciprocating 
Gas/vapour outlet No No Reciprocating 
Uquid inlet Yes Yes Gravity 
Uquid inlet Yes Yes Centrifugal (Iow) 
Uquid inlet No Yes Centrifugal (High) 
Uquid inlet No Yes Reciprocating 
Uquid inlet No No Reciprocating 
Uquid outlet Yes Yes Gravity 
Uquid outlet No Yes Centrifugal 
Uquid outiet No Yes Reciprocating 
Uquid outlet No No Reciprocating 
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7.3 Vessel Model Generation Program 
An automatic vessel model generation subroutine has been written Into the unit model 
generation program MODGEN. The user has the option of using this facility after the 
model number and name have been entered. The vessel model information described 
in the previous section is collected through a series of questions. These questions and, 
therefore, the user interaction are kept to a minimum by tailoring and only prompting for 
data which cannot be derived from previous answers. A simple example of this is that all 
vessels that contain any gaseslvapours are automatically assumed to be closed. 
The process is split into four subroutines, the first collects the data from the user, generates 
a description of the model from the data (for reference purposes), and calls the three 
subroutines to generate the rest of the model. The second subroutine generates the 
propagation equations, a third the event statements and the fourth is for the decision 
tables. The models produced are based on those developed by Kelly, Mullhl and Hunt 
as described by Hunt and Lees (5) but have a greater variation of configurations.·· 
7.3.1 Data Collection 
The vessel must be Identified as containing gas/vapour, liquid or both and then, if only 
liquid is selected, whether it is open or closed to the atmosphere. Vessels containing any 
gaseslvapours are automatically given a closed specification. The number of inlet and 
outlet ports are given as between one and seven which means that there must be at least 
one inlet port and one outlet port, although in some circumstances either of these may 
be later defined as a non-flow port. In addition to these port types it is necessary to define 
another port to model the Internal characteristics of the vessel. This port Is called the 
vessel port and is used to model the level, pressure, temperature and composition of the 
vessel as a whole. There is a restriction imposed by the FAULTFINDER code such that 
only nine ports can be given In total, including the vessel port. A check is carried out to 
ensure that these rules are adhered to. 
The characteristics of each port are then determined. The user defines each port as being 
a flow port or a non-flow port under normal operating conditions. If the vessel contains 
both liquid and gas/vapour it is necessary for the user to distinguish between ports for 
gases/vapours and ports for liquids. The methodology used is such that the fluid passing 
through any port can be of only one type, le liquid orgaslvapour. Therefore, a port specified 
as liquid is assumed to have its opening below the normal operating level of the vessel 
and all gas/vapour port openings are above any liquid level. 
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There may be some situations where it is desirable to model the effects of break-through 
or carry-over of gas/vapour or liquid to a port defined as being for the other. This scenario 
has not been considered in the methodology because it represents a change in the 
configuration of the vessel. The causes of such an occurrence can be modelled usirig 
the high level top event to mean high enough for liquid carry-over or the low level top 
event to mean low enough for gas/vapour break-through. The effects of having a 
carry-over or break-through can be modelled using the composition variable where in this· 
case it refers to the gas/vapour or liquid as an impurity. 
Finally the mode of transportation of the fluid is specified. Three options are given, the 
fiow may be induced by gravity (or a pressure difference between the vessel and another 
unit), pumped by a centrifugal pump or pumped by a reciprocating pump. The option 
used should be determined by examining Table 7.1. Additional information may be 
required for different port types used. A liquid inlet port can have a low pressure centrifugal 
pump or a high pressure centrifugal pump for which the former has pressure effects and 
the latter does not. If a positive displacement pump is selected the user has to declare 
whether the port can or cannot have reverse flow through it. All other port types are 
assumed to allow reverse flow. 
All the information required by the generation routines is now contained in various arrays 
and it is only a matter of applying the rules to them. 
7.3.2 Generation Of Propagation Equations 
The propagation equations are generated for each port in tum. This includes the non-flow 
ports because these will behave as flow ports should a fault occur that allows flow. For 
this reason all non-flow port variables are also included in the equations for other ports, 
where necessary. 
There are four equations asSOCiated with each inlet port and they take the form, 
GmIN= F (QmIN) 
RmIN= F (-PvVES) 
UmIN= F (TvVES) 
YmIN= F (XvVES) 
flow 
pressure 
temperature 
composition 
where 'm' is the inlet port number and 'v' is the vessel port number. 
Note: The temperature and composition propagation equations are only used if reverse 
flow is possible through the port. 
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The pressure, temperature and composition equations are the same for all types of inlet 
port. However, the flow equation contains a vessel pressure term if pressure effects are 
to be considered. The equation becomes, 
GmIN= F (OmIN, -PvVES) flow. 
There are four similar equations for the outlet ports and they take the form, 
OnO UT = F (GnOUT) 
PnOUT = F (PvVES) 
TnOUT = F (TvVES) 
XnOUT = F (XvVES) 
where 'n' Is the outlet port number. 
flow 
pressure 
temperature 
composition 
If the outlet flow is affected by the pressure then the flow equation needs to contain the 
vessel pressure term because there is a dependence on the vessel pressure. The equation 
becomes, 
OnOUT= F (GnOUT, PvVES) flow. 
The pressure, temperature and composition equations are the same for all outlet port 
types. 
The vessel port equations are slightly more complicated because the format depends on 
the nature of the vessel and the fluid in the ports. If liquid is present then the vessel port 
level equation is needed. The level is a positive function of all the liquid inlet flow port 
flows and a negative function of all the liquid outlet flow port flows. It takes the form, 
LvVES= F (GmIN, ... , -QnOUT, ... ) liquid flow ports. 
The vessel port pressure term has four main formats. For an open vessel it is a positive 
function of the liquid level because the effective pressure of the vessel is equivalent to 
the pressure exerted by the liquid head above the port. In a closed vessel containing only 
liquid the effective pressure is a positive function of the liquid level and the temperature 
ofthe gas/vapour in the gas/vapourspace above the liquid level. This is because variations 
in temperature will cause variations in the pressure of the gas/vapour. For a gas/vapour 
only vessel the pressure is a positive function of the flow rates at the Inlet gas/vapour flow 
ports and a negative function of the flow rates at the outlet gas/vapour flow ports, plus a 
temperature term. The equation for vessels containing both liquid and gas/vapour contains 
all four terms, inlet, outlet, level and temperature. The equations are: 
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PvVES= F (LvVES) 
PvVES= F (LvVES. TvVES) 
PvVES= F (Gm IN •...• -QnOUT •...• TvVES) 
PvVES= F (GmIN •...• -QnOUT •...• LvVES. TvVES) 
liquid only. open 
liquid only. closed 
gas/vapour only. closed. 
gas/vapour flow ports 
gas/vapour and liquid. closed. 
gas vapour flow ports. 
It may appear Inappropriate to use the vessel pressure propagation equation for open 
vessels because a pressure does not really exist. However. the term is required to give 
a systematic approach to the model and enable automatic generation. The overall result 
Is the same if the vessel pressure is removed and substituted for the level term in the 
propagation equations. The only difference is that a pressure term appears between the 
flow term and the level term of fault trees which use the automatically generated vessel 
models. 
The vessel port temperature term is given as a positive function ofthe inlet port temperature 
terms only. The outlet port temperature terms require the flow to be reversed at that port 
In order for the vessel port temperature to be affected. Therefore the outlet port 
temperature deviations are ANDed with reverse flow in the decision tables given later. 
The equation is 
TvVES= F (TmIN •... ) temperature. 
The vessel port composition term Is similar to the temperature term and is a positive 
function of the Inlet port composition terms. The outlet port composition terms are dealt 
with in the decision tables because they require reverse flow. The equation is 
XvVES= F (XmIN,. .. ) composition. 
This completes the propagation equations required for vessel models. 
7.3.3 Generation Of Event Statements 
For the event statements each deviation and 6\lent is considered in tum and applied to 
the appropriate ports. 
The first set of event statements deal with the effect of the inlet ports on the level and for 
the pressure. The exact configuration depends on the type of vessel and the type of fluid. 
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II the port is a non-flow port then some flow through the port may cause a high level and/or 
pressure. The various combinations lor this deviation are: 
V GmlN SOME: LvVES HI liquid non-flow port, open vessel 
V GmlN SOME: LvVES HI, PvVES HI liquid non-flow port, closed vessel 
V GmlN SOME: PvVES HI gas/vapour non-flow port. 
No Ilow through any 01 the normal Ilow ports may cause low level and/or low pressure. 
Deviations relating to no level are dealt with later. 
V GmlN NONE: LvVES LO liquid flow port, open vessel 
V GmlN NONE: LvVES LO, PvVES LO liquid Ilow port, closed vessel 
V GmlN NONE: PvVES LO gas/vapour flow port. 
II the port can have reverse Ilow then this may be a cause 01 low or no level and/or low 
pressure. 
V GmlN REV: LvVES LO, LvVES NONE liquid port, open vessel, reverse flow 
V GmlN REV: LvVES LO, LvVES NONE, 
PvVES LO 
V GmlN REV: PvVES LO 
liquid port, closed vessel reverse flow 
gas/vapour port, reverse flow. 
The intermediate dummy event C(DUMMY) lorms part 01 the causes 01 no outlet flow and 
combines the no flow deviations 01 ali the liquid flow ports. If there is more than one flow 
port then the deviations lorm a decision table generated later. However, if there is only 
one flow port then an event statement is used. The statement is 
V GmlN NONE: C(DUMMY) only one liquid inlet port. 
The intermediate dummy event C(DUMMY) also gives the causes 01 no level. 
I C(DUMMY): LvVES NONE liquid inlet ports. 
The next set 01 event statements deal with the effects 01 the outlet ports on the level and 
pressurEl in the vessel. If the port is non-flow then some flow will cause a low level and/or 
a low pressure. 
V OnOUT SOME: LvVES LO liquid non-flow port, open vessel 
V OnOUT SOME: LvVES LO, PvVES LO liquid non-flow port, closed vessel 
V OnOUT SOME: PvVES LO gas/vapour non-flow port. 
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High level and pressure may be caused by no flow out of a normal flow port or reverse 
flow through any outlet port, if this is possible. The event statements are: 
V OnOUT NONE: LvVES HI liquid flow port, open vessel 
V OnOUT NONE: LvVES HI, PvVES HI liquid flow port, closed vessel 
V OnOUT NONE: PvVES HI gas/vapour flow port 
V OnOUT REV: LvVES HI 
V OnOUT REV: LvVES HI, PvVES HI 
V OnOUT REV: PvVES HI 
liquid port, open vessel, reverse flow 
liquid port, closed vessel, reverse flow 
gas/vapour port, reverse flow. 
The following set of event statements deals with the effects of deviations at the vessel 
ports. High effective pressure may cause none or reverse flow or relief at the inlet ports, 
If this is possible. 
V PvVES HI: GmlN NONE, RmlN NONE, ... 
V PvVES HI: GmlN REV, RmlN REV, ... 
flow port 
reverse flow. 
Reverse flow through an outlet port may be caused by a no effective pressure in the 
vessel. The event statements for ports allowing reverse flow are, 
V PvVES NONE: OnOUT REV, PnOUT REV,... reverse flow. 
An additional event statement is required to indicate that a no level deviation may cause 
a low pressure. 
V LvVES NONE: PvVES LO vessel containing liquid. 
The basic faults used in vessel models are the leaks, LK-LP-EN and LK-HP-EN, and the 
temperature effects, EXT-HEAT and EXT-COLD, The standard data files used in the 
Version 2 methodology for event statement generation as developed by Mullhi (7) are 
used to generate the event statements for these faults. Only the vessel port Is specified 
as being affected by the fault. 
A leak to a low pressure environment, LK-LP-EN, applies to most vessels and simply 
models the effects of fluid leaking out of the vessel. This fault may cause the level to be 
low or none, if liquid is present, and the vessel pressure to be low if the vessel is closed. 
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F LK-LP-EN: LvVES LO, LvVES NONE open vessel 
F LK-LP-EN: LvVES LO, LvVES NONE, PvVES LO closed vessel containing 
liquid 
F LK-LP-EN: PvVES LO closed vessel containing 
gas/vapour only. 
A leak from a high pressure environment, LK-HP-EN, applies only to vessels which are 
closed and where the Intemal pressure is below atmospheric pressure. The fault models 
the in-flow of airto the vessel which results in an impurity being present. The fault is given 
in vessels where the Intemal pressure is above atmospheric pressure because of the 
systematic approach used for the process, in these cases the fault can be deleted from 
the model later or ignored. The result of the fault is a higher vessel pressure and a high 
deviation to the composition variable. Multi-components are not required for this fault 
because the composition variable is used to model the composition of the component of 
interest which In this case would be the air impurity. A secondary effect is also given 
which deals with a large leak sufficient enough to cause such a high vessel pressure that 
relief into the vessel is not possible. The event statement is 
F LK-HP-EN: PvVES HI, PvVES NOR, XvVES HI closed vessel. 
An extemal heat source, EXT-HEAT, models the effects of things like an extemal fire. It 
may cause the vessel temperature to become high and in a closed vessel the vessel 
pressure may also become high. An extemal cold source, EXT-COLD, may cause the 
vessel temperature to become low and in a closed vessel the vessel pressure may also 
become Iow. 
F EXT-HEAT: TvVES HI 
F EXT-HEAT: PvVES HI, TvVES HI 
F EXT-COLD: TvVES LO 
F EXT-COLD: PvVES LO, TvVES LO 
open vessel 
closed vessel 
open vessel 
closed vessel. 
Vessel models are different from many other models because the propagation equations 
for flow do not link up the inlet and outlet ports. In models such as the length of pipe, the 
outlet flow is a function of the inlet flow and from this the model generation program 
MODGEN, derives a minitree indicating that some flow out may be caused by some flow 
In. However, the flow equations for a vessel give the flow as a function of the level and/or 
the vessel pressure. These terms belong to the vessel port where the some deviation 
has no meaning and is not defined. This results in the some deviation for flow at the port 
having no causes and being marked as impossible. This deviation and others above it 
in the fault tree branch are deleted according to a set of rules for Impossible events. 
However, this gives an Incorrect fault tree because the some deviation may be a normal 
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event. It is therefore necessary to introduce the some deviation to the model to prevent 
this happening. The S NORMAL event statement Is used to Indicate to the synthesis 
program which deviations in the model do not require a fault to cause them. The some 
deviation is added to this for flow ports and the none deviation for non-flow ports. When 
this event in encountered by the synthesis algorithm the event is marked as certain and 
a different deletion process is carried out than for impossible events. 
S NORMAL: GmlN SOME. RmlN SOME .... 
S NORMAL: OnOUT SOME. PnOUT SOME .... 
S NORMAL: GmlN NONE. RmlN NONE .... 
S NORMAL: OnOUT NONE. PnOUT NONE .... 
inlet flow ports 
outlet flow ports 
inlet non-flow ports 
outlet non-flow ports. 
For similar reasons as the S NORMAL event statement the S IMPOSS event statement 
is used to define which deviations are impossible within the domain of the vessel unit. 
These prevent deviations propagating through the vessel which have been defined in the 
methodology or by the user as impossible events. These are reverse flow and pressure 
through a port where it has been specified as impossible by the user. 
S IMPOSS: GmlN REV. RmlN REV .... 
S IMPOSS: OnOUT REV. PnOUT REV .... 
inlet ports. no reverse flow 
outlet ports. no reverse flow. 
It should be noted that the S NORMAL and S IMPOSS event statements are only used 
in models with vessel ports. 
This completes the event statements for the vessel model. 
7.3.4 Generation Of Decision Tables 
This first set of decision table rules are only applied if there is liquid present because they 
deal with the influences of the liquid level and the causes of its deviations. If there is more 
than one liquid inlet with flow then a decision table is required to indicate that there must 
be no flow through each of these ports to cause the intermediate dummy event C(DUMMY). 
The effects of this are dealt with later. If there are more than three of these ports then 
the Intermediate dummy event D(DUMMY) has to be used because the decision table 
becomes too long. The decision tables are: 
V GmlN NONE ... T C(DUMMY) 
or 
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more than one liquid inlet flow 
port 
V GmlN NONE ... I D(DUMMY) T C(DUMMY) 
V GmlN NONE ... T D(DUMMY) 
more than three liquid 
inlet flow ports. 
The effect of no level in the vessel is obviously no flow or pressure out but it is possible 
that flow can occur if there is flow in, so a decision table has to be generated that combines 
no flow in and no level. The intermediate dummy event C(DUMMY) combines all the 
liquid Inlet ports for no flow, therefore, for each liquid outlet flow port we have: 
I C(DUMMY) V LvVES NONE T QnOUT NONE, PnOUT NONE causes of no 
flow. 
The pressure term is included in this because if there is no flow of liquid then there can 
be no pressure transmission since this is a liquid port. 
The causes of the vessel temperature and composition deviations can be generated by 
the propagation equations for the inlet ports because these involve flow in the normal 
direction. The outlet ports are more difficult because for flow through these to cause 
deviations requires the flow to be reversed. For each outlet port that allows reverse flow 
the following set of decision tables is required: 
V QnOUT REV V UnOUT HI T TvVES HI 
V QnOUT REV V UnOUT LO T TvVES LO 
V QnOUT REV V YnOUT Hi T XvVES HI 
V QnOUT REV V YnOUT LO T XvVES LO 
7.3.5 Additional Information 
outlet port with reverse flow 
outlet port with reverse flow 
outlet port with reverse flow 
outlet port with reverse flow. 
To complete the model some additional information has to be provided to aid the program 
and other users. A facility has been added to generate a limited number of engineering 
assumptions and a deSCription of the model. This essentially gives the type of vessel, 
open or closed, and what it stores, liquid, gas/vapour or both. Then for each port it gives 
the normal flow state, whether it is for liquid or gas/vapour, if this applies, and whether it 
is an inlet or outlet port. It also gives the type of flow and any other information such as 
reverse flow or a high pressure pump. 
The program generates the normal state character string such that it contains a list of 
ports which normally have flow. 
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The generation routine only deals with single component flow or vessels where mass 
transfer between phases does not occur so the mUlti-component variable is set to "N" for 
no. 
The model generation Is then complete and the routine retums to the main program where 
the data file is written and the option given to examine it before proceeding to the mlnitree 
generation phase. Section 7.5 deals with problems encountered during this phase. 
7.4 Vessel Model Template Examples 
The vessel model templates have been created to give the user an example of the type 
of vessel model that can be developed. They give the user the ability to create a number 
of common configurations by deleting certain elements from the model. 
The set of vessel model templates were developed in parallel with the automatic vessel 
model generation algorithm. They were deveioped from the rules for the vessel models 
and then used to test the output from the generation algorithm. The models can be used 
as a base or an example for developing other vessel models. All the models appear as 
they would after generation using the algorithm except that the description has details on 
editing the model. 
Each model can be used as it is with the user connecting other units to a proportion of 
the existing ports and ignoring the rest. Although this procedure will work satisfactorily it 
is not strictly in keeping with the methodology which states that all ports must be connected 
to a unit. A solution to this would be to use Dummy Heads and Dummy Tails but this 
would then alter the configuration diagram. Therefore, within the description of the model 
is an explanation on to how to remove an unwanted port by giving an example. 
The configurations for the models have been chosen in an attempt to show as many 
different types of vessel and port connections as possible. There is an open vessel, a 
closed vessel for liquid only, a pressurised gas/vapour vessel, a vacuum gas/vapour 
vessel and a vessel containing gas/vapour and liqUid. A brief description of each model 
and the model listing is given in Appendix C. 
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7.4.1 Example Editing Of A Template Model 
The open vessel model, number 90 (Appendix C.1), has the following description for 
editing, 
PORTS CAN BE REMOVED IF SO DESIRED BY FOLLOWING THIS EXAMPLE. 
IF PORT 2 IS NOT REQUIRED, DELETE PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 5 TO 8. DELETE THE G2IN. 
T21N AND X2IN TERMS FROM EQUATIONS 33, 35 AND 36 RESPECTIVELY. DELETE EVENT 
STATEMENTS 3 AND 4. DELETE THE G21N NONE, R21N NONE, G21N REV AND R21N REV TERMS 
FROM EVENT STATEMENTS 16 AND 17. DELETE THE G21N SOME AND R21N SOME TERMS FROM 
EVENT STATEMENT 24. WHEN THE G21N NONE TERM IS REMOVED FROM THE FIRST DECISION 
TABLE THIS LEAVES ONE ELEMENT so DELETE THE DECISION TABLE AND ADD V G11N NONE: 
C(DUMMY) TO THE LIST OF EVENT STATEMENTS. 
ALTER THE NUMBERS FOR THE NUMBER OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS, EVENT STATEMENTS 
AND DECISION TABLES AS NECESSARY AT THE TOP OF THE MODEL. 
HAVING CHANGED THE MODEL IT MUST BE GIVEN A NEW FILE NAME AND CORRESPONDING 
MODEL NUMBER. 
ConSidering port 2 as the redundant port then the above instructions have to be carried 
out. Propagation equations 5 to 8 are those which have a '2' on the left hand side of the 
'=' sign, ie. G2IN, R2IN, U21N and Y2IN. These need to be deleted. The 'G2IN,', 'T2IN,' 
and 'X2IN,' terms have to be deleted from the L9VES, T9VES and X9VES propagation 
equations, respectively. 
The third and fourth event statements can be deleted because the 'G2IN NONE' and 
'G2IN REV' terms no longer exists. The '2' terms in the P9VES HI and S NORMAL state 
event statements must also be removed. This is the section ',G2IN NONE' and 'G2IN 
REV,' in the two P9VES HI event statements and the 'G2IN SOME, R21N SOME,' in the 
first S NORMAL event statement. 
The 'V G21N NONE' term in the first decision table must be removed but this leaves the 
decision table with only one term, 
V G11N NONE T C(DUMMY) 
which should not be used as part of the model. It is necessary to convert this decision 
table into an event statement. It will become 
V G11N NONE: C(DUMMY) 
and must be placed in the list of event statements. 
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The assumptions, propagation equations, event statements and decision tables should 
be counted and the correct numbers placed at the end of the 'NO. OF' lines near the top 
of the model. The normal state line in the supplementary information section should have 
the '2,' removed from it. 
Finally the model number must be changed and the model saved to a file with that number 
in it, ie. changing the model numberto 99 requires the model to be saved as MDAT99.DAT. 
The new model is shown in the following pages. 
1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
99 VESSEL MODEL (LIQUID, OPEN) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 9 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 32 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 26 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 10 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
THIS IS AN OPEN VESSEL USED TO STORE LIQUID, ALL PORTS ARE BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE 
LIQUID SURFACE. 
PORT 1: NORMAL FLOW INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 3: NO FLOW INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 4: NO FLOW INLET FROM HIGH PRESSURE CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 5: NORMAL FLOW OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 6: NORMAL FLOW OUTLET UNDER GRAVITY 
PORT 7: NO FLOW OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 8: NO FLOW OUTLET UNDER GRAVITY. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
Gl IN= F (QlIN) 
RlIN= F (-P9VES) 
UlIN= F (T9VES) 
Yl IN= F (X9VES) 
G3IN= F (Q3IN) 
R3IN= F (-P9VES) 
U3IN= F (T9VES) 
Y3IN= F (X9VES) 
G4IN= F (Q4IN) 
R4IN= F (-P9VES) 
U4IN= F (T9VES) 
Y4IN= F (X9VES) 
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050UTa F (G50UT) 
P50UT a F (P9VES) 
T50UT. F (T9VES) 
X50UT - F (X9VES) 
OSOUT= F (GSOUT, P9VES) 
PSOUT a F (P9VES) 
TSOUT = F (T9VES) 
XSOUT _ F (X9VES) 
070UT - F (G70UT) 
P70UT = F (P9VES) 
T70UT a F (T9VES) 
X70UT. F (X9VES) 
080UT. F (G80UT, P9VES) 
P80UT = F (P9VES) 
T80UT - F (T9VES) 
X80UT a F (X9VES) 
19VE5= F (G1IN, -050UT, -QSOUT) 
P9VE5= F (L9VES) 
T9VE5= F (T1IN, T3IN, T4IN) 
X9VE5= F (X1IN, X3IN, X4IN) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V G11N NONE: L9VES LO 
V G11N REV: 19VES LO, L9VES NONE 
V G31N SOME: L9VES HI 
V G31N REV: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE 
V G4IN SOME: L9VES HI 
V G4IN REV: 19VES LO, L9VES NONE 
I C(DUMMY): L9VES NONE 
V 050UT NONE: L9VES HI 
V aSOUT NONE: L9VES HI 
V aSOUT REV: L9VES HI 
V a70UT SOME: L9VES LO 
V a80UT SOME: L9VES LO 
V a80UT REV: L9VES HI 
V P9VES HI: G11N NONE, R1IN NONE 
V P9VES HI: G11N REV, R11N REV, G31N REV, R31N REV 
V P9VES HI: G4IN REV, R4IN REV 
V P9VES NONE: OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV, 080UT REV, P80UT REV 
V L9VES NONE: P9VES LO 
F LK-LP-EN: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE 
F EXT-HEAT: T9VES HI 
F EXT-COLD: T9VES LO 
S NORMAL: G11N SOME, R11N SOME, G31N NONE, R31N NONE 
S NORMAL: G4IN NONE, R4IN NONE, OSOUT SOME, P50UT SOME, OSOUT SOME, PSOUT SOME 
S NORMAL: 070UT NONE, P70UT NONE, 080UT NONE, P80UT NONE 
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S IMPOSS: OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV, 070UT REV, P70UT REV 
V G11N NONE: C(DUMMy) 
5) DECISION TABLES 
I C(DUMMY) V L9VES NONE T OSOUT NONE, PSOUT NONE 
I C(DUMMY) V L9VES NONE T OSOUT NONE, PSOUT NONE 
V OSOUT REV V USOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV V USOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V OSOUT REV V YSOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV V YSOUT LO T X9VES LO 
V OBOUT REV V UBOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V OBOUT REV V UBOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V OBOUT REV V YBOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V OBOUT REV V YBOUT LO T X9VES LO 
6) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1,5 AND 6. 
NO MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES 
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7.5 Special Notes 
When the template models are compiled Into minitree format by the unit model generation 
program, the program prompts the user for more information. This happens as a result 
ofthe program's built-In mlnitreegeneration routines developed by Mullhi (6), which create, 
from the propagation equations, some minitrees which would otherwise have to be 
specified as event statements. This system produces questions for the user to answer 
which requires a degree of knowledge of the methodology but since the generation routine 
is an aid to the user it is not really appropriate for this to occur. Therefore, all the information 
has been incorporated Into the event statements and decision tables. 
The prompts given by the program deal with the validity of a variable deviation as a cause 
of another deviation. A simple "Y" or "N" answer is required. For each inlet port the 
following prompts appear: 
THE EVENT: GmlN REV 
CAN BE CAUSED BY: P9VES NOR 
IS THIS A VALID MINITREE, Y/N ? 
and 
THE EVENT: RmlN REV 
CAN BE CAUSED BY: P9VES NOR 
IS THIS A VALID MINITREE, Y/N ? 
It has been assumed that no relief into the vessel cannot cause a reverse pressure gradient 
or reverse relief through the port, so these are not valid minitrees. In any case some of 
these deviations may have been labelled impossible by the model. 
The other type of prompt that occurs concems the outlet ports: 
THE EVENT: L9VES NONE 
CAN BE CAUSED BY: QnOUT HI liquid ports 
IS THIS A VALID MINITREE, Y/N? 
This Implies that high flow through a single outlet port may cause the liquid level to fall to 
zero. This situation has been dealt with In the event statements and decision tables 
because other factors are necessary. A high flow will cause the liquid level to be low but 
in order for the level to fall to zero there must be no Inlet flow either. For this reason the 
minitree is not required. 
The advice given to a user is to reply with "N" because all the information required for the 
vessel Is contained in the model. 
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7_6 Vessel Model Summary Tables 
Table 7.2 - Options 
Vessel type: Open 
Closed 
Vessel storage fluid: Uquid 
Gas/vapour 
Uquid and gas/vapour 
Number of Inlet ports: 1 to 7 
Number of outlet ports: 1 to 7 
(NB Total number is 8) 
Port flow types: Normally flow 
Normally no flow 
Pressure effects 
No pressure effects 
Reverse flow through ports: Optional 
Mu III-com ponent featu res : No 
Table 7.3 - Faults 
Extemal heat source F EXT-HEAT 
Extemal cold source FEXT-COLD 
Leak to a low pressure environment F LK-LP-EN 
Leak from a high pressure environment F LK-HP-EN 
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Chapter 8 
Rules For The Generation Of Heat Exchanger Models 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has dealt with the rules for generating vessel models which involved 
a process of modelling the intemal characteristics as a flow from the inlet or outlet ports 
to the intemal vessel port and then back to the Inlet or outlet ports. This produced a 
relatively simple model generation routine. 
This chapter deals with the generation of heat exchanger models. While many heat 
exchangers are simply used to transfer heat from one process fluid to another, some 
involve phase changes (either complete or partial) such as condensers and reboilers. 
The simple heat exchangers can be modelled without using Intemal variables but the ones 
involving phase changes require intemal variables for flow transfer and heat transfer. 
8.2 Heat Exchanger Characteristics 
Heat transfer equipment covers a wide range of types as given by Perry (1). These cover 
simple heat exchangers for two process fluids and air-cooled systems to evaporator 
systems and systems for solids. However some of this equipment is very specialised and 
does not lend itself to characterisation and automatic model generation. Therefore, the 
process has been kept to the principal types of heat exchanger found in the process 
industries. These are the shell and tube type, frame and plate (or plate) type, air-cooled 
finned tube type and the double pipe type heat exchangers given by Coulson (3). 
These four types can be further reduced into two specific categories based on one 
particular fault. This is made possible because the basic heat transfer fundamentals are 
similar for all equipment as regard to fault initiation and propagation. The only difference 
occurs with the blockage faults. In a shell and tube or finned tube heat exchanger it can 
be assumed lI/UJI unlikely that the shell side or air side will become blocked or partially 
blocked to an extent thatthe flow will be affected. In the plate ordouble pipe heat exchanger 
it is possible for both sides to become blocked or partially blocked. This will ultimately 
affect the heat transfer in the unit. Therefore two types of heat exchanger can be modelled, 
the shell and tube type and the plate type. The former can only be blocked on the tube 
side whereas the latter can be blocked on both sides. This is shown In Figure 8.1. 
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Figure 8.1 - Heat Exchanger Types 
Different designs of heat exchanger mean there is a variety of ways in which the two 
process streams can flaw relative to each other. There is counter-current flow, ca-current 
flow, double pass, triple pass, etc. However the basic heat transfer equation gives the 
amount of heat transferred as proportional to the area and the temperature difference. In 
the above heat exchanger types they can all be given the same area by design and 
Coulson (2) shows the temperature difference expressions to be the same. It should be 
noted that although the expression is the same the value will depend on the inlet and 
outlet temperatures and the difference between the two streams at the exit points, resulting 
In a difference in the quantity of heat transferred. However, for the purpose of modelling 
we are only interested in the effects of changes in the flow and the temperature variables 
which will be the same. Therefore no distinction is necessary for the flow type. 
The propagation equations for the temperature at the ports of a simple heat exchanger 
were derived by Kelly (4). This showed the expression for the first side containing the 
cold fluid as 
T20UT= F (-GlIN, T11N, G31N, T3IN) 
which indicates the first side outlet temperature to be proportional to the first side inlet 
temperature and the second side Inlet flow and temperature, and Inversely proportional 
to the first side inlet flow. 
If the first side contains the hot fluid then the expression is, 
T20UT = F (G1IN, T11N, -G3IN, T3iN) 
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giving the first side outlet temperature as proportional to the first side inlet flow and 
temperature and second side inlet temperature, and inversely proportional to the second 
side Inlet flow. 
Therefore it is necessary to label the first side as hot or cold. 
In orderto model any leaks which may occur Intemally it is necessary to Identify the higher 
pressure side such that the direction of flow of fluid from one side to the other can be 
determined. This allows the effects of contamination of one stream by the other to be 
modelled. If the pressure difference is not significant, then the internal leak fault is not 
modelled. 
Heat exchangers also include reboilers and condensers where one or both of the streams 
undergo a phase change. Phase changes can be modelled relatively easily but they 
require the use of additional ports called vessel ports to model the internal characteristics 
of the flow and heat transfer. There is a restriction imposed by FAULTFINDER of a 
maximum of nine ports in a unit. In addition to the four flow ports (or five in the case of 
a partial phase change), a complete phase change has two vessel ports and a partial 
phase change has three vessel ports. Forthis reason the phase change is only considered 
on one side, which has to be specified, and any change on the other is ignored as not 
Important. This may create problems if there Is a change on both sides but when tracing 
fault propagation the top event of interest will only ever be concerned with one of the 
phase changes. If another top event is then concerned with the other phase change a 
new model can easily and quickly be generated and the data file altered to use this model. 
This restriction has been identified as an area for improvement for which the duration of 
this project has not allowed. 
If there is a complete phase change then the composition of the end phase will be the 
same as the initial phase, however, In a partial phase change not all the fluid will change 
phase. If there are components of different volatility then different quantities of each will 
change phase. Therefore, for a partial phase change, it is necessary to define the system 
as mUlti-component if there is more than one component as shown In Figure 8.2. 
To enable the flow to be modelled through each port it is necessary to define the type of 
fluid transportation method. There are a variety of types but essentially they break down 
Into categories of pressure and reverse flow effects. The pressure effects are due to the 
vessel pressure influences on the flow and the reverse flow capability depends on the 
type of pump connected to the port. The assumptions used are based on those applied 
for the vessel model generation rules (see Section 7.2.2). 
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Figure 8.2 - Phase Changes 
For the no phase change side the flow is assumed to behave similar1y to that in a simple 
pipe type model. In these situations the pressure is simply transmitted through the unit 
and the flow is not affected by the vessel pressure. There is an option to indicate if reverse 
flow can occur through the ports. 
If a phase change occurs then changes in the vessel pressure are likely. For this reason 
four port types have been considered for an inlet and three for an outlet port. An inlet 
port defined as a gravitylback-pressure fed flow port is assumed to be affected by the 
vessel pressure. The same is assumed for an Inlet port which Is defined as connected 
to a low pressure centrifugal pump which has a pump pressure close to the vessel 
pressure. An Inlet port defined as connected to a high pressure centrifugal pump or a 
reciprocating pump Is not affected by the vessel pressure. All ports are assumed to allow 
reverse flow unless the user defines a reciprocating pump where an option Is given to 
suppress the reverse flow deviation. Outlet ports are split Into gravity/back-pressure 
flows and pumped flows. Gravity/back-pressure flows are assumed to be affected by the 
vessel pressure and pumped flows are not. The pumped flows are divided into centrifugal 
and reciprocating pumps with the latter having the ability to suppress reverse flow. 
On some heat exchanger equipment relief ports and drain ports are used for safety and 
maintenance reasons so these have been integrated into the layout should they be 
required. These are simply expressed as non-flow ports and are modelled as being 
affected by the vessel pressure and allowing reverse flow. 
The information required for each port is summarised in Table 8.1. 
8-4 
Table 8.1 - Port Information 
Port Type Pressure Effects Reverse Flow Mode used 
No phase No Yes Normally flow 
change inlet 
No phase No No Normally flow 
change inlet 
No phase No Yes Normally flow 
change outlet 
No phase No No Normally flow 
change outlet 
Phase change Yes Yes Gravity/back-pressure 
inlet 
Phase change Yes Yes Centrifugal (Iow) 
inlet 
Phase change No Yes Centrifugal (High) 
inlet 
Phase change No Yes Reciprocating 
inlet 
Phase change No No Reciprocating 
inlet 
Phase change Yes Yes Gravity/back-pressure 
outlet 
Phase change No Yes Centrifugal 
outlet 
Phase change No Yes Reciprocating 
outlet 
Phase change No No Reciprocating 
outlet 
Relief Yes Yes Normally no flow 
Drain Yes Yes Normally no flow 
These are the only characteristics required for generating heat exchanger models. 
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8.3 Heat Exchanger Model Generation Program 
The heat exchanger model generation subroutine has been written Into the unit model 
generation program MODGEN. The option to use this facility is given after the model 
number and name have been entered. The information required by the subroutine is 
collected by a set of questions with optional answers given to the user. The questions 
asked depend on previous options selected and, therefore, the user interaction is kept to 
a minimum. Most of the information can be found on a piping and Instrumentation diagram 
although some such as the fluid states may need to be calculated from the temperature 
and pressu re data. 
The generation process is split into four subroutines, a master subroutine collects the 
data, generates a description of the model and then calls the other subroutines. There 
is one to generate the propagation equations, one for the event statements and one for 
. the decision tables. 
As well as generating all the propagation equations, event statements and decision tables 
the routine generates the list of engineering assumptions and description and prints it on 
the screen for the user to check. This information is saved with the model and can be 
used as a reference when looking for a suitable model. 
8.3.1 Data Collection 
The generation subroutine has been developed to deal with two types of process heat 
exchanger, one which can be blocked on only one side, such as the tube side of a shell 
and tube heat exchanger and one which can be blocked on both sides such as in a plate 
heat exchanger. The type required must be Identified as one of these. Should the heat 
exchanger be of another type the model must be specified as being of the type with the 
appropriate blockage properties. The fault propagation models are the same for all types 
of heat exchanger. 
The restriction imposed by FAULTFINDER on the maximum number of ports in a unit 
means the user must specify if there is a phase change or not. Any phase change must 
be confined to one side, which must be identified, and specified as a complete or partial 
phase change. The side containing the phase change is hereafter referred to as the 
second side because it is dealt with after the no phase change side. 
If a partial phase change occurs then the user has to specify If there is more than one 
component in that particular side. This is necessary because different components have 
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different rates of condensing or boiling and, therefore, the liquid or vapour produced will 
have a different composition. If this is specified then multi-component modelling must be 
used. 
There are two sets of temperature propagation equations, one for the hot fluid and one 
for the cold fluid. Therefore the first side must be specified as containing the hot or the 
cold fluid. There is no difference between the flow regimes of counter-current, co-current, 
double-pass, etc. 
It is necessary to indicate if there is a significant pressure difference between the two 
sides and if so in which side the higher pressure is located. This is used to model intemal 
leaks. 
If there are sufficient ports remaining, a relief port and/or drain port can be speCified for 
each side. These are defined as normally having no flow. 
Assumptions have been made about the flows to and from the heat exchanger. For no 
phase change the vessel pressure does not affect the flow and the behaviour Is the same 
as in a simple pipe. This Is standard for the first side where it Is defined as having no 
phase change. If a phase change occurs on the second side then the user is prompted 
for the type of flow which occurs through the port. This mayor may not be affected by 
the vessel pressure. Table 8.1 shows the flow type combinations and the corresponding 
method of transportation. The ports can be defined as being under gravity flow, low 
pressure or high pressure centrifugal pumped flow or reciprocating pumped flow. 
Reverse flow is allowed In all flow ports but the user can change this by choosing the no 
reverse flow option which is given by the program. 
This is all the information required by the routine and the model can now be generated 
using the rules incorporated In the routine. 
8.3.2 Model Ports And Nomenclature 
The layout of the models has been standardised as much as possible to reduce any 
confusion. Port 1 is always the first side inlet stream and port 2 the outlet stream. Any 
additional ports on the first side, such as the relief or drain ports, are allocated the next 
port or ports as necessary otherwise they are used by the second side. Hence port 3 
may be the relief or drain port for the first side or the inlet for the second side. Therefore 
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port 4 may be the first side drain port, if there Is also a relief port, or the second side inlet, 
if there is only one additional port on the first side, orthe outlet on the second side, if there 
are no additional first side ports. 
As can be seen the logic here gets quite complicated and some variables have been set 
up to overcome this. FLAG (3) Is set to 0, 1 or 2 for the number of additional ports on 
the first side and if this is 1 then FLAG (4) is set to 1 for a reliefor2 for a drain port. Similar 
variables have been set up for the second side. It Is also necessary to define a complete 
set of character variables which contain the port numbers of the second side ports used. 
The port numbers are allocated in the following order if they are used, 
PORCH (1) 
PORCH (2) 
PORCH (3) 
PORCH (4) 
PORCH (5) 
Inlet 
Outlet or, If there Is a partial phase change, liquid outlet 
Vapour outlet for a partial phase change 
Relief if there is one 
Drain if there is one 
The following are used for the vessel ports If a phase change occurs, 
VESCH (1) 
VESCH (2) 
VESCH (3) 
Vessel port or, for a partial phase change, vessel port relating to 
the liquid 
Vessel port relating to the vapour for a partial phase change 
Vessel port relating to the Internal flow from liquid to vapour or 
vapour to liquid. 
The last vessel port is used to model the Internal flow of fluid from one phase to the other. 
For a reboiler the port is used to model the flow from the liquid to the vapou r and for a 
condenser it Is used to model the flow from the vapour to the liquid. This means the flow 
will always be positive and the model has been defined such that reverse flow in this port 
is impossible. 
The following sections on the modelling of the heat exchanger uses the following 
nomenclature. The sides of the exchanger have been defined as: 
first side 
second side 
no phase change 
phase change if required. 
If no phase change occurs then the two sides will be similar and the order will not matter. 
8-8 
After each rule or set of rules is defined a list of example propagation equations, event 
statements or decision tables is given. These use a set of keywords to describe the type 
of heat exchanger to which they apply. The terms are: 
for no phase change none 
complete 
partial 
hot 
for a complete phase change 
for a partial phase change 
cold 
single 
multi 
reverse 
current side contains the hot fluid 
current side contains the cold fluid 
no multi-component features used 
mUlti-component features are used 
reverse flow is possible through the port. 
The 'hot' and 'cold' keywords refer to the current side of the heat exchanger in which the 
deviation or fault occurs. This is easy to determine for deviations such as 'GlIN=' (first 
side propagation equation) and 'l5VES HI:' (second side event statement) but for basic 
faults It Is not as obvious. For basic faults such as 'INT-lK' the side referred to is given 
by the heading prior to the list of event statements. For the 'PART-BlK', 'FOULING', 
'FROTHING' and 'VAP-BlKT' faults there are no headings and reference is made to the 
first side. 
The example propagation equations, event statements and decision tables are based on 
three types of model which have the following port types: 
No phase change 
port 1 first side inlet 
port 2 first side outlet 
port 3 second side inlet 
port 4 second side outlet. 
Complete phase change 
port 1 first side inlet 
port 2 first side outlet 
port 3 second side inlet 
port 4 second side outlet 
port 5 vessel port for variables 
port 6 vessel port for flow. 
Partial phase change 
port 1 first side inlet 
port 2 first side outlet 
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port 3 second side Inlet 
port 4 second side liquid outlet 
port 5 second side vapour outlet 
port 6 vessel port for liquid 
port 7 vessel port for vapour 
port 8 vessel port for flow. 
These models are not the same as the illustrative example models given in Appendix D. 
For simplicity the above models have no relief or drain ports but the example models do. 
There are rules given for relief and drain ports and In these cases one port has been 
added to the side of interest and is noted in the example. 
8.3.3 Generation Of Propagation Equations 
This section deals with the rules used to develop the propagation equations. Each port 
is taken in turn and the equation for the flow, pressure, temperature and composition 
defined as necessary. 
The flow and relief propagation equations for the inlet port on the first side are taken 
directly from the standard pipe model. These are: 
G1IN= F (Q1IN, Q20UT) 
R1IN= F (R20UT) 
flow 
relief 
The temperature propagation equation for the inlet port on the first side, if reverse flow 
can occur, depends on whether the first side is for the hot or cold fluid. The equation Is 
a function of the Inlet flow on the second side, the reverse temperature on the first side 
and the Inlet temperature on the second side. However, if a phase change occurs on the 
second side the vessel port temperature is used instead of the second side inlet 
temperature. The matter is further complicated if the phase change is only partial because 
there are two vessel port temperatures, one for the liquid and one for the vapour. The 
vapour vessel port temperature is used if the first side is for the cold fluid and the liquid 
vessel port is used if it is the hot fluid. This is because generally the exit port for the first 
side on a cooling system will be in the vapour space, whereas for a heating system it will 
be in the liquid space. In fact the question of which to use is not important because the 
two temperatures will be very similar anyway and the deviation from the normal will be in 
the same direction. The equation will have one of the following forms: 
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U1IN= F (U20UT, -G3IN, T3IN) 
U1IN= F (U20UT, G3IN, T3IN) 
U1IN= F (U20UT, -G3IN, T5VES) 
U1IN= F (U20UT, G3IN, T5VES) 
U1IN= F (U20UT, -G3IN, T6VES) 
U1IN= F (U20UT, G3IN, T7VES) 
none, hot, reverse 
none, cold, reverse 
complete, hot, reverse 
complete, cold, reverse 
partial, hot, reverse 
partial, cold, reverse. 
The composition term, if reverse flow can occur, is a straightforward function of the reverse 
exit composition, If this is also possible. If the mUlti-component feature is used then the 
format has to be altered slightly by Incorporating a 'C' which refers to the component (or 
component of Interest) in the first side. 
Y1IN= F (Y20UT) 
YC1IN= F (YC20UT) 
single, reverse 
multi, reverse. 
The flow and pressure equations for the outlet port on the first side are also taken directly 
from the standard pipe model. These are: 
Q20UT= F (G1IN, G20Un 
P20UT= F (P1IN) 
flow 
pressure. 
The form of the equation used for the temperature at the outlet port Is similar to those for 
the reverse temperature term. The equation is a function of the inlet flows and 
temperatures on both sides with similar adaptations for the phase changes. The equation 
will have one of the fOllowing forms: 
T20UT= F (G1IN, T1IN, -G3IN, T3IN) 
T20UT= F (-G1IN, T1IN, G3IN, T3IN) 
T20UT= F (G1IN, T1IN, -G3IN, T5VES) 
T20UT= F (-G1IN, T1IN, G3IN, T5VES) 
T20UT = F (G1IN, T1IN, -G3IN, T6VES) 
T20UT= F (-GlIN, T1IN, G3IN, T7VES) 
none, hot 
none, cold 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial, hot 
partial, cold. 
The composition term is a straightforward function of the inlet composition. 
X20UT= F (X1IN) 
XC20UT = F (XC1IN) 
single 
multi. 
The equations for any additional ports are the same for both the relief and the drain port. 
Since there are no vessel ports on the first side the Intemal pressure has been defined 
as the pressure at the inlet port. The flow equation for a relief or drain port incorporates 
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pressure effects and the pressure equation is a straight-forward function of the iniet 
pressure. In the following two equations, used to illustrate the use of additional ports, 
port 3 has been defined as a relief or drain port with port 1 remaining the inlet port. 
030UT= F (G30UT, PlIN) 
P30UT= F (P1IN) 
relief or drain flow 
relief or drain pressure. 
The temperature and composition propagation equations are similar to those for the outlet 
port. Again, port 3 has been defined as a relief or drain port with port 1 remaining the 
inlet port. Each of the second side port numbers are increased by one to allow for the 
additional port on the first side. 
T30UT = F (GlIN, TllN, -G41N, T4IN) 
T30UT= F (-GlIN, TllN, G41N, T4IN) 
T30UT= F (GlIN, TllN, -G4IN, T6VES) 
T30UT= F (-GlIN, TlIN, G41N, T6VES) 
T30UT= F (GlIN, TllN, -G4IN, T7VES) 
T30UT= F (-GlIN, TllN, G41N, TBVES) 
X30UT= F (XlIN) 
XC30UT = F (XC1IN) 
none, hot 
none, cold 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial, hot 
partial, cold 
single 
multi. 
The first side equations are not complex or numerous because it has been defined as 
having no phase change. The second side equations will be very similar if no phase 
change takes place except that the port numbers will be different. Explanation, therefore, 
is limited to phase change situations only but the equations have still been given in the 
lists. 
The flow equation for the second side inlet port depends on whether pressure effects are 
to be considered. This is defined by the choice of transportation mode used in Table B.l. 
G3IN= F (03IN, 040UT) 
G3IN= F (03IN) 
G3IN= F (03IN, -P5VES) 
G3iN= F (03IN, -P7VES) 
none 
complete or partial, no pressure effects 
complete, pressure effects 
partial, pressure effects. 
Note the use of different vessel ports for the effective vessel pressure between a complete 
phase change and a partial phase change. This is because there is an extra flow port 
and the vapour vessel port is the second vessel port (the first being the liquid vessel port) 
for a partial phase change. 
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The relief equation for the second side inlet port is a function of the pressure at the 
appropriate vessel port. 
R3IN= F (R40UT) 
R3IN= F (-P5VES) 
R3IN= F (-P7VES) 
none 
complete 
partial. 
The temperature equation, if reverse flow is possible, is a function of the temperature at 
the appropriate vessel port. 
U3IN= F (G1IN, T1IN, U40UT) 
U3IN= F (-G1IN, T1IN, U40UT) 
U3IN= F (T5VES) 
U3IN= F (T6VES) 
U3IN= F (T7VES) 
none, cold, reverse 
none, hot, reverse 
complete, reverse 
partial, cold, reverse 
partial, hot, reverse. 
The composition equation for the second side inlet port, if reverse flow is possible, is a 
function of the composition at the appropriate vessel port. If there is more than one 
component In the second side then the mUlti-component feature must be used. Two 
equations are required and the 'A' refers to the more volatile component which Is modelled 
in the vapour phase and 'B' is that remaining and is modelled in the liquid phase. 
Y3IN= F (Y40UT) 
Y3IN= F (X5VES) 
Y3IN= F (X6VES) 
Y3IN= F (X7VES) 
YA3IN= F (-XB6VES) 
YB3IN= F (XB6VES) 
YA3IN= F (XA7VES) 
YB3IN= F (-XA7VES) 
none, reverse' 
complete, reverse 
partial, single, cold, reverse 
partial, single, hot, reverse 
partial, multi, cold, reverse 
partial, multi, cold, reverse 
partial, multi, hot, reverse 
partial, multi, hot, reverse. 
For no phase change or a complete phase change there is only one outlet flow port but 
for a partial phase change one is required for the liquid outlet and one for the vapour 
outlet. The flow equation for the second side outlet or liquid outlet port contains a pressure 
term if pressure effects are to be considered. 
Q40UT= F (G3IN, G40UT) 
Q40UT = F (G40UT) 
Q40UT = F (G40UT, P5VES) 
Q40UT= F (G40UT, P7VES) 
none 
complete or partial, no pressure effects 
complete, pressure effects 
partial, pressure effects. 
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The pressure equation for the second side outlet or liquid outlet port is a function of the 
pressure at the appropriate vessel port. 
P40UT = F (P3IN) 
P40UT= F (P5VES) 
P40UT = F (P7VES) 
none 
complete 
partial. 
The temperature equation for the second side outlet or liquid outlet port Is a function of 
the temperature at the appropriate vessel port. 
T40UT= F (G1IN, T1IN, -G3IN, T3IN) 
T40UT= F (-G1IN, T1IN, G3IN, T3IN) 
T40UT= F (T5VES) 
T40UT= F (T6VES) 
none, cold 
none, hot 
complete 
partial. 
The composition equation for the second side outlet or liquid outlet port is a function of 
the composition at the appropriate vessel port. 
X40UT= F (X3IN) 
X40UT = F (X5VES) 
X40UT = F (X6VES) 
XA40UT= F (-XB6VES) 
XB40UT = F (XB6VES) 
none 
complete 
partial, single 
partial, multi 
partial, multi. 
For a partial phase change a second outlet port is required forthe vapour. This is modelled 
in the same way as the other second side outlet port except that the partial phase change 
options and the vapour vessel port are used. The equations are: 
050UT = F (G50UT) 
050UT = F (G50UT, P7VES) 
P50UT= F (P7VES) 
T50UT = F (T7VES) 
X50UT = F (X7VES) 
XA50UT= F (XA7VES) 
XB50UT = F (-XA7VES) 
partial, no pressure effects, flow 
partial, pressure effects, flow 
partial, pressure 
partial, temperature 
partial, single, composition 
partial, mUlti, composition 
partial, mUlti, composition. 
The flow and pressure equations for any additional ports are similar to the additional ports 
on the first side except that the vessel port terms for the pressure are used for phase 
change situations. In these examples there Is only one additional port and that is on the 
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second side. For no phase change or a complete phase change the additional port is 
port 5 but for a partial phase change it is port 6. It may be either a relief or drain port 
because the results are the same. 
Q50UT= F (G50UT, P3IN) 
Q50UT= F (G50UT, P6VES) 
Q60UT = F (G60UT, P8VES) 
P50UT= F (P3IN) 
P50UT = F (P6VES) 
P60UT = F (P8VES) 
none 
complete 
partial 
none 
complete 
partial 
The temperature and composition propagation equations are similar to those for the outlet 
port. Again, the same port numbers are used for the relief or drain port. It should be 
noted that there is a difference between a relief port and a drain port, with one being for 
the vapour and the other for the liquid, respectively. The appropriate vessel ports must 
be used. 
T50UT= F (G1IN, T11N, -G3IN, T3IN) 
T50UT= F (-G1IN, T11N, G31N, T3iN) 
T50UT = F (T6VES) 
T60UT = F (T7VES) 
T60UT = F (T8VES) 
X50UT= F (X3IN) 
X50UT = F (X6VES) 
X50UT = F (X7VES) 
X50UT = F (X8VES) 
XA60UT= F (-XB7VES) 
XB60UT = F (XB7VES) 
XA60UT = F (XA8VES) 
XB60UT= F (-XA8VES) 
none, cold 
none, hot 
complete 
partial, drain 
partial, relief 
none 
complete 
partial, single, drain 
partial, single, relief 
partial, mUlti, drain 
partial, multi, drain 
partial, multi, relief 
partial, multi, relief. 
The last sets of equations deal with the vessel ports and are only necessary if there is a 
phase change. The first vessel port is used either to model all the variables for a complete 
phase change or just the variables associated with the liquid side for a partial phase 
change. 
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The level term Is generated from a mass balance of all the liquid streams entering and 
leaving the second side. The actual terms depend on whether the second side is the hot 
or cold side. The complete selection of terms Is; liquid inlet flow, G3IN, liquid outlet flow, 
Q40UT, and the internal flow, QvVES. This becomes, 
L5VES= F (G3IN, -QSVES) 
L5VES= F (-Q40UT, QSVES) 
LSVES= F (G3IN, -Q40UT, -QaVES) 
LSVES= F (-Q40UT, Q8VES) 
complete, cold 
complete, hot 
partial, cold 
partial, hot. 
The pressure term Is used at this port only if there is a complete phase change and is a 
mass balance on the vapour streams entering and leaving the second side. The possible 
terms are; vapour inlet flow, G3IN, vapour outlet flow, Q40UT, and the internal flow, 
QSVES. The level term, L5VES, is also used in this because as the level rises so will the 
pressure and the head of liquid above the port will also exert a pressure. 
P5VES= F (-Q40UT, L5VES, QSVES) complete, cold 
P5VES= F (G3IN, L5VES, -QSVES) complete, hot 
The temperature term has been developed from those derived by Kelly (5). For a single 
component system it is a function of the pressure and the internal flow. For a system with 
mUlti-component features the pressure and composition of the liquid are used. 
T5VES= F (P5VES, -QSVES) 
TSVES= F (P7VES, -Q8VES) 
TSVES= F (P7VES, XBSVES) 
complete 
partial, single 
partial, mu It I. 
The composition term again comes from those developed by Kelly. Fora single component 
system it is a function of the inlet composition. A system with multi-component features 
is more complicated and since this is the liquid outlet port the equation makes reference 
to the less volatile component or components. For a cold fluid it is a function of the inlet 
composition and the internal flow but for a hot fluid it is a function of the composition at 
the vapour vessel port (since only the less volatile component is modelled at this port, a 
negative relationship is used) and the internal flow. 
X5VES= F (X3IN) 
XSVES= F (X3IN) 
XBSVES= F (XB3IN, QaVES) 
XBSVES= F (-XA7VES, -Q8VES) 
complete 
partial, single 
partial, multi, cold 
partial, multi, hot. 
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A second vessel port is required for a partial phase change to model the vapour phase. 
The pressure term is a mass balance of the vapourflows into and out of the second side. 
The possible terms are; vapour inlet flow, G3IN, vapour outlet flow, C40UT, the internal 
flow, CaVES, and the level term, LSVES. 
P7VES= F (-CSOUT, LSVES, CaVES) 
P7VES= F (G3IN, -CSOUT, LSVES, -CaVES) 
partial, cold 
partial, hot. 
The temperature for the second vessel port as derived by Kelly is a function ofthe pressure 
and internal flow for single components and a function of the pressure and the composition 
for mUlti-component features. 
T7VES= F (P7VES, -Ca7VES) 
T7VES= F (P7VES, -XA7VES) 
partial, single 
partial, multi. 
The composition term for the second vessel port depends on the number of components 
and whether the second side is hot or cold. For single components only the inlet 
composition is used. For multi-component features the inlet composition and internal flow 
are used for the hot side and the composition at the liquid vessel port and internal flow 
are used for the cold side. 
X7VES= F (X3IN) 
XA7VES= F (-XBSVES, -CaVES) 
XA7VES= F (XA3IN, CaVES) 
partial, single 
partial, multi, cold 
partial, multi, hot. 
The last vessel port is used to model the intemal flow between the liquid and vapour 
phases. The equation depends on whether it is for the hot or cold side and is a function 
of the flow and the temperature into the first side, the composition (if a partial phase change 
occu rs) and the pressu re. 
CSVES= F (G1IN, T1IN, -PSVES) 
CSVES= F (G1IN, -T1IN, PSVES) 
CaVES= F (G1IN, T1IN, -P7VES) 
CaVES= F (G1IN, -T1IN, P7VES) 
CaVES= F (G1IN, T11N, -XBSVES, -P7VES) 
CaVES= F (G1IN, -T1IN, -XA7VES, P7VES) 
complete, cold 
complete, hot 
partial, single, cold 
partial, single, hot 
partial, multi, cold 
partial, multi, hot. 
This completes all the necessary propagation equations for the heat exchanger model. 
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8.3.4 Generation Of Event Statements 
For the event statements each deviation or event is considered in tum and applied to 
each appropriate port. 
A high flow through the second side liquid outlet port may cause the level to fall to zero 
for a partial phase change. A high flow through the second side outlet port of a hot system 
with a complete phase change may also cause the level to fall to zero. 
V Q40UT HI: L5VES NONE 
V Q40UT HI: LSVES NONE 
complete, hot 
partial. 
The effect of some flow out through any relief or drain port has to be considered. This 
increases the inlet flow and reduces the outlet flow and even reverses it if this can occur 
through the outlet. For the second side where a phase change occurs the effects are on 
the pressure for a relief port and on the level and the pressure for a drain port. For the 
first side port 3 is the additional port and for the second side it is port 5 (or S for a partial 
phase change). 
First side 
V 030UT SOME: G11N HI, 020UT LO, 020UT NONE, 020UT REV, 
R11N HI, P20UT LO, P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
Second side 
V 050UT SOME: G31N HI, 040UT LO, Q40UT NONE, 040UT REV, 
R31N HI, P40UT LO, P40UT NONE, P40UT REV 
V 050UT SOME: PSVES LO 
V 050UT SOME: LSVES LO, LSVES NONE, PSVES LO 
V OSOUT SOME: P8VES LO 
V OSOUT SOME: L7VES LO, L7VES NONE, P8VES LO 
none 
complete, 
relief 
complete, 
drain 
partial, relief 
partial, drain. 
The results of reverse flow through the ports for a no phase change situation are modelled 
by the propagation equations. However, for a phase change situation on the second side 
where vessel ports are involved the process must be handled the same as that in vessel 
models (see section 7.3.3). For the Inlet ports, reverse flow may cause low or no level 
and/or low pressure depending on whether the second side was the hot or cold side. 
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V G31N REV: L5VES LO, L5VES NONE, PSVES LO 
V G31N REV: P5VES LO 
V G31N REV: LSVES LO, LSVES NONE, P7VES LO 
V G31N REV: P7VES LO 
complete, cold 
complete, hot 
partial, cold 
partial, hot. 
For the outlet ports, reverse flow may cause high level and/or pressure. 
V Q40UT REV: PSVES HI 
V Q40UT REV: L5VES HI, PSVES HI 
V Q40UT REV: L6VES HI, P7VES HI 
V QSOUT REV: P7VES HI . 
complete, cold 
complete, hot 
partial 
partial. 
The effect of reverse flow through any relief or drain port has to be considered. This 
decreases the inlet flow (it may even reverse it) and increases the outlet flow. For the 
second side where a phase change occurs the effects are on the pressure for a relief port 
and on the level and the pressure for a drain port. Impurities may also be introduced from 
these ports. For the first side port 3 Is the additional port and for the second side it is port 
S (or S for a partial phase change). The component 'D' refers to an impurity entering 
through any of the additional ports, for example air. 
First side 
VQ30UT REV: G11N LO, G11N NONE, G11N REV, Q20UT HI 
R11N LO, R11N NONE, R11N REV, P20UTHI 
Y11N HI, X20UT HI single 
V Q30UT REV: G11N LO, G11N NONE, G11N REV, Q20UT HI 
R11N LO, R11N NONE, R11N REV, P20UT HI 
YD11N HI, XD20UT HI multi. 
Second side 
V QSOUT REV: G31N LO, G31N NONE, G31N REV, Q40UT HI 
R31N LO, R31N NONE, R31N REV, P40UT HI 
Y31N HI, X40UT HI 
V Q50UT REV: P6VES HI, XSVES HI 
V QSOUT REV: LSVES HI, PSVES HI, XSVES HI 
V QSOUT REV: P8VES HI, X8VES HI 
V QSOUT REV: L7VES HI, P8VES HI, X7VES HI 
V QSOUT REV: P8VES HI, XD8VES HI 
V QSOUT REV: L7VES HI, P8VES HI, XD7VES HI 
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none 
complete, relief 
complete, drain 
partial, relief, single 
partial, drain, single 
partial, relief, multi 
partial, drain, multi. 
If a phase change occurs then the various deviations of the level term may have different 
effects on other variables. These also depend on whether the second side is the hot or 
cold side. The effects are in the outlet temperature of the first side and the intemal flow. 
V L5VES HI: T20UT HI, QSVES LO 
V L5VES HI: T20UT LO, QSVES HI 
V LSVES HI: T20UT HI, QaVES LO 
V LSVES HI: T20UT LO, QaVES HI 
V LSVES LO: T20UT LO, QSVES HI 
V LSVES LO: T20UT HI, Q6VES LO 
V LSVES LO: T20UT LO, QaVES HI 
V LSVES LO: T20UT HI, QaVES LO 
V LSVES NONE: T20UT LO, PSVES LO, QSVES HI 
V LSVES NONE: T20UT HI, TSVES HI, PSVES LO, 
QSVES NONE 
V LSVES NONE: T20UT LO, P7VES LO, QaVES HI 
V LSVES NONE: T20UT HI, T7VES HI, P7VES LO, 
QaVES NONE 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial, hot 
partial, cold 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial, hot 
partial, cold 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial, hot 
partial, cold. 
If there is a phase change then the vessel pressure may affect the flows into and out of 
the second side. The reverse flow deviation is only used if the particular port allows 
reverse flow. 
V PSVES HI: G31N NONE, R31N NONE, G31N REV, R31N REV complete 
V P7VES HI: G31N NONE, R31N NONE, G31N REV, R31N REV . partial 
V PSVES NONE: Q40UT REV, P40UT REV complete 
V P7VES NONE: Q40UT REV, P40UT REV, 
QSOUT REV, PSOUT REV partial 
V PSVES NONE: QSOUT REV, PSOUT REV 
V paVES NONE: Q60UT REV, PSOUT REV 
complete, relief or drain port 
partial, relief or drain port. 
The effects of no intemal flow have also to be considered for phase changes. This affects 
the level and the pressure depending on whether the second side is the hot or cold side. 
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V QSVES NONE: LSVES LO, P5VES HI 
V QSVES NONE: LSVES HI, P5VES LO 
V QaVES NONE: LSVES LO, P7VES HI 
V QaVES NONE: LSVES HI, P7VES LO 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial, hot 
partial, cold. 
These are all the variable deviations that are considered, the rest of the event statements 
are used to Incorporate the basic faults. 
The external heat source or cold source faults affect the inlet and outlet temperatures on 
both sides and the vessel port temperatures for a phase change. The affect on the 
pressure is also considered. In the examples all ports have reverse flow. 
F EXT-HEAT: U1 IN HI, T20UT HI, U31N HI, T40UT HI 
F EXT-HEAT: U11N HI, T20UT HI, T5VES HI, P5VES HI 
F EXT-HEAT: U11N HI, T20UT HI, TSVES HI, P7VES HI, 
T7VES HI 
F EXT-COLD: U11N La, T20UT LO, U31N La, T40UT La 
F EXT-COLD: U11N La, T20UT LO, T5VES LO, P5VES LO 
F EXT-COLD: U11N LO, T20UT LO, TSVES LO, P7VES LO, 
T7VES LO 
none 
complete 
partial 
none 
complete 
partial. 
A leak to a low pressure environment deals with leaks to the atmosphere and it is assumed 
that a leak from only one side of the heat exchanger occurs. The leak will affect the inlet 
and outlet flows or the vessel ports, including reverse flow if this is allowed. 
First Side 
F LK-LP-EN: G11N HI, Q20UT LO, Q20UT NONE, Q20UT REV, 
R11N HI, P20UT LO, P20UT NONE, P20UT REV. 
Second side 
F LK-LP-EN: G31N HI, Q40UT LO, Q40UT NONE, Q40UT REV, 
R31N HI, P40UT LO, P40UT NONE, P40UT REV 
, F LK-LP-EN: LSVES LO, LSVES NONE, P5VES LO 
F LK-LP-EN: LSVES LO, LSVES NONE, P7VES LO 
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none 
complete 
partial. 
Intemal leaks are assumed only to occur if there is a significant pressure difference 
between the two sides of the heat exchanger. From the high pressure side there is 
increased flow in but reduced flow out or even reverse flow. The lower pressure side has 
reduced and possibly reversed flow in but a high flow out. Temperature effects are 
considered and depend on the current side indicated being hot or cold and the direction 
of flow, for example, a hot fluid entering the cold side will cause the cold side exit 
temperature to be high and the other sides to be low. Composition is also considered as 
one side being an impurity In the other. In the example event statements the current side 
is the high pressure side. The effects shown are for flow and pressure on the first side 
then flow and pressure on the second side followed by the effects on temperature and 
composition. 
High pressure first side 
F INT-LK: G11N HI, 020UT LO, 020UT NONE, 020UT REV, 
R11N HI, P20UT LO, P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
F INT-LK: G31N LO, G31N NONE, G31N REV, 040UT HI, 
R31N LO, R31N NONE, R31N REV, P40UT HI 
F INT-LK: T20UT LO, U31N HI, T40UT HI, Y31N HI, X40UT HI 
F INT-LK: T20UT HI, U31N LO, T40UT LO, Y31N HI, X40UT HI 
F INT-LK: L5VES HI, P5VES HI 
F INT-LK: T20UT LO, T5VES HI, X5VES HI 
F INT-LK: T20UT HI, T5VES LO, X5VES HI 
F INT-LK: L6VES HI, P7VES HI 
F INT-LK: T20UT LO, T6VES HI, T7VES HI, X6VES HI, 
X7VES HI 
F INT-LK: T20UT HI, T6VES LO, T7VES LO, X6VES HI, 
X7VES HI 
F INT-LK: T20UT LO, T6VES HI, T7VES HI, XC6VES HI, 
XC7VES HI 
F INT-LK: T20UT HI, T6VES LO, T7VES LO, XC6VES HI, 
XC7VES HI 
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none 
none, hot 
none, cold 
complete 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial 
partial, single, hot 
partial, single, cold 
partial, multi, hot 
partial, multi, cold. 
High pressure second side 
F INT-LK: G11N LO, G11N NONE, G11N REV, 020UT HI, 
R11N LO, R11N NONE, R11N REV, P20UT HI 
F INT-LK: G31N HI, 040UT LO, Q40UT NONE, Q40UT REV, 
R31N HI, P40UT LO, P40UT NONE, P40UT REV 
F INT-LK: U11N HI, T20UT HI, T40UT LO, Y11N HI, X20UT HI 
F INT-LK: UlIN LO, T20UT LO, T40UT HI, Y11N HI, X20UT HI 
F INT-LK: LSVES LO, PSVES LO 
F INT-LK: U11N HI, T20UT HI, TSVES LO, Y11N HI, X20UT HI 
F INT-LK: U11N LO, T20UT LO, TSVES HI, Y11N HI, X20UT HI 
F INT-LK: L6VES LO, P7VES LO 
F INT-LK: U11N HI, T20UT HI, T6VES LO, T7VES LO, 
Y11N HI, X20UT HI 
F INT-LK: U11N LO, T20UT LO, T6VES HI, nVES HI, 
Y11N HI, X20UT HI 
F INT-LK: U11N HI, T20UT HI, T6VES LO, T7VES LO, 
YA11N HI, YB11N HI, XA20UT HI, XB20UT HI 
F INT-LK: U11N LO, T20UT LO, T6VES HI, T7VES HI, 
YA11N HI, YB11N HI, XA20UT HI, XB20UT HI 
none 
none, hot 
none, cold 
complete 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial 
partial, single, hot 
partial, single, cold 
partial, multi, hot 
partial, multi, cold. 
The partial blockage fault has been included to simulate a blockage occurring in some of 
the tubes or a partial blockage in the frame or plate side. It is assumed that a blockage 
of the shell side of any significance is impossible. This fault affects the flow rates and the 
temperatures depending on if the first side is the hot or cold side. 
First side flow and pressure effects 
F PART-BLK: G11N LO, 020UT LO, RlIN LO, P20UT LO 
Second side flow and pressure effects 
F PART-BLK: G31N LO, Q40UT LO, R31N LO, P40UT LO 
F PART-BLK: G31N LO, 040UT LO, QSOUT, 
R31N LO, P40UT LO, PSOUT LO 
8-23 
partial. 
Temperature effects 
F PART-BlK: U11N lO, T20UT lO, U31N lO, T40UT lO 
F PART-BlK: U11N HI, T20UT HI, U31N HI, T40UT HI 
F PART-BlK: UlIN lO, T20UT lO, T5VES lO 
F PART-BlK: UlIN HI, T20UT HI, T5VES HI 
F PART-BlK: U11N lO, T20UT lO, TSVES lO, T7VES lO 
F PART-BlK: U11N HI, T20UT HI, TSVES HI, T7VES HI 
none, hot 
none, cold 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial, hot 
partial, cold. 
The next set of event statements deal with faults specific to heat exchangers, these are: 
fouling, frothing and vapour blanket 'VAP-BlKT'. The faults are all associated with a 
reduction in the heat transfer efficiency. The effects are high or low temperature in the 
inlet and outlet streams depending on whether the first side is the hot or cold side. When 
a phase change occurs the faults also reduce the transfer rate between phases. The 
frothing fault represents liquid entrained in the vapour phase and the vapour blanket fault 
represents vapour trapped in the liquid phase. These two are used only if there is a phase 
change. 
F FOULING: U11N HI, T20UT HI, U31N lO, T40UT lO 
F FOULING: U11N lO, T20UT lO, U31N HI, T40UT HI 
F FOULING: U11N HI, T20UT HI, T5VES lO, 
OSVES lO, OSVES NONE 
F FOULING: U11N lO, T20UT lO, T5VES HI, 
OSVES lO, OSVES NONE 
F FOULING: U11N HI, T20UT HI, TSVES lO, 
T7VES lO, oaVES lO, oaVES NONE 
F FOULING: U11N lO, T20UT lO, TSVES HI, 
T7VES HI, oaVES lO, oaVES NONE 
F FROTHING: U11N HI, T20UT HI, T5VES lO, OSVES lO 
F FROTHING: U11N lO, T20UT lO, T5VES HI, OSVES lO 
F FROTHING: U11N HI, T20UT HI, TSVES lO, 
T7VES lO, oaVES lO 
F FROTHING: U11N lO, T20UT lO, TSVES HI, 
T7VES HI, oaVES lO 
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none, hot 
none, cold 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial, hot 
partial, cold 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial, hot 
partial, cold 
F VAP-BLKT: U11N HI, T20UT HI, TSVES LO, 06VES LO 
F VAP-BLKT: U11N LO, T20UT LO, TSVES HI, 06VES LO 
F VAP-BLKT: U11N HI, T20UT HI, T6VES LO, 
TIVES LO, OaVES LO 
F VAP-BLKT: U11N LO, T20UT LO, T6VES HI, 
TIVES HI, OaVES LO 
complete, hot 
complete, cold 
partial, hot 
partial, cold. 
If there is a phase change vessel ports are used to link inlet and outlet ports. However, 
the some deviation is not defined at vessel ports (see the end of section 7.3.3) and it is 
necessary to use the S NORMAL event statement. These introduce the some deviation 
for ports on the second side with a phase change. They are also used to define any relief 
or drain ports as having no flow under normal conditions. 
S NORMAL: G31N SOME, 040UT SOME, R31N SOME, P40UT SOME complete 
S NORMAL: G31N SOME, 040UT SOME, OSOUT SOME, 
R31N SOME, P40UT SOME, PSOUT SOME partial 
S NORMAL: 030UT NONE, 060UT NONE relief port. 
The S IMPOSS event statements are used to define which deviations are impossible as 
given by the. user and assumed in the methodology. This covers reverse flow at certain 
ports and reverse flow from liquid to vapour or vapour to liquid. 
S IMPOSS: G11N REV, Q20UT REV, G3iN REV, 040UT REV 
S IMPOSS: 06VES REV 
S IMPOSS: OaVES REV 
optional 
complete 
partial. 
This completes all the necessary event statements for the heat exchanger model. 
8.3.5 Generation Of Decision Tables 
The decision tables are used to combine temperature and composition deviations at ports 
where a flow condition other than the normal state needs to occur before the deviation 
can propagate. This is generally reverse flow through the second side outlet ports where 
a phase change occurs. 
The causal events for the vessel temperature deviations are reverse temperature at the 
outlet port ANDed with reverse flow through that port. 
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V U40UT HI V 040UT REV T T5VES HI 
V U40UT LO V Q40UT REV T T5VES LO 
V U40UT HI V 040UT REV T T6VES HI 
V U40UT LO V Q40UT REV T T6VES LO 
V U50UT HI V 050UT REV T T7VES HI 
V U50UT LO V 050UT REV T T7VES LO 
The ports considered also Include the relief or drain ports. 
V U50UT HI V 050UT REV T T6VES HI 
V U50UT LO V 050UT REV T T6VES LO 
V U60UT HI V 060UT REV T T8VES HI 
V U60UT LO V 060UT REV T TBVES LO 
V U60UT HI V 060UT REV T T7VES HI 
V U60UT LO V 060UT REV T T7VES LO 
complete 
complete 
partial 
partial 
partial 
partial. 
complete, relief or drain 
complete, relief or drain 
partial, relief 
partial, relief 
partial, drain 
partial, drain. 
The vessel composition is affected by the reverse composition at the outlet ports only if 
accompanied by reverse flow. 
V Y 40UT HI V Q40UT REV T X5VES HI 
V Y40UT LO V 040UT REV T X5VES LO 
V Y40UT HI V Q40UT REV T X6VES HI 
V Y 40UT LO V 040UT REV T X6VES LO 
V Y50UT HI V 050UT REV T X7VES HI 
V Y50UT LO V 050UT REV T X7VES LO 
V Y A40UT HI V 040UT REV T XB6VES LO 
V YA40UT LO V Q40UT REV T XB6VES HI 
V YB40UT HI V 040UT REV T XB6VES HI 
V YB40UT LO V Q40UT REV T XB6VES LO 
V Y ASOUT HI V 050UT REV T XA7VES HI 
V YA50UT LO V 050UT REV T XA7VES LO 
V YBSOUT HI V 050UT REV T XA7VES LO 
V YB50UT LO V 050UT REV T XA7VES HI 
complete 
complete 
partial, single 
partial, single 
partial, single 
partial, single 
partial, multi 
partial, multi 
partial, multi 
partial, multi 
partial, multi 
partial, multi 
partial, multi 
partial, multi. 
A similar set of decision tables is obtained for deviations through the relief or drain ports. 
V Y50UT HI V 050UT REV T X6VES HI 
V Y50UT LO V 050UT REV T X6VES LO 
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complete 
complete 
V Y60UT HI V Q60UT REV T X8VES HI 
V Y60UT LO V a60UT REV T X8VES LO 
V Y60UT HI V Q60UT REV T X7VES HI 
V Y60UT LO V a60UT REV T X7VES LO 
V YD60UT HI V a60UT REV T XD8VES HI 
V YD60UT LO V a60UT REV T XD8VES LO 
V YD60UT HI V a60UT REV T XD7VES HI 
V YD60UT LO V a60UT REV T XD7VES LO 
partial, single, relief 
partial, single, relief 
partial, single, drain 
partial, single, drain 
partial, multi, relief 
partial, multi, relief 
partial, multi, drain 
partial, mUlti, drain. 
This completes all the necessary decision tables for the heat exchanger model. 
8.3.6 Additional Information 
There are two final sections of the model to be generated. The first is used by the main 
program when converting the text form of the model to the numerical form. The character 
variable used to indicate if the model has mUlti-component features is redefined to the 
text string "There are no mUlti-component features" or "There are mUlti-component 
features". This also serves the purpose of informing a user if the model uses this feature. 
The second section is purely for user information and is not used by the programs. A text 
string is set up which is used to indicate the normal state of the model. This contains a 
list of ports which normally have flow. 
The generation of the heat exchanger model is now complete. 
8.4 List Of Example Models 
Six examples are given to Illustrate the rules given in this chapter. There is a partial 
reboiler, a partial condenser, a total reboiler, a total condenser, a heater unit and a cooler 
unit. These models are contained in Appendix 0 and the engineering description gives 
details on the port types. 
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8.5 Heat Exchanger Summary Tables 
Table 8.2 • Options 
Heat exchanger type: Shell & tube and Air·cooled finned 
Frame & plate and Double pipe 
First side temperature: Hot 
Cold 
First side phase change: None 
Second side phase changes: None 
Partial 
Complete 
Multi·component features: Optional for partial phase change 
Pressure difference: First side at higher pressure 
Second side at high pressure 
Insignificant pressure difference 
Additional ports (each side) : Relief and/or drainage port 
First side port flow type: As for pipe type unit 
Optional reverse flow 
Second side port flow types: Pressure effects 
No pressure effects 
Optional reverse flow 
Additional port flow type: Normally no flow 
Pressure effects 
Reverse flow 
Table 8.3 - Faults 
External heat source FEXT-HEAT 
Extemal cold source FEXT-COLD 
Leak to a low pressure environment F LK-LP-EN 
Intemalleak F INT-LK 
Partial blockage F PART-BLK 
Fouling FFOULING 
Frothing FFROTHING 
Vapour blanketing FVAP-BLKT 
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Chapter 9 
Rules For The Generation Of Reaction Vessel Models 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the generation of reaction vessel unit models. These are probably 
the most diverse items of equipment, around which all the other units are based. Ideally. 
the generation of reaction vessels would be of great advantage to the user but the variety 
of different reactions makes it very difficult to sort out any type of taxonomy. 
However, a reaction vessel can be broken into a combination of two types of process unit, 
a holding vessel and a heat exchanger (since the majority of reactions require a heat input 
system to start and maintain a reaction or a removal system to prevent a runaway reaction). 
Systems for categorising vessels and heat exchangers have already been discussed In 
the previous chapters. The next step Is to look at characteristics particular to reaction 
vessels. 
9.2 Reaction Vessel Characteristics 
There are many different types of reaction vessel of all sizes which makes a 
characterisation process seem very difficult. However, Coulson (2) has looked at the 
design procedure used for reaction vessels and has put forward three classes to 
characterise them. To enable fault modelling to be carried out an additional class has 
been added giving the following four classes, 
1. Mode of operation: 
2. Reaction vessel geometry: 
3. Phases present: 
4. Heat transfer requirements: 
batch, continuous or hybrid 
stirred tank, tubular or packed! fluidised bed 
homogeneous or heterogeneous 
none, cooling or heating, intemal or extemal 
These are explained more fully by Coulson (1) and in the following sections. 
9.2.1 Mode Of Operation 
A batch process operates In three distinct stages. There is a reaction vessel filling or 
charging stage when all the reactants are added to the vessel, a reaction stage when the 
chemical reaction takes place and a reaction vessel emptying or discharge phase when 
the products and any unconverted reactants are removed. 
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Reaction vessels situated in a batch operation process are used mainly for very slow 
reactions and specialist chemical production. They require less auxiliary equipment but 
are less economical to run for mass production. They are particularly useful for 
polymerisation and biochemical reactions because the time between batches can be used 
to clean the equipment. A disadvantage is that all the reactants are contained in the 
reaction vessel which prevents control of the reaction rate by control of the reactant feed. 
There is a strong possibility of a runaway reaction. 
A batch process is shown schematically in Figure 9.1. 
A _rl~_f=:;_8 
> 
Charging Reacting 
Of Reactant. A and 8 
) 
I Product 
Discharging 
Of Product And Any 
Remaining Reactants 
Figure 9.1 - Batch Reaction Process 
A continuous process is where all the reactants are continually added to the reaction 
vessel and the product and any unreacted material continually removed. The entire 
reaction process may occur in several reaction vessels placed in series. 
This is very economical for large scale production of chemicals. The disadvantage lies 
in the capital cost of the control and other safety systems. A continuous process is shown 
schematically in Figure 9.2. 
AB --l Reactants .I
'---------' 
f--." Products Plus Any 
Remaining Reactants 
Figure 9.2 - Continuous Reaction Process 
In some reaction processes it may be necessary to keep the concentration of one of the 
reactants low due to violent or side reactions or simply because of the volume of reactant 
required (eg. gases). For these a hybrid reaction vessel set-up is used such that one of 
the reactants is added at the rate at which it is used or at different intervals. This gives 
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better control than simple batch operation and less complex control than continuous 
operation. There are three types, a simple semi-batch reaction vessel, a divided-feed 
reaction vessel and a divided-feed to several reaction vessels in series as shown 
schematically in Figure 9.3. 
Reoctont A 
1] 
1 r!-: 
.... _ .. 
Semi-Batch 
• -....---r--.---.. 
Reoetontt .l...l.. .l,. .It. 
A~PrOduct."""/IIt'l 
- ........... 
Divided-Feed 
Figure 9.3 - Hybrid Reaction Processes 
9.2.2 Reaction Vessel Geometry 
The actual reaction vessel can be categorised into one of three types. There is the stirred 
tank or back-mix vessel which has some form of paddle to mix the reactants and products 
together such that the concentration of any component in the vessel is the same 
throughout. These may be operated in a batch, continuous, semi-batch or divided-feed 
process. 
A tubular reaction vessel is simply a long tube into which reactants are added at one end 
and products withdrawn at the other. These are always operated as continuous reaction 
vessels or as divided-feed reaction vessels. 
Packed bed and fluidised bed reaction vessels consist of a vessel with some form of 
packing which acts as a catalyst or even a reactant. In packed beds the packing remains 
stationary but with fluidised beds the flow rate of the reactants is sufficient enough to lift 
the packing and keep it mobile. The packing does not leave the vessel in the product 
stream. They may be operated as continuous or divided-feed processes. 
Figure 9.4 shows the three types of reaction vessel geometry. 
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Figure 9.4 - Reaction Vessel Geometries 
9.2.3 Phases Present 
A homogeneous mixture is one where the reactants, products and any catalyst are present 
in the same phase. A homogeneous gas phase reaction is always carried out as a 
continuous process. _ 
A heterogeneous mixture Is one where there is more than one phase present. 
9.2.4 Heat Transfer Requirements 
Most chemical reactions involve the generation of heat (exothermic) or a heat input to 
keep them going (endothermic). Sometimes the heat removal through the product take-off 
Is sufficient to prevent a runaway reaction or the reactants are heated sufficiently prior to 
entry to the reaction vessel that no more heat Is required. These reactions do not require 
heat transfer processes to be modelled In the reaction vessel. 
There may also be a take-off stream which syphons off reaction fluid, passes it through 
a heat exchanger and recycles it back to the reaction vessel. Cases like this are extemal 
sources and do not require the heat transfer system to be modelled in the reaction vessel. 
There are many chemical reactions which do require some additional form of heat transfer 
system and It is often necessary to provide a heat source or sink to the reaction vessel. 
These take the fonm of jackets around the vessel, coils within the vessel or the 'vessel' 
fonms coils within a heat transfer medium. All of these types require the heat transfer 
process to be modelled within the reaction vessel model. 
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As with heat exchangers (section 8.2) it is necessary to distinguish between exothennic 
and endothennic reactions so the appropriate temperature equations can be used. 
9.2.5 Common Reaction Vessel Types 
Batch operations are usually carried out for liquid phase or liquid-solid reactions in stirred 
tank type reaction vessels. 
Semi-batch operations are also carried out in stirred tank type reaction vessels. They are 
usually used for contacting liquids with gases or for violent liquid phase reactions. 
Continuous operations for gas phase reactions are carried out in tubular reaction vessels. 
However, by far the most common reaction vessel is the continuous stirred tank reaction 
vessel (CSTR) used for liquid phase reactions. 
9.3 Reaction Types 
The number of types of chemical reaction are even more numerous than the vessel types 
and can involve gases, liquids and solids. Some example equations are 
A 
-+ C 
A + B -+ C 
A 
-+ C + 0 
A + B -+ C + 0 
A major factor in any chemical reaction is the temperature. This more than any other 
parameter affects the reaction rate although secondary factors such as changes in volume, 
pressure and concentration can be involved. In all reactions an increase in temperature 
results in a increase in reaction rate. 
In gas phase reactions there can be significant changes in volume and pressure. For 
example, the reaction for the second equation results in a decrease in volume (at constant 
pressure) and the reaction for the third equation results in an increase in pressure (at 
constant volume). To encourage the reaction to go to completion quickly a high pressure 
is used for the second equation. 
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9.4 Modelling Assumptions And Simplifications 
Chemical reactions involving gases often result in a change In volume. Most of these 
though are carried out as continuous or hybrid processes. This greatly simplifies the 
modelling because under normal operating conditions any change in volume is a normal 
state. Consider a reaction where the volume doubles (third equation). If the flow rate 
into the reaction vessel is lower than normal then the product flow rate will also be lower 
than normal because there Is less reactant to react. The models assume that a volume 
or pressure change occurs under normal steady state operation and does not represent 
a fault condition. Hence it Is possible to model the reaction vessel without conSidering 
these changes. 
The stoichiometry of reactions involving gases has other effects besides volume. For 
example, it is assumed that a higher temperature may cause either a lower or higher 
pressure, depending on whether the number of gaseous atoms on the right hand side of 
the equation decreases or Increases. This occurs because more reactant than normal 
has reacted. Also it is assumed that a higher pressure may cause either a higher or lower 
reaction rate due to a decrease or increase in the amount of gas phase material present. 
Reactions that involve catalysts can be modelled In two ways. If the catalyst is a solid it 
is assumed to be contained within the reaction vessel in the form of a packed/fluidised 
bed and will not pass out into the product stream under normal operation. The second 
type is where the catalyst is a liquid (or gas) and enters the reaction vessel In a reactant 
stream. The catalyst can be modelled using the concentration variable which has the 
deviations of high (XC1IN HI) or low (XC1IN LO). For the solid catalyst the low deviation 
may be caused by exhaustion or poisoning and the high deviation by too much catalyst 
in the reaction vessel. For the liquid the low deviation may be caused by pOisoning or 
generally low concentration in the stream and the high deviation may be caused by an 
excess In the stream. 
The reaction stage in a batch reaction process can be modelled simply as a vessel which 
has no Inlet ports or outlet ports on the reaction side. Control Is maintained by adjusting 
the flow of coolant or heating fluid. The hybrid reaction process must be modelled in a 
similar way to a continuous process. 
The intemal characteristics of the reaction vessel are modelled using the vessel port. This 
port is used to model level (if applicable), temperature, pressure and concentration. Since 
flow cannot be modelled at the same port as level a separate vessel port Is required to 
model the transfer of material from the reactant side to the product side, le. the reaction 
rate. 
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Reactions which require a heat transfer system built into the reaction vessel can be 
modelled in the same way whether it is In the form of an extemal device such as a jacket 
or fumace, or an Intemal coil. Basically there is a separate flow stream for heat input or 
removal which can have its own deviations and affect the temperature within the reaction 
vessel. It Is necessary to determine the high pressure side, if any, such that Intemalleak 
faults can be modelled correctly. 
9.5 Example Models 
Consider the catalytic reaction 
There are no side reactions and the catalyst, represented by the component letter 'K', Is 
mixed in with reactant A. The reaction is to be carried out continuously but there are two 
different scenarios. 
9.5.1 Stirred Tank Reaction Vessel 
As an exothermic liquid phase reaction It may be carried out in a stirred tank reaction 
vessel. The reactants are pumped into the reaction vessel separately but the products 
and any unreacted material is removed through a single outlet port. An intemal cooling 
coil is used with liquid coolant at a higher pressure than the reaction vessel and contents. 
The catalyst may be poisoned by the coolant and all reverse flow effects are ignored. A 
schematic representation is shown in Figure 9.5. 
RtoCtanll 
A. B 
Cotol~t 
1 3 
wo~ • 
Cd' • C -) 
(' 
2 A+II+C+D+Catol,.t 
Figure 9.5 - Continuous Stirred Tank Reaction Vessel With Intemal Cooling Coils 
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The numbers on the reaction vessel represent the port numbers. These are 
port 1 • inlet port for reactant A and catalyst 
port 2 • outlet port for catalyst, products and any unreacted material 
port 3 • Inlet port for reactant B 
port 4 • inlet port for cooling liquid 
port 5 • outlet port for cooling liquid 
port 6 • vessel port used to model intemal variables 
port 7 • vessel port used to model the reaction rate 
The flow and pressure propagation equations for the reaction side are 
G1IN= F( 011N) 
R1IN= F( ·P6VES) 
G3IN= F( 031N) 
R3IN= F( ·P6VES) 
020UT= F( G20UT, P6VES) 
P20UT = F( P6VES) 
These show there are no pressure effects on the inlets and there are no direct links 
between the in let and outlet ports. 
The flow and pressure propagation equations for the coolant side are the same as In the 
pipe model. 
G4IN= F( Q4IN, 050UT) 
R4IN= F( R50UT) 
050UT= F( G41N, G50UT) 
P50UT = F( P4IN) 
The outlet temperature of the reaction side is a function of the intemal temperature but 
the outlet of the coolant side is also affected by the inlet temperature and flow. 
T20UT= F( T6VES) 
T50UT= F( ·G4IN, T41N, T6VES) 
The intemal level and pressure variables are modelled using the following propagation 
equations 
L6VES= F( G11N, G31N, ·020UT) 
P6VES= F( L6VES, T6VES) 
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The intemal temperature and composition of the components are modelled using the 
following propagation equations 
T6VES= F( TlIN, T3IN, -G4IN, T4IN, a7VES) 
XA6VES= F( XA l1N, -a7VES) 
XB6VES= F( XB3IN, -a7VES) 
XC6VES= F( a7VES) 
XK6VES= F( XK1IN) 
All are affected by the reaction rate except the catalyst composition. Component 'D' is 
not modelled because it is the same as component 'C'. The outlet compositions are simple 
functions of the intemal compositions. 
The reaction rate is modelled on a separate port. It is a function of the intemal temperature, 
the total component flows of the two reactants and the catalyst composition. Event 
statements using total componentfiow are required in addition to the propagation equation. 
a7VES= F( T6VES, XK6VES) 
V GllN ® XAllN LO: a7VES LO 
V G31N ® XB31N LO: a7VES LO 
V GlIN ® XAllN HI : a7VES HI 
V G31N ® XB31N HI : a7VES HI 
Some of the event statements that can be used with the model are: 
F INT-LK: XK6VES LO 
F MIX-BROK: a7VES LO 
to represent the catalyst being poisoned by the coolant leaking into the reaction vessel 
and the reaction rate being reduced by a broken mixer. Other event statements may be 
used for high intemal temperature caused by poor heat transfer or agitation. 
Note: This is only an outline of some of the propagation equations and event statements 
required for a continuous stirred tank reaction vessel model and does not 
represent the entire model. 
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9.5.2 Tubular Reaction Vessel 
As an endothermic gas phase reaction it may be carried out in a tubular reaction vessel. 
The pumped reactants and catalyst are mixed before entry to the vessel through a single 
inlet and the products and any unreacted material removed through the single outlet. The 
reaction tube is jacketed and uses a gaseous heating medium at a higher pressure than 
the reaction material. The catalyst may be poisoned by the heating medium and all reverse 
flow effects are ignored. 
A schematic representation is shown in Figure 9.6. 
A + B + Cotol,.~ !.--t. + B + C + D + ColOf,.t 
3 
Figure 9.6 • Continuous Tubular Reaction Vessel With Heating Jacket 
The numbers on the reaction vessel represent the port numbers. These are 
port 1 - inlet port for reactants and catalyst 
port 2 - outlet port for catalyst, products and any unreacted material 
port 3 - inlet port for heating medium 
port 4 - outlet port for heating medium 
port 5 - vessel port used to model the reaction rate 
The flow and pressure propagation equations for the reaction side and jacket side are the 
same as the pipe model. There are no pressure effects 
G1IN=F(Q1IN, Q20UT) 
R1IN= F( R20UT) 
Q20UT= F( GlIN, G20UT) 
P20UT= F( P1IN) 
G3IN= F( Q3IN, Q40UT) 
R3IN= F( R40UT) 
Q40UT= F( G3IN, G40UT) 
P40UT = F( P3IN) 
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The outlet temperatures are functions of the inlet flows and temperatures and the reaction 
rate. (NB. High inlet reactant temperature does not result in high outlet temperature 
because another effect Is a higher reaction rate which causes cooling.) 
T20UT= F( G3IN, T3IN, ·OSVES) 
T40UT= F( ·G1IN, T1IN, G3IN, T3IN, ·QSVES) 
V T11N LO : T20UT LO 
The composition of the components are modelled using the following propagation 
equations: 
XA20UT= F( XA1IN, ·OSVES) 
XB20UT = F( XB1IN, ·OSVES) 
XC20UT = F( OSVES) 
XK20UT= F( XK1IN) 
All are affected by the reaction rate except the catalyst composition. Component 'D' is 
not modelled because it is the same as component 'C'. 
The reaction rate is a function of the inlet flow of heating medium, the temperatures, the 
total component flows of the two reactants and the catalyst composition. In this case the 
total component flows of both components must be high for the reaction rate to be high. 
Event statements and decision tables are required in addition to the propagation equation. 
OSVES= F( T1IN, G3IN, T3IN, XK1IN) 
v G1IN®XA1INLO:OSVESLO 
V GlIN ® XB11N LO : OSVES LO 
V G1IN®XAlINHI:A(DUMMY) 
V G11N ® XB11N HI : B(DUMMY) 
I A(DUMMY) I B(DUMMY) T OSVES HI 
Since the reaction rate is the only Intemal variable the effect of catalyst poisoning due to 
an intemal leak is modelled using this rather than the catalyst composition. 
F INT·LK: OSVES LO 
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Note: This is only an outline of some of the propagation equations, event statements 
and decision tables required for a tubular reaction vessel model and does not 
represent the entire model. 
9.6 Reaction Vessel Summary Table 
OPTIONS 
Reaction vessel mode: Batch 
Continuous 
Hybrid. 
Reaction vessel geometry : Stirred tank 
Tubular 
Packed/Fluidised bed. 
Reaction mixture phase: Homogeneous liquid 
Homogeneous gas 
Heterogeneous. 
Gas phase stoichiometry : No change 
Increase 
Decrease. 
Catalyst: None involved 
Inside reaction vessel 
With reactant. 
Heat transfer requirements: None 
Heating by high pressure source 
Heating by low pressure source 
Cooling by high pressure source 
Cooling by low pressure source. 
Additional ports: Relief (pressure effects) 
Drain (pressure and level effects). 
Reaction port flow types: Pressure effects 
No pressure effects. 
Heat transfer ports flow type : Pressure effects 
No pressure effects. 
Reverse flow through ports: Optional. 
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Chapter 10 
Rules For Modelling Divider-Header Combinations 
10.1 Introduction 
The concept of divider-header combinations was Introduced to solve a problem 
encountered during fault tree synthesis. This was caused by the methodology employed 
to achieve two way fault propagation for flow. Divider-header combinations were first 
used by KeUy (1) and later updated by Mullhi (2). 
Consider the section of plant shown in Figure 10.1 which simply has a dividing and then 
joining of a process stream. 
..,2 
.. 
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..,4 
r r 
} 
.. 
Figure 10.1 - Simple Dividing And Joining Of Pipeline 
The partial fault tree for high flow in stream 4 is shown in Figure 10.2. 
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High Flow 
In Stream 1 
Low Flow 
In Stream 2 
Figure 10.2 - Partial Fault Tree For High Flow 
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This tree is Incorrect because low flow in either of the legs can never give rise to high flow 
In the outlet stream. The problem arises because synthesis is carried out vertically and 
consistency checks can only be applied with respect to the branch already developed. 
The two way propagation results in a loop of information flow which must either be handled 
by additional consistency checks after synthesis or by defining additional boundary 
conditions. The former was dropped because the incorrect branches still had to be 
developed before the checks could be carried out and this was felt unnecessary and time 
consuming. 
10.2 Development Of A Solution 
The approach adopted by Kelly was to treat the divider-header combinations as special 
SUb-systems similar to control and trip loops. The user was required to identify the loops 
during the decomposition stage. 
However, this was not as simple as it seems because there are three types of 
divider-header combination to be considered and each type had its own divider and header 
models. 
a) By-pass with flow, ego by-pass around a heat exchanger for the excess"flow. 
a) By-pass without flow, ego by-pass around a control valve for on-line maintenance. 
a) Parallel flow, ego pump bank with equal flows. 
The three types are illustrated in Figure 10.3. 
By-poSI With Flow 
tl ( ) ...... 
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..... ," 
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tl By-p ••• With No Flow 
Parollet flow 
Figure 10.3 - Types Of Divider-Header Combination 
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This technique produced the correct fault trees but was restricted to these specific types 
of divider-header combination and could not deal with overlapping loops. It also had the 
problem that the user had to identify all the divider-header combinations which in some 
cases could prove to be very difficult. 
10.2.1 Automated Loop Searches 
The approach used by Mullhi was to differentiate between the different types of 
divider-header combination during the synthesis stage. Furthermore, the restrictions on 
the functionality of the loops were relaxed to cover more types of loop. 
The process depends on the ability to detect any loops In the information flow structure. 
The user has been relieved of the burden of this by an automatic identification procedure 
used during the configuration Input. 
All the divider and header units are identified from the connection topology array (section 
4.4.3) which contains information on which unit and port number each connection starts 
from and goes to. Any unit which has two or more entries in the upstream unit column 
but only one entry in the downstream unit column is marked as a divider unit and any unit 
which has only one entry in the upstream unit column but two or more entries in the 
downstream unit column is marked as a header unit. 
The next step is to reduce the search area by condensing the topology array until it just 
contains the divider and header units as nodes and the connections between them as the 
edges. This effectively removes the flow through units which contribute nothing to the 
loop. 
It Is then a matter of starting at each divider unit and trying to return back to it. The 
procedure is exhaustive as every possible route is tried but it leads to duplicated loops 
and loops which have sub-loops. These are removed by sorting the loops such that they 
always start and end with an outlet of the same divider and into an ascending order of 
the number of nodes. 
The ends of the loops are identified such that closed flow paths can be recognised in both 
the upstream and downstream fault propagation routes. This enables any pairs of streams 
with continuity of flow to be recorded. 
All this information is passed on to the synthesis algOrithm so that the appropriate boundary 
conditions can be set up. 
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10.2.2 The Divider And Header Models 
The Kelly approach to divider-header combinations used three different models for dividers 
and headers for each type of combination. This requires the user to not only Identify the 
type of combination but also the correct divider and header model to use from the unit 
model library. 
The automated search method Introduced by Mullhl removes the need to find the loops 
and utilises single models for the divider and for the header. These models simply model 
flow as being the normal state In both legs. 
10.2.3 Flow Capacities 
Having reduced the number of models to choose from, the synthesis algorithm stili requires 
the different types of divider-header combinations to be separated. This is carried out by 
specifying the flow capacities of each outlet leg of the divider or each Inlet leg of the header 
during the configuration data input. This serves to identify non-flow legs and excess 
capacity in parallel systems. The user is prompted automatically for each divider or header 
and has to supply a value of 0, 50 or 100 to represent 0%, 50% or 100% of the required 
throughput, respectively. 
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10.3 Improvements To Models 
Consider the configuration In Figure 10.4 which shows part of a larger plant system. The 
divider·header combination forms a by·pass with no flow through the closed hand valve. 
11 
'0 11 
Figure 10.4 - Section Of Plant Showing A By-pass With No Flow 
Figure 10.5 shows part of the fault tree for high flow through this plant section. 
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Figure 10.5 - Partial Fault Tree For High Flow 
, 
CL-STK 
Loop 1 
, 
The control loop failure branches (CL·F·HA and CL-STK) take the normal format and have 
been omitted for clarity. 
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The high flow fault Is traced to the outlet of the header. The causes of this are high flow 
down either Inlet leg of the header or high pressure gradient out of the header. The high 
flow deviation in the non-flow leg of the header is correctly changed to some flow since 
'SOME' represents any type of deviation in the normal direction of flow in a non-flow leg. 
The causes of some flow are given as only the hand valve being open. 
There are two problems here, the first is that for there to be some flow out of the hand 
valve there must be some flow Into it, which is not given, and the second is that this some 
flow deviation is not continued beyond the hand valve or divider unit. 
A similar problem was encountered when tracing high flow into the divider unit rather than 
high flow out of the header unit. The causes of these problems were found to be in the 
divider and header unit models and the closed valve unit model. 
10.3.1 Divider And Header Model Changes 
The original methodology for handling divider-header combinations used three different 
pairs of divider and header models. These were adapted to model only one specific type 
of combination. This was inefficient and consequently the methodology was changed to 
make use of just one pair of divider and header models. 
However, these models were not designed specifically for this approach but were simply 
a combination of the two flow models used previously. It was anticipated that the new 
methodology would be able to deal with the non-flow legs. This has been shown not to 
be the case. 
Although, for example, a high flow deviation proceeding along a non-flow leg is changed 
to 'some flow' once the deviation reaches the other end of the divider-header combination 
the synthesis algorithm cannot find any causes of some flow. Consequently it is deleted 
as an impossible event. 
It can be seen that the divider and header models require additional information in them 
to deal with the 'SOME' deviation. This will not alter the results for the flow legs because 
some flow is a normal state and will be deleted by the synthesis algorithm in these cases. 
Changes to the divider model Include: some flow in either outlet leg being caused by high 
inlet flow or reverse flow in the other outlet leg. Equivalent combinations are also used 
for pressure and relief. 
The revised divider model is given in Appendix E.1. 
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Changes to the header model include: some flow in either inlet leg being caused by high 
outlet flow or reverse flow In the other Inlet leg and high flow in one inlet leg may cause 
none or reverse flow in the other. Equivalent combinations are also used for pressure 
and relief. 
The revised header model is given in Appendix E.2. 
10.3.2 Closed Valve Model Changes 
The original methodology used in this type of unit, which contains any unit which normally 
has no flow, was directed specifically at the non-flow leg divider-header combination. The 
methodology was different in that the 'HIGH' deviation meant 'SOME' and the 'LOW' 
deviation meant 'REVERSE'. This is very confusing and does not work with the new 
single divider and header model methodology. Therefore, the closed valve type unit 
models have had to be revised. 
The models have been altered such that only the 'SOME' and 'REVERSE' deviations for 
flow and pressure are used. All deviations are ANDed with the valve being open in a 
decision table. Some examples are: 
F HV-F-OP V GllN SOME T G20UT SOME 
F HV-F-OP V 020UT SOME T 011N SOME 
The model in this format only partially solves the problem noted in section 10.3. As can 
be seen in Figure 10.5 the cause of 'some flow' is the valve being open. However, there 
also has to be 'some flow' Into the valve. Using the decision tables for GlIN and 020UT, 
above, allows the AND gate to be Incorporated In the fault tree in one direction but not 
the other. For example, when tracing high flow out of the header unit the AND gate with 
the valve faults is used but when tracing high flow into the divider unit it is not. The reason 
forthis is the way two-way fault propagation of flow is achieved. All possible combinations 
were tested but each resulted in only one direction with the AND gate. 
Use of two pairs of decision tables for flow incorporating all the flow variables resulted in 
another problem. 
F HV-F-OP V GllN SOME T G20UT SOME 
F HV-F-OP V G20UT SOME T GllN SOME 
F HV-F-OP V 011N SOME T 020UT SOME 
F HV-F-OP V 020UT SOME T 011N SOME 
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The AND gate using these decision tables appeared twice in the fault tree. This is 
undesirable because it increases the cutset order by one which may result in loss of detail. 
The modelling problem was solved by using event statements to link the flow variables 
for two-way fault propagation. The format is 
V QllN SOME: GllN SOME 
V G20UT SOME: Q20UT SOME 
F HV-F-OP V GllN SOME T G20UT SOME 
F HV-F-OP V Q20UT SOME T QllN SOME 
This places a single AND gate in the fault tree for both directions. However, it also places 
an OR gate with the valve open faults below it for one of the directions. This can be seen 
in Figure 10.6 which gives the partial fault tree for high flow when the new models are 
used. 
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Figure 10.6 - Modified Partial Fault Tree For High Flow 
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The problem is not one of modelling In the valve but one of the synthesis algorithms 
consistency checking routines. The results of the synthesis process have been examined 
closely and during synthesis the AND gate appears twice as before. However, in the 
direction traced in Figure 10.6 the SOME deviation (not shown) under the 'DTROW 1 Unit 
11' Is Immediately deleted as occurring further up the branch (series consistency : 
boundary conditions) changing the AND gate to a single cause OR gate. 
In the other direction the boundary conditions series check does not work but during the 
parallel consistency checks the SOME deviation under the second decision table is noted 
as occurring further up the branch and Is marked for deletion. The mark consists of the 
label 'impossible' which Is processed later. As expected if one branch of an AND gate is 
impossible then the whole gate is impossible and is deleted. This conveniently removes 
the second decision table resulting is just the single occurrence of the valve open faults. 
This Investigation has partially solved the problem with closed valve models but has 
highlighted a discrepancy In the consistency checks which needs to be examined further. 
The duplication of the valve open faults in the fault tree results in an 'incorrect' tree. 
However, this does not affect the final cutsets because the analysis program used 
recognises these duplicated events. Therefore, the additional branch in the tree can be 
considered as more of a nuisance rather than a problem because it does not have any 
influence on the structure of the rest of the fault tree or its analysis. 
The new closed valve model is given in Appendix E.3. It should be noted that there are 
no propagation equations because under fault free conditions variable deviations cannot 
propagate through the unit. 
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10.4 Revision To Loop Searches 
The purpose of divider-header combinations was to maintain a consistency between 
events leaving a divider-header combination and causes propagating into them. For 
example low flow propagating out of a header cannot be caused by high flow propagating 
Into the divider (a valid cause of some flow in a non-flow leg). 
The automatic loop search facility identifies every possible divider-header combination 
and Information flow path loop. However, this also labels signal paths as divider-header 
combinations which, since they do not propagate the flow variable, is incorrect. The divider 
and header Identification process has been modified such that the ports on the unit must 
be either of the inlet port type or the outlet port type. 
The loops identified by this process incorporate every unit between the divider and the 
header regardless of the type. However, consider the three loops shown in Figure 10.7 . 
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Figure 10.7 - Divider-Header Combinations Involving Vessels 
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Configuration A shows a pump protection system consisting of a relief valve on a kick-back 
leg to the vessel which operates should the pressure rise above a certain level. 
Configuration B shows a by-pass around a heat exchanger. 
Configuration C shows a pump protection system for two pumps in parallel. 
For configuration A the loop search identifies not only the divider on the kick-back leg but 
it also identifies the vessel as a header type unit. This is reasonable because the vessel 
does have two Inlet ports and one outlet port. The process thus concludes that the vessel 
and divider unit form a divider-header combination or information loop. 
As was mentioned earlier, the divider-header combination concept was introduced to 
prevent Inconsistencies In flow deviations at the inlet and outlet of the loop. However, 
this Is a special case because the vessel unit has the ability to accumulate mass. A cause 
of low flow into the vessel is high level which may be caused by some flow through the 
kick-back leg. A cause of the relief valve working is high pressure caused by no flow out 
of the divider unit. This gives no flow out of the loop as a cause of low flow into it. This 
represents a change In the flow deviation and the boundary conditions Imposed for the 
divider-header combination force it to be deleted. The accumulation effect, though, means 
the cause is valid. Similar logic is applied for configuration B. 
The accumulation also affects the deviations when a vessel forms one of the units 
contained within the divider-header combination loop as In configuration C. Although 
there are three loops in this example only two cause a problem. The first loop is the one 
around the pumps. The second and third loops are similar In that they go from one pump, 
through the kick-back leg, through the vessel and back to the same pump. These latter 
two loops contain the vessel as one of the interconnecting units. This causes problems 
because low flow out of the vessel may be caused by low level which in turn may be 
caused by no inlet flow. This results in a change in deviation and consequently opposite 
ends of a loop may have different flow deviations. 
For this reason the loop identification process has been modified to remove loops which 
contain any unit where an accumulation of mass can occur. 
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10.5 Revision To Flow Capacity Specification 
As part of the process of improving the user Interface of the programs the options given 
for the capacities have been changed. Originally the values of 0, 50 or 100 were used 
but some users, especially with three-way divider-header combinations find this confusing 
because in theory the parallel flow system has 33i% of the capacity In each leg. 
To avoid this the number system has been removed and in its place text is used. There 
are no differences in the results but it is less confusing for the user. The new options are: 
none 
shared/some 
full 
non-flow leg 
shared capacity or some flow leg 
full capacity flow leg 
The text option chosen is converted to the numerical capacity by the program. 
10.6 Summary 
Thorough tests have been carried out on all combinations of two-way divider-header 
combinations. These are by-pass with no flow, by-pass with flow and parallel flow systems. 
All deviations into and out of such divider-header combinations have been studied and 
the synthesis algorithm deals with them correctly (except the duplication of events in a 
non-flow leg which is dealt with by the cutset analysis programs). 
All deviations into and out of multiple-way divider-header combinations with parallel flow 
are also dealt with satisfactorily. 
Preliminary tests have been carried out on the effects of. having three pumps in parallel, 
one being on standby, but although the tree was synthesised with the low flow template 
it was not easily interpreted and some of the branches had errors in them. Further 
investigation is needed on this. 
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Chapter 11 
Modelling Control Loops And Trip Loops 
11.1 Introduction 
The modelling of individual control and trip loops has been covered in earlier Chapters 
and by Kelly (1,2) and Mullhl (3, 4). This chapter looks at modelling systems with multiple 
control loops and combined control and trip loops. The modelling of multiple trip loops 
has not caused any problems. 
This project has looked at two types of control and protection system. One is a system 
which has multiple control loops which are closely linked together In such a way as to 
leave the system over-determined and the other Is the combined control and trip system. 
11.2 Over-Determined Control Loops 
The problem of over-determined control loops has not been addressed by any of the 
previous workers. The object was to ascertain whether any problems might arise during 
fault tree synthesis of such a system. 
11.2.1 First Example Configuration 
Consider the control system shown in Figure 11.1. 
Fi 
Fo 
}-------''------------{ F 
Figure 11.1 - Level And Flow Control System 
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Loop 1 Is a level control loop which regulates the level in the vessel by manipulating the 
inlet flow rate. A second control system is added (Loop 2) which senses the outlet flow 
rate and regulates the inlet flow rate accordingly. 
The configuration diagram is shown in Figure 11.2. 
Figure 11.2 - Configuration Diagram 
11.2.1.1 System Analysis 
If only the flow and associated variables are considered then there are three variables in 
the system, the flow in Fi, the flow out Fo, and the level L. However, there are four 
relationships for these in the unit models concemed and the control loops. 
Fi = F( -L) 
Fi = F( Fo) 
L = F( Fi, -Fo) 
Fo = F( L) 
This makes the system over-determined because the number of equations is greater than 
the number of variables. 
Similarly by using the directed graph or digraph approach shown In Figure 11.3 it can be 
seen that the system is over-determined because the level and flow out will be competing 
with each other. 
11·2 
Figure 11.3 - Digraph For Control System 
The terms used are: 
F - flow 
L-Ievel 
Y - measurement value 
R - set point value 
E - error in measurement 
I - for inlet 
o - for outlet 
1- for level 
However, this system will work provided that the set points for the level and flow out are 
compatible. The loops can also compensate for faults In the other provided the fault does 
not lead to over1oad. 
11.2.1.2 System Fault Trees 
Two top events have been chosen for the example, the first is a low level in the vessel 
and the second is a high flow into the vessel. The respective fault trees are shown in 
Figures 11.4 and 11.5. 
11-3 
......... 
..,' 
'I' 
.,\LO 
G$l I"'~I t$ -, '-' 
... 
'I' .. 0 0 
a.-I'", 
"r- ..... '"T' I -, 
'I' I .. 
0 0 COO ~ T ~ T 
---
........ 
Olr- , 
'"T' ..... GO g, ... 
L t\ LO a.-I'M .-----. ... Cl.'" Cl.-f'_NA 
.. '"T' 0 0 , '"T' 
0 0 .......... ~ T 
.,LO 'l~ '"T' O~r-
.. ... 
~ I 0 0 ,........sL., I~I I'"S"'I 'I' .......... -'"T' '"T' o I r- Q.-F-NA ... ~ .. ,........sL., '"T' I .-----. I OD 
'I' a.-n< o...f-LA O,LO Q.-F-LA .. 1--~ T '"T' '"T' '"T' , Q.-f'-LA 'I' g,-~ ....... 0,&.0 '"T' ....,.. I.oap 2 LK~-'" _. '" 
"''' '* at UC..J._ I I UIIII. 0,&.0 a.-SOW 
I '"T' 
T g, LO 
Figure 11.4 - Partial Fault Tree For Low Level 
§ 
1 
FLOW 10 
..,.. 
'\" 
i -, 
'\" 
L '\ LO 
'" 
'\" 
Q.-STK OR er 
,..tiorl Loop 2 I fayIb ...,.' 1·==,II-~~· I,~~ol 
,,:;:,,;:::::~"""'F.=n - 2 ,!. - 2 r.,._... ~~. .:. '\" .:. ~ 101,,", I Q.-F-HA I 
drAaUon Loop 2 Q 1 tt Loop 2 G 7 HI 
_. I I 
.:. OR I I 
I I at OR GaHl a. ... snc I I 
I '--T2 C10" CIOHl 
I 
'\" 
Q I HI 
L .j LO 
I 
OIl 
1$pm~1 
I 
'\" 
CL·'-HA 
....,.' OR , 
"""PLOOP 
....,.. 
AND 
cv";-HA 
Un/! • 
....:...a. 
'"T' 
A(DU .... .., 
..... 
AND , 
""""LOOP 
...,.. 
.,,, 
I 
'\" 
CID HI 
OR 
Figure 11.5 - Partial Fault Tree For High Inlet Flow 
11-4 
Both these fault trees show the use of the compensating control loop feature. This is 
used when one or more control loops are configured in such a way that if one fails then 
another can compensate for the fault. In Figure 11.4 the control loop stuck and control 
loop fails low aperture faults of each loop are ANDed together. The event 'A(DUMMY) 
Unit 0' Is required to prevent the combinations forming lower order cutsets than the 
combination of latent failure loop 1 , latent failure loop 2 and manipulated variable deviation 
loop 2. 
The cutsets for the causes of low level are: 
01 REV 
01 NONE 
CL-F-NA Loop 1 
CL-F-NA Loop 2 
CV-F-LA Unit 5 
CL-STK Loop 1 and G 10HI 
CL-STK Loop 1 and CL-F-LA Loop 2 
CL-STK Loop 1 and LK-LP-EN Unit 8 
CL-F-LA Loop 1 and CL-F-LA Loop 2 
CL-F-LA Loop 1 and LK-LP-EN Unit 8 
CL-STK Loop 1 and CL-STK Loop 2 and 01LO 
These show the four over-loading faults to be single order cutsets. The top event will 
occur if the inlet flow is none or reversed or either control loop fails with a closed valve. 
Also the level control valve failing with low aperture is a cause. If the level control loop 
sticks (loop 1) this must be accompanied by high flow out of the system or loop 2 failing 
with low aperture. Also a leak to a low pressure environment causing low flow in the 
sensor but high flow out of the vessel and loop 1 failing with low aperture or stuck is a 
cause. Both the loops failing with low aperture or both sticking and low flow into the system 
will cause the top event. 
The cutsets for high inlet flow to the vessel are: 
and CL-F-HA Loop 2 
G 10HI 
CL-F-HA Loop 2 
CV-F-HA Unit 5 
CL-F-HA Loop 1 
CL-STK Loop 1 and CL-STK Loop 2 and 0 1 HI 
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These show the causes of high Inlet flow to the vessel to be high outlet flow or either 
control valve failing with high aperture. Both loops failing with high aperture or both loops 
sticking with high Inlet flow to the system are also causes of the top event. 
11.2.2 Second Example Configuration 
Now consider the system given in Figure 11.6. The system Is very similar to that in Figure 
11.1 except that the flow control valve has been placed on the outlet of the vessel. This 
severs the influence that the flow controller has on the level. 
}----...:...---( L 
l 
ri ro 
Figure 11.6 - Second Level And Flow Control System 
The configuration diagram is shown in Figure 11.7. 
Figure 11.7 - Configuration Diagram 
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11.2.2.1 System Analysis 
If the same models are used as before and only the flow and associated variables are 
considered then there are three variables In the system, the flow in Fi, the flow out Fo, 
and the level L. However, this time there are only three relationships for these in the unit 
models concerned and the control loops. 
FI = F( -L) 
L = F( Fi, -Fo ) 
Fo = F( L) 
Therefore the system is not over-determined. 
However, the digraph given in Figure 11.8 shows the link between the level and flow out 
which Indicates that the two set points for the control loops must be compatible. 
Figure 11.8 - Digraph For Control System 
The same nomenclature for Figure 11.31s used. 
This time the two loops cannot compensate for faults In each other. 
11.2.2.2 System Fault Trees 
The same two top events have been chosen for this example, the first is a low level in the 
vessel and the second is a high flow into the vessel. The respective fault trees are shown 
in Figures 11.9 and 11.10. 
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The cutsets for the causes of low level are: 
01 REV 
01 NONE 
CL-F-NA Loop 1 
CL-F-LA Loop 1 
CL-STK Loop 1 
CL-STK Loop 1 
CL-STK Loop 1 
CL-STK Loop 1 
and Q 1 LO 
and LK-LP-EN Unit 8 
and CL-F-HA Loop 2 
and CL-STK Loop 2 and G 10 HI 
These cutsets are very similar to the ones obtained for the configuration in Figure 11.1. 
The differences can be attributed to the positioning of the flow control valve from the inlet 
to the vessel to the outlet of the vessel. 
The cutsets for high inlet flow to the vessel are: 
and G10HI 
CL-F-HA Loop 1 
CL-F-HA Loop 2 
LK-LP-EN Unit 8 
CL-STK Loop 2 
CL-STK Loop 1 and CL-STK Loop 2 and Q 1 HI 
Again the cutsets are very similar. 
11.2.3 Conclusions 
These two examples were chosen specifically to demonstrate the ability of the modelling 
and synthesis methodology to deal with over-determined control loop systems should the 
need arise. The examples are very similar in construction and operation except for one 
factor. The first example, with the two control valves on the inlet stream to the vessel, is 
over-determined whereas the second, with the control valves on opposite sides of the 
vessel, is not. 
The fault trees produced and the resultant cutsets are very similar so it can be concluded 
that the methodology is able to deal with configurations involving over-determined control 
loop systems. 
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11.3 Combined Control And Trip Loop Systems 
The methodology for modelling the protective systems in any configuration has been 
developed by considering one control loop or one trip loop operating on one variable. 
This means that in any configuration all the control loops and trip systems must be 
independent of each other. 
This approach is limited in its use especially with more and more complicated process 
plant control systems being designed. The methodology for dealing with multiple control 
loops has been developed by Mullhi (3). There are currently no foreseeable problems in 
modelling multiple trip systems as combinations of the individual trips. 
A problem encountered by Mullhi was in modelling combined control and trip loops. These 
consist of single valve units which act as control valves under normal operating conditions 
but should an undesired event occur a trip switch operates to slam shut the valves. The 
rapid closing of the valves is achieved by venting the pneumatic control signal. 
Consider the section of plant shown in Figure 11.11. 
Pr ..... 
ftuld_---t 
~--------------------------__{u 
Heating 
ftuld 
Figure 11.11 • Combined Control And Trip Loop System 
A process fluid is supplied from storage and is to be heated before proceeding further 
down the pipeline. The heat exchanger provides a constant load so the temperature is 
controlled by manipulating the flow rate of the process fluid. The controlltrip valve is 
pneumaticand the control Signal passes through a vent valve. Should the exittemperature 
be below the minimum temperature then a trip switch on a second temperature sensor 
operates the vent valve. This vents the control signal and Since the controlltrip valve is 
of the air·ta-open type the control/trip vaive closes rapidly. 
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The configuration diagram is shown in Figure 11.12. 
" 
.. 
Figure 11.12 - Configuration Diagram 
The top event to be examined is low temperature propagating into the pipeline from the 
heat exchanger. 
11.3.1 Modelling And Terminology 
The Immediate problem with this system is that although the trip switch operates on the 
vent valve the result of its action is directed to the control/trip valve to shut off the flow. 
Therefore, the trip valve unit must be specified as the controlltrip valve and not the vent 
valve. It is not possible to specify the vent valve because the methodology requires the 
valve to be on a process flow stream. There are two signal lines from the vent valve to 
the control/trip valve to enable the trip loop and the control loop to be modelled correctly. 
The controlltrip valve must contain the failure modes for both the control loop and the trip 
loop. The control loop failures pertinent to the top event are control loop stuck CL-STK 
and control loop fails with high aperture CL-F-HA. The trip loop failure is trip loop functional 
failure TL-FN-F. 
Within the unit model for the controVtrip valve are the following event statements for the 
control loop failures 
F CTV-F-HA: CL-F-HA 
F CTV-STK: CL-STK 
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representing control/trip valve fails with high aperture and control/trip valve stuck 
respectively. 
The trip loop failures are any poSition where the valve is unable to close. These are 
control/trip valve fails with high aperture CTV-F-HA,. control/trip valve fails with low 
aperture CTV-F-LA and control/trip valve stuck CTV-STK. The following event statements 
are used: 
F CTV-F-HA: TL-FN-F 
F CTV-F-LA: TL-FN-F 
F CTV-STK: TL-FN-F 
The synthesis algorithm uses these definitions to develop the control loop failures and 
trip loop failures. 
In order for low temperature to propagate out of the system both the control loop and the 
trip loop must fail. The synthesis of the fault tree is such that the control loop template is 
added first and then the trip loop functional failure branch is ANDed to it. 
11.3.2 Mutually Exclusive Failure States 
For the low temperature top event the partial fault tree shown in Figure 11.13 is obtained. 
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Figure 11.13 - Partial Fault Tree For Low Temperature. 
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This shows the control loop failures ANOed with the trip loop failures. However, the 
consequence of this is different failure states of the controlltrip valve being ANOed 
together. 
Mullhi regarded this as an incorrect fault tree and he developed a solution to deal with 
this. The solution was not applied to the main fault tree but to the fault tree developed 
for use by the analysis program. This involved manipulating the data and restructuring 
the fault tree such that the trip loop functional failure branch was ANOed with each control 
loop failure branch. The trip loop functional failure branch was then modified to contain 
only the failure state of the valve which was the same as that in the control loop branch. 
This is explained more fully in his thesis. 
However, there were two draw-backs to this approach. The first was that the structural 
rearrangement was not carried out on the main fault tree so the plotted fault tree still 
remained as before. The second was that the process had not been developed fully and 
was not complete. 
The problem has been re-examined by investigating the operation and results of the 
analysis program. The fault tree in Figure 11.13 yields the following cutsets: 
1 CTV-STK Unit 3 and SEN-F-HI Unit 7 
2 CTV-STK Unit 3 and CTV-F-HA Unit 3 
3 CTV-STK Unit 3 and CTV-STK Unit 3 and T5LO 
4 CTV-STK Unit 3 and SEN-STK Unit 7 and T5LO 
5 CTV-F-LA Unit 3 and SEN-F-HI Unit 7 
6 CTV-F-LA Unit 3 and CTV-F-HA Unit 3 
7 CTV-F-LA Unit 3 and CTV-STK Unit 3 and T5LO 
8 CTV-F-LA Unit 3 and SEN-STK Unit 7 and T5LO 
9 CTV-F-HA Unit 3 and SEN-F-HI Unit 7 
10 CTV-F-HA Unit 3 and CTV-F-HA Unit 3 
11 CTV-F-HA Unit 3 and CTV-STK Unit 3 and T5LO 
12 CTV-F-HA Unit 3 and SEN-STK Unit 7 and T5 LO 
13 W-FT-VT UNIT 15 and SEN-F-HI Unit 7 
14 W-FT-VT UNIT 15 and CTV-F-HA Unit 3 
15 W-FT-VT UNIT 15 and CTV-STK Unit 3 and T5LO 
16 W-FT-VT UNIT 15 and SEN-STK Unit 7 and T5LO 
17 SEN-STK UNIT 8 and SEN-F-HI Unit 7 
18 SEN-STK UNIT 8 and CTV-F-HA Unit 3 
19 SEN-STK UNIT 8 and CTV-STK Unit 3 and T5LO 
20 SEN-STK UNIT 8 and SEN-STK Unit 7 and T5LO 
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The first event is a trip loop failure and the second is a control loop failure. The third event 
is the initiating variable deviation. 
These cutsets form the basic raw cutset data obtained from the fault tree. It is necessary 
to delete the duplicated events from the cutsets and then delete any non-minimal cutsets. 
The list becomes: 
1 CTV-STK Unit 3 and SEN-F-HI Unit 7 
3 CTV-STK Unit 3 and T5LO 
5 CTV-F-LA Unit 3 and SEN-F-HI Unit 7 
8 CTV-F-LA Unit 3 and SEN-STK Unit 7 and T5LO 
10 CTV-F-HA Unit 3 
13 VV-FT-VT UNIT 15 and SEN-F-HI Unit 7 
16 VV-FT-VT UNiT 15 and SEN-STK Unit 7 and T5 LO 
17 SEN-STK UNIT 8 and SEN-F-HI Unit 7 
20 SEN-STK UNIT 8 and SEN-STK Unit 7 and T5LO 
As can be seen by the outcome of this process, the cutsets no longer contain mutually 
exclusive failure states. This happens because when the two cutsets with identical events 
ANOed together are reduced to contain only one of these events the cutset order is also 
reduced by one. This results in a new minimum cutset which supersedes the others 
causing the cutsets with mutually exclusive events to be deleted as non-minimal. 
11.3.3 Conclusions 
It can be concluded from this that for the current example the fault tree s}7'1IhOsis program 
has the ability to deal with the mutually exclusive failure states but further work is required 
to establish the generality of this. 
However, this highlights that there is perhaps a problem in dealing with combined control 
and trip loops that needs further investigation. The problem may stem from the controVtrip 
valve model. It appears that the methodology for defining the failure states of the valve 
for the trip loop must be made compatible with the definitions in the control loop failures. 
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11.4 Summary 
The methodology for modelling control and trip loop systems has been tested on many 
types of configuration. This includes simple control loops and trip loops to complex 
over-lapping control systems. To date there are no foreseeable problems. 
However, combined control and trip loop systems have caused problems which need to 
be further investigated. It may require a new methodology for modelling the control/trip 
valve unit. 
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Chapter 12 
Some Fault Tree Synthesis And Analysis Problems 
12.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at some of the problems encountered during fault tree synthesis and 
analysis besides those already mentioned In previous chapters. The problems arise from 
the experiences of users during this project. 
There is the stability of the fault tree to changes in the models used and the adaptation 
of the fault tree to mimic manually drawn trees. The increased size of the plants modelled 
and the complexity of the units has resulted in increases in the size of data arrays used 
in both the unit models and the configuration program. It has also been necessary to 
carry out further processing on the cutsets generated by the analysis program to remove 
unnecessary and misleading events. Work Is under way in developing a new method of 
presenting the fault trees to the user by investigation of fault tree drawing packages. 
1.2.2 Fault Tree Stability 
The stability of the fault tree refers to the robustness of the tree to changes in the models 
used. During a small project using the Faultfinder package to develop fault trees for a 
chemical plant an ever changing fault tree was encountered. The plant modelled was a 
storage facility and the undesired event being studied was a vessel rupture. The top event 
model TANK-RUP was created for the system and is shown in Figure 12.1. 
TANK-RUP 
I 
OR 
I I I 
SUP-FAIL DTROW 1 
I 
AND 
I I I I I 
R50UT R60UT R70UT P8VES 
NONE NONE NONE HI 
Figure 12.1 - Top Event Model For A Tank Rupture 
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The short duration of a project can mean that the user has to develop models for the plant 
very quickly and without fully understanding the methodology. It should be noted that this 
took place before the vessel model generation routine was developed. A plant 
configuration and some simple models were produced but when these were altered slightly 
the structure of the tree was changed. This was particularly apparent when composition 
and pressure variables were used in the same model. 
The programs were run and the fault tree produced. Examination of the fault tree revealed 
that the R50UT and R70UT branches had not been developed. The cause of this was 
the Intemal consistency checks which identified some events in the branches as 'certain' 
events resulting in the entire branch being deleted as certain. However, it was noted that 
the vessel model being used was not the one intended which was remedied by changing 
the configuration library number and re-running. 
This solved part of the problem but a faulttree could not be obtained because the program 
entered a continuous loop during synthesis. The vessel model was examined for faults 
and more event statements were added and a propagation equation altered to prevent 
the looping. This time the fault tree was synthesised with all the branches fully developed. 
This has highlighted a common area where inexperienced users have encountered 
problems with 
a) Incorrect fault trees and 
b) unstable fault trees. 
The cause of this stems from the users trying to 
a) select a unit model and top event model such that a mismatch is obtained and 
b) use incomplete unit models. 
The fault tree produced depends on the data supplied to the program. If, for example, 
the top event does not match up to the unit to which it Is attached then spurious results 
can occur. It is also important to ensure that any models developed are complete and 
correct. At first it may not seem necessary to include all variables in a model when only 
one is of Interest but the synthesis package may trace faults to other variable deviations 
In the model. The implementation of the vessel model generation routine is a powerful 
aid for this and helps to maintain a user-friendly facility. 
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12.3 Risk Assessment Fault Trees 
The Faultfinder approach to fault tree synthesis is to trace variable deviations from their 
effects to their sources, usually basic faults. However, risk assessment encompasses 
not only variable deviation causes but mechanical faults as well. Therefore, fault trees 
produced manually for risk assessment include chains of these mechanical faults linked 
together. 
An example of such a fault tree is shown in Figure 12.2 which has been adapted from 
one developed by Cremer and Wamer Lld (1) for a chlorine storage vessel. 
TANK RIJ"I""E 
OR 
i I i 
WEOtANICAL. LOW ltWPERAlURE CROSS 
DafCT BRlT11.E rACTURE OVER-Sr'SSlNG 
i er i 
CONSTRUCTION CORRj""'" 'ATfUE 
""'fCT 
-
..... 
AND i I i i I i TANK RUPTURES FATIGUE FROY TANK RUPTURES CONSTRUCTION NOTCRAC<S EXCESS 'tBtATlON NOT CRACKS DEFtCT OR 
OR i , i 
i i FAULT HOT , AlA. T REACHES 
FAULT NOT FAUlT REACHES NOnC£D DURING CRITICAL STRESS 
NOTlCEODURIHC CRITICAL STRESS ..... CTKlN BETWEEN INSPECTIONS 
IrISPECTlON BETWEEN INsPEC'nONS 
TANK IlUPruRES 
NOT CRAOC$ 
OR 
i i 
FAULT NOT FAUlT REACHES 
NOnctO DURING CRITICAL STRESS 
INSPEC~ B£1\IIEEN INSPECTIONS 
OR 
HIGH TEMPERATURE PRESENCE or 
COROO'"'' WA'TtR ... TANK I I 
i 
'" 
i 
EXTERNAL nRE [JCOTHERMIC REACTION 
1EUPERATURE ABOVE"~ PRESENCE OF' F'ORElGN MATERIAL 
H2S04 CARRY ... O'tO 
fR()U SCRUBBER 
i 
AND 
i I i 
1NEFTJ00NT UAlNttNANCE CARRY-O\4ER rE H2S04 NOT F'ROZEN 
rE DE-"STER H2S04 NOT OBSER\tO OUT IN PRE-coa.ER 
Figure 12.2 - Partial Fault Tree For Risk Assessment 
Only the lower branches for the mechanical defects fault are shown. The mechanical 
defects are split into three types of causes, construction defects, corrosion and fatigue. 
These all have sub-trees made up of other faults. 
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While the Faultfinder methodology allows variable deviations to be linked together, basic 
faults, which include mechanical faults, only appear at the end of the fault tree branches. 
It is desirable to be able to link basic events together to form a failure branch. An example 
chain of basic events is 
tank rupture, caused by 
support failure, caused by 
over-stressed support, caused by 
design error. 
Attempts were made to include the chain as part of the unit model using the Intennediate 
event status. However, this failed because the synthesis program ignored these events 
such that they never appeared in the generated fault tree. The reason for this is that the 
top event Initialises which variable deviations to trace. The chain of basic faults are causes 
of a particular event and not a variable deviation, therefore, they are 'over-looked'. 
The majority of the mechanical fault branches appear near the top of the tree and are 
generally associated with the immediate causes of the top event. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to incorporate the failure branches into the top event. 
The top event model library contains a complete set of context independent models which 
can be applied to pipe type models or vessel type models. These models are used to 
initiate fault tracing of a single variable or a related pair of variables. 
It may be possible for a 'package' of faults, such as the mechanical faults, to be contained 
in the model library and used when required to connect to an existing top event to produce 
the risk assessment type fault tree. The faults contained in the 'package' must be 
self-contained. These faults can have other faults as causes but must exclude any faults 
caused by variable deviations, such as corrosion caused by an Impurity. 
However, this approach has been discarded in favour of encapsulating the entire top event 
In one model. This is also necessary if the top event initiates more than one type of 
variable deviation trace. In the current example the variables are high concentration and 
high pressure. 
The linking together of the basic faults In the top event model is achieved using the event 
statements and decision tables and the Intermediate event status. However, in the present 
fonn the program requires the mechanical faults to be entered in a particular order. The 
faults are required in an ascending order from the bottom row of the tree. If the order Is 
altered, the fault tree will not contain the basic faults. 
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As an illustration, the fault tree in Figure 12.2 can be represented on the Faultfinder 
package In the form of Figure 12.3. 
, 
RUP-SEV FAULT CONS-ERR 
I 
"" 
I 
MECH-OEF 
I 
OR 
I 
"""F" 
AND 
I 
AUP-SEV 
I 
FA1fUE 
AND 
I 
FAULT 
I 
"" 
TAHK-RUP 
I 
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I 
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BAO-iNSP RAP-ICRDW 
I 
BAO-INSP 
RUP-SEV 
BAIHNSP 
FAULT 
I 
OR 
ACID-C-O 
I 
AND 
I 
RAP-GROW 
CCRRo-EN 
I 
r I 
HT-CORRO H20-IN-T 
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I 
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AOD-N-F EXT-'.c:AT t no-iREAC ~ 
Figure 12.3 - Partial Faultfinder Fault Tree For Risk Assessment 
The events enclosed in diamonds are those which initiate the Faultfinder package to start 
the synthesis process. 
The following event statements and decision tables are required: 
F BAO-MNTN FOP-ERROR F ACIO-N-F T ACIO-C-O (bad maintenance) 
F EXT-HEAT: HT-CORRO 
F EXO-REAC: HT-CORRO 
V X5VES HI : H20-IN-T 
I ACIO-C-O: CORRO-EN 
I HT-CORRO: CORRO-EN 
I H20-IN-T: CORRO-EN 
F BAO-INSP : FAULT 
F RAP-GROW: FAULT 
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(operator error) 
(acid not frozen out) 
(external heat) 
(exothermic reaction) 
(high concentration) 
(acid carry-over) 
(high temperature 
corrosion) 
(water in tank) 
(bad inspection) 
(rapid growth of crack) 
F RUP-SEV I FAULT F CONS-ERR T CONS-OEF 
F RUP-SEV I FAULT I CORRO-EN T CORROSN 
F RUP-SEV I FAULT F XS-VIBN T FATIGUE 
I CONS-OEF: MECH-OEF 
I CORROSN: MECH-OEF 
I FATIGUE: MECH-OEF 
V P5VES HI : O-STRESS 
I MECH-OEF: TANK-RUP 
I L-B-FRAC: TANK-RUP 
I O-STRESS: TANK-RUP 
(ruptures severely) 
(fault) 
(construction error) 
(corrosive environment) 
(excessive vibration) 
(construction defect) 
(corrosion) 
(fatigue) 
(high pressure) 
(mechanical defect) 
(Iow temperature brittle 
fracture) 
(over-stressing) 
Faultfinder limits the basic fault names to eight characters in length so abbreviations have 
to be used. The text in brackets translates these. 
The 'FAULT' and 'CORROsive-ENvironment' events have been added as intermediate 
events because In the original fault tree two logic gates were linked together. Faultfinder 
requires a named event between all logic gates. 
A simpler example of this type of top event is the ruptured tank, RUP-TANK top event in 
the model library. The partial fault tree for this top event is given in Figure 12.4. 
RUP-TANK 
I 
OR , 
Figure 12.4 - Partial Fault Tree For Top Event 
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The event statements and decision tables are: 
V X6VES HI : RAP-REAC 
I RAP-REAC: INT-EXPL 
F DSGN- ERR: OV-ST-SP 
F EXT-IMP: OV-ST-SP 
I OV-ST-SP: SUP-FAIL 
F EXT-HEAT AND F I-COOL-F : OV-HT-TK 
V R50UT NONE: NORELlEF 
I OV-HT-TK: HI-PRESS 
I NORELlEF: HI-PRESS 
V P6VES HI : HI-PRESS 
(high concentration) 
(rapid reaction) 
(design error) 
(external impact) 
(over-stressed support) 
(external fire, 
internal cooling failed) 
(no relief) 
(over-heated vessel) 
(no relief) 
(high pressure) 
I INT-EXPL: RUP-TANK (internal explosion) 
I SUP-FAIL: RUP-TANK (support failure) 
I HI-PRESS V R30UT NONE V R40UT NONE T RUP-TANK 
This is for a reaction vessel with two inlet ports and two outlet ports. Port 5 is the relief 
port and port 6 is the vessel port for the Internal variables. 
The model states that a high concentration In the vessel will cause a rapid reaction, which 
will cause an internal explosion causing the vessel to rupture. A design error or an external 
impact will cause an over-stressed support, which will cause the support to fail, also 
causing the vessel to rupture. If there is an external fire and the internal cooling fails the 
vessel will become over-heated causing a high pressure. Another cause of high pressure 
Is no relief through the relief port or the variable deviation high internal pressure. High 
pressure coupled with no relief through either of the outlet ports will cause the vessel to 
rupture. 
Before synthesis is started the firstfew rows of the faulttree will be made up ofthe minitrees 
describing the top event. There are five variable deviations to be traced for this top event: 
no relief at either outlet port, no relief at the relief port, high internal pressure and high 
Internal concentration. The Initial causes of all these events will be found in the reaction 
vessel model to which the top event Is connected. 
This process now allows computer synthesised fault trees to be compared with manually 
drawn fault trees. 
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12.4 Dimensionallty Aspects 
The development of the fault tree synthesis package has been carried out using real 
industrial examples. As the capability of the facility has improved, the examples have 
become larger containing many units and connections. The size of the data arrays used 
In all the programs making up the synthesis package was Initially set many years ago and 
was determined by the size of the computer. With the advances In computing technology 
this is no longer a restriction. 
However, uncontrolled increases In data storage result in a greatly reduced processing 
speed. In some cases the data array sizes have been reduced. In general the following 
changes have been carried out 
Unit model generation: Increase in overall size of modelling arrays. 
Top event model generation: Decrease in overall size of modelling arrays. 
Secondary event modelling: Decrease in number of different models possible. 
Configuration size: Increase in number of units to 400 
Increase in number of connections to 500 
Increase in number of control and trip loops to 30 each 
Decrease in number of divider-header combinations to 100 
Decrease In number of secondary failures. 
The synthesis program was Initially set up to handle up to 9000 individual events and so 
far not even half of these have been used for any of the test configurations. Therefore 
an increase in the synthesis ability has not been necessary. 
However, as expected, an increase in configuration size and complexity has resulted in 
larger fault trees. It has been found necessary to increase the number of transmissive, 
basic and diamond events stored by the synthesis program forthe cutset analysis program. 
These have been increased to the same size as the faulttree contained within the synthesis 
program. 
With increases in the size of the fault tree produced the time required for syntheSis also 
increases. However, the processing time only depends on the size of the initial, raw, 
synthesised fault tree. A large configuration may involve a large fault tree and a 
correspondingly high processing time but after rationalisation the final fault tree may be 
relatively small. Equally, the same configuration but with a different top event may result 
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in another small fault tree which is synthesised very quickly. The processing time on a 
DEC Microvax 11 can be roughly estimated to 1 minute for every 500 minitrees added to 
the initial fault tree. This is also dependent on the speed of the computer. 
Larger and more complex fault trees also result in higher processing times for the fault 
tree analysis program. Experience has shown a rapid increase In analysis time with 
increasing fault tree size. It Is not possible to estimate the processing time from the fault 
tree but experience has shown the time to range from a few seconds up to 4 minutes for 
a fault tree yielding 2500 cutsets. 
The time for processing the cutsets has been estimated to be in the form of a geometric 
expression Involving the number of cutsets contained in the initial results. For the DEC 
Microvax 11 computer used in this project the expression used to estimate the time, in 
seconds, is: 
( n' n) 7 --+- *-+30 3000 100 4 
where 'n' Is the number of cutsets in the fault tree. This is also dependent on the work 
load. This gives process times of 1/2 minute for 100 cutsets, 3 minutes for 500 cutsets 
and just over 10 minutes for 1000 cutsets. 
However, the analysis and cutset processing times can be decreased independently of 
the synthesised fault tree by the user by reducing the maximum order of the cutsets 
required. The analysis program has a built in mechanism for this and has been altered 
to read in the maximum order value with the fault tree input. The synthesis package has 
been changed to provide the maximum ordervaiue and the means to set this appears as 
one of the options with the top event specification in the configuration data input program 
MASTER. 
The package is currently stored on a small mainframe type computer (DEC Microvax 11) 
with a high memory and hard disk capacity. This has posed no restrictions to the operation 
of the programs. With the advances in personal computer (PC) technology it is hoped to 
be able to produce a compact PC version. The present size of the package is four 
megabytes for storage. This includes all the modelling, synthesis, drawing and analysis 
prog rams, the unit model and top event model libraries and a complete worked example. 
An additional one megabyte of storage space Is recommended forthe users own examples 
and models but this can be reduced by deleting old synthesised trees but keeping the 
configuration files. The largest program requires a memory capacity of 250 kbytes so it 
is clearly possible to develop a PC version of the Faultfinder package. 
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12.5 Fault Tree Presentation 
The basic method for producing a fault tree from the package is on a line printer In the 
fonn of text characters. The synthesis program provides a drawing file which contains all 
the transmissive, basic and diamond event names along with co-ordinates for each based 
on a 250 by 130 grid. The connectivity of the events is contained In a separate table in 
the file. 
A fault tree drawing program reads in this data file and constructs a text file containing 
the tree. Each event name is made up of a 12 character length string split over 3 lines 
(le. 4 characters per line). The actual field length is 5 characters. Below each event is a 
gate type occupying 3 lines and a connectivity line, made up from asterisks (*) occupying 
3 more lines. The connectivity lines may be stretched to enable the tree to be drawn In 
the available width. 
The file can be plotted on a 132 character line printer. An example of the type of fault 
tree output Is shown in Figure 12.5. 
As can be seen this is not very clear but it is a very quick and easy method of obtaining 
a fau l!tree. 
A program was written to generate a plotted fault tree from the data using the GINO 
graphics routines. The program worked successfully but the facility was machine and 
software dependent and both are no longer available. Although the output was easy to 
Interpret the synthesis of larger fault trees resulted In long lengths of paper similar to that 
obtained from the text print-out. 
Ideally the fault tree would be more presentable if it could be produced on a regular sheet 
of paper. The major cause of the long length of paper required to plot the fault tree is the 
single event intermediates, ie. the events which only have one cause. These are 
characteristic of the systematic tracing of variable deviations from effect to source 
encompassing every unit and connection in between as used in the computer generation 
of fault trees. However, the Faultfinder package has the ability to suppress these 
Intermediate events, thereby reducing the length of the tree. 
Another method is to use the fault tree generated for the fault tree analysis program. The 
tree only contains the events immediately under multi-input logic gates, ie. the single event 
intennediates are removed. This approach is being developed with the help of British 
Gas and a program called FTPLOT. This program uses the input file for FTAP, the fault 
tree analysis program, to plot a fault tree In an 'A size' format. The input file has had to 
12-10 
be modified to contain the text for each event. This data is placed at the end of the file 
and does not affect the operation of the analysis program. It is hoped that the plotting 
program can be used to produce fault trees which are easy to comprehend. 
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Figure 12.5 - Une Printer Output Of Fault Tree 
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12.6 Removal Of The 'Normally Working' Events 
The synthesis methodology has the ability to model common mode aspects of utility supply 
failures. For example, a batch of control loops may be connected to the same power 
supply which when disrupted results in the loss of all the loops. 
However, there are instances where it is necessary to state explicitly that the utility must 
be working for events further down the branch to have an effect. This was first recognised 
by Trenchard (2) in his alarm diagnosis work. The approach used was to introduce the 
'normally working' events into the unit models. 
This was later expanded by Mullhi (3), who incorporated the 'working normally' events 
into the fault tree at the synthesis stage. Consider a simplified version of the plant layout 
used by Mullhi shown in Figure 12.6. 
Air 
Figure 12.6 - Contamination Protection System 
The plant consists of an effluent holding vessel which discharges Into a river. To prevent 
contamination of the river two protective devices are used. An alarm connected to a 
concentration sensor in the vessel alerts the operator to shut the hand valve on the exit 
from the vessel. There is a back-up trip system on the exit pipe which operates on a high 
concentration signal from a sensor. The second trip operates a solenoid valve which 
vents the air from the trip valve slamming it shut. 
The configuration diagram is shown in Figure 12.7. 
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Figure 12.7 - Configuration Diagram 
It should be noted that in order for the alarm system to be modelled as a trip loop a trip 
switch is required between the alarm and the sensor. This is because the alarm is modelled 
as a simple device which operates should it receive a signal from the trip switch. This 
allows the failures of both 'trips' to be modelled as trip loop functional failure TL-FN-F 
branches. For the purpose of this example both the concentration sensors are without a 
separate power supply. 
The protection is a fail safe mechanism because should the air supply fail the trip valve 
will shut and if the powersupply should fail then the solenoid valve will de-energise venting 
the air, thus shutting the trip valve. 
There are two 'trip' mechanisms, trip 1 is the alarm and operator system and trip 2 is the 
automatic system. A cause of trip 1 failing is the power supply failing, because the alarm 
and the trip switch will both be inoperative. However, the loss of power will not cause a 
toxic release because the second trip system will close off the flow unless either of its 
valves are stuck. In orderforthe other failures ofthesecond trip system to be incorporated 
into the fault tree correctly they must be ANDed with a working utility (power) supply. 
The partial fault tree is shown in Figure 12.8. 
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Figure 12.8 - Partial Fault Tree For Toxic Release 
The fault tree can be split into three sections. The middle section deals with the causes 
of the high concentration and has not been developed since it does not form part of this 
discussion. The right and left branches deal with the functional failures of trip loops 1 and 
2 respectively. 
For trip loop 1 there are two points where the loss of power may cause the trip to fail. The 
first (ie. the highest occurrence in the branch) is a cause ofthe alarm failing and the second 
is a cause of the trip switch failing. 
For trip loop 2 a cause of no change in the signal between the trip switch and the solenoid 
valve (S 14 NCHA) is a loss of power to the trip switch. This would give a similar sub-tree 
structure as that for trip loop 1. However. it has been noted that a power loss cannot 
cause the trip to fail. Therefore. inclusion of power loss as a cause of failure of trip 2 is 
incorrect. In fact the power supply must be working for the failures of the trip switch. 
sensor and set point units to have an effect. Hence the event S 14 NCHA must be ANDed 
with UTIL-OK to represent a working power supply. 
The inclusion prevents the analysis program listing. for example. power loss AND trip 
switch stuck unit 13 as a cutset. Instead the cutset becomes power loss AND trip switch 
stuck AND utility working. The post-cutset generation program written by Mullhi then 
removes the cutset because it has two mutually exclusive failure states of the same unit. 
However. a problem has resulted from the use of this procedure. Since the approach is 
systematic it very often results in many occurrences of the UTIL-OK event in the fault tree. 
The problem with this is the extra AND gates in the fault tree which greatly increase the 
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orders of the cutsets. Experience has shown this to be very misleading with large order 
cutsets being Ignored when In fact once all the UTI L-OK events have been removed they 
reveal a serious third order cutset. 
It is desirable to remove these 'working normally' events from any faulttree analysis output 
so that a concise list of fault events can be produced. The probability of such events Is 
very close to one and can be assumed to be unity. If these events remained in the cutsets 
the overall probability of a top event will be reduced, so by removing them the actual 
computed value will be higher. 
The removal of the 'working normally' events is achieved by using the post-cutset 
generation program. This program was written by Mullhl to remove the mutually exclusive 
failure states and to check the consistency of the cutsets. After all the deletions have 
been carried out the program checks all the remaining cutsets for minimality and re-packs 
them into an ascending cutset order. 
The algorithm written to remove the 'working normally' events is inserted before the 
minimality checks but after the removal of any mutually exclusive failure states. The 
program examines each cutset and removes any event with '-OK' in it. 
12.7 Summary 
This chapter has highlighted some of the problems in synthesis and analysis encountered 
during this project. The work is aimed at making the package more adaptable to both the 
user and the types of synthesis required. 
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PART 3 
Chapter 13 
Worked Examples 
13.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers some of the more substantial examples looked at over the duration 
of the project. The work covered in this thesis deals mainly with the modelling aspects 
of computer-aided fault tree synthesis. Therefore, although fault trees are presented, the 
actual intricacies of their generation are omitted and only a brief description of the synthesis 
is given. However, the difficulties in modelling the various systems are covered in more 
detail. 
13.2 Nitric Acid Cooling System 
This example was first introduced by Lapp and Powers (1) and has since been widely 
covered in the field of fault tree synthesis. Two previous workers on this project, KeUy 
and Mullhi, have looked at this example in considerable detail. The system is shown in 
Figure 13.1. 
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Figure 13.1 - Nitric Acid Cooling System 
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The hot nitric acid comes from the manufacturing process and must be cooled sufficiently 
before proceeding to other areas of the plant. A shell and tube heat exchanger with a 
cooling water supply is used for this purpose. A control loop connected to a temperature 
sensor on the acid outlet from the heat exchanger manipulates the flow of cooling water 
into the heat exchanger. Should the cooling water supply fail completely a trip system 
operates to shut off the flow of hot acid. 
13.2.1 Configuration And Modelling 
The configuration diagram Is show In Figure 13.2. 
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(direct) Un" 
Figure 13.2 - Configuration Diagram 
All models used in this configuration are present In the unit model library. The heat 
exchanger model, although present in the unit library, could easily be generated using 
the heat exchanger model generation routine and a detailed account of the model 
characteristics can be found in Chapter 8. 
Common mode utility failures are modelled using single supply units. From Figure 13.2 
it can be seen thatthe power supply (unit 18) and the instrument air supply (unit 19, shown 
as two units for clarity) both have connections to the control loop and the trip system. It 
should be noted that a different power supply is used for the pump. 
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The information required to define the control loop and the trip system has been covered 
in detail in Chapter 4. as has a more detailed description for determining the format of the 
configuration diagram. Therefore. only the definition of the control loop and trip system 
is given here. 
CONTROL LOOP 
SENSED VARIABLE: T 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 5 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 10 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL LOOP: 13 14 18 19 
VARIABLE T REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 3 4 5 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 6 7 8 9 10 11 
LOOP IS NOT OF FEED FORWARD TYPE 
OPEN VALVE TRIP SYSTEM 
TRIP VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 2 
OTHER UNITS IN TRIP SYSTEM: 9 15 16 18 19 
TRIP IS OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
13.2.2 Fault Tree Synthesis 
A very detailed description of the process for synthesising a fault tree for high temperature 
in the acid outlet stream for this example is given by Mullhi (2). The greater part of the 
synthesis principles and rules has not been altered during this project so a step by step 
description will not be given. 
The top event chosen for the example is high flow of coolant out of the pipe from the 
control valve to the heat exchanger. This was chosen because it uses the manipulated 
variable control loop template as opposed to the regulated variable template used by 
Mullhi. 
The top event Is HIGH FLOW Unit 11 which translates to Q 10 HI. The synthesis algorithm 
immediately recognises this to be in the manipulated stream of the control loop and applies 
the appropriate control loop template. This produces the partial fault tree shown in Figure 
13.3. 
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Figure 13.3 - Partial Fault Tree Showing Control Loop Template 
The fault tree branch for the spontaneous failure of the control loop and the branch for 
the latent failure of the control loop are shown in Figure 13.4. 
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13-4 
The spontaneous failure branch traces all the faults which may cause the control loop to 
fail high. It starts off with the control valve failing with a high aperture CV-F-HA, or a high 
signal to the valve S 13 HI. However, In order for a high signal to reach the valve the 
utility supply to the controller must be functioning. Therefore, S 13 HI is ANDed with 
UTI L-OK Unit 18. A high signal from the controller S 13 HI may be caused by the controller 
failing high CNT-F-HI, a high signal from the sensor S 12 HI, or a low signal from the set 
point unit W 14 LO. The latter may be caused by a low set point SET-polO. The high 
signal from the sensor may be caused by the sensor failing high SEN-F-HI. The 
spontaneous failure branch Is shown in Figure 13.4a. 
The synthesis for the latent failure branch of the control loop Is very similar to the 
spontaneous failure branch and is shown in Figure 13.4b. 
The fault tree branches for the manipulated variable deviation and the sensed variable 
deviation are shown In Figure 13.5. 
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Figure 13.5 - Manipulated And Sensed Variable Deviation Branches 
The continuation branch of the manipulated variable deviation Is derived from the pipe 
model minitrees. The causes of a 10 HI are G 10 HI or G 9 HI or a leak from a high 
pressure environment LK-HP-EN. The causes of G 10 HI are traced through the heat 
exchanger to the dummy tail unit resulting in the diamond event G 11 HI. The causes of 
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G 9 HI are traced back through the control valve. Since the valve requires an air supply 
to open Q 9 Hlis ANOed with UTIL·OK Unit 19. The trace is continued through the flow 
sensor to the pump. A high flow out of the pump requires the pump to be working so the 
flow is ANOed with UTIL·OK Unit 17. Causes of high flow out of the pump are high flow 
into the pump G 6 HI, the pump racing RACING, a pump surge PUMp·SUR or a leak from 
a high pressure environment LK·Hp·EN. The causes of high flow into the pump are traced 
to the dummy head unit resulting in the diamond event Q 6 HI. This branch of the fault 
tree is shown in Figure 13.5a. 
The sensed variable deviation is a high temperature in the pipe on the heat exchanger 
outlet T 4 HI. This branch is included because a deviation in the sensed variable 
accompanied by the correct action of the control loop will result in a deviation of the 
manipulated variable. The causes of this are high temperature out of the heat exchanger 
T 3 HI, or an extemal heat source EXT·HEAT. There are several causes for high 
temperature in the heat exchanger outlet. The basic faults are fouling, an external heat 
source EXT·H EAT, or a leak to a low pressure environment LK·Lp·EN in the cooling side. 
Another cause is a high acid temperature into the heat exchangerT 2 HI, which is traced 
to the dummy head giving the diamond event T 1 HI, and a high coolant temperature T 
10 HI, which is traced to the dummy head unit giving the diamond eventT 6 HI. The final 
cause of high temperature from the heat exchanger is high flow of acid G 2 HI. This is 
traced downstream to the diamond event G 5 HI and upstream to the diamond event Q 
1 HI. The sensed variable deviation branch is shown in Figure 13.5b. 
This completes the synthesis of the fault tree for the high flow top event. The trip system 
does not appear in the fault tree because neither of the failure modes of the trip result in 
high flow. 
13.2.3 Conclusions 
The Lapp and Powers nitric acid cooling system has been used as a basic illustration of 
the decomposition, modelling and fault tree synthesis ability of the Faultfinder package. 
Togetherwith the top event used by Mullhi (2) they give an example of a regulated variable 
deviation and a manipulated variable deviation. 
This example has shown the structural features imposed by the control loop template on 
the fault tree giving it a formal framework which is easy to interpret. 
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13.3 Reaction Vessel Charging System 
The reaction vessel charging system is a hypothetical section of plant developed for use 
in alarm diagnosis work. The format used here is a simplification of the system used by 
Trenchard (3). He used the Faultfinder package to generate fault trees for use in an alarm 
diagnosis package. The system Is shown in Figure 13.6 where the extra line appearing 
on the process flow path is a representation of the electrical tracing used. 
5tOl"09' 
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Figure 13.6 - Reaction Vessel Charging System 
The function of the section of plant is to provide the reaction vessel with a constant flow 
rate of ethanoic acid. The acid is pumped from the storage facility to an elevated holding 
vessel. The level in the vessel is maintained by a controller and control valve on the Inlet. 
The acid flows under gravity to the reaction vessel and hence the flow rate Is controlled 
by the level in the holding vessel. 
The process may seem straightforward but the choice of ethanoic acid with its freezing 
point of 16.6·C poses problems in that the piping and instruments require an electrical 
tracing system to prevent blockages due to freezing. This is shown as an additional line 
along the process flow lines in Figure 13.6. 
13.3.1 Configuration And Modelling 
The configuration diagram is shown in Figure 13.7. 
The difficulty with this configuration is how to model the pipe tracer malfunctions. A new 
variable E is introduced to model the flow of electrical current from the tracer unit to the 
pipeline. 
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Figure 13.7 - Configuration Diagram 
The effects of the process fluid freezing are partial blockage or, more severely, complete 
blockage. Some of the models in the pipeline contain these events as basic faults so it 
is possible to model the causes as secondary failures. 
Secondary failures were introduced to allow variable deviations or basic faults in unit 
models to be further developed for a particular situation without the need to change the 
unit model. For example, a leak may be caused by an impurity or low flow may be caused 
by a low temperature. Two types of secondary failure are used for this: a Type I failure 
represents an additional cause of a variable deviation and a Type 11 failure represents an 
extension to a basic fault. Thus, an example of a Type I failure is a low flow resulting from 
FREEZING caused by low temperature and an example of a Type 11 failure is a leak to a 
low pressure environment resulting from CORROSION caused by an impurity. 
Two secondary failures are used to represent differing degrees of severity. They are both 
defined as Type 11 failures because they model the causes of basic faults. The first, called 
FREEZE 1, identifies some freezing as an additional cause for partial blockage PART -BLK. 
This is caused by low electrical current. The second failure Is called FREEZE2 and 
represents the fluid being completely frozen. This is caused by a complete loss of electrical 
current. The following event statements are used: 
V E31N LO : FREEZE1 
V E31N NONE: FREEZE2 
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Rather than exhaustively modelling the effects of freezing in every unit the secondary 
failures are only defined as affecting some of the models. These are the pipe models 
used at the start of the tracing, at the entrance to the holding vessel and in the line to the 
reaction vessel and the level sensor unit. This avoids excessive occurrences of the faults. 
The secondary failure definitions for the configuration are: 
NAME: FREEZE1 
SUSCEPTIBLE FAULTS: PART-BlK 
UNITS: 6 15 22 27 
NAME: FREEZE2 
SUSCEPTIBLE FAULTS: COMP-BlK 
UNITS: 6 15 22 27 
The overall effect of this is that a blockage may result from freezing caused by Insufficient 
current to the electrical tracer. 
Although the pipe model in the unit library only has two ports, an inlet and an outlet, it can 
be seen in the block diagram shown in Figure 13.7 that the units connected to the pipe 
tracer have three connection points. This does not cause any problems because the 
secondary failure models provide the link between the blockage faults in the pipe model 
and the connection to the pipe tracer. 
Should it be necessary to model the effects on temperature, a variable deviation, in the 
pipe of the tracer unit, a Type I secondary failure can be used to relate pipe temperature 
to flow of electric current. 
The level sensor Is highlighted as a special model since it is susceptible to blockages, 
even more so than the pipe since flow does not occur In this unit. Therefore, the model 
contains the two blockage faults. From Figure 13.6 it can be seen that the level sensor 
consists of a hand valve and a pneumatic level sensing device. In the Faultfinder 
methodology it is not possible to connect a hand valve to a vessel port so the level sensor 
and the hand valve are modelled as one unit. The resultant model contains three additional 
causes of no change in output signal to the simple level sensor model. The new level 
sensor model contains the following propagation equation and event statements: 
S2SIG= F( L1 VES) 
F SEN-F-HI: S2SIG HI 
F SEN-F-LO: S2SIG LO 
F SEN-STK: S2SIG NCHA 
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F PART-BLK: S2SIG NCHA 
F COMP-BLK: S2SIG NCHA 
o HV-D-SH: S2SIG NCHA 
V S4UTL NONE: S2SIG NONE 
The pipe tracer unit is used to introduce specific faults for this unit and to convert a utility 
supply to an electrical current. Event statements are used to convert a low utility supply 
to a low electrical current and the causes of no electrical current are the pipe tracer heater 
failing or no utility supply. The event statements are: 
v SI UTL LO : E20UT LO, E30UT LO, E40UT LO, E50UT LO 
V SIUTL NONE: A(DUMMY) 
F HEATFAIL: A(DUMMY) 
I A(DUMMY): E20UT NONE, E30UT NONE, E40UT NONE, E50UT NONE 
All the vessels in the configuration have been developed using the vessel model templates 
or the generation routine. The storage facility is modelled as a large capacity unit with 
just two outlet ports and no Inlet ports. This model already exists in the unit library but 
can be obtained from the open vessel model template by deleting all ports except for one 
outlet flow port to a pump and one outlet non-flow port to gravity. Low level. or no level 
may result from some flow through the closed valve or a leak in the unit. The holding 
vessel is straightforward with no unusual features. It has a pumped iniet and a gravity 
outlet which are affected by the level In the vessel. The second outlet port is a non-flow 
port. Any reaction effects in the reaction vessel are ignored since these are assumed to 
affect only the temperatures and outlet flows but not the flow into it. This unit is modelled 
as a simple vessel. 
The definition of the control loop for the level is straightforward but it should be noted that 
the tracer units are also included, as failure of these results in failure of the control system. 
The definition is 
CONTROL LOOP 
SENSED VARIABLE: L 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 27 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 12 
OTHER UN ITS IN CONTROL LOOP: 28 29 30 31 32 33 
VARIABLE L REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 26 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
LOOP IS NOT OF FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
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13.3.2 Fault Tree Synthesis 
The top event chosen to illustrate this example is low flow of ethanoic acid to the reaction 
vessel. The unit is number 20, the pipe model. Figure 13.8 shows the causes of low flow 
both upstream and downstream of the pipe and the point where the control loop template 
for the regulated variable Is placed. 
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Figure 13.8 - Top Part Of Fault Tree For low Flow 
The G 20 lO branch traces faults downstream towards the reaction vessel and shows 
the addition of the FREEZE1 secondary failure event at the fault PART-BlK Unit22. This 
fault is traced to low electric current from the tracer E 36 lO caused by a low utility supply 
lO-POWER Unit 32. 
The G 19 lO branch traces faults upstream to the holding vessel where a deviation in the 
level causes the control loop template to be used. 
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Figure 13.9 shows the control loop overload branch. 
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Figure 13.9 - Control loop Overload Branch 
The causes of control loop overload are no flow or reverse flow in the manipulated stream. 
The reverse flow branch is quite straightforward and not all intermediate events and 
variable deviations are shown (this is indicated by the extended broken line after an OR 
gate). The non-flow branch has a FREEZE2 secondary failure at the complete blockage 
COMP-BlK fault on unit 15 and the control loop failing with no aperture Cl-F-NA at the 
control valve. This branch is traced to the hand valve being open on the other storage 
vessel outlet connection. 
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The spontaneous failure and latent failure branches of the control loop are shown In Figure 
13.10. 
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Figure 13.10 - Control Loop Spontaneous And Latent Failures Branches 
The spontaneous failures branch of the control loop is shown In Figure 13.1 Oa and poses 
no problems. 
The control loop latent failures branch shown In Figure 13.1 Ob is slightly unusual due to 
the level sensor model used. The branch has the hand valve closed fault HV-D-SH Unit 
27 to represent closure of the valve between the connection to the vessel and the sensor. 
Also the sensor is susceptible to both the secondary failure effects. 
The sensed variable deviation branch shown in Figure 13.11 is straightforward and again 
has the secondary failure branch on the partial blockage fault PART-BLK Unit 15. 
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Figure 13.11 - Sensed Variable Deviation Branch 
This completes the fault tree for low flow into the reaction vessel. 
13.3.3 Conclusions 
The reaction vessel charging system has illustrated the ability of the Faultflnder package 
to deal with unusual plant systems such as the distribution of an electrical heating system 
throughout the whole section. The modelling has resulted in the introduction of a new 
variable for the electrical current 
The system has also demonstrated the use of the secondary failures facility which was 
created during the first version of the package but which, before the present work, had 
hardly been used. It has highlighted the need for the type of secondary failure name to 
be revised because the original interpretation no longer applies. This only reflects the 
changes In the application of the failures but not the methodology used. This Is covered 
in more detail in Section 5.S. 
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13.4 Reaction Vessel Cooling System 
The ethylene oxide reaction vessel cooling system was used by Picclnini and Levy (4, 5) 
for an operability analYSis. It has been used by Khan (6) as part of a study for 
computer-aided design. The system diagram is shown in Figure 13.12. 
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Figure 13.12 - Ethylene Oxide Reaction Vessel Cooling System 
... 
A detailed account of the ethylene and oxygen reaction process and the nonane cooling 
system is given by the authors (5). The basic layout of the plant is as follows. The vertical 
reaction vessel and surge drum are six metres above the ground-mounted condenser 
and pumps. The coolant loop Is closed hence the level controller on the surge drum 
maintains a constant level in the reaction vessel. 
The temperature of the coolant Is kept constant by controlling the evaporation pressure. 
Under normal operating conditions the pressure in the surge drum plus the hydrostatic 
head of the liquid in the drum exerts sufficient pressure on the liquid outlet from the 
condenser to submerge some of the cooling tubes. This exposes enough tubes to 
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condense the required amount of vapour and allows for undercooling. If the amount of 
vapour in the reaction vessel outlet stream increases as a result of higher temperature in 
the reaction vessel, the pressure control valve aperture decreases. This reduces the 
pressure in the surge drum, causing more liquid to flow from the condenser and 
consequently uncovering more condensing tubes allowing the extra vapour to be 
condensed. 
Should the pump break down or should there be a sudden evaporation in the reaction 
vessel, the surge drum level will increase to a point where the high level trip will operate. 
This opens the closed trip valve on the steam line to the turbine generator for the second 
pump (filled In black in Figure 13.12 to represent a non·operating status). 
13.4.1 Configuration And Modelling 
The configuration diagram is shown in Figure 13.13 . 
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Figure 13.13· Configuration Diagram 
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All of the unit models are contained in the model library except for the vessels and the 
condenser. 
The reaction vessel is modelled using the heat exchanger generation routine because 
the modelling is only concerned with the cooling system and, therefore, it is not necessary 
to model the reaction parameters. The causes of high evaporation rate are high reactant 
inlet temperature or high reactant flow rate in the tubes. The effects of reactant 
compositions are not considered. The coolant inlet Is a pumped liquid but the outlet is a 
vapour under back-pressure from the vessel's shell side and hence is affected by the 
pressure. 
The condenser Is modelled as a shell and tube heat exchanger with a relief port on the 
shell side. The tubes contain the water for condensing the coolant vapour. Both inlet and 
outlet to the shell side are affected by the vessel pressure. 
The surge drum Is a product of the vessel model generation routine. The vapour and 
liquid inlet ports are affected by the vessel pressure but since the liquid outlet is pumped 
the vessel pressure is assumed not to affect it. The liquid make-up port is only used 
occasionally to replace lost fluid, therefore it is modelled as a non-flow port connected to 
a dummy head unit. 
The configuration has a single divider-header combination around units 11 and 15. This 
gives a continuity of flow between streams 10 and 15 which means that low flow out of 
the header, unit 15, can only have the low flow deviation as a cause entering at the divider, 
unit 11. Other possible loops can be found but each of these contains a unit in which 
accumulation of mass can occur thus negating the restriction on the inlet and outlet 
deviations. 
The level control system is straightforward but there is only one control loop because the 
second control valve, unit 18, although operating, does not manipulate the flow because 
it Is a non-flow leg. The flow Is manipulated in streams 11 to 14 only. 
CONTROL LOOP 
NUMBER: 1 
SENSED VARIABLE: L 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 19 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 13 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL LOOP: 20 21 22 23 49 52 
VARIABLE L REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 20 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 11 12 13 14 
LOOP IS NOT OF FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
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The pressure control system used in this example is unusual in the way that it is used to 
increase or decrease the condensation rate in the condenser. This is achieved by reducing 
or raising, respectively, the pressure in the surge drum. 
The following description looks at the effect of an increase in surge drum vessel pressure. 
To counteract this the hydrostatic head between the drum and the condenser must change 
to equalise the pressure between the two units. An increase in vessel pressure causes 
the flow of liquid from the condenser to the surge drum to decrease, reducing the level in 
the surge drum. This has two effects, the first is that the flow rate from the drum to the 
reaction vessel decreases due to the action of the level controller and the second is that 
the level in the condenser increases. A higher level in the condenser covers more cooling 
tubes, thus, decreasing the condensation rate. An opposite effect is achieved for a 
decrease in the surge drum pressure. 
The pressure control loop behaves as follows. The sensor and the control valve are in 
different streams separated by the divider unit and the loop does not receive information 
about the effects of its actions. Therefore it is a feedlorward loop. The controller 
manipulates the flow into the surge drum thereby regulating the pressure in the drum. 
This causes a problem due to the two types 01 pressure variable used. In pipes there is 
the pipe pressure and in vessels there is the vessel pressure. They are kept separate 
because they do not have the same deviations. However, the current programming set-up 
used means that pressure in a vessel cannot be specified as a controlled variable because 
its variable index number is greater than 9. This restriction can be overcome in this 
example because it is possible to specify the pressure in the inlet stream as the regulated 
variable because ofthe direct link between it and the vessel pressure. The problem cannot 
be solved simply because the indices lonn part 01 the programming methodology. 
As defined in the description 01 the process the temperature in the reaction vessel is also 
regulated by this loop. The control loop definition is 
CONTROL LOOP 
NUMBER: 2 
SENSED VARIABLE: P 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 41 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 45 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL LOOP: 42 43 51 55 
VARIABLE P REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 50 
VARIABLE T REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 36 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 49 50 
LOOP IS OF THE FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
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The high level trip operation is simple but the definition must be considered carefully. The 
trip opens the valve to allow steam to flow to the turbine. This powers the pump which 
then draws liquid through the non-flow leg of the divider-header combination. This results 
In a change In the configuration and models which is a difficult situation for automatic 
synthesis to handle. However, we are only concemed with the failure of the trip system 
to activate and not the consequences of successful operation. The consequences are 
flow through the divider-header combination which cannot be a cause of the chosen top 
event of low level in the reaction vessel. 
Unlike other trip systems in this thesis, where only the trip switch, sensor and utilities form 
part of the trip system, the turbine and pump must also be given. This is necessary 
because should either of these fail to operate then the trip action Is defeated. Also it is 
not only the steam line which has flow when the trip activates but the non-flow leg of the 
divider-header combination as well. The trip definition Is 
CLOSED VALVE TRIP SYSTEM 
TRIP VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 26 
OTHER UNITS IN TRIP SYSTEM ARE: 17 19 20 24 25 28 50 54 
CONNECTIONS HAVING FLOW WHEN VALVE OPENS: 16 17 18 19 30 31 32 
13.4.2 Fault Tree Synthesis 
The top event chosen is low coolant level in the reaction vessel UNDRLEVL Unit 30. The 
top part of the fault tree Is shown In Figure 13.14. 
The causes of low level are low G 15 LO or no G 15 NONE flow of coolant, a high 
evaporation rate a 37 HI, or a leak from the vessel LK-LP-EN. The high evaporation rate 
may be caused by high flow of reactants through the vessel a 34 HI or G 35 HI, or high 
temperature of the reactant stream T 34 HI. All of these events are diamond events. 
The cause of no coolant flow is traced to the header unit where there must be no flow in 
both the inlet streams G 14 NONE and G 19 NONE. Stream 19 has been identified in 
the configuration as the non-flow leg of the divider-header combination and therefore no 
flow will be the normal event. However. the stream has been Identified as having flow 
when the trip system operates. Assuming the trip operates normally then for the leg to 
continue to have no flow the control valve must fail closed. Therefore, the cause of G 19 
NONE is CL-F-NA. The causes of this are developed as for any other control loop except 
that at the sensor the synthesis also traces causes of no level In the holding vessel L 20 
NONE. This Is traced to no flow Into the vessel G 9 NONE, caused by no pressure In the 
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condenser P 6 NONE. This may be caused by no condensation flow Q 7 NONE, which 
is a result of fouling or loss of cooling water Q 1 NONE or G 2 NONE, or no flow into the 
condenser G 52 NONE, which Is developed elsewhere. 
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Figure 13.14 - Top Part Of Fault Tree For Low Level 
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No flow in stream 14 may also be caused by the control loop failing with no aperture 
CL-F-NA Unit 13. The development is almost identical to that for unit 18 except for the 
different control valves. The diamond at the end of the S 24 NONE branch indicates a 
continuation elsewhere in the fault tree. No flow through the control valve Q 13 NONE 
may also be caused by no flow into it G 12 NONE. The causes of this are pump failure 
or power loss, or no flow at the start of the divider outlet leg Q 11 NONE. No flow may 
be caused by high flow in the other divider outlet leg Q 16 HI or no flow into the divider 
G 10 NONE. The high flow is converted to some flow G 16 SOME because it is a non-flow 
leg and the causes of this are traced to leaks in the pipe or pump. No flow into the divider 
is caused by no flow out of the holding vessel Q 10 NONE. A decision table provides the 
causes of this as no level L 20 NONE ANOed with no flow into the vessel G 9 NONE. 
This event has been developed for a previous branch. 
Low flow of coolant has causes of low flow through the flow leg of the header unit G 14 
LO or low G 19 LO or no G 19 NONE flow in the non-flow leg of the header. The no flow 
branch has been developed previously and low flow in the non-flow leg has causes of a 
partial blockage or a leak. The development of the low flow fault for the flow leg of the 
header is shown in Figure 13.15. 
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Figure 13.15 - The Causes Of Low Flow 
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Stream 14 is manipulated by control loop 1 so the appropriate control loop template is 
applied. The spontaneous failures and latent failures branches follow the same format 
as those In the eariier examples and are not explained any further. 
The manipulated variable deviation branch traces low flow through the rest of the 
divider-header combination. Low flow through the pump Q 12 LO may be caused by 
pump failures such as cavitation or impeller failure or low flow Into the pump G 11 LO. 
Low flow into the divider-header combination G 10 LO Is not given as a cause of low flow 
into the pump because this is caused by low level in the vessel which is the sensed variable 
deviation. Low flow in the divider-header combination is given by high flow in the other 
outlet leg Q 16 HI. This is converted to some flow by the synthesis algOrithm which has 
been developed in another branch. 
The sensed variable deviation is low level in the surge drum L 20 LO and there are two 
variable deviation causes. No inlet flow from the condenser G 9 NONE is traced to events 
in the condenser which have been developed previously. Low inlet flow to the surge drum 
G 9 LO is traced to low pressure In the condenser P 6 LO. This Is developed as shown 
in Figure 13.16. 
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Figure 13.16 - Low Pressure In The Condenser 
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Low pressure in the condenser P 6 LO has a variety of causes. A high condensation rate 
Q 7 HI is caused by high flow rate of cooling water through the condenser Q 1 HI or G 2 
HI, or low temperature of the water T 1 LO. 
Low level in the condenser L 6 LO may be caused by .Iow or no condensation rate Q 7 
LO or Q 7 NONE. The former is traced to low fiow of cooling water, cooling water at a 
high temperature, or fouling in the condenser. The latter has been traced further up the 
fault tree. 
If the hand valve, unit 5, on the relief port of the condenser fails or Is directed open then 
this will cause some flow through the non-flow port Q 3 SOME, causing a low pressure. 
Low flow of vapour to the condenser G 52 LO is traced back to the divider, unit 44. Here 
the stream is split, one traces low flow back to the divider for the pressure relief valve and 
the other is the leg to the surge drum. The former has causes of a leak to the environment 
or the relief valve being open RV-F-OP. The latter traces the deviation of high flow Q 49 
HI. This is the manipulated variable deviation for the second control loop so the template 
is applied. 
The spontaneous failures branch is straightforward. The sensed variable deviation branch 
traces low pressure back to the relief valve where a leak or the relief valve failing open 
are causes. The manipulated variable deviation is traced to a leak in the control valve. 
No flow of vapour to the condenser G 52 NONE is again traced back to the divider. No 
flow from the reaction vessel direction G 48 NONE is traced to high flow in the relief valve 
leg Q 39 HI which has already been developed. Another cause of no flow to the condenser 
. is high flow in the leg to the surge drum a 49 HI which has already been developed. 
This completes the fault tree for low level in the reaction vessel. 
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13.4.3 Conclusions 
The reaction vessel cooling system example has highlighted a few areas for concem in 
the methodology of the Faultfinder package. 
The pressure and flow relationship in vessels is quite complex and although a general 
methodology has been developed there are still some residual questions to be answered. 
While the effect of level on pressure is modelled, the effect of pressure on level is not 
directly modelled. The methodology achieves the result by modelling the effect of pressure 
on the inlet and outlet flows. This ultimately affects the level. This system was used in 
the original methodology. One desirable effect of this approach is that it avoids any 
'looping' due to the interaction between level and pressure. What has not been explored 
is whether this is the best solution and whether this is an instance of a potentially more 
general problem of interaction between variables and possible resultant looping problems. 
-' 
The pressure control system actually regulates the pressure in the surge drum but the 
current program does not permit this. Only those variables with indices less than 10 can 
be incorporated into the control methodology. Fortunately this is no more than a nuisance 
because it is possible to use the pipe pressure on the inlet to the drum. 
There also exists uncertainly in the ability forthe package to deal correctly with trip systems 
such as the one found in this example. The trip initiates changes in the state of some of 
the models which mayor may not have a bearing on the fault tree. For the given fault 
tree there do not appear to be any problems. 
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13.5 AKZO Chlorine Storage Facility 
This plant was studied as part of the risk analysis report to the Rijnmond Public Authority 
(6) and formed part of a final year project using the Faultfinder package. 
The chlorine is produced on site and stored at atmospheric temperature In a set of five 
horizontal vessels, pressurised to 9 bar, with a capacity for 100 tonnes each. All the 
vessels are Identical but one remains empty at all times to act as a dump tank should one 
of the others develop a fault. 
The facility can be operated in various ways but for the purpose of this example a single 
vessel is considered undergoing a filling operation at 6.5 bar. A schematic representation 
of the vessel developed from the description given in the report is shown in Figure 13.17. 
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Figure 13.17· Schematic Representation of Chlorine Storage Vessel 
The vessel has a single manhole through which four pipes enter. In addition to this there 
Is a single exit pipe at the base connected to a closed hand valve and a blank flange. Of 
the four pipes entering through the man-hole two project to the base of the vessel. One 
is forthe liquid chlorine inlet from the production plant and the other is for the liquid chlorine 
outlet to the user facilities. 
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The other two pipes remain in the gas space above the liquid. The first of these extends 
to a series of pressure sensors, valves and connections used to maintain a constant 
pressure. The first two pressure sensors are connected to a pressure gauge and a 
pressure alarm gauge set at 11 bar in the control room. The final sensor passes to a 
pressure controller which gradually releases the padding gas to either the destruction 
plant or the liquefaction plant. The sensor is aiso connected to a controller on the chlorine 
padding gas inlet but during the filling stage this is set to manual and the valve remains 
closed. 
The last pipe through the manhole is connected to a bursting disk set at 12 bar which is 
in tum connected to the dump tank. The test pressure of the vessel is 18 bar. 
The degree of filling of the vessel is monitored in the control room by means of weight 
sensors on the vessel legs. The vessel is also fitted with an extemallevel indicator which 
operates an alarm on high level. 
All valves on piping through the manhole are remotely controlled pneumatic valves from 
the control room and close should the air supply be lost. 
13.5.1 Configuration And Modelling 
The storage vessel was created using the vessel model generation routine. Only the 
liquid inlet port and the excess gas outlet port are flow ports and only the liquid inlet port 
is from a pumped supply, all others are affected by the pressure. 
A number of other components had to be created but the models for these could be easily 
based on the models for other units. Examples were the closed remotely controlled valve 
and blank flange which are similar to the closed hand valve. The open remotely controlled 
valve is similar to the open hand valve and the bursting disc is identical to the relief valve. 
The high alarm is modelled as a trip switch sending out a signal when the input signal is 
high. 
Two other units, the operator and the manual controller, were also created. The operator 
has four inputs, the high level alarm, the high pressure alarm, the weight indicator and 
the pressure indicator. The unit is modelled as a trip switch sending a signal to the trip 
valve should the alarm emit a signal or the indicators produce a high signal. The manual 
controller simply has an event statement which attributes the controller being set to 
automatic mode by the operator and a decision table ANDing this with some form of input 
signal producing an output signal. 
13-26 
The configuration diagram is shown in Figure 13.18. 
Figure 13.18 - Configuration Diagram 
Determination of the configuration sUb-systems is straightforward. The closed remotely 
controlled valve and the manual controller do not form a control loop, which leaves just 
the one in the configuration. There are four trip systems all operating on the same trip 
valve via the operator. 
The level and the weight in a vessel have the same propagation equations and event 
statements, therefore the configuration can be simplified by using the same sensor and 
variable for both. The output from the sensor for the level is split producing separate 
inputs to the operator for the weight indicator and the level alarm. 
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The purpose of this example is to illustrate the ability of the package to produce risk 
assessment type fault trees as produced forthe Rijnmond report (7). These involve linking 
together basic fault type events rather than variable deviations. The top event chosen is 
vessel rupture VES-RUPT, and the model used is 
V X6VES HI : H20-PRES high concentration 
I H20-PRES: CORROSN water present 
F EXT-HEAT: CORROSN external heat source 
F VIBRATN : FATIGUE vibrations 
I CORROSN: A(DUMMY) corrosion 
I FATIGUE: A(DUMMY) metal fatigue 
F FLASHING: LOW-TEMP flashing liquid 
F EXT-COLD: LOW-TEMP extemal cold source 
I LOW-TEMP: BRITFRAC low temperature 
V R40UT NONE: NORELlEF no relief through port 
V L6VES HI : OVR-FILL high level 
I OVR-FILL: OVERPRES over filling 
F EXT-IMP: SUP-FAIL extemal impact 
F FLOODING: SUP-FAIL flooding 
F SUBSDNCE: SUP-FAIL land subsidence 
F EXT-EXPL: SUP-FAIL extemal explosion 
F MAJ-FIRE: SUP-FAIL major fire 
I OVERPRES: CRIT-STR over pressure 
I SUP-FAIL: CRIT-STR support failure 
I MECH-DEF: VES-RUPT mechanical defect 
I BRITFRAC: VES-RUPT brittle fracture 
I CRIT-STR: VES-RUPT critical stress 
I NORELlEF V P6VES HI T OVERPRES no relief, high pressure 
I A(DUMMY) F INSP-ERR T MECH-DEF dummy event, inspection error 
All the faults to be linked together have to be contained in the top event model along with 
the variable deviations which are to be traced by the package. This model is specific to 
the situation being studied and cannot be used for other examples. 
13.5.2 Fault Tree Synthesis 
The top part ofthe fault tree is shown Figure 13.19. This is similar to the fault tree produced 
for the Rijnmond report, part of which is shown in Figure 12.2 on page 12-3 of this thesis. 
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Figure 13.19 - Top Part Of Fault Tree For Vessel Rupture 
This shows the way the basic events are linked together to fonn the actual top event. The 
mechanical defects branch has causes given by the second decision table in the top event 
model. These are the intermediate dummy event A(DUMMY) and the fault inspection 
error INSP-ERR. The intermediate event combines the faults corrosion CORROSN and 
fatigue. The latter is caused by vibrations VIBRATN and the former an extemal heat 
source EXT-HEAT or water present in the vessel H2o-PRES. The water present fault is 
converted to the variable deviation X 30 HI which is traced back to leaks in the liquid inlet 
pipe or water entering with the liquid chlorine X 1 HI. 
The brittle fracture fault BRITFRAC is made up entirely of basic faults. A brittle fracture 
may be caused by a low temperature LOW-TEMP, which has causes of an extemal cold 
source EXT-COLD or the liquid chlorine flashing in the vessel. 
Causes of the vessel reaching its critical stress are support failure SUP-FAIL or an over 
pressure OVERPRES. The former has a list of five causes under an OR gate. Over 
pressure may be caused by over filling OVR-FILL, which converts to high liquid level in 
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the vessel L 30 HI, or a combination of high pressure P 30 HI ANOed with no relief which 
in tum converts to R 20 NONE. The no relief deviation is traced to the pipe being blocked 
or the bursting disc failing to rupture BO-FT-RP. 
The high level and high pressure deviations are traced to their causes in the normal way 
and present no new synthesis techniques. For this reason only a brief deSCription of their 
causes is given and they are not shown in the figure. 
The high level deviation is traced to high flow of liquid chlorine at the inlet a 3 HI. However, 
high flow is a protectable event by all four trip loops, therefore, the branch is ANOed with 
each trip loop functional failure. The branches are similar to other trip loop failures. 
The high pressure deviation has causes of high level, high temperature, or low or no flow 
in the gas outlet pipe. The gas outlet is manipulated by the control loop so the appropriate 
control loop template is used on each deviation. 
This completes the fault tree for vessel rupture. 
13.5.3 Conclusions 
The AKZO chlorine storage facility illustrates the adaptability of the Faultfinder package 
to produce the kind of fault trees used in hazard assessments. This can be seen by 
comparing the Faultfinderfault tree and the Rijnmond report fault tree. Both trees contain 
various levels of mechanical faults linked together, some of which are eventually traced 
to variable deviations. 
However, it could be argued that by the time the top event has been modelled and entered 
into the computer the fault tree could be developed manually. This suggests that if there 
Is a high degree of interaction between mechanical faults and variable deviations to model 
then there is not much benefit in using an automated approach because the amount of 
effort saved is not great. 
An advantage of using an automated system would be gained if the mechanical faults 
could be kept separate from the variable deviations. These could then be retrieved from 
a file and combined with the top event when constructing the fault tree. Insufficient time 
on this project has not ailowed this Idea to be developed any further. 
The main advantage of using the Faultfinder package is its ability to produced multiple 
fault trees for different top events very quickly and easily once the initial configuration 
data and models have been entered. 
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13.6 British Gas LNG Vaporiser System 
The research into and the development of the Faultfinder package has been supported 
both financially and technically with examples by British Gas. Mullhi, a previous worker, 
studied an example of a butane vaporiser and published a paper (8). In order to 
demonstrate the ease of modelling similar systems a second vaporiser example was put 
forward by British Gas. This time a liquid natural gas (LNG) vaporiser was used. The P 
& I diagram is given In Figure 13.20. 
FUEL GAS 
GAS (~ 
Figure 13.20 - British Gas LNG Vaporiser System 
Uquid natural gas is pumped from storage to the vaporiser. The inlet line contains a 
divider-header combination before the vaporiser. Each leg of the combination contains 
a control valve, however, only one leg contains flow at anyone time. The pneumatic 
signal to the second control valve is vented to the atmosphere by a manually set vent 
valve. The loss of air to the valve causes it to stay shut. 
The flow of LNG to the vaporiser is controlled by a flow rate control loop on the Inlet stream. 
However, should the vaporiser bumers be unable to cope an over-ride temperature 
controller operates. The flow of fuel gas to the bumers Is manipulated by an independent 
temperature controller. Should the control fail a temperature trip system operates to vent 
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the control signal from the control valve on the LNG inlet stream causing the valve to shut. 
As afurther precaution a second temperature trip system has been installed which closes 
a slam shut valve on the LNG inlet stream. This valve can also be closed by an operator 
and Is also connected to a high flow trip which operates on very high flow in the inlet 
stream which may be caused by catastrophic failure of the pipeline. 
Although the two systems are very similar the protection devices operate for different 
reasons. The purpose of the butane vaporiser system is to provide a butane vapour 
supply to supplement the natural gas supply at times of peak demand. A pump, capable 
of delivering liquid butane at 300 psig, supplies a vaporiser rated at 250 psig. Hence the 
function of the protective devices is to prevent the vaporiser from being overpressured. 
In the LNG vaporiser the protection is against liquid entering the exit line, detectable by 
a low temperature in the exit pipeline. 
13.6.1 Configuration And Modelling 
The configuration diagram for the system Is shown in Figure 13.21 (overleaf). 
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All models for this configuration are contained In the unit model library except for the 
vaporiser itself. This model was created using the heat exchanger model generation 
routine. Heat exchanger characteristics were used because the process of buming fuel 
gas to vaporise a process fluid can be reduced to heat transfer between the two streams. 
The temperature of the vaporised gas Is modelled as a function of the inlet flow rate and 
temperature, and the fuel gas inlet flow rate and temperature. 
T20UT= F( -G11N, T1IN, G3IN, T3IN) 
Hence, high flow of LNG or low Inlettemperature of LNG will cause a low exittemperature. 
Also a low flow of bumer fuel or low temperature in the bumer fuel will cause a low exit 
temperature. 
In using a heat exchanger model for the vaporiser the processes of vaporisation and 
buming have been greatly simplified. On the vaporisation side it has been assumed that 
the effect of the phase change on the heat transfer efficiency is relatively constant and 
can be ignored. On the bumer side the process of buming the fuel is again assumed to 
have a constant effect on the heat transfer efficiency and can be ignored. The only change 
to the model is the addition of an event statement which relates bumer failure to low exit 
temperature. 
Although all the other models were contained in the unit model library, some had to be 
altered to take into account improvements in the modelling methodology implemented 
during this project. The main ones were the combined controlltrip valves in the operating 
and closed states and the divider and header models. Details of these changes can be 
found in Section 11.3 and Chapter 10. 
Two points to note about the configuration are the use of a combined control/trip valve 
model and the use of two connections between the vent valve and the combined controlltrip 
valve. The combined model is a control valve model but with the inclusion of trip valve 
faults. However, instead of using trip valve fails open TV-F-OP the control/trip valve faults 
of fails high aperture CTV-F-HA, stuck CTV-STK and low aperture CTV-F-LA are used. 
This was the case in the butane vaporiser example. 
The two connections between the models are required because of the methodology used 
for control loops and trip loops. One connection is for the control signal and one for the 
trip signal. The reasons for this are given in Section 11.3. 
The relay model which sits between the controller models and the controlltrip and control 
valve models is a simple unit which converts an electrical signal to a pneumatic signal. 
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The configuration has three control loops, the flow controller (loop 2), the over-ride 
temperature controller (loop 1) and the fuel gas flow controller (loop 3). The over-ride 
controller is specified first because this is the master loop in a master-slave system. The 
slave loop is the flow controller. 
CONTROL LOOP 
NUMBER: 1 
SENSED VARIABLE: T 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 11 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 6 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL LOOP: 23 24 25 26 27 42 46 
VARIABLE T REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 11 12 13 14 15 16 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 5 7 
LOOP IS NOT OF FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
NUMBER: 2 
SENSED VARIABLE: Q 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 3 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 6 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL LOOP: 17 23 24 25 26 27 42 46 
VARIABLE Q REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 1 2 3 4 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 5 7 
LOOP IS NOT OF FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
NUMBER: 3 
SENSED VARIABLE: T 
VARIABLE SENSED IN UNIT: 14 
CONTROL VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 38 
OTHER UNITS IN CONTROL LOOP: 35 36 37 45 47 
VARIABLET REGULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 11 12 1314 15 16 
FLOW MANIPULATED IN CONNECTIONS: 49 50 51 
LOOP IS NOT OF FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
The link between the controller and the closed control/trip valve is not specified as a control 
loop because under normal operation the valve is closed and the control signal is vented 
to the atmosphere. Therefore, this control loop is not functioning and any failures will not 
affect the system 
The flow control loop is unusual because it has flow as both the regulated and manipulated 
variable. Usually flow is one or the other. For example, in a simple feedback flow control 
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loop, with the sensor and the control valve in the same pipeline, the flow Is, or is treated 
as, regulated and in a simple feedforward control loop between two streams, with the 
sensor and control valve In separate pipelines, the flow is, or is treated as, manipulated. 
In this example, although the sensor and control valve are in the same pipeline, the 
divider-header combination in which the control valve sits acts as a flow transition point. 
Therefore the flow is regulated in streams 1 to 4, which Is where the sensor is situated, 
but the flow is manipulated in the divider-header combination leg, streams 5 and 7. The 
other leg provides a cause for the flow deviation to change. 
The configuration has three open valve trip systems. Again the system connected to the 
closed controVtrip valve Is not specified. The three loops are the low temperature trip to 
the control/trip valve (trip 1), the low temperature trip to the slam shut valve (trip 2) and 
the high flow trip to the slam shut valve (trip 3). 
OPEN VALVE TRIP SYSTEM 
NUMBER: 1 
TRIP VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 6 
OTHER UNITS IN TRIP SYSTEM: 12 27 30 31 32 43 46 
TRIP IS NOT OF FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
NUMBER: 2 
TRIP VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 4 
OTHER UNITS IN TRIP SYSTEM: 13 20 21 33 34 44 
TRIP IS NOT OF FEED FORWARD TYPE 
NUMBER: 3 
TRIP VALVE UNIT NUMBER: 4 
OTHER UNITS IN TRIP SYSTEM: 3 17 18 19 20 21 41 
TRIP IS NOT OF FEEDFORWARD TYPE 
The top event of interest for this configuration is low temperature in the exit pipeline from 
the vaporiser. 
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13.6.2 Fault Tree Synthesis 
The top of the fault tree Is shown in Figure 13.22 . 
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Figure 13.22 • Top Of Fault Tree For Low Temperature 
Temperature in the outlet pipe line Is the regulated variable of control loops 1 and 3. The 
control loop template for loop 1 Is applied first. The misleading faults are those which 
occur after the sensing range of the loops. In this case It Is an extemal cold source at the 
pipe which is also a misleading fault of control loop 3. 
The spontaneous failures of the loops are protectable by trip systems 1 and 2. Therefore, 
the trip functional failures TL·FN·F are ANOed into this branch. Trip 1 is on the control/trip 
valve and has the controiltrip valve open faults whereas trip 2 is on the slam shut valve 
and has the single valve failing to shut fault. It is the no change NCHA deviation which 
is traced for the functional failure branch. The end causes are trip switch stuck, sensor 
stuck, power loss or set point low. 
The control loop failing high and the latent failures branches are traced to the normal 
causes. 
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The sensed variable deviation branch is shown in Figure 13.23. 
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Figure 13.23 - Sensed Variable Deviation Branch For Loop 1 
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This part of the fau It tree shows the application of the control loop template for loop 3. 
The overloading branch traces the causes of no flow of fuel gas. Control loop 3 failing 
with no aperture is identified as a cause of this. Again the spontaneous and latent failures 
branches are straight-forward. 
The sensed variable deviation branch is shown in Figure 13.24. 
This deals with the interaction of the two streams In the vaporiser. Causes of low 
temperature at the outlet are fouling, an extemal cold source or bumer failure. Of the 
variable deviation causes low flow or temperature of the fuel gas supply are identified. 
There is also low temperature of the LNG supply which is traced to low temperature at 
the source. A low temperature through the non-flow leg of the divider-header combination 
must be accompanied by a failure of the controlftrip valve or the manual vent valve. 
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Figure 13.24 - Sensed Variable Deviation Branch For Loop 3 
High flow rate of LNG to the vaporiser may also cause low temperature and this may be 
caused by high flow in the outlet stream. On the other hand it may be caused by high 
flow at the divider-header combination. This branch is continued in Figure 13.25. 
The causes of high flow are high flow in the flow leg or some flow in the non-flow leg. The 
flow leg is manipulated by control loop 2 so the template is applied. The spontaneous 
and latent failures branches are simple and the manipulated variable deviation branch is 
traced to high flow at the source. 
Any flow in the non-flow leg must be ANDed with failure of the control/trip valve or manual 
vent valve. The some flow deviation is traced to high flow at the inlet which is traced to 
high flow at the source. 
This completes the low temperature fault tree for the LNG vaporiser example. 
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Figure 13.25 - High Flow Out Of The Divider-Header Combination 
13.6.3 Conclusions 
The LNG vaporiser example illustrates the relative ease with which it was possible to 
model the system based on the previous butane vaporiser. Although the two had different 
priorities for control, only the actual vaporiser unit Itself required a new model. 
Problems not foreseen in the butane vaporiser example were discovered which resulted 
in improvements in the modelling methodology for dividers, headers and closed valves. 
These dealt primarily with the non-flow leg where the some deviation was involved. To 
prevent the some branch being deleted when the trace exited from the divider-header 
combination it is necessary to change the deviation to high flow. This is explained in 
Section 10.3. No other problems were encountered. 
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13.7 Summary 
The five examples given In this chapter cover the main aspects of the work carried out 
during this project. These are the: 
• modelling relationship of flow and pressure in vessels 
- specification of a vessel model taxonomy 
- creation of a set of vessel model templates 
- creation of a vessel model generation routine 
- creation of a heal exchanger model generation routine 
- improved modelling of dividers, headers and their combinations, especially with 
reference to the non-flow legs 
- Improved modelling of closed valve type units 
- standardisation of the unit model and top event model libraries. 
The following table gives a summary, for each example, ofthe number of units, connections 
and special sUb-systems (control loops, trip loops, divider-header combinations and 
secondary failures), the number of new models required, excluding those requiring 
modifications due to changes in the methodology, and whether either the vessel model 
or heat exchanger model generation routines were used 
Number of 
Generation Routine Uses 
Example Units Connections Sub- New Vessel Heat 
systems Models Exchanger 
13.2 19 22 2 0 0 O· 
13.3 33 36 3 5 3 0 
13.4 55 61 4 3 1 2 
13.5 44 57 5 8 1 0 
13.6 47 59 7 1 0 1 
• The heat exchanger model for the nitric acid cooling system was already contained 
in the model library but could easily be generated using the heat exchangergeneration 
routine. 
Of the seventeen new models developed for these examples, eight were either vessel 
models or heat exchanger models, all of which could be generated automatically. Most 
of the remaining models could be derived from existing models In the library or contained 
very simple modelling. 
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The two additional new models in example 13.3. the reaction vessel charging system. 
were unique to this configuration. One was the modified level sensor which contained 
supplementary event statements to model a hand valve being closed and the effects of 
a partial or complete blockage In the unit. The other model was the pipe tracer unit which 
simply converted a utility signal to an electric current signal. Neither of these models 
posed any difficulties. 
The majority of new models required were in example 13.5. the AKZO chlorine storage 
vessel. This example required seven additional models which had to be developed by 
the user. However. the new models were very closely linked to existing models in the 
library and much of the modelling process could be parallelled with these. The closed 
remotely controlled valve is a closed hand valve with an extra event statement relating 
some signal Input to the valve being open. The blank flange is also based on a closed 
hand valve but Instead of the valve open faults it has flange removed faults. The bursting 
disk model is the same as the relief valve but the faults relate to a disk rather than to a 
valve. The high alarm Is Identical to a trip switch which responds to a high input signal. 
The operator model is unique to this configuration. It has four Inputs. two from the high 
alarm and two from sensors. An output signal is generated if some signal is received 
from the alarms or a high signal is received from the sensors. An event statement relates 
an Incorrect output signal to operator error and a decision table is used to relate no output 
signal when a response is required to an absent operator. The control valve on manual 
has a set of decision tables for each deviation of the signal variable. For an output signal 
to occur there must be an input signal and the controller must be set to automatic. 
The synthesis of the fault trees for these examples has uncovered a few problems in the 
methodology and programming which had gone unnoticed. These included uncertainties 
in the modelling of flow and pressure in vessels. The process works but its application 
to all situations has not been verified. A similar problem was encountered with the trip 
system in example 13.4. the reaction vessel COOling system. When the trip operates some 
of the models change state and it Is not known whether the synthesis procedure deals 
with this correctly. Both these require further Investigation. 
As the number of variables has increased the Index numbers have expanded beyond the 
one digit representation. The configuration and synthesis programs are unable to model 
these as control loop variables (see example 13.4) which restricts the capability of the 
package. Either some extensive re-programming is required or a re-ordering of the 
variable Indices. 
The power of the methodology to adapt to different situations has been demonstrated in 
two ways. First the failure modes of units can be increased without the need to alter the 
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models by using the secondary failures facility (see example 13.3) and secondly it is 
possible to develop complete risk assessment type fault trees with strings of mechanical 
faults linked together simply by using a different top event model (see example 13.5). 
13.8 References 
1. Lapp S. A., Powers G. L.; Computer-Aided Synthesis Of Fault-Trees; IEEE 
Transactions On Reliability; R-26; 1977; pp 2-13. 
2. Mullhi J. S.; Rules For Computer-Aided Synthesis Of FaultTrees For Process Plant; 
PhD Thesis, Loughborough University Of Technology; 1990; pp 10/1-10/19. 
3. Trenchard A. J.; Process Plant Alann Diagnosis Using Synthesised Fault Tree 
Knowledge; PhD Thesis, Loughborough University Of Technology; 1990; pp 
153-183. 
4. Piccinini N., Levy G.; Process Safety Analysis For Better Reactor Cooling System 
Design In The Ethylene Oxide Reactor; Canadian Journal Of Chemical Engineering; 
V 62; 1984; pp 541-546. 
5. Piccinini N., Levy G.; Ethylene Oxide Reactor, Safety According To Operability 
Analysis; Canadian Journal Of Chemical Engineering; V 62; 1984; pp 546-558. 
6. Khan A. R., Hunt A.; The Propagation Of Faults In Process Plants: Integration Of 
Fault Propagation Technology Into Computer-Aided Design; In McGreavy C. (eds.), 
Computer Integrated Process Engineering Conference 1989; pp 35-43. 
7. Risk Analysis Of Six Potentially Hazardous Industrial Objects In The Rijnmond 
Area, A Pilot Study : A Report To The Rijnmond Public Authority; D. Reidel 
Publishing Company; 1982; pp 151-182 
8. Risk Analysis Of Six Potentially Hazardous Industrial Objects In The Rijnmond 
Area, A Pilot Study : A Report To The Rijnmond Public Authority; D. Reidel 
Publishing Company; 1982; pp 491. 
9. Mullhi J. S., Lees F. P.; The Propagation Of Faults In Process Plants: 5. Fault 
Tree Synthesis For A Butane Vaporiser System; Reliability Engineering And System 
Safety, 23; 1988; pp 31-49. 
13-42 
Chapter 14 
Conclusions And Recommendations 
14.1 Introduction 
This thesis has described recent research work carried out on a computer based system 
for fault tree synthesis at Loughborough University. This has formed part of an on·going 
programme of work on the FAUL TFINDER package spanning several years (1 ·5). 
The procedure for fault tree synthesis is: 
1. Decompose the piping and instrumentation (P & I) diagram into a configuration 
diagram consisting of a set of units and the connections between them. 
2. For each unit identify a unit model from the library or create a new model if 
necessary. A unit model is made up of propagation equations, initial event 
statements and modified decision tables which are converted to a minitree format. 
3. Identify all control loops and trip systems. Only the units involved and the variables 
and connections affected are required. 
4. Determine which top event model is to be used. This gives the variable deviation 
or fault of interest. 
5. Synthesise the fault tree using the package. 
6. Use the analysis program to determine the minimum cutsets. 
7. Repeat steps 4 to 6 for different top events. 
The advantage of this methodology is the use of unit models rather than system models 
as a base for fault tree syntheSiS because the items are smaller and, therefore, easier to 
conceive. The models are context independent and can be used in any system 
configuration as necessary. 
Although situated on a DEC Microvax 11 computer system running VMS, the programs 
are portable, with a minimum of alterations, to any other computer system or personal 
computer (PC) with a Fortran compiler. 
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14.2 Conclusions 
A goal in developing this computer package is to make the process of fault tree synthesis 
as simple as possible and one way to achieve this is to make it fully automatic. This 
package has progressed towards this aim and is at a stage where, if all the required 
models are contained in the unit model library, the process is automatic requiring only the 
configuration to be entered. Therefore any work the user has to do centres almost entirely 
on creating new models. The aspect of this project has been to look at the problems of 
having to develop a unit model. The research has been concerned primarily with the 
generation of unit models and, in particular, with the formulation of rules for modelling. 
A technique has been devised to make the initial modelling stages easier. The process 
works by allowing the plant configuration to be broken up into smaller sections which can 
then be studied separately. The advantage of this is to enable the user to identify any 
problem areas in the modelling simply by reducing the size of the synthesised fault tree. 
Once each section is modelled correctly the entire plant can be studied without errors. 
The previous methodology for modelling flow and pressure characteristics in vessel type 
units was not clearly defined and this resulted in various styles of model being used. The 
flow and pressure relationships have been revised and a set of rules formulated. The 
result has been the introduction of a set of core propagation equations based on a 
taxonomy of vessel connections. 
A change in the methodology was necessary since vessels had been identified as the 
most likely unit to require a new model. A further step in the enhancement of the user 
friendliness of the modelling aspect has been the development of a model generation 
routine for vessels. This is an interactive facility which can be called up by the user when 
a new vessel unit needs to be created. The methodology is based on the rules identified 
for vessels. A set of vessel model templates has been produced simultaneously as a 
comparison for the generation routine and as an additional aid. A set of edit instructions 
for these is given so the user can tailor the model to their own requirements. 
Another class of models which vary considerably is heat exchangers. Using the rules for 
vessel models coupled with a similar set involving heat transfer a generation routine for 
heat exchangers has been developed. It is an interactive facility requiring information 
available on a P&l diagram. The routine has been used to create six example heat 
exchanger models for use as a reference base. 
A smaller quantity of work has been carried out investigating the rules for modelling 
reaction vessels. These are also varied and as such will usually be unique to a particular 
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plant. Hence it is necessary to provide some user aids for their development. A set of 
rules based on a broad outline of considerations has been presented and two example 
reaction vessels have been created. 
Much of the work on rule development has been based on trials with examples from the 
literature. This has revealed limitation in the synthesis methodology which has been 
corrected where possible. These Include further revisions to the modelling of dividers, 
headers and associated units within their combinations and control and trip systems. 
Dividers and headers, when combined, form information loops within the plant 
configuration. A previous worker (5) developed a system to automatically identify such 
units based on a single model for a divider and one for a header. However, the single 
models were inadequate for modelling both flow legs and non-flow legs. The models 
have been amended to enable a correct modelling approach. 
The associated units within divider-header combinations refer particularty to closed valve 
type units usually found in the non-flow branch. The models have been altered to correctly 
model the some flow deviation and the valve open faults. However, further attention is 
required on this aspect. 
Control loops of various types and complexities are correctly modelled by the package. 
However, the effect of having an over-determined control system was unknown. These 
systems have more control relationships than control variables. An Investigation has been 
carried out and it has been concluded that over-determined control loops do not pose any 
problems. 
Further work has looked at combined controlltrip valve systems. These are protective 
systems which have a single valve for both control and trip operation. This has posed 
problems in the past with mutually exclusive events appearing in the fault tree and attempts 
have been made to remedy them. The solutions were incomplete but an investigation 
has shown that while the events remain in the fault tree the cutset analysis program can 
deal with them and mutually exclusive events do not appear In the minimum cutsets. 
However, this has been identified as an area requiring further attention. 
The adaptability of the methodology to produce fault trees for different situations has been 
investigated. The basic format is a fault tree with vartable deviations for transmissive 
events and basic faults for terminal events. However, fault trees used in hazard 
assessment techniques not only model deviations in plant variables but also mechanical 
and design faults. These faults may in tum be caused by variable deviations. Hazard 
assessments are important because they form part of the safety case for a formal safety 
assessment of any hazardous location. Such locations include storage facilities and 
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pumping stations. A technique has been developed which enables mechanical faults to 
be linked together and has been achieved by incorporating them into the top event model 
rather than the unit model. 
Other work has been carried out improving the capabilities and user friendliness of the 
programs. This includes increases in the acceptable sizes of the unit models and system 
configurations and an increase in the possible size of a fault tree. This has been possible 
through advances in computer hardware facilities. The user friendliness of the programs 
has been increased with the addition of answer options presented to the user at the 
prompts for information. 
14.3 Recommendations For Future Work 
The FAULTFINDER package has been shown to be versatile with an ability to cope with 
many plant configurations. However, improvements have been identified which may 
enhance the capabilities of the package but have not been implemented due to the time 
limit on this project. The recommendations fall into six categories: new methodology; 
programming of methodology already developed; rationalisation of programmed 
methodology; improved program structure, improved software compatibility and improved 
software presentation. 
Sections of the methodology which need to be defined are: 
- The handling of divider-header combinations with more than two parallel legs of 
which one has no flow ego three pumps in parallel with one on standby (see Section 
10.6). 
- The search procedure for the automatic identification of control loops (see Section 
4.5.2). 
- The search procedure for the automatic identification of trip systems (see Section 
4.5.2). 
Sections of the methodology which need to be programmed are: 
- The effects of control loop overload in the control loop template methodology (4). 
- The simplification of the fiow capacity definitions for the divider-header combinations 
by implementing a routine to identify divider-header pairs such that the flow capacity 
in adjoining legs automatically get the same value (see Section 10.2.3 and 10.5). 
Sections of the programmed methodology which need to be rationalised are: 
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- The treatment of non-flow legs In divider-header combinations and in particular the I 
consistency checking of AND gates with respect to closed valves (see Section 
10.3.2). 
The synthesis process involving combined controlltrip valves and in particular the 
effect of mutually exclusive events (see Section 11.3). 
Improvements which need to be Implemented into the programs are: 
- The re-ordering of the variable indices such that all variables affected by control and 
trip systems can be defined proper1y. This requires considerable program 
Investigation because many of the rules are written into the program code (see 
Section 13.4.1). 
- A feasibility study into increasing the number of ports on a unit from 9 to double 
figures. Again considerable program investigation is required (see Section 7.3.1 
and 8.3.1). 
- The re-ordering of the fault event library list to use the new ordered format. Again 
considerable program investigation is required (see Section 5.4). 
- The re-ordering of the unit model library list to use the new format. All of the worked 
examples will have to be converted (see Section 5.6). 
Improvements to the compatibility are: 
- The linking to a CAD system to enable the configuration to be derived from a computer 
generated P&l diagram (see Section 4.5.3). 
Improvements to the presentation are: 
- The adoption of a PC based version considering the widespread acceptance of these 
machines. This is possible because the disk space and memory requirements are 
not large. 
- The program interface is in basic text format and should be improved possibly with 
the adoption of a PC windows system and a menu driven response format. 
- The programs themselves have had Improvements added to them and been edited 
in an unstructured way which, over many years, has resulted in an opaque mass. 
They would greatly benefit from a rewrite and even a conversion from Fortran to a 
quicker programming language. 
Currently there are no problems Imposed by the dimensionality aspects programmed into. 
the code such as the number of connections affected by a control loop (Section 4.4.4). 
However, at a later date this may not be true. The restrictions are embedded in the code 
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and are indicative of the Fortran program language. Conversion to another language 
which does not use an array type structure for data storage would be advantageous in 
this situation. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A 
System Decomposition And Data Input 
A,1 Break Point Subroutine 
SUBROUTINE BREAK (DATFIL) 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Subroutine to collect data on which units become dummy heads, 
C which become dummy tails and which are Ignored completely when 
C setting up break points in a configuration. 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
INTEGER PMAX,TOPOL(400,20),STREA(SOO,30),HEAD(lS),TAIL(lS), 
, CONTRIP(30,S),PPEF(20,10),MFEF(20,S),NDATA(20) 
COMMONIDATA1/NUN,NST,PMAX,NHEAD,NTAIL,NDH,NLOOP,NZTRP, 
, NTRIP,NMF,NPP 
COMMON/ARRAYlfTOPOL,STREA,HEAD,TAIL,CONTRIP ,PPEF,MFEF ,NDATA 
INTEGER HD,TL,DUD,NEWHD(30),NEWTL(30),REDUN(100),ANSWER 
CHARACTER DATFIL'10,BRKFIL'10,OPT'4 
FORMAT(/,' ',A,' 7 ',$) 
2 FORMAT(/,' ',A) 
3 FORMAT(",A,' ',$) 
4 FORMAT(2014) 
5 FORMAT(/,' ',A,A) 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Is data read in from terminal or from file. 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT3,'IS THE DATA ENTRY FROM TERMINAL OR FILE, T/F 7' 
OPT='TF' 
IF(ANSWER(OPl).EQ.l)THEN 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Read in from file DATFIUf.BPT' 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BRKFIl=DA TFIL(l :LENGTH(DA TFIL))/f .BPT 
OPEN(UNIT =S,FILE='[.RESUL TS],/IBRKFIL,STATU5='OLD' ,ERR=SOO) 
READ(S,4,ERR=SSO)HD,TL,DUD 
READ(S,4,ERR=600)(NEWHD(I),I.l,HD) 
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READ(5.4.ERR=650)(NEWTL(I).1=1.TL) 
READ(5.4.ERR=700)(REDUN(I).1=1.DUD) 
CLOSE(5) 
PRINT·:BREAK POINT DATA TRANSFERRED.' 
ELSE 
C •••••••••••••••••••.•••••••.•••••• - ••••••••••••••••.••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••• - •.•••••• 
C Read in data from terminal. 
C ••••..•••••.••••••.••••..•••••.•.•••• - ..••••••••.•••••..••••••...•••••... - ••• - •.•.••••... 
PRINT2:BREAK POINT UNITS THAT BECOME DUMMY HEADS OR TAILS MUST' 
PRINT"'ONL Y HAVE TWO PORTS. AN INLET AND AN OUTLET PORT.' 
C ........................................................................................... . 
C Read in new dummy head units. 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - •••••••• - ••••••••••••••••• - ••••••••••••••••• - ••••••••••• 
50 PRINTl :NUMBER OF NEW DUMMY HEADS (UP TO 30)' 
READ(· ... ERR.50)HD 
IF(HD.NE.O)THEN 
60 PRINT3:ENTER LIST OF UNITS SEPARATED BY COMMAS;' 
READ(·.·.ERR=60)(NEWHD(I).1=1.HD) 
ENDlF 
C .•••••.••••••.. - ••••.••• - •••.••• --•••••••..•••• - •...••••.....••••••..•••••••...••••••. 
C Read in new dummy tail units. 
C •••.••••••••••••..•••••••.••••••.•.••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••...••••••••.•••••••••.•• 
70 PRINTl :NUMBER OF NEW DUMMY TAILS (UP TO 30)' 
READ(· ... ERR=70)TL 
IF(TL.NE.O)THEN 
BO PRINT3:ENTER LIST OF UNITS SEPARATED BY COMMAS;' 
READ(·.· .ER R=BO)(NEWTL(I).I=l.TL) 
ENDIF 
C ........................................................................................... . 
C Read in redundant units. 
C •••••••..••••••••••••••..•••••••.•••••••..••••••••••••••••.•• - •••••..••••••••••••••••....•• 
90 PRINT1:NUMBER OF REDUNDANT UNITS (UP TO 100)' 
READ(·. ·.ERR=90)DUD 
IF(DUD.NE.O)THEN 
100 PRINT3:ENTER LIST OF UNITS SEPARATED BY COMMAS;' 
READ(· ".ERR=l OO)(REDUN(I).I=l.DUD) 
ENDIF 
C ••••••• - .••••••..••••••••.•••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••• 
C Write data to file DATFIUr.BPT'. 
C •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - •••••• 
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BRKFlLooDATFIL(1 :LENGTH (DA TFIL))// .BPT 
OPEN (UNIT E5,FILE='[.RESUL TS),/IBRKFIL,STA TU5='UNKNOWN' ,ERR=500) 
WRITE(5,4)HD,TL,DUD 
WRITE(5,4)(NEWHD(I),1=1,HD) 
WRITE(5,4)(NEWTL(I),1=1,TL) 
WRITE(5,4)(REDUN(I),1=1,DUD) 
CLOSE(5) 
PRINT5,'DATA WRlmN TO FILE ',BRKFIL 
ENDIF 
C •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C Set the new library reference number of new dummy heads, 
C add connection number to the HEAD array and reset outlet 
C port number to 1. Set the incoming connections end unit 
C number to zero and reset inlet port number to 2. 
C •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
IF(HD.NE.O)THEN 
DO 150,1=1 ,HO 
TOPOL(NEWHD(I),1 )=6 
NHEAD=NHEAD+1 
DO 150,JE1 ,NST 
IF(STREA(J,1 ).EO.NEWHD(I))THEN 
HEAD(NHEAD)=J 
STREA(J,2)=1 
ENDIF 
IF(STREA(J,3).EO.NEWHD(I»THEN 
STREA(J ,3)=0 
STREA(J,4)=2 
ENDIF 
150 CONTINUE 
ENDIF 
C ••••••••••••.•.••••••••...••••• - ••••••••••••• - ••••....••••••••••.....••••••••••.....• - ••• 
C Set the new library reference number of new dummy tails and 
C add connection number to the TAIL array. Set the outgoing 
C connections start unit number to zero. 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
IF(TL.NE.O)THEN 
DO 200,1=1 ,TL 
TOPOL(NEWTL(I),1):7 
NTAIL=NTAIL+1 
DO 200,J=1 ,NST 
IF(STREA(J,3).EO.NEWTL(I)) TAIL(NT AIL)=J 
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IF(STREA(J,l).EQ.NEWTL(I)) STREA(J,l )=0 
200 CONTINUE 
ENDIF 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Set the library reference number of redundant units to zero. 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF(DUD.NE.O)THEN 
DO 250,1=1 ,DUD 
250 TOPOL(REDUN(Q,l)=O 
ENDIF 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Reset the numbers of dummy heads and tails in the NDATA 
C array and retum. 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NDATA(3)=NHEAD 
NDATA(4)=NTAIL 
RETURN 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Error trapping section. 
C -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
500 PRINT5:CAN NOT OPEN FILE' ,DATFIL 
GOT01000 
550 PRINT5:CAN NOT READ FIRST LINE IN FILE ',DATFIL 
GOTO 1000 
600 PRINT5:CAN NOT READ DUMMY HEADS IN FILE ',DATFIL 
GOTO 1000 
650 PRINT5,'CAN NOT READ DUMMY TAILS IN FILE ',DATFIL 
GOTO 1000 
700 PRINT5,'CAN NOT READ REDUNDANT UNITS IN FILE ',DATFIL 
1000 CALL EXIT 
END 
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Appendix B 
Fault And Unit Library 
B.1 Fault And Event Library List 
The list consists of sixty two rows of eight names and one row of four names. This is the 
format used in the program data file. There is a total of five hundred possible fault and 
event names. Names are limited to eight characters in length and a translations of most 
of the abbreviations can be found in Tables 5.3 and 5.4. 
The numbering system for the fault and event index goes from left to right one row at a 
time. The rows are numbered to help identify the index of a particular fault or event. 
The ,-------, is used to indicate a poSition which is not in current use. 
1 A(DUMMy) B(DUMMY) C(DUMMy) D(DUMMY) E(DUMMY) F(DUMMy) G(DUMMY) H(DUMMY) 
2DUMMY1 DUMMY2 DUMMY3 OUMMY4 DUMMY5 DUMMY6 DUMMY7 DUMMY8 
3DUMMY9 DUMMY10 DUMMY11 DUMMY12 DUMMY13 DUMMY14 DUMMY15 DUMMY16 
4 INTERNAL EXTERNAL ENABUNG BRANCH LEAKAGE BLOCKAGE COMPLOOP ----_. 
5 HI-FLOW LO·FLOW NO·FLOW HI·PRESS LO·PRESS NO·PRESS 
6 SEQ·ABRT SEQ·F·AF SEQ·F·AT NORMAL IMPOSS OTH·CAUS 
7 CL·F·HA CL·HA CL·F·NA CL·STK TL·FN·F TL-OR·F 
8 LK·LP·EN LK·HP·EN PART·BLK COMp·BLK EXT·HEAT EXT·COLD INT·LK 
9 HV·D·SH HV·F·SH HV·FT·SH HV·D·OP HV·F-OP HV·FT-OP 
10 SV·D·SH SV·F·SH SV·FT·SH SV·D-OP SV·F-OP SV·FT-OH 
11 RCV·D·SH RCV·F·SH RCV·FT·S RCV·D-OP RCV·F-OP RCV·FT-O 
12 CV·D·SH CV·F·SH CV·FT·SH CV·D-OP CV·F-OP CV·FT-OP 
13 CV·F·HA CV·HA CV·F·NA CV·STK CV·F·VL CV·F·NM 
14 TV·D·SH TV·F·SH TV·FT·SH TV·D-OP TV·F-OP TV·FT-OP 
15 3WV·D·SH 3WV·F·SH 3WV·FT·S 3WV·D·OP 3WV·F-OP 3WV·FT-O 
16 3WV·F·HA 3WV·F·LA 3WV·F·NA 3WV·STK 
17 CTV·D·SH CTV·F·SH CTV·FT·S CTV·D-OP CTV·F-OP CTV·FT -0 
18 CTV·F·HA CTV·F·LA CTV·F·NA CTV·STK 
19 ESV·D·SH ESV·F·SH ESV·FT·S ESV·D-OP ESV·F-OP ESV·FT-O 
20 RV·D·SH RV·F·SH RV·FT·SH RV·O·OP RV·F-OP RV·FT-OP RV·UNDSZ 
21 W·D·SH W·F·SH W·FT·SH W·D-OP W·F-OP W·FT-OP 
22 NRV·F·SH NRV·FT·S NRV·F-OP NRV·FT-O 
23 SMP·FT·S SMp·D-OP SMP·F-OP 
24 GOV·D·SH GOV·F·SH GOV·FT·S GOV·D-OP GOV·F-OP GOV·FT-O 
25 PRV·D·SH PRV·F·SH PRV·FT·S PRV·D-OP PRV·F-OP PRV·FT-O 
26 BD·FT-OP BD·FT·RP BD·UNDSZ BD·RUPT 
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27 BLK·FAIL BLK·REM 
28 CNT·F·HI CNT·F·LO CNT·STK CNT·MAN CNT·F·VL CNT·F·NM 
29 TSW·F-ON TSW·F-OF TSW·STK TSW·DIS ACT·F-ON ACT·F-OF ACT·STK 
30 Op·FN·F OP-OR·F OP·ERROR OP-OVLD Op·ABSNT 
31 COM·FN·F COM-OR·F COMp·ERR COM-OVLD 
32 SEL·PC SEL·PCO SEL·PCH SEL·PLVC SEL·PCL SEL·VC SEL·BROK 
33SW·AT·P3 SW·BROKN 
34 REL·F-ON REL·F-OF REL·STK 
35 SEN·F·HI SEN·F-LO SEN·STK 
36 ALM·F-ON ALM·F-OF ALM·DIS ALM·FAIL AL·BROKN 
37SIG·PB SIG·CB 
38 SET·P·HI SET·P·LO 
39 UTILLOSS POW·LOSS STM·LOSS IAR·LOSS 
40 PAR·LOSS ING·LOSS NIT·LOSS CWT·LOSS PWT·LOSS VAC·LOSS 
41 FWT·LOSS C02·LOSS FOAMLOSS FFS-FAIL SPRINK·F 
42 UTIL-OK AIR-OK POWER-OK PRESS-OK CL·IS-OK 
43 POWER·HI POWER·LO POWER-ON POWER-OF 
44 SHUTDOWN STARTUP FT·ST·UP 
45IMPLR·F FAN·BRKN AIR·LOCK CAVITATN PUMp·SUR RACING W·HAMMER --
46 FOULING VAP·BLKT FLOODING FROTHING CAT·DETN POOR·MIX INT·EXPL RAP·RCTN 
47 RAP·FLSH HEATFAIL I·HEAT·F I·COOL·F OV·HT·TK H20·PRES 
48 CORROSN FATIGUE BRITFRAC VIBRATN LOW·TEMP FLASHING 
49 FLAM·MIX FIRE·IGN ELEC-SPK EXT·FIRE MAJ·FIRE 
SO SUP·FAIL OV·ST·SP OV·LOAD OVR·FILL CRIT·STR OVERPRES 
51 DESN·ERR INSp·ERR MECH·DEF 
52 E-OUAKE SUBSDNCE L·SUDE VHI·WIND EXT·IMP AIR·IMP VEH·IMP EXT·EXPL 
531S0LATN SYS·ISOL 
54 NO·TORCH NO·SPARK NO·PILOT NO·BURNR NORELIEF 
55INSUF·PU PR·PURGE P·FL·STA P·X·UT T·FL·LT PR·FL·ST PR·X·LT TOR·NUT 
56 T·N·INS THV·B·IN THVB-OUT PIL·NLIT PIL·LIT 
57--
58 _.-
59 _.-_. 
60--
61 --
62--
63--
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B.2 Unit Model Library List 
This Is a list of unit names that should make up the unit model library. It Is not a 
comprehensive list but has been compiled to give as many types of unit that may be found 
in a process plant. 
The models with a '#' are those which are currently contained in the library. 
1 PROCESS AIR SUPPLY 
2 PROCESS STEAM SUPPLY 
3 PROCESS WATER SUPPLY 
4 # PROCESS NITROGEN SUPPLY 
5 COOLING WATER SUPPLY 
6 FIRE WATER SUPPLY 
7 FUEL GAS SUPPLY 
8 INERT GAS SUPPLY 
10 # INSTRUMENT AIR SUPPLY 
11 # ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLY 
12 # STEAM POWER SUPPLY 
15 # STEAM TURBINE FOR POWER SUPPLY 
20 # DRAIN 
21 # VENT STACK 
22 # FLARE RELIEF STACK 
25 # VACUUM UNIT 
30 # DUMMY HEAD 
31 # DUMMY TAIL 
32 # SHORT LENGTH OF PIPE 
33 # LONG LENGTH OF PIPE 
34 # DIVIDER (2 OUTPUTS) 
35 # HEADER (2 INPUTS) 
40 # BINARY MIXER (2 INPUTS) 
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50 # CONTROL VALVE (FAILS OPEN) 
51 # CONTROL VALVE (FAILS CLOSED) 
52 3·WAY CONTROL VALVE (FAILS OPEN) 
53 # 3·WAY CONTROL VALVE (FAILS CLOSED) 
60 # TRIP VALVE (OPEN, FAILS OPEN) 
61 # TRIP VALVE (OPEN, FAILS CLOSED) 
62 TRIP VALVE (CLOSED, FAILS OPEN) 
63 # TRIP VALVE (CLOSED, FAILS CLOSED) 
70 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN VALVE (OPEN, FAILS CLOSED) 
71 EMERGENCY SHUTDOWN VALVE (CLOSED, FAILS OPEN) 
72 # VENT VALVE (OPEN) 
73 # VENT VALVE (CLOSED) 
74 COMBINED CONTROUTRIP VALVE (OPERATING, FAILS OPEN) 
75 COMBINED CONTROUTRIP VALVE (OPEN) 
76 # COMBINED CONTROUTRIP VALVE (OPERATING, FAILS CLOSED) 
77 # COMBINED CONTROUTRIP VALVE (CLOSED) 
78 # MANUAL VENT VALVE (OPEN) 
79 MANUAL VENT VALVE (CLOSED) 
80 # PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE 
81 # HAND VALVE (OPEN) 
82 # HAND VALVE (CLOSED) 
83 # REMOTELY CONTROLLED VALVE (OPEN) 
84 # REMOTELY CONTROLLED VALVE (CLOSED) 
85 # SOLENOID VALVE (OPEN) 
86 SOLENOID VALVE (CLOSED) 
87 # PRESSURE REDUCING VALVE 
88 # GOVERNOR VALVE 
89 EXCESS FLOW VALVE 
90 # NON·RETURN VALVE 
100 # LOCAL SENSOR 
101 # SAMPLE POINT 
102 # FLUSHING LINK 
103 # DRAIN POINT 
104 IN·LlNE FILTER 
105 STEAM TRAP 
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106 # BLANK FLANGE 
107 # BURSTING DISC 
108 # ORIFICE PLATE 
115 # MUL TI·PURPOSE PIPE MOUNTED SENSOR 
116 # MUL TI·PURPOSE DEAD LEG SENSOR 
117 # MULTI·PURPOSE VESSEL MOUNTED SENSOR 
118 POTENTIOMETER ON VALVE STEM 
119 # DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSDUCER 
125 # ELECTRIC CABLE 
126 INSTRUMENT AIR PIPE 
127 # I/P TRANSDUCER 
128 P/I TRANSDUCER 
129 # TRIP ACTIVATOR 
130 # ELECTRICAL RELAY 
131 # SIGNALSPLlTIER (2 OUTPUTS) 
132 # VESSEL PORT SPLlTIER (2 OUTPUTS) 
133 # SIGNAL HEADER (2 INPUTS) 
134 # HIGH SIGNAL SELECTOR (2 INPUTS) 
135 # LOW SIGNAL SELECTOR (2 INPUTS) 
136 # SET POINT UNIT 
137 # PROCESS OPERATOR 
138 PROCESS CONTROL COMPUTER 
139 # HIGH ALARM 
140 # LOW ALARM 
141 VARIABLE RESISTOR 
145 # PRESSURE CONTROL AND OVER·RIDE CONTROL SELECTOR 
150 # CONTROLLER (DIRECT ACTING) 
151 # CONTROLLER (REVERSE ACTING) 
152 # CASCADE CONTROLLER (DIRECT/DIRECn 
153 # CASCADE CONTROLLER (DIRECT/REVERSE) 
154 CASCADE CONTROLLER (REVERSE/DIRECT) 
155 # CASCADE CONTROLLER (REVERSE/REVERSE) 
156 # DOUBLE OUTPUT CONTROLLER (DIRECT/REVERSE) 
157 # CONTROLLER ON MANUAL 
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165 # TRIP SWITCH (1/1 HIGH) 
166 # TRIP SWITCH (1/1 LOW) 
167 # TRIP SWITCH (111 NONE) 
168 TRIP SWITCH (1/2 HIGH) 
169 # TRIP SWITCH (1/2 LOW) 
170 TRIP SWITCH (112 NONE) 
171 TRIP SWITCH (1/3 HIGH) 
172 TRIP SWITCH (1/3 LOW) 
173 TRIP SWITCH (113 NONE) 
174 # TRIP SWITCH (213 HIGH) 
175 TRIP SWITCH (213 LOW) 
176 TRIP SWITCH (213 NONE) 
190 FLOW SWITCH 
191 # PRESSURE SWITCH 
192 TEMPERATURE SWITCH 
193 LEVEL SWITCH 
194 LIMIT SWITCH FOR VALVE 
200 RECIPROCATING COMPRESSOR (RUNNING) 
201 RECIPROCATING COMPRESSOR (STOPPED) 
202 CENTRIFUGAL COMPRESSOR (RUNNING) 
203 CENTRIFUGAL COMPRESSOR (STOPPED) 
204 RECIPROCATING PUMP (RUNNING) 
205 RECIPROCATING PUMP (STOPPED) 
206 # CENTRIFUGAL PUMP (RUNNING) 
207 # CENTRIFUGAL PUMP (STOPPED) 
208 # CENTRIFUGAL PUMP WITH WATER SEAL (RUNNING) 
209 # CENTRIFUGAL PUMP WITH WATER SEAL (STOPPED) 
220 # HEAT EXCHANGER (S&T/FT, HEATING SHELUAIR SIDE) 
221 # HEAT EXCHANGER (S&T, HEATING TUBE SIDE) 
222 HEAT EXCHANGER (F&P/DP, HEATING FRAME/OUT- SIDE) 
223 HEAT EXCHANGER (F&P/DP, HEATING PLATE/IN- SIDE) 
224 # HEAT EXCHANGER (PARTIAL CONDENSER, S&T, COOLING SHELLSIDE) 
225 # HEAT EXCHANGER (CONDENSER, S&T, COOLING SHELL SIDE) 
226 HEAT EXCHANGER (CONDENSER, S&T/FT, COOLING TUBE SIDE) 
227 HEAT EXCHANGER (CONDENSER, F&P/DP, COOLING FRAME/OUT-
SIDE) 
228 # HEAT EXCHANGER (CONDENSER, F&P/DP, COOLING PLATE/IN- SIDE) 
229 HEAT EXCHANGER (PARTIAL REBOILER, S&T, HEATING SHELL SIDE) 
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230 HEAT EXCHANGER (REBOILER, S&T, HEATING SHELL SIDE) 
231 # HEAT EXCHANGER (REBOILER, S&T, HEATING TUBE SIDE) 
232 HEAT EXCHANGER (REBOILER, F&P/DP, HEATING FRAME/OUT- SIDE) 
233 HEAT EXCHANGER (REBOILER, F&P/DP, HEATING PLATE/IN- SIDE) 
235 # HEAT EXCHANGER (CONDENSER, RELIEF, S&T, 7 PORTS) 
245 PIPE HEATER 
246 BOILER 
247 VAPORISER 
248 FURNACE 
249 BURNER 
250 # ELECTRICAL VAPORISER 
251 # BGAS BUTANE VAPORISER 
252 # BGAS LNG VAPORISER 
253 # BGAS LNG VAPORISER (NO FUEL GAS LIMITATION) 
270 # TEMPLATE VESSEL MODEL (OPEN, LIQUID) 
271 # TEMPLATE VESSEL MODEL (CLOSED, LIQUID) 
272 # TEMPLATE VESSEL MODEL (PRESSURISED, GAS) 
273 # TEMPLATE VESSEL MODEL (VACUUM, GAS) 
274 # TEMPLATE VESSEL MODEL (PRESSURISED, GAS AND LIQUID) 
280 STORAGE VESSEL (PRESSURISED, GAS) 
281 STORAGE VESSEL (FLOATING ROOF, GAS) 
282 STORAGE VESSEL (OPEN, LIQUID) 
283 STORAGE VESSEL (OPEN, FIXED ROOF, LIQUID) 
284 STORAGE VESSEL (OPEN, FLOATING ROOF, LIQUID) 
285 STORAGE VESSEL (PRESSURISED, LIQUID) 
290 # VESSEL MODEL FOR OLEFIN DIMERISATION PLANT 
291 # VESSEL MODEL FOR LAWLEY PIPELINE 
292 # AMMONIA SPHERE 
293 # AKZO CHLORINE STORAGE VESSEL 
310 STORAGE SILO FOR SOLIDS 
311 CONTAINMENT HOPPER FOR SOLIDS 
312 POWER CYLINDER FOR SOLIDS 
313 SCREW FEEDER AND MOTOR 
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314 FEEDER BELT AND MOTOR FOR SOLIDS 
315 CONVEYOR BELT FOR SOLIDS 
316 GRINDING MILL 
320 REACTION VESSEL (TUBULAR, GAS) 
321 REACTION VESSEL (TUBULAR, LIQUID) 
322 REACTION VESSEL (CONTINUOUS STIRRED TANK) 
323 REACTION VESSEL (PACKED BED, GAS) 
324 REACTION VESSEL (PACKED BED, LIQUID) 
325 REACTION VESSEL (FLUIDISED BED, GAS) 
326 REACTION VESSEL (FLUIDISED BED, LIQUID) 
327 REACTION VESSEL (CATALYTIC GAUZE, GAS) 
328 REACTION VESSEL (SEMI-BATCH, FILLING) 
329 REACTION VESSEL (SEMI-BATCH, REACTING) 
330 REACTION VESSEL (SEMI-BATCH, EMPTYING) 
331 REACTION VESSEL (BATCH, FILLING) , 
332 REACTION VESSEL (BATCH, REACTING) , 
333 REACTION VESSEL (BATCH, EMPTYING) 
340 # ETHENE-OXIDE REACTION VESSEL (SHELL AND TUBE) 
350 ABSORPTION COLUMN (PACKED) 
351 ABSORPTION COLUMN (PLATE) 
352 ADSORPTION COLUMN 
353 WET SCRUBBER (GAS-LIQUID) 
354 WET SCRUBBER (GAS-SOLID) 
355 STEAM STRIPPER (LIQUID-GAS) 
356 STEAM STRIPPER (LIQUID-LIQUID) 
357 DISTILLATION COLUMN (SUPER-HEATED VAPOUR FEED) 
358 # DISTILLATION COLUMN (SATURATED VAPOUR FEED) 
359 DISTILLATION COLUMN (BOILING LIQUID FEED) 
360 DISTILLATION COLUMN (SUB-COOLED LIQUID FEED) 
361 RECTIFYING COLUMN 
362 STRIPPING COLUMN 
363 DECANTING VESSEL 
364 ION EXCHANGER 
365 FLASH DRUM 
366 HYDROCYCLONE 
367 CYCLONE 
368 FILTER (GAS-SOLID) 
369 FILTER (LIQUID-SOLID) 
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370 ELECTROSTATIC PRECIPITATOR 
371 THICKENER/CLARIFIER 
372 CENTRIFUGE 
373 ROTARY DRIER 
374 EVAPORATOR (CONCENTRATING) 
375 EVAPORATOR (CRYSTALISING) 
400 # BVD2 E1 COLUMN SECTION 
410 # BGAS BURNER (SHUTDOWN) 
411 # BGAS BURNER (START UP) 
412 # BGAS BURNER (RUN CONDITION) 
413 # BGAS TORCH VALVE (CLOSED) 
414 # BGAS TORCH VALVE (LIT) 
415 # BGAS PILOT BURNER (LIGHTING MAIN BURNER) 
416 # BGAS PILOT BURNER (RUN CONDITION) 
417 # BGAS FLAME DETECTOR 
418 # BGASFAN 
419 # BGAS FLAME DETECTOR (AUTO) 
420 # BGAS AUTO PILOT BURNER (START UP) 
421 # BGAS AUTO PILOT BURNER (RUNNING) 
422 # BGAS AUTO MAIN BURNER (BEING LIT) 
423 # BGAS AUTO MAIN BURNER (RUNNING) 
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Appendix C 
Vessel Model Templates 
C.1 Open Vessel Model Template 
This is a liquid storage vessel which is open to the atmosphere. All the port openings are 
assumed to be below the liquid surface because this is the normal design procedure for 
preventing electrostatic build up. The first four ports are inlet ports, the second four are 
outlet ports and the ninth port is the vessel port. 
Port 1 normally has flow and is connected to a running pump with no pressure effects. 
The pump is defined as a reciprocating pump. Reverse flow Is allowed because a leak 
In the piping from the pump will cause liquid to run out of the vessel through this port. 
Port 2 is defined as connected to a running, high pressure centrifugal pump which is not 
affected by the vessel pressure. Ports 3 and 4 are the same as ports 1 and 2, respectively, 
except that the pumps for these two are not running and a closed valve is connected to 
it so there is no flow. 
The port 5 outlet is not affected by the vessel pressure and the pump is defined as a 
reciprocating pump. Since the vessel is open to the atmosphere a leak in the pipe-work 
for this port will result in liquid running out of the vessel in the normal direction of flow. 
For reverse flow to occur liquid must pass through the pump in the wrong direction. In 
the assumptions it has been noted that reverse flow through a reCiprocating pump is 
impossible, therefore, this port cannot sustain reverse flow. Port 6 is not connected to a 
pump and flow occurs under gravity so is affected by the vessel pressure. Port 7 is the 
same as port 5 except the pump is not running and a closed valve is connected so there 
is no flow. Port 8 is the same as port 6 except a closed valve prevents liquid flowing out 
of it. 
The entire model is shown on the following pages. 
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1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
90 TEMPLATE VESSEL MODEL (LIQUID, OPEN) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 27 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 36 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 26 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 11 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
USE THIS MODEL TO DEVELOP YOUR OWN MODELS OR USE IT AS IT IS. 
PORTS CAN BE REMOVED IF SO DESIRED BY FOLLOWING THIS EXAMPLE. 
IF PORT 2 IS NOT REQUIRED, DELETE PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 5 TO 8. DELETE THE G21N, 
T21N AND X2IN TERMS FROM EQUATIONS 33, 35 AND 36 RESPECTIVELY. DELETE EVENT 
STATEMENTS 3 AND 4. DELETE THE G21N NONE, R2IN NONE, G21N REV AND R21N REV TERMS 
FROM EVENT STATEMENTS 16 AND 17. DELETE THE G21N SOME AND R2IN SOME TERMS FROM 
EVENT STATEMENT 23. WHEN THE G21N NONE TERM IS REMOVED FROM THE FIRST DECISION 
TABLE THIS LEAVES ONE ELEMENT SO DELETE THE DECISION TABLE AND ADD V G11N NONE: 
C(DUMMY) TO THE LIST OF EVENT STATEMENTS. 
ALTER THE NUMBERS FOR THE NUMBER OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS, EVENT STATEMENTS 
AND DECISION TABLES AS NECESSARY AT THE TOP OF THE MODEL. 
HAVING CHANGED THE MODEL IT MUST BE GIVEN A NEW FILE NAME AND CORRESPONDING 
MODEL NUMBER. 
IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE PORT NUMBERS BUT ENSURE THE CORRECT PORT 
NUMBERS ARE GIVEN IN THE MASTER PROGRAM. 
THIS IS AN OPEN VESSEL USED TO STORE LIQUID, ALL PORTS ARE BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE 
LIQUID SURFACE. 
PORT 1: NORMAL FLOW INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 2: NORMAL FLOW INLET FROM HIGH PRESSURE CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 3: NO FLOW INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 4: NO FLOW INLET FROM HIGH PRESSURE CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 5: NORMAL FLOW OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 6: NORMAL FLOW OUTLET UNDER GRAVITY 
PORT 7: NO FLOW OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 8: NO FLOW OUTLET UNDER GRAVITY. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
G1IN. F (Q1IN) 
R1IN= F (-P9VES) 
U1IN= F (T9VES) 
Y1IN= F (X9VES) 
G2IN- F (Q2IN) 
R2IN= F (-P9VES) 
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U2IN= F (T9VES) 
Y2IN= F (X9VES) 
G3IN= F (03IN) 
R3IN= F (-P9VES) 
U3IN= F (T9VES) 
Y3IN= F (X9VES) 
G4IN= F (04IN) 
R4IN= F (-P9VES) 
U4IN= F (T9VES) 
Y 41N= F (X9VES) 
OSOUT= F (GSOUT) 
PSOUT = F (P9VES) 
TSOUT = F (T9VES) 
XSOUT = F (X9VES) 
OSOUT= F (GSOUT, P9VES) 
PSOUT = F (P9VES) 
TSOUT = F (T9VES) 
XSOUT. F (X9VES) 
070UT= F (G70UT) 
P70UT = F (P9VES) 
T70UT = F (T9VES) 
X70UT = F (X9VES) 
OBOUT= F (GBOUT, P9VES) 
PBOUT = F (P9VES) 
TBOUT = F (T9VES) 
XBOUT = F (X9VES) 
L9VE5= F (G1IN, G21N, -OSOUT, -OSOUT) 
P9VE5= F (L9VES) 
T9VE5= F (T11N, T21N, T31N, T4IN) 
X9VE5= F (X1IN, X2IN, X31N, X4IN) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
VG11N NONE: L9VES LO 
V G11N REV: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE 
V G21N NONE: L9VES LO 
V G21N REV: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE 
V G31N SOME: L9VES HI 
V G31N REV: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE 
V G41N SOME: L9VES HI 
V G41N REV: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE 
I C(OUMMY): L9VES NONE 
V OSOUT NONE: L9VES HI 
V OSOUT NONE: L9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV: L9VES HI 
V 070UT SOME: L9VES LO 
V OBOUT SOME: L9VES LO 
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V aBOUT REV: L9VES HI 
V P9VES HI: GllN NONE, RllN NONE, G21N NONE, R2IN NONE, GllN REV, RllN REV 
V P9VES HI: G21N REV, R21N REV, G31N REV, R31N REV, G41N REV, R41N REV 
V P9VES NONE: a60UT REV, P60UT REV, aBOUT REV, PBOUT REV 
V L9VES NONE: P9VES LO 
F LK-LP-EN: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE 
F EXT-HEAT: T9VES HI 
F EXT-COLD: T9VES LO 
S NORMAL: GlIN SOME, RllN SOME, G21N SOME, R2IN SOME, G31N NONE, R31N NONE 
S NORMAL: G41N NONE, R41N NONE, Q50UT SOME, P50UT SOME, a60UT SOME, P60UT SOME 
S NORMAL: a70UT NONE, P70UT NONE, aBOUT NONE, PBOUT NONE 
S IMPOSS: a50UT REV, P50UT REV, a70UT REV, P70UT REV 
5) DECISION TABLES 
VG11N NONE V G21N NONE TC(DUMMy) 
I C(DUMMY) V L9VES NONE T a50UT NONE, P50UT NONE 
I C(DUMMY) V L9VES NONE T a60UT NONE, P60UT NONE 
V a60UT REV V U60UT HI T T9VES HI 
, V a60UT REV V U60UT LO T T9VES LO 
V a60UT REV V Y60UT HI T X9VES HI 
V a60UT REV V Y60UT LO T X9VES LO 
V aBOUT REV V UBOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V aBOUT REV V UBOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V aBOUT REV V YBOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V aBOUT REV V YBOUT LO T X9VES LO 
6) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1,2, 5 AND 6. 
NO MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES 
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C.2 Closed Liquid Vessel Model Template 
This is a closed vessel used solely to store liquid. Although there is a gas space above 
the liquid surface containing vapour the quantity of vapour cannot be changed by using 
the inlet or outlet ports. The vapour is compressed as the level of liquid rises. The vessel 
temperature will also have an effect on the vapour so this has to be incorporated into the 
vessel pressure term. The vessel pressure is below atmospheriC pressure which allows 
a demonstration of the effects of no reverse flow on the inlet ports. Each of the four inlet 
and four outlet ports are assumed to be below the surface of the liquid. 
Port 1 is an inlet connected to a runni~g pump operating like a reciprocating pump. Since 
the vessel is below atmospheric pressure a leak in the connection will cause a flow of air 
into the vessel, for this reason it is assumed impossible for flow to occur in the reverse 
direction. This port is not affected by the vessel pressure. Port 2 is an inlet with flow 
under gravity caused by a unit at a higher elevation or pressure, it is affected by the vessel 
pressure. Port 3 is the same as port 1 butthe pump is stopped and a closed valve prevents 
flow. Port 4 is the same as port 2 but a closed vaive prevents flow. 
The port 5 outlet is connected to a running pump similar to a reciprocating pump. The 
port allows reverse flow because the higher, extemal pressure will cause air to flow in 
through the port. The port is not affected by the vessel pressure. Port 6 is connected to 
a running pump so the vessel pressure does not affect it. The pump on this port has been 
defined as a centrifugal pump. Port 7 and port 8 are the same as port 5 and port 6, 
respectively, except that the pumps are not running and a closed vaive prevents flow. 
It should be noted that in this model reverse flow through ports 5 and 7 has been defined 
as causing high pressure and level. However, this reverse flow is likely to be air and will 
only affect the pressure. This event statement is the result of the systematic approach 
used in the process and the level term should be deleted or ignored in this case. A similar 
result is obtained for the leak from a high pressure environment, LK-HP-EN fault. In this 
case the concentration term appears but it is quite possible for the air to dissolve in the 
liquid and thus cause an impurity in the liquid so the term is in fact valid. 
The entire model is shown on the following pages. 
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1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
91 TEMPLATE VESSEL MODEL (LIQUID, CLOSED) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 24 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 32 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 28 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 19 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
USE THIS MODEL TO DEVELOP YOUR OWN MODELS OR USE IT AS IT IS. 
PORTS CAN BE REMOVED IF SO DESIRED BY FOLLOWING THIS EXAMPLE. 
IF PORT 3 IS NOT REQUIRED, DELETE PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 9 TO 12. DELETE THE T3IN 
AND X31N TERMS FROM EQUATIONS 35 AND 36 RESPECTIVELY. DELETE EVENT STATEMENT 
4. DELETE THE G31N NONE, R31N NONE, G31N REV AND R31N REV TERMS FROM EVENT 
STATEMENTS 25 AND 28. 
AL TERTHE NUMBERS FOR THE NUMBER OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS, EVENT STATEMENTS 
AND DECISION TABLES AS NECESSARY AT THE TOP OF THE MODEL. 
HAVING CHANGED THE MODEL IT MUST BE GIVEN A NEW FILE NAME AND CORRESPONDING 
MODEL NUMBER. 
IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE PORT NUMBERS BUT ENSURE THE CORRECT PORT 
NUMBERS ARE GIVEN IN THE MASTER PROGRAM. 
THIS IS A CLOSED VESSEL USED TO STORE LIQUID, ALL PORTS ARE BELOW THE LEVEL OFTHE 
LIQUID SURFACE AND THE VESSEL PRESSURE IS BELOW ATMOSPHERIC. 
PORT 1: NORMAL FLOW INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 2: NORMAL FLOW INLET UNDER GRAVITY 
PORT 3: NO FLOW INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 4: NO FLOW INLET UNDER GRAVITY 
PORT 5: NORMAL FLOW OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 6: NORMAL FLOW OUTLET TO CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 7: NO FLOW OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 8: NO FLOW OUTLET TO CENTRIFUGAL PUMP. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
G1IN= F (Q1IN) 
R1IN= F (-P9VES) 
G2IN= F (Q2IN, -P9VES) 
R2IN= F (-P9VES) 
U2IN= F (T9VES) 
Y2IN. F (X9VES) 
G3IN= F (Q3IN) 
R3IN= F (-P9VES) 
G4IN= F (Q4IN, -P9VES) 
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R4IN= F (-P9VES) 
U4IN= F (T9VES) 
Y4IN= F (X9VES) 
OSOUT. F (GSOUT) 
PSOUT. F (P9VES) 
TSOUT. F (T9VES) 
XSOUT. F (X9VES) 
OSOUT. F (GSOUT) 
PSOUT. F (P9VES) 
TSOUT. F (T9VES) 
XSOUT = F (X9VES) 
070UT. F (G70UT) 
P70UT. F (P9VES) 
T70UT. F (T9VES) 
X70UT = F (X9VES) 
OBOUT. F (GBOUT) 
PBOUT = F (P9VES) 
TBOUT. F (T9VES) 
XBOUT. F (X9VES) 
L9VE5= F (G1IN, G2IN, -QSOUT, -QSOUT) 
P9VE5= F (L9VES, T9VES) 
T9VE5= F (T1IN, T2IN, T3IN, T4IN) 
X9VE5= F (X1IN, X2IN, X3IN, X4IN) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V G11N NONE: L9VES LO, P9VES LO 
V G21N NONE: L9VES LO, P9VES LO 
V G21N REV: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE, P9VES LO 
V G3IN SOME: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
V G41N SOME: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
V G41N REV: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE, P9VES LO 
I C(OUMMY): L9VES NONE 
V OSOUT NONE: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
V OSOUT NONE: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
V 070UT SOME: L9VES LO, P9VES LO 
V 070UT REV: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
V OBOUT SOME: L9VES LO, P9VES LO 
V OBOUT REV: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
V P9VES HI: G11N NONE, R1IN NONE, G21N NONE, R21N NONE 
V P9VES HI: G21N REV, R21N REV, G41N REV, R41N REV 
V P9VES NONE: OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV, OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV 
V P9VES NONE: 070UT REV, P70UT REV, OBOUT REV, P80UT REV 
V L9VES NONE: P9VES LO 
F LK-LP-EN: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE, P9VES LO 
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F LK-HP-EN: P9VES HI, P9VES NOR, X9VES HI 
F EXT-HEAT: P9VES HI, T9VES HI 
F EXT-COLD: P9VES LO, T9VES LO 
S NORMAL: G11N SOME, R11N SOME, G21N SOME, R21N SOME, G31N NONE, R31N NONE 
S NORMAL: G41N NONE, R41N NONE, QSOUT SOME, PSOUT SOME, Q60UT SOME, P60UT SOME 
S NORMAL: Q70UT NONE, P70UT NONE, aBOUT NONE, PBOUT NONE 
S IMPOSS: G11N REV, R11N REV, G31N REV, R31N REV 
S) DECISION TABLES 
V G11N NONE V G21N NONE T C(DUMMY) 
I C(DUMMY) V L9VES NONE T QSOUT NONE, PSOUT NONE 
I C(DUMMY) V L9VES NONE T QSOUT NONE, PSOUT NONE 
V QSOUT REV V USOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V QSOUT REV V USOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V QSOUT REV V YSOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V QSOUT REV V YSOUT LO T X9VES LO 
V QSOUT REV V USOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V QSOUT REV V USOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V QSOUT REV V YSOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V QSOUT REV V YSOUT LO T X9VES LO 
V Q70UT REV V U70UT HI T T9VES HI 
V Q70UT REV V U70UT LO T T9VES LO 
V Q70UT REV V Y70UT HI T X9VES HI 
V Q70UT REV V Y70UT LO T X9VES LO 
V QBOUT REV V UBOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V QBOUT REV V UBOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V QBOUT REV V YBOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V QBOUT REV V YBOUT LO T X9VES LO 
S) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1, 2, SAND 6. 
NO MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES 
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C.3 Pressurised Gas Vessel Model Template 
This is a closed vessel used for storing gas above atmospheric pressure. If a leak occurs 
in the pipe-work to a port connection then the gas will leak out. Therefore it Is possible 
for an Inlet port to have reverse flow even if it is connected to a reciprocating type pump. 
There are four inlet ports and four outlet ports 
Port 1 Is an inlet which normally has flow and Is connected to a running pump (or 
compressor) where pressure effects are important. The pump Is defined as a centrifugal 
pump. Port 2 is also connected to a running pump but there are no pressure effects. In 
this case the pump is defined as a reciprocating pump. As mentioned before it is possible 
for this port to have reverse flow. Ports 3and 4 are the same as port 1 and2, respectively, 
except that the pump is not running and a closed valve prevents flow. 
Port 5 is an outlet connected to a running pump with no pressure effects. The pump is 
defined as a reciprocating pump but on this port reverse flow is not allowed. Port 6 is not 
connected to a pump but flow occurs due to the pressure inside the vessel. The port is 
defined as having flow under back-pressure. Ports 7 and 8 are the same as ports 5 and 
6, respectively, but no flow occurs due to a closed valve. 
Note that in this model the LK-HP-EN event statement has been removed because the 
vessel is above atmospheric pressure. 
The entire model is shown in the following pages. 
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1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
89 TEMPLATE VESSEL MODEL (GAS, CLOSED) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 23 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 35 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 24 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 8 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
USE THIS MODEL TO DEVELOP YOUR OWN MODELS OR USE IT AS IT IS. 
PORTS CAN BE REMOVED IF SO DESIRED BY FOLLOWING THIS EXAMPLE. 
IF PORT 3 IS NOT REQUIRED, DELETE PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 9 TO 12. DELETE THE T31N 
AND X31N TERMS FROM PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 34 AND 35. DELETE EVENT STATEMENTS 
5AND 6. DELETE THE G31N REV AND R31N REV TERMS FROM EVENT STATEMENT 16. DELETE 
THE G31N NONE AND R31N NONE TERMS FROM EVENT STATEMENT 21. 
ALTER THE NUMBERS FOR THE NUMBER OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS, EVENT STATEMENTS 
AND DECISION TABLES AS NECESSARY AT THE TOP OF THE MODEL. 
HAVING CHANGED THE MODEL IT MUST BE GIVEN A NEW FILE NAME AND CORRESPONDING 
MODEL NUMBER. 
IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE PORT NUMBERS BUT ENSURE THE CORRECT PORT 
NUMBERS ARE GIVEN IN THE MASTER PROGRAM. 
THIS IS A CLOSED VESSEL USED TO STORE GASES ABOVE ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE. 
PORT 1: NORMAL FLOW INLET FROM CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 2: NORMAL FLOW INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 3: NO FLOW INLET FROM CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 4: NO FLOW INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 5: NORMAL FLOW OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 6: NORMAL FLOW OUTLET UNDER BACK PRESSURE 
PORT 7: NO FLOW OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 8: NO FLOW OUTLET UNDER BACK PRESSURE. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
G1IN= F (QlIN, -P9VES) 
RlIN= F (-P9VES) 
UlIN= F (T9VES) 
YlIN= F (X9VES) 
G2IN= F (Q2IN) 
R2IN= F (-P9VES) 
U2IN= F (T9VES) 
Y2IN= F (X9VES) 
G3IN= F (Q3IN, -P9VES) 
R3IN= F (-P9VES) 
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U3IN= F (T9VES) 
Y3IN= F (X9VES) 
G4IN= F (Q4IN) 
R4IN= F (-P9VES) 
U4IN= F (T9VES) 
Y4IN= F (X9VES) 
QSOUT = F (GSOUT) 
PSOUT = F (P9VES) 
TSOUT = F (T9VES) 
XSOUT = F (X9VES) 
Q60UT = F (G60UT, P9VES) 
P60UT = F (P9VES) 
T60UT = F (T9VES) 
X60UT = F (X9VES) 
Q70UT = F (G70UT) 
P70UT = F (P9VES) 
T70UT = F (T9VES) 
X70UT = F (X9VES) 
QSOUT = F (G80UT, P9VES) 
P80UT = F (P9VES) 
T80UT = F (T9VES) 
X80UT = F (X9VES) 
P9VES= F (GlIN, G21N, -QSOUT, -Q60UT, T9VES) 
T9VES= F (Tl1N, T21N, T31N, T4IN) 
X9VES= F (Xl IN, X2IN, X31N, X4IN) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V GllN NONE: P9VES LO 
V GllN REV: P9VES LO 
V G21N NONE: P9VES LO 
V G21N REV: P9VES LO 
V G31N SOME: P9VES HI 
V G31N REV: P9VES LO 
V G41N SOME: P9VES HI 
V G41N REV: P9VES LO 
V QSOUT NONE: P9VES HI 
V Q60UT NONE: P9VES HI 
V Q60UT REV: P9VES HI 
V Q70UT SOME: P9VES LO 
V QSOUT SOME: P9VES LO 
V QSOUT REV: P9VES HI 
VP9VES HI: GllN NONE, RllN NONE, G21N NONE, R21N NONE, GlIN REV, RllN REV 
V P9VES HI: G21N REV, R21N REV, G31N REV, R31N REV, G41N REV, R41N REV 
V P9VES NONE: Q60UT REV, P60UT REV, QSOUT REV, PSOUT REV 
F LK-LP-EN: P9VES LO 
F EXT-HEAT: P9VES HI, T9VES HI 
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F EXT-COLD: P9VES LO, T9VES LO 
S NORMAL: G1IN SOME, R11N SOME, G21N SOME, R2IN SOME, G31N NONE, R31N NONE 
S NORMAL: G41N NONE, R41N NONE, OSOUT SOME, PSOUT SOME, OSOUT SOME, PSOUT SOME 
S NORMAL: 070UT NONE, P70UT NONE, OBOUT NONE, PBOUT NONE 
S IMPOSS: OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV, 070UT REV, P70UT REV 
S) DECISION TABLES 
V OSOUT REV V USOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV V USOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V OSOUT REV V YSOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV V YSOUT LO T X9VES LO 
V OBOUT REV V UBOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V OBOUT REV V UBOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V OBOUT REV V YBOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V OBOUT REV V YBOUT LO T X9VES LO 
S) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1,2, SAND 6. 
NO MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES 
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C.4 Vacuum Gas Vessel Model Template 
This is a closed vessel used for storing gas below atmospheric pressure. This implies 
that a leak on a port connection will cause air to flow into the vessel. Hence it is impossible 
for inlet ports to have reverse flow if they are connected to a reciprocating type pump. 
There are five inlet ports and three outlet ports. 
Port 1 is an inlet connected to a running pump (or compressor) with no pressure effects. 
The pump is defined as a reciprocating pump and hence. the port cannot have reverse 
flow. Port 2 is connected to a running pump defined as a centrifugal pump and port 3 has 
flow caused by back-pressure from an upstream unit. Both these ports are affected by 
the vessel pressure. Port 4 is the same as port 1 except the pump is not running and a 
closed valve prevents flow. Port 5 is the same as port 3 except a closed valve prevents 
flow. 
The outlet ports are all connected to pumps. None of the ports are affected by the vessel 
pressure. Port 6 is defined as connected to a running reciprocating pump and reverse 
flow is possible through the port due to the lower internal pressure. Port 7 is defined as 
connected to a running centrifugal pump. Port 8 is the same as port 6 but the pump is 
not running and a closed valve prevents flow. 
The entire model is shown on the following pages. 
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1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
92 TEMPLATE VESSEL MODEL (GAS, CLOSED) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 24 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 31 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 26 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 12 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
USE THIS MODEL TO DEVELOP YOUR OWN MODELS OR USE IT AS IT IS. 
PORTS CAN BE REMOVED IF SO DESIRED BY FOLLOWING THIS EXAMPLE. 
IF PORT 31S NOT REQUIRED, DELETE PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 9 TO 12. DELETE THE G3IN, 
T31N AND X31N TERMS FROM PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 33, 34 AND 35. DELETE EVENT 
STATEMENTS 4,5 AND 16. DELETE THE G31N SOME AND R31N SOME TERMS FROM EVENT 
STATEMENT 23. 
ALTER THE NUMBERS FOR THE NUMBER OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS, EVENT STATEMENTS 
AND DECISION TABLES AS NECESSARY AT THE TOP OF THE MODEL. 
HAVING CHANGED THE MODEL IT MUST BE GIVEN A NEW FILE NAME AND CORRESPONDING 
MODEL NUMBER. 
IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE PORT NUMBERS BUT ENSURE THE CORRECT PORT 
NUMBERS ARE GIVEN IN THE MASTER PROGRAM. 
THIS IS A CLOSED VESSEL USED TO STORE GAS BELOW ATMOSPHERIC PRESSURE. 
PORT 1: NORMAL FLOW INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 2: NORMAL FLOW INLET FROM CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 3: NORMAL FLOW INLET UNDER BACK-PRESSURE 
PORT 4: NO FLOW INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 5: NO FLOW INLET UNDER BACK-PRESSURE 
PORT 6: NORMAL FLOW OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 7: NORMAL FLOW OUTLET TO CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 8: NO FLOW OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
G1IN= F (Q1IN) 
R1IN= F (-P9VES) 
G2IN= F (Q2IN, -P9VES) 
R2IN= F (-P9VES) 
U21Nz F (T9VES) 
Y21Nz F (X9VES) 
G3IN= F (Q3IN, -P9VES) 
R3IN= F (-P9VES) 
U3IN= F (T9VES) 
Y3IN= F (X9VES) 
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G4IN= F (Q4IN) 
R4IN. F (-P9VES) 
G5IN= F (Q5IN, -P9VES) 
R5IN= F (-P9VES) 
U5IN= F (T9VES) 
Y5IN= F (X9VES) 
aSOUT = F (GSOUT) 
PSOUT = F (P9VES) 
TSOUT = F (T9VES) 
XSOUT. F (X9VES) 
a70UT = F (G70UT) 
P70UT = F (P9VES) 
T70UT = F (T9VES) 
X70UT = F (X9VES) 
aBOUT = F (GBOUT) 
PBOUT = F (P9VES) 
TBOUT. F (T9VES) 
XBOUT = F (X9VES) 
P9VES= F (G1IN, G2IN, G3IN, -aSOUT, -a70UT, T9VES) 
T9VES= F (T1IN, T2IN, T3IN, T4IN, T5IN) 
X9VES= F (X1IN, X2IN, X3IN, X4IN, X5IN) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V G11N NONE: P9VES LO 
V G21N NONE: P9VES LO 
V G21N REV: P9VES LO 
V G31N NONE: P9VES LO 
V G31N REV: P9VES LO 
V G41N SOME: P9VES HI 
V G51N SOME: P9VES HI 
V G51N REV: P9VES LO 
V aSOUT NONE: P9VES HI 
V QSOUT REV: P9VES HI 
V Q70UT NONE: P9VES HI 
V a70UT REV: P9VES HI 
V aBOUT SOME: P9VES LO 
V aBOUT REV: P9VES HI 
V P9VES HI: G11N NONE, R11N NONE, G21N NONE, R21N NONE, G21N REV, R21N REV 
V P9VES HI: G31N NONE, R31N NONE, G31N REV, R31N REV 
V P9VES NONE: aSOUT REV, PSOUT REV, a70UT REV, P70UT REV 
V P9VES NONE: aBOUT REV, PBOUT REV 
F LK-LP-EN: P9VES LO 
F LK-HP-EN: P9VES HI, P9VES NOR, X9VES HI 
F EXT-HEAT: P9VES HI, T9VES HI 
F EXT-COLD: P9VES LO, T9VES LO 
S NORMAL: G11N SOME, R1IN SOME, G21N SOME, R21N SOME, G31N SOME, R31N SOME 
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S NORMAL: G41N NONE, R41N NONE, G51N NONE, R51N NONE, a60UT SOME, P60UT SOME 
S NORMAL: a70UT SOME, P70UT SOME, aBOUT NONE, PBOUT NONE 
S IMPOSS: G11N REV, R11N REV, G41N REV, R41N REV 
5) DECISION TABLES 
va60UT REV V U60UT HI T T9VES HI 
V aSOUT REV V U60UT LO T T9VES LO 
Va60UT REV V Y60UT HI T X9VES HI 
V aSOUT REV V Y60UT LO T X9VES LO 
V a70UT REV V U70UT HI T T9VES HI 
V a70UT REV V U70UT LO T T9VES LO 
V a70UT REV V Y70UT HI T X9VES HI 
V a70UT REV V Y70UT LO T X9VES LO 
V aBOUT REV V UBOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V aBOUT REV V UBOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V aBOUT REV V YBOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V aBOUT REV V YBOUT LO T X9VES LO 
6) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1, 2, 3, 6 AND 7. 
NO MULTI·COMPONENT FEATURES 
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C.5 Gas And Liquid Vessel Model Template 
This is a closed vessel which can be used to store gases and liquids together. All the 
liquid ports are assumed to be below the liquid surface and the gas ports above the surface 
such that there is no break through of fluid types for the ports. The vessel pressure is 
above atmospheric. therefore fluid will flow out of the vessel should a leak occur in the 
piping. There are five inlet ports and three outlet ports. 
Port 1 is a liquid inlet connected to a running pump. The vessel pressure affects this port 
and the pump is defined as a low pressure centrifugal pump. Port 2 is the same but the 
pump is stopped and a closed vaive prevents flow. Port 3 is a gas inlet connected to a 
running pump (or compressor) which is not affected by the vessel pressure. The pump 
is defined as a reciprocating pump but reverse flow can occur because the higher internal 
pressu re means fluid will flow out of the vessel should there be a leak. Port 4 is the same 
but the pump is stopped and a closed valve prevents flow. Port 5 is a gas inlet connected 
to a closed valve and stopped pump. The pump is defined as a centrifugal pump because 
any flow through this port would be affected by the vessel pressure. 
Outlet port 6 is a liquid outlet connected to a running pump which is not affected by the 
vessel pressure. The pump is defined as a centrifugal pump. Port 7 is a gas outlet 
connected to a running pump defined as a reciprocating pump. reverse flow is not allowed 
through the port. This port is not affected by the vessel pressure. Port 8 is a gas outlet 
connected to a closed valve. any flow would be caused by the internal vessel pressure. 
Note that in this model the LK-HP-EN event statement has been removed because the 
vessel is above atmospheriC pressure. 
The model is shown on the following pages. 
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1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
93 TEMPLATE VESSEL MODEL (GAS AND LIQUID, CLOSED) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 27 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 36 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 29 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 9 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
USE THIS MODEL TO DEVELOP YOUR OWN MODELS OR USE IT AS IT IS. 
PORTS CAN BE REMOVED IF SO DESIRED BY FOLLOWING THIS EXAMPLE. 
IF PORT 8 IS NOT REQUIRED, DELETE PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 29 TO 32. DELETE EVENT 
STATEMENTS 16 AND 17. DELETE THE Q80UT REV AND P80UT REV TERMS FROM EVENT 
STATEMENT21. DELETE THE Q80UT NONE AND P80UT NONE TERMS FROM EVENT STATEMENT 
28. DELETE DECISION TABLES 6 TO 9. 
ALTER THE NUMBERS FOR THE NUMBER OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS, EVENT STATEMENTS 
AND DECISION TABLES AS NECESSARY AT THE TOP OF THE MODEL. 
HAVING CHANGED THE MODEL IT MUST BE GIVEN A NEW FILE NAME AND CORRESPONDING 
MODEL NUMBER. 
IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE PORT NUMBERS BUT ENSURE THE CORRECT PORT 
NUMBERS ARE GIVEN IN THE MASTER PROGRAM. 
THIS IS A CLOSED VESSEL USED TO STORELlQUIDSAND GASESTOGETHER,ALL LIQUID PORTS 
ARE BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE LlaUID SURFACE AND THE VESSEL PRESSURE IS ABOVE 
ATMOSPHERIC. 
PORT 1: NORMAL FLOW LIQUID INLET FROM LOW PRESSURE CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 2: NO FLOW LIQUID INLET FROM LOW PRESSURE CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 3: NORMAL FLOW GAS INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW 
ALLOWED 
PORT 4: NO FLOW GAS INLET FROM RECIPROCATING PUMP, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 5: NO FLOW GAS INLET FROM CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 6: NORMAL FLOW LIQUID OUTLET TO CENTRIFUGAL PUMP 
PORT 7: NORMAL FLOW GAS OUTLET TO RECIPROCATING PUMP, NO REVERSE FLOW 
ALLOWED 
PORT 8: NO FLOW GAS OUTLET UNDER BACK-PRESSURE. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
G1IN= F (Q1IN, -P9VES) 
R1IN= F (-P9VES) 
U1IN= F (T9VES) 
Y1IN= F (X9VES) 
G2IN= F (Q2IN, -P9VES) 
R2IN= F (-P9VES) 
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U2IN= F (T9VES) 
Y2IN= F (X9VES) 
G3IN= F (03IN) 
R3IN= F (-P9VES) 
U3IN= F (T9VES) 
Y3IN= F (X9VES) 
G4IN= F (04IN) 
R4IN= F (-P9VES) 
U4IN= F (T9VES) 
Y4IN= F (X9VES) 
GSIN= F (OSIN, -P9VES) 
RSIN= F (-P9VES) 
USIN= F (T9VES) 
YSIN= F (X9VES) 
OSOUT = F (GSOUT) 
PSOUT = F (P9VES) 
TSOUT = F (T9VES) 
XSOUT = F (X9VES) 
070UT = F (G70UT) 
P70UT = F (P9VES) 
T70UT = F (T9VES) 
X70UT = F (X9VES) 
OSOUT= F (GSOUT, P9VES) 
PSOUT = F (P9VES) 
T80UT = F (T9VES) 
XSOUT = F (X9VES) 
L9VES= F (G1IN, -OSOUT) 
P9VES= F (G3IN, -070UT, L9VES, T9VES) 
T9VES= F (T11N, T21N, T31N, T41N, TSIN) 
X9VES= F (X1IN, X2IN, X31N, X41N, XSIN) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V G11N NONE: L9VES LO, P9VES LO 
V G11N REV: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE, P9VES LO 
V G21N SOME: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
V G21N REV: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE, P9VES LO 
V G31N NONE: P9VES LO 
V G31N REV: P9VES LO 
V G41N SOME: P9VES HI 
V G41N REV: P9VES LO 
V GSIN SOME: P9VES HI 
V GSIN REV: P9VES LO 
V G11N NONE: C(OUMMY) 
I C(OUMMY): L9VES NONE 
V OSOUT NONE: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV: L9VES HI, P9VES HI 
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v 070UT NONE: P9VES HI 
V OSOUT SOME: P9VES LO 
V OSOUT REV: P9VES HI 
V P9VES HI: GlIN NONE, RlIN NONE, G11N REV, R11N REV, G21N REV, R21N REV 
V P9VES HI: G31N NONE, R31N NONE, G31N REV, R31N REV G41N REV, R41N REV 
V P9VES HI: G51N REV R51N REV 
V P9VES NONE: OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV, OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV 
V L9VES NONE: P9VES LO 
F LK-LP-EN: L9VES LO, L9VES NONE, P9VES LO 
F EXT-HEAT: P9VES HI, T9VES HI 
F EXT·COLD: P9VES LO, T9VES LO 
S NORMAL: G11N SOME, R11N SOME, G21N NONE, R2IN NONE, G31N SOME, R31N SOME 
S NORMAL: G41N NONE, R41N NONE, G51N NONE, R51N NONE, OSOUT SOME, PSOUT SOME 
S NORMAL: 070UT SOME, P70UT SOME, OSOUT NONE, PSOUT NONE 
S IMPOSS: 070UT REV, P70UT REV 
5) DECISION TABLES 
I C(DUMMY) V L9VES NONE T OSOUT NONE, PSOUT NONE 
V OSOUT REV V USOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV V USOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V OSOUT REV V YSOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV V YSOUT LO T X9VES LO 
V OSOUT REV V USOUT HI T T9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV V USOUT LO T T9VES LO 
V OSOUT REV V YSOUT HI T X9VES HI 
V OSOUT REV V YSOUT LO T X9VES LO 
S) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1, 3, SAND 7. 
NO MULTI·COMPONENT FEATURES 
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C.6 Vessel Model Generation Subroutine 
SUBROUTINE TANKMOD 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C This subroutine is called if automatic vessel model generation is 
C specified. It automatically generates the propagation equations, 
C event statements and decision tables for the vessel model .. 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHARACTER FU(500)'S,DV(20)"4,VR(20),PT(10)"3,NA"SO,AD(25)"SO, 
" FE(45)"SO,FI(50)"SO,NS"SO,MC,FA(5)"SO,DT(25)"80,TE(200)"12 
INTEGER IL,FL,DL,JL,PV(l O,20),PC(1 O,20),PM,CM,KL,LG(1 O),INLET, 
" VES,NF(l O),ET(l O),RF(l O),FLAG(10) 
COMMON/ONEIFU,DV,VR,PT,NA,AD,FE,FI,NS,MC,FA,DT,TE 
COMMONITWO/IL,FL,DL,JL,PV,PC,PM,CM,KL 
COMMONITWELVElLG,INLET,VES,NF,ET,RF,FLAG 
CHARACTER OPT"4,POCH 
INTEGER ANSWER,CL,OUTLET,PO,L 1 
FORMAT(/: ',A:? ',$) 
2 FORMAT(",A:? ',$) 
3 FORMAT(/,",A) 
4 FORMATC ',A,12:)? ',$) 
5 FORMAT(/: ',A: ',12) 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C The FLAGS set by this subroutine are: 
C FLAG(1)=1 for no checking of event statements from the GENEV routine. 
C FLAG(2)=O for closed vessels but is set to the vessel port number for 
C open vessels to indicate that the pressure terms are to be Ignored. 
C FLAG(3) is the number of flow ports. 
C FLAG(4) is the number of liquid inlet flow ports. 
C FLAG(5) is non zero if an overflow decision table Is used for C(DUMMY) 
C which takes the mini-top to be D(DUMMY). 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FLAG(l)=l 
PRINT3: VESSEL MODEL GENERATION ROUTINE' 
PRIN,..: 
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C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Determine the vessels overall characteristics 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT3,'OUESTIONS REFER TO NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS.' 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C LG(10) gives fluid type in vessel: Q-liquid, 1-gas, 2-both. 
C Any level effects are handle In the vessel pressure equation. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT1,'IS THE VESSEL FOR STORING L10UID, GAS OR BOTH, UG/B' 
OPT='LGB' 
LG(10)=ANSWER(OPT) 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C CL Is used to indicate if the vessel is open (0) or closed (1). 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (LG(10).NE.O) THEN 
CL=l 
ELSE 
PRINT2,'IS THE TANK AN OPEN OR CLOSED VESSEL, OIC' 
OPTa'OC' 
CL=ANSWER(OPT) 
END IF 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the initial description array and print user infonnation. 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1l=IL+l 
AD(IL)='THIS IS A' 
L l=LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
IF (CL.EO.l) THEN 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(l:L l)1f CLOSED' 
ELSE 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(l :L l)1f OPEN' 
END IF 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(l :L l)1f VESSEL USED TO STORE' 
L l=LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
IF (LG(l O).EO.O) THEN 
. AD(IL)=AD(IL)(l:L l)1f L10UIDS ONLY.' 
ELSE IF (LG(10).EQ.l) THEN 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(l :Ll)1f GASES ONLY.' 
ELSE 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(l:L l)1f LIQUIDS AND GASES TOGETHER.' 
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END IF 
IF (LG(1 0).NE.1) THEN 
IL~IL+1 
IF (LG(1 O).EQ.O) THEN 
AD(IL)='ALL' 
ELSE 
AD(IL)='ALL LIQUID INLET 
END IF 
L 1=LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f PORT OPENINGS ARE BELOW THE LEVEL OF THE LIQUID SURFACE: 
END IF 
PRIN,..: • 
DO 40.1=1.IL 
40 PRIN"'.AD(I) 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Determine the number of inlet and outlet ports. 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50 PRINT3:MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PORTS. INCLUDING VESSEL PORT. IS 9: 
60 PRINT1 :NUMBER OF INLET PORTS. (1 TO 7)' 
READ(· ... ERR=GO)INLET 
IF (INLET.LT.1.0R.INLET.GT.7) GOTOGO 
70 PRINT4:NUMBER OF OUTLET PORTS. (1 TO·.(B-INLEl) 
READ(·.·.ERR=70)OUTLET 
IF (OUTLET.LT.1.0R.OUTLET.GT.(B-INLEl) GOT050 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: C:alculate the number of the vessel port and if the vessel is closed 
c: set FLAG(2) to the vessel port number. 
c: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VES=INLET +OUTLET + 1 
IF (CL.EQ.O) FLAG(2)=VES 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Determine the characteristics for each port in tum. 
c: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 100.PD=1.VES-1 
IF (PO.LE.INLEl) THEN 
PRINTS:INLET PORT.PO 
PRINT·:------· 
ELSE 
PRINTS:OUTLET PORT·.PO 
PRINT': --------------------. 
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END IF 
IL-IL+1 
WRITE(POCH:(11),)PO 
AD(IL)='PORT'IIPOCH 
L 1~LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
e ...... -.................................... -....................... -.-.. -.... -..................... . 
e Set NF(port number) to 0 for flow or 1 for no flow. Set NF(1 0) 
e to 1 If it Is a no flow port or add 1 to FLAG(3) for flow port. 
e .............. -......... -............................ -.... -.................... -.................... . 
PRINT1:DOES THIS PORT NORMALLY HAVE FLOW, Y/N' 
OPT.'YN' 
NF(PO)=ANSWER(OPl) 
IF (NF(PO).EQ.1) THEN 
NF(10)=1 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f: NO FLOW 
ELSE 
FLAG(3)-FLAG(3)+ 1 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f: NORMAL FLOW 
END IF 
L 1=LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
e ......................................................... -............ -................................ . 
e Set LG(port number) to fluid type, o· liquid or 1 • gas. 
e For no flow ports on liquid and gas vessels the position of the port 
e relative to the liquid level is used. 
e If the port is an inlet for liquid and has flow add 1 to FLAG(4). 
e ............................. - ......................................................................... . 
IF (LG(10).EQ.2) THEN 
IF (NF(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
PRINT1:IS THIS PORT FOR LIQUID OR GAS, UG' 
OPT='LG' 
ELSE 
PRINT1 :IS THIS PORT NORMALLY ABOVE OR BELOW LIQUID LEVEL, AlB' 
OPT.'BA' 
END IF 
LG(PO)=ANSWER(OPl) 
IF (LG(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
AD(IL):AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f LIQUID' 
ELSE 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f GAS' 
END IF 
L1=LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
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ELSE 
LG(PO)=LG(10) 
END IF 
IF (PO.LE.1NLET.AND.LG(PO).EO.O.AND.NF(PO).EO.O) FLAG(4)=FLAG(4)+1 
c: ......................................................................................................... . 
c: Add the port type to the descirption. 
c: ......................................................................................................... . 
IF (PO.LE.INLET) THEN 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f INLET FROM' 
ELSE 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :L 1)1f OUTLET TO' 
ENDIF 
L 1=LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
c: ......................................................................................................... . 
c: Set ET(port number) to the type of flow for the port, 0 for positive 
c: displacement pumped, 1 for centrifugally pumped and 2 for gravityl 
c: back pressure. 
c: ......................................................................................................... . 
IF (NF(PO).EO.O) THEN 
PRINT3,'IS FLOW POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT OR CENTRIFUGALLY PUMPED OR' 
ELSE 
PRINT3,'WOULD FLOW BE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT OR CENTRIFUGALLY PUMPED OR' 
END IF 
IF (LG(PO).EO.1) THEN 
IF (PO.LE.INLET) THEN 
PRINT2,'BACK PRESSURE FED, P/C/G' 
ELSE 
PRINT2,'BACK PRESSURE BLED, P/C/G' 
END IF 
ELSE 
IF (PO.LE.INLET) THEN 
PRINT2,'GRAVITY FED, P/C/G' 
ELSE 
PRINT2,'GRAVITY BLED, P/C/G' 
ENDIF 
END IF 
OPT='PCG' 
ET(PO)=ANSWER(OPT) 
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c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
................................ -.. ---_ .......... -_ ...... _ ...... --_ .... _-.............. _--- .... --_ .... _ ........ --......... __ .... -- ......... _-_ .... -_ ...... -............. __ .... -_ .. 
For both inlet and outlet ports, leave RF(port number) as 0 for 
centrifugal and gravity systems, these allow reverse flow or flow 
with pump off. 
Positive displacement systems mayor may not allow reverse flow to 
occur. Set to 1 for no reverse flow. 
RF(10) set to 1 if reverse flow restrictions occur. 
--_ ........ _--_ ................... -.. ----_ .. _--_ ...... ---------_ .. --_ .. _ ...... -_ ........ __ ...... _------_ ...... ---------_ ................. _----_ .. 
IF (ET(PO).EO.O) THEN 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1/ +VE DISPLACEMENT PUMP: 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(IL» 
PRINT1:IS REVERSE FLOW TO BE ALLOWED IN THIS CONNECTION, V/N' 
OPT.'YN' 
RF(PO)=ANSWER(OPT) 
IF (RF(PO).EO.1) THEN 
RF(10)=1 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1/ NO' 
L 1=lENGTH(AD(IL» 
END IF 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1/ REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED: 
END IF 
C ••••.•..••••.•....•••••••..•.••••••....••••••••....•••••••••.....••••••....••••••••.....•••••.••..•..••••• 
C Gravity fed systems for closed vessels· Inlet and outlet ports. 
C _ ••••••••...••••••••••..•••••...••••••••••.•••••••••••..••••••••••..••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
IF (ET(PO).EO.2) THEN 
IF (LG(PO).EO.O) THEN 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :L1-3)1f UNDER GRAVITY: 
ELSE 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1-3)1f UNDER BACK PRESSURE: 
END IF 
IF (FLAG(2).EO.O) THEN 
PRINT3:IT IS ASSUMED THAT SONIC FLOW IS UNLIKELY SO THAT 
PRINT':FLOW IS DEPENDENT ON PRESSURE DIFFERENCE: 
END IF 
END IF 
C ......................................................................................................... . 
C Inlet centrifugal systems: Gases use compressor, pressure effects. 
C Uquids may be affected by the pressure, change ET to 0 or 2. 
C ......................................................................................................... . 
C·26 
IF (PO.LE.lNLET.AND.ET(PO).EQ.1) THEN 
IF (LG(PO).EQ.1) THEN 
ET(PO)=2 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :L 1)1f CENTRIFUGAL PUMP.' 
ELSE 
PRINT1 ;IS VESSEL PRESSURE (INCLUDING LIQUID HEAD) NEAR TO PUMP PRESSURE, Y/N' 
OPT='NY' 
ET(PO)=ANSWER(OPT) 
IF (ET(PO).EQ.1) THEN 
ET(PO)=2 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f LOW PRESSURE CENTRIFUGAL PUMP: 
ELSE 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L1)1f HIGH PRESSURE CENTRIFUGAL PUMP: 
END IF 
END IF 
END IF 
C; •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C; Outlet centrifugal systems are not affected by pressure, set ET to O. 
C; •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
IF (ET(PO).EQ.1) THEN 
ET(PO)=O 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f CENTRIFUGAL PUMP: 
END IF 
C; •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C; Having determined the nature of the port, print the result. 
C; ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
IF (ET(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
PRINT3;PRESSURE AND/OR LEVEL EFFECTS ARE NEGLIGABLE: 
ELSE 
PRINT3;PRESSURE AND/OR LEVEL EFFECTS WILL BE CONSIDERED.' 
END IF 
100 CONTINUE 
C; ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ •••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ ••••••• 
C; Generate the propagation equation. 
C; ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
CALL TANKPROP 
C; ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C; Generate the event statements. 
C; ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
PRINT3;GENERATING THE EVENT STATEMENTS· PLEASE WAIT.' 
CALL TANKSTATE 
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c: ................•....................................................................... --................ . 
c: Generate the decision tables. 
c: --.-.................................................................................................... . 
PRINT3,'GENERATING THE DECISION TABLES· PLEASE WAIT: 
CALL TANKTABLE 
c: ...............................................•........................................................... 
c: Determine the supplimentary information. 
c: The normal state lists the ports where flow normally exists. 
c: .......................................................................................................... . 
IF (FLAG(3).EQ.1) THEN 
DO 200,P0=1,VES-1 
IF (NF(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
WRITE(POCH,'(I1)}PO 
NS='FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORT 'IIPOCHIf: 
END IF 
200 CONTINUE 
ELSE 
NS='FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS' 
DO 21 0,P0=1,VES-1 
IF (NF(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
WRITE(POCH,'(11)')PO 
L1=LENGTH(NS) 
N5=NS(1:L 1)11 'IIPOCHlf,' 
END IF 
210 CONTINUE 
NS=NS(1:L H)If AND 'IIPOCHIf: 
END IF 
c: ........................................................ --................................................ . 
c: The are no multicomponent features. 
c: .............................................................................. --...................... - .. 
MC='N' 
c: ........................................................................................................••. 
c: The generation of the model is complete. 
c: ..........•................................................................................................ 
RETURN 
END 
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SUBROUTINE TANKPROP 
c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Subroutine to generate the propagation equation for the vessel model. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHARACTER FU(500)'S,DV(20)'4,VR(20) ,PT(1 0) '3,NA'SO,AD(2S)'SO, 
, FE(4S)'SO,FI(SO)'SO,NS'60,MC,FA(5)'SO,DT(25)'SO,TE(200)'12 
INTEGER IL,FL,DL,JL,PV(10,20),PC(10,20),PM,CM,KL,LG(10),INLET, 
, VES,NF(10),ET(10),RF(10),FLAG(10) 
COMMON/ONEIFU,DV,VR,PT,NA,AD,FE,FI,NS,MC,FA,DT,TE 
COMMONITWO/IL,FL,DL,JL,PV,PC,PM,CM,KL 
COMMONITWELVElLG,INLET,VES,NF,ET,RF,FLAG 
CHARACTERVESCH,POCH,LEVEL '15,PRESS'75,TEMPFE(45)'SO,IN'40,BASICF'10 
INTEGER PO 
3 FORMAT(/,",A) 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Initialize the temporary storage strings. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LEVEL='F(' 
PRESS='F(' 
DO 100,1=1,45 
100 TEMPFE(I)=FE(I) 
WRITE(VESCH ,'(11 nVES 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Take each port in turn. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 200,PO= 1,vES-1 
WRITE(POCH,'(I1)?PO 
IF (PO.LE.lNLEl) THEN 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Determination of 'IN' propagation equations.· 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEMPFE(FL+1)='G'IIPOCHlfIN=F(Q'IIPOCHIfIN,·P'INESCHlfVES), 
IF (ET(PO).EQ.O) TEMPFE(FL+1)= TEMPFE(FL+1)(:11)1f)' 
TEMPFE(FL+2)='R'IIPOCHlfIN=F(·P'INESCHIfVES)' 
FL=FL+2 
IF (RF(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )='U'IIPOCHIfIN=F(T'INESCHIfVES)' 
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/...:.;. 
TEMPFE(FL+2)='Y'IIPOCHIfIN=F(X'INESCHIfVES)' 
FLEFL+2 
END IF 
ELSE 
e: •............................................................................. --........................ . 
e: Determination of 'OUT' propagation equations, 
e: .............•.......................................................... --..... --....................... . 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )='Q'IIPOCHlfOUT =F(G'IIPOCHIfOUT,P'INESCHIfVES), 
IF (ET(PO).EQ.O) TEMPFE(FL+1)_TEMPFE(FL+1)(:13)1f)' 
TEMPFE(FL+2)='P'IIPOCHlfOUT =F(P'INESCHIfVES)' 
TEMPFE(FL+3)=T IIPOCHlfOUT =F(T'INESCHlfVES)' 
TEMPFE(FL+4)='X'IIPOCHIfOUT _F(X' INESCHIfVES)' 
FL=FL+4 
END IF 
e: ......................................................................................................... . 
e: Write flow term to appropriate level or pressure string for 
e: use in the vessel port equations if it is a flow port. 
e: .............................................................................................. --......... . 
200 
e: 
e: 
e: 
e: 
IF (NF(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
IF (PO.LE.INLEl) THEN 
BASICF='G'IIPOCHIfIN: 
ELSE 
BASICF='-Q'IIPOCHIfOUT: 
END IF 
IF (LG(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
L 1 =LENGTH(LEVEL) 
LEVEL=LEVEL(1:L 1)/IBASICF 
ELSE 
L 1=LENGTH(PRESS) 
PRESS=PRESS(1 :L 1 )/IBASICF 
END IF 
END IF 
CONTINUE 
. 
_______ e ••• ___________________________________________ -----------------------------------------------------
Determination of 'VES' propagation equations. 
Generate level term, if liquid present, from LEVEL string. 
IF (LG(10).NE.1) THEN 
L 1=LENGTH(LEVEL)-1 
C-30 
FL=FL+l 
TEMP FE(FL)='L'INESCHIfVES='/ILEVEL(l:L l)1f)' 
END IF 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate pressure term: liquid only vessels only have the 
C level term, others taken from PRESS string. Add temperature if 
C vessel Is closed. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FL=FL+l 
IF (LG(10).EQ.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)-'P'INESCHIfVES=F(L'INESCHIfVES)' 
ELSE 
L 1=LENGTH(PRESS)-1 
TE MPFE(FL)='P'INESCHIfVES='IIPRESS(l:L l)1f)' 
IF (LG(10).NE.1) THEN 
L 1 =LENGTH(TEMPFE(FL))-l 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1)1/ ,L'INESCHlfVES), 
END IF 
END IF 
IF (FLAG(2).EQ.O) THEN 
L 1 =LENGTH (TEMPFE(FL))-1 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1)1f ,rINESCHlfVES), 
END IF 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the temperature term. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN:'T1IN,T2IN,T3IN,T4IN,TSIN,T6IN,T7IN: 
I=S'INLET-1 
FL=FL+1 
TEMPFE(FL)=TINESCHIfVES=F(,/IIN(:I)II)' 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the composition term. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN='XlIN,X2IN,X3IN,X4IN,XSIN,X6IN,X7IN: 
FL=FL+1 
TEMPFE(FL)='X'INESCHIfVES=F(,mN(:I)If)' 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Completion of propagation equations, now check. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT3:THE FOLLOWING PROPAGATION EQUATIONS HAVE BEEN CREATED:' 
CALL CHECK(TEMPFE,FL) 
C-31 
! 
c .......................................................................................................... . 
C Take prop. eqs. from the temporary array and place in the FE array. 
C ••••••••.•••••••••.•••••••••••.•••••••••••.•.••• _ •••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••• 
K=FL 
FL=O 
DO 210,1=1 ,K 
IF (TEMPFE(IH1:1 ).NE.' ') THEN 
FL=FL+1 
L1=INDEX(TEMPFE(I),' ') 
IF (L 1.EO.O) L1=SO 
FE(FL)= TEMPFE(IH1:L 1) 
END IF 
210 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE TANKSTATE 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ ••••••••••••••••• _ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C Subrouitine to generate the event statements for the vessel model. 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
CHARACTER FU(SOO)"S,DV(20)"4,VR(20),PT(10)"3,NA"SO,AD(2S)"SO, 
" FE(4S)"SO,FI(SO)"SO,NS"SO,MC,FA(S)"SO,DT(25)"SO,TE(200)"12 
INTEGER IL,FL,DL,JL,PV(10,20),PC(10,20),PM,CM,KL,LG(10),INLET, 
" VES,NF(10),ET(1 0),RF(1 0),FLAG(1 0) 
COMMON/ONEIFU,DV,VR,PT,NA,AD,FE,FI,NS,MC,FA,DT,TE 
COMMONITWOIIL,FL,DL,JL,PV,PC,PM,CM,KL 
COMMONITWELVE/LG,INLET,VES,NF,ET,RF,FLAG 
CHARACTE R VESCH, POCH, TEMPFI(SO)"SO, BASICF"1 O,TEMPEV(2S)"1 2 
INTEGER PO,FAUPOR(SO,12) 
3 FORMAT(/,",A) 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ ••••••• _ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C Initialize the temporary storage strings. 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C-32 
/' 
DO 100,1=1,50 
TEMPFI(I)=FI(I) 
100 FAUPOR(I,1)=0 
WRITE(VESCH :(11 )')VES 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Consider the effect of each inlet port on the level and pressure. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 200,P0=1 ,INLET 
WRITE(POCH:(11),)PO 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C For a non-flow Inlet port SOME flow may be a cause of high level 
C or pressure. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (NF(PO).EQ.1) THEN 
JL=JL+1 
IF (LG(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)a'V G'IIPOCHIfIN SOME:L'INESCHIfVES HI' 
IF (FLAG(2).EQ.0) THEN 
L1=LENGTH(THEMPFI(JL) 
TEMPFI(JL)-TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)If,P'INESCHIfVES HI' 
END IF 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)='V G'IIPOCHlfIN SOME:P'INESCHIfVES HI' 
END IF 
ELSE 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C For a flow Inlet port NO flow may be a cause of low level 
C or pressure. 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JL=JL+1 
IF (LG(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)='V G'IIPOCHIfIN NONE:L'INESCHIfVES LO' 
IF (FLAG(2).EQ.0) THEN 
L 1=LENGTH(THEMPFI(JL) 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)/f,P'INESCHIfVES LO' 
END IF 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)='V G'IIPOCHIfIN NONE:P'INESCHIfVES LO' 
END IF 
ENDIF 
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C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C If REVerse flow is possible through the inlet port, then 
C this may be a cause of low or no level or low pressure, 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (RF(PO),EO,O) THEN 
JL=JL+1 
IF (LG(PO),EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)='V G'/IPOCHIfIN REV:L'/NESCHlfVES LO,L'/NESCHlfVES NONE' 
IF (FLAG(2).EO.0) THEN 
L 1:LENGTH(THEMPFI(JL) 
TEMPFI(JL)=TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)1f,P'/NESCHlfVES LO' 
ENDIF 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)='V G'/IPOCHIfIN REV:P'/NESCHlfVES LO' 
END IF 
END IF 
200 CONTINUE 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C If there is only one liquid inlet flow port then the NONE deviation is 
C a cause of C(DUMMY). Otherwise the NONE deviation for each port forms 
C a decision table. This forms part of the no flow out decision table. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (LG(10).NE.1) THEN 
IF (FLAG(4).EO.1) THEN 
DO 21 O,P0=1,INLET 
IF (LG(PO).EO.O.AND.NF(PO).EO.O) THEN 
WRITE(POCH,'(11),)PO 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='V G'/IPOCHIfIN NONE:C(DUMMy)' 
END IF 
210 CONTINUE 
END IF 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C The 'no flow in' decision table for C(DUMMY) or the single event 
C statement is also a cause of no level. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='I C(DUMMYj:L'/NESCHlfVES NONE' 
ENDIF 
C-34 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Now consider the effect of each outlet port on the level and pressure. 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 220,PO=INLET+l,VES-l 
WRITE(POCH:(ll),)PO 
e -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e The low deviation may be caused by SOME flow out of a non-flow port. 
e ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (NF(PO).EO.l) THEN 
JL=JL+l 
IF (LG(PO).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPOCHIfOUT SOME:L'INESCHIfVES LO' 
IF (FLAG(2).EO.0) THEN 
L 1 =LENGTH(TEMPFI(JL)) 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)If,P'INESCHIfVES LO' 
END IF 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPOCHIfOUT SOME:P'INESCH/rvES LO' 
END IF 
ELSE 
e ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e The high deviation may be caused by NO flow out for a normal flow port. 
e ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JL=JL+l 
IF (LG(PO).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPOCHIfOUT NONE:L'INESCHlrvES HI' 
IF (FLAG(2).EO.0) THEN 
L 1 =LENGTH(TEMPFI(JL)) 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)1f,P'lNESCH/rvES HI' 
END IF 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPOCHIfOUT NONE:P'INESCHlrvES HI' 
END IF 
END IF 
e --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e The high deviation may also be caused by REVerse flow through 
e an outlet port, if possible. 
e ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C-3S 
IF (RF(PO).EO.O) THEN 
JL=JL+1 
IF (LG(PO).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPOCHIfOUT REV:L'INESCHIfVES HI' 
IF (FLAG(2).EO.0) THEN 
L 1 ~LENGTH(TEMPFI(JL)) 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)1f,P'INESCHI!VES HI' 
END IF 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPOCHIfOUT REV:P'INESCH/tVES HI' 
END IF 
END IF 
220 CONTINUE 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C No or reverse flow through an inlet port can be caused by High 
C effective pressure. Use the EVSTAT routine. 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BASICF='V P'INESCHIfVES HI' 
NDEV=O 
DO 230,P0=1 ,INLET 
WRITE(POCH,'(11)')PO 
IF (NF(PO).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+ 1 )='G'IIPOCHI!IN NONE' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='R'IIPOCHIfIN NONE' 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
END IF 
IF (RF(PO).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='G'IIPOCHI!IN REV 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='R'IIPOCHI!IN REV 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
END IF 
230 CONTINUE 
IF (NDEV.NE.O) CALL EVSTAT(TEMPEV,BASICF,NDEV,TEMPFI,JL) 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C No or reverse flow through an outlet port can be caused by LOw 
C effective pressure. Use the EVSTAT routine. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BASICF='P'INESCHIfVES NONE' 
NDEV=O 
DO 240,PO=INLET+1 ,VES·1 
WRITE(POCH:(11),)PO 
C-36 
IF (RF(PO).EQ.O) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='Q'/IPOCHIIOUT REV' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='P'/IPOCHIIOUT REV' 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
END IF 
240 CONTINUE 
IF (NDEV.NE.O) THEN 
JzJL+1 
CALL EVSTAT(TEMPEV,BASICF,NDEV,TEMPFI,~L) 
DO 245,1-J,JL 
245 TEMPFI(I)='V'IITEMPFI(I) 
END IF 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C Set up the level and pressure relationship if vessel is 
C closed and liquid is present. 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••..••••••• - ••.•••••••••.•••••••••.••••••••••••• - ••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••• 
IF (LG(10).NE.1) THEN 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='V L'INESCHIfVES NONE:P'INESCHIfVES LO' 
END IF 
C ••.••••.••.••.•••.•.. - •••.•••......•••.•...• -.-•. --•••.••• - ••••• - ..••.•••••.......•••••• - •... - •• 
C Initialize the FAUPOR array for the basic faults LK·Lp·EN, 
C LK·Hp·EN (if not an open vessel), EXT·HEAT and EXT·COLD for 
C the vessel port. Use GENEV for these. 
C .......................................................................................................... . 
1=1 
FAUPOR(l,l)=l 
IF (FLAG(2).EQ.0) THEN 
FAUPOR(2,l)=2 
1=2 
ENDIF 
FAUPOR(I+ 1,1 )s5 
FAUPOR(I+2,1)=6 
J=l 
1=1+2 
DO 250,K=J,1 
FAUPOR(K,2)=1 
250 FAUPOR(K,3)=VES 
CALL GENEV(FAUPOR,TEMPFI) 
C·37 
C ••••••••.•••••••••••••.••••••••..••••..•.••..••.•••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••..•••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C Create the NORMAL state event statement. 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••...••••••••.••••...••••..•••••...•••••..••••••.•••••••.•••••••..••••••..•••••.••••••• 
BASICF.'S NORMAL' 
NDEV..o 
DO 260,P0=1 ,INLET 
WRITE(POCH,'(11),)PO 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='G'IIPOCHIfIN SOME' 
IF (NF(PO).EQ.1) TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='G'IIPOCHIfIN NONE' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='R'IIPOCHlfIN SOME' 
IF (NF(PO).EQ.1) TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='R'IIPOCHlflN NONE' 
260 NDEV=NDEV+2 
DO 270,PO=INLET+1 ,VE5-1 
WRITE(POCH,'(11),)PO 
TEMPEV(NDEV+ 1 )='Q'IIPOCHlfOUT SOME' 
IF (NF(PO).EQ.1) TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='Q'IIPOCHlfOUT NONE' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='P'IIPOCHlfOUT SOME' 
IF (NF(PO).EQ.1) TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='P'IIPOCHlfOUT NONE' 
270 NDEV=NDEV+2 
CALL EVSTAT(TEMPEV,BASICF,NDEV,TEMPFI,JL) 
C ••••••••••••••••••• _ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C Create the IMPOSS state event statement. 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _._ ••••••••••••••••• _ •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
BASICF='S IMPOSS' 
NDEV=O 
DO 280,P0=1 ,INLET 
WRITE(POCH,'(11)')PO 
IF (RF(PO).EQ.1) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1).'G'IIPOCHlflN REV' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2).'R'IIPOCHIfIN REV' 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
END IF 
280 CONTINUE 
DO 290,PO=INLET+1 ,VES-1 
WRITE(POCH,'(11),)PO 
IF (RF(PO).EQ.1) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='Q'IIPOCHlfOUT REV' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='P'IIPOCHlfOUT REV' 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
C·38 
ENDIF 
290 CONTINUE 
IF (NDEV.NE.O) CALL EVSTAT(TEMPEV,BASICF,NDEV,TEMPFI,JL) 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Completion of event statements, now check. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT3,'THE FOLLOWING EVENT STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED:' 
CALL CHECK(TEMPFI,JL) 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Take the event statements from the temporary array and 
C place in the FI array. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
K=JL 
JL=O 
DO 300,I:l,K 
IF (TEMPFI(I)(l:l ).NE: ') THEN 
JL=JL+l 
L l=INDEX(TEMPFI(I),' ') 
IF (L1.EO.O) Ll=SO 
FI(JL)= TEMPFI(I)(l:L 1) 
END IF 
300 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE TANKTABLE 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Subroutine to generate the decision tables for the vessel model. 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHARACTER FU(SOO)'S,DV(20)' 4,VR(20),PT(1 0) '3,NA 'SO,AD(25)'SO, 
, FE(45)'SO,FI(50)'SO,NS'SO,MC,FA(5)'SO,DT(25)'SO,TE(200)'12 
INTEGER IL,FL,DL,JL,PV(l 0,20),PC(1 O,20),PM,CM,KL,LG(1 O),INLET, 
, VES,NF(10),ET(10),RF(10),FLAG(10) 
COMMON/ONEIFU,DV,VR,PT,NA,AD,FE,FI,NS,MC,FA,DT,TE 
COMMONITWOIIL,FL,DL,JL,PV,PC,PM,CM,KL 
COMMONITWELVElLG,INLET,VES,NF,ET,RF,FLAG 
C-39 
CHARACTER VESCH,POCH,TEMPDT(25)'SO 
INTEGER PO,L 1 
3 FORMAT(/,",A) 
C; -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C; Initialize the temporary storage strings. 
C; -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 100,1=1,25 
100 TEMPDT(I)=DT(I) 
WRITE(VESCH:(ll)')VES 
C; ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C; If liquid is present, then generate the level decision tables. 
C; If there is more than one inlet liquid flow ports, string together 
C; the NONE deviations as a cause of C;(DUMMY). 
C; -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (LG(10).NE.l) THEN 
IF (FLAG(4).GT.l) THEN 
DL=DL+l 
DO 200,PO=l ,INLET 
IF (LG(PO).EO.O.AND.NF(PO).EO.O) THEN 
WRITE(POCH:(ll)')PO 
L l=LENGTH(TEMPDT(DL)) 
IF (L 1.EO.0) THEN 
TEMPDT(DL)='V G'IIPOCHIfIN NONE' 
ELSE IF (L 1.L T.50) THEN 
TEMPDT(DL)= TEMPDT(DL)(l:L 1)/f V G'IIPOCHlflN NONE' 
ELSE 
TEMPDT(DL)= TEMPDT(DL)(l:L 1)/f I O(DUMMY) T C(DUMMY)' 
FLAG(5)=1 
DL=DL+l 
TEMPDT(DL)='V G'IIPOCHIfIN NONE' 
END IF 
END IF 
200 CONTINUE 
L 1.LENGTH(TEMPDT(DL)) 
IF (FLAG(5).EO.0) THEN 
TEMPDT(DL)= TEMPDT(DL)(l:L 1)/f T C(DUMMY)' 
ELSE 
TEMPDT(DL)= TEMPDT(DL)(l:L 1)/f T O(DUMMY)' 
END IF 
END IF 
C-40 
c: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: For liquid outlet flow ports, generate causes of NO flow and pressure. 
c: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
• 
DO 210,PO=INLET+1,VE5-1 
IF (LG(PO).EO.O.AND.NF(PO).EO.O) THEN 
WRITE(POCH,'(l1)')PO 
DL=DL+1 
TEMPDT(DL)='I C(DUMMY) V L'/NESCHIfVES NONE T O'/IPOCH/fOUT NONE,P' 
/IPOCHIfOUT NONE' 
END IF 
210 CONTINUE 
END IF 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Generate the decision tables for High and LOw temperature and 
c: composition caused by reverse flow through the outlets. 
c: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 220,PO=INLET+1,VES-1 
IF (RF(PO).EO.O) THEN 
WRITE(POCH,'(11),)PO 
TEMPDT(DL+1)='V O'/IPOCHlfOUT REV V U'/IPOCHlfOUT HI T rlNESCH/fVES HI' 
TEMPDT(DL+2)='V O'/IPOCHlfOUT REV V U'/IPOCHlfOUT LO T T/NESCHIfVES LO' 
TEMPDT(DL+3)='V O'/IPOCHIfOUT REV V Y' /IPOCHIfOUT HI T X' /NESCHIfVES HI' 
TEMPDT(DL+4)='V O'/IPOCH/fOUT REV V Y'/IPOCHIfOUT LO T X'/NESCHIfVES LO' 
DL=DL+4 
ENDIF 
220 CONTINUE 
c: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: C:ompletion of decision tables, now check. 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT3,'THE FOLLOWING DECISION TABLES HAVE BEEN CREATED:' 
CALL CHECK(TEMPDT,DL) 
c: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Take dec. tabs. from the temporary array and place in the DL array. 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
K=DL 
DL=O 
DO 300,1=1,K 
IF (TEMPDT(I)(1:1).NE.' ') THEN 
DL=DL+1 
L1=INDEX(TEMPDT(I),' ') 
IF (l1.EO.O) L 1 =80 
C-41 
DT(DL)= TEMPDT(I)(1:L 1) 
END IF 
300 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
C-42 
Appendix D 
Heat Exchanger Model Examples 
0.1 Partial Reboiler 
1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
200 HEAT EXCHANGER (PARTIAL REBOILER, SHELL & TUBE) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 15 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 32 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 28 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 6 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGER WITH COLD FLUID IN THE SHELL SIDE. 
ANY PHASE CHANGE OR PRESSURE EFFECTS IN THE TUBE SIDE IS IGNORED. 
A PARTIAL PHASE CHANGE TAKES PLACE IN THE SHELL SIDE. 
THE TUBE SIDE IS AT A HIGHER PRESSURE THAN THE SHELL SIDE. 
TUBE SIDE. 
PORT 1: INLET STREAM, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 2: OUTLET STREAM, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 3: DRAIN PORT, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
SHELL SIDE. 
PORT 4: INLET STREAM, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 5: LIQUID OUTLET STREAM, NO PRESSURE EFFECTS, NO REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 6: VAPOUR OUTLET STREAM, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 7: VESSEL PORT FOR LIQUID IN THE SHELL SIDE 
PORT 8: VESSEL PORT FOR VAPOUR IN THE SHELL SIDE 
PORT 9: VESSEL PORT FOR LIQUID TO VAPOUR FLOW IN THE SHELL SIDE. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
GlIN= F (QlIN, Q20Ul) 
RlIN= F (R20Ul) 
Q20UT= F (GlIN, G20Ul) 
P20UT= F (PI IN) 
T20UT= F (GlIN, T1IN, -G41N, T7VES) 
XC20UT = F (XCI IN) 
Q30UT= F (G30UT, PlIN) 
P30UT= F (PlIN) 
T30UT= F (GlIN, TllN, -G41N, T7VES) 
XC30UT. F (XCI IN) 
0-1 
G4IN= F (04IN, -PBVES) 
R4IN= F (-PBVES) 
U4IN= F (T7VES) 
YA4IN. F (-XB7VES) 
YB4IN= F (XB7VES) 
OSOUT = F (GSOUT) 
PSOUT = F (PBVES) 
TSOUT = F (T7VES) 
XASOUT. F (-XB7VES) 
XBSOUT - F (XB7VES) 
OSOUT= F (GSOUT, PBVES) 
PSOUT = F (P8VES) 
TSOUT = F (TBVES) 
XASOUT = F (XABVES) 
XBSOUT. F (-XA8VES) 
L7VES: F (G4IN, -OSOUT, -OeVES) 
T7VES: F (P8VES, XB7VES) 
XB7VES= F (XB4IN, 09VES) 
P8VES: F (-OSOUT, L7VES, OeVES) 
T8VES: F (paVES, -XA8VES) 
XAaVES= F (-XB7VES, -OeVES) 
oeVES: F (GlIN, T1IN, -XB7VES, -paVES) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V OSOUT HI: L7VES NONE 
v 030UT SOME: GllN HI, 020UT LO, 020UT NONE, 020UT REV, RllN HI 
V 030UT SOME: P20UT LO, P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
V G41N REV: L7VES LO, L7VES NONE, paVES LO 
V OSOUT REV: paVES HI 
V030UT REV: GllN LO,GlIN NONE, 020UTHI, RllN LO, RllN NONE, P20UT HI 
V 030UT REV: XD20UT HI 
V L7VES HI: T20UT LO, oeVES HI 
V L7VES LO: T20UT HI, oeVES LO 
V L7VES NONE: T20UT HI, TaVES HI, paVES LO, oeVES NONE 
V P8VES HI: G41N NONE, R41N NONE, G41N REV, R41N REV 
V P8VES NONE: OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV 
V oeVES NONE: L7VES HI, paVES LO 
F EXT-HEAT: T20UT HI, T7VES HI, paVES HI, TBVES HI 
F EXT-COLD: T20UT LO, T7VES LO, P8VES LO, TBVES LO 
F LK-LP-EN: L7VES LO, L7VES NONE, paVES LO 
F INT-LK: GllN HI, RllN HI, 020UT LO, 020UT NONE, 020UT REV, P20UT LO 
F INT-LK: P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
F INT-LK: L7VES HI, paVES HI 
F INT-LK: T20UT LO, T7VES HI, T8VES HI, XC7VES HI, XC8VES HI 
F PART-BLK: GllN LO, RllN LO, 020UTLO, P20UTLO 
F PART-BLK: T20UT LO, T7VES LO, TaVES LO 
0-2 
F FOULING: T20UT HI, 17VES LO, T8VES LO, Q9VES LO, Q9VES NONE 
F FROTHING: T20UT HI, 17VES LO, T8VES LO, Q9VES LO 
F VAP-BLKT: T20UT HI, 17VES LO, T8VES LO, Q9VES LO 
S NORMAL: Q30UT NONE, G41N SOME, Q50UT SOME, Q60UT SOME, R41N SOME 
S NORMAL: P50UT SOME, P60UT SOME 
S IMPOSS: GllN REV, RllN REV, Q50UT REV, P50UT REV,Q9VES REV 
5) DECISION TABLES 
V U60UT HI V Q60UT REV T T8VES HI 
V U60UT LO V Q60UT REV T T8VES LO 
V YA60UT HI V Q60UT REV T XA8VES HI 
V YA60UT LO V Q60UT REV T XABVES LO 
V YB60UT HI V Q60UT REV T XA8VES LO 
V YB60UT LO V Q60UT REV T XABVES HI 
6) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS I, 2, 4, 5 AND 6. 
MODEL IS MULTI-COMPONENT 
0-3 
0.2 Partial Condenser 
1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
201 HEAT EXCHANGER (PARTIAL CONDENSER, SHELL & TUBE) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIOESCRIPTIONS: 15 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 34 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 29 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 16 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGER WITIl HOT FLUID IN TIlE SHELL SIDE. 
ANY PHASE CHANGE OR PRESSURE EFFECTS IN TIlE TUBE SIDE IS IGNORED. 
A PARTIAL PHASE CHANGE TAKES PLACE IN TIlE SHELL SIDE. 
TIlE TUBE SIDE IS AT A LOWER PRESSURE THAN THE SHELL SIDE. 
TUBE SIDE. 
PORT 1: INLET STREAM, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 2: OUTLET STREAM, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
SHELL SIDE. 
PORT 3: INLET STREAM, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 4: LIQUID OUTLET STREAM, NO PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 5: VAPOUR OUTLET STREAM, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 6: RELIEF PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 7: VESSEL PORT FOR LIQUID IN THE SHELL SIDE 
PORT 8: VESSEL PORT FOR VAPOUR IN TIlE SHELL SIDE 
PORT 9: VESSEL PORT FOR VAPOUR TO LIQUID FLOW IN THE SHELL SIDE. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
GlIN= F (QlIN, Q20UT) 
RlIN= F (R20UT) 
UlIN. F ( G3IN, T8VES) 
Q20UT- F (GlIN, G20UT) 
P20UT = F (PlIN) 
T20UT- F (-GlIN, T1IN, G3IN, T8VES) 
XC20UT. F (XC1IN) 
G3IN= F (Q3IN, -P8VES) 
R3IN= F (-P8VES) 
U3IN= F (T8VES) 
YA3IN= F (XA8VES) 
YB3IN. F (-XA8VES) 
Q40UT = F (G40UT) 
P40UT = F (P8VES) 
T40UT. F (T7VES) 
XA40UT = F (-XB7VES) 
0-4 
XB40UT = F (XB7VES) 
OSOUT= F (GSOUT, P8VES) 
PSOUT. F (P8VES) 
TSOUT. F (T8VES) 
XASOUT = F (XA8VES) 
XBSOUT = F (-XA8VES) 
060UT= F (G60UT, P8VES) 
P60UT. F (P8VES) 
T60UT = F (T8VES) 
XA60UT = F (XA8VES) 
XB60UT = F (-XA8VES) 
L7VES: F (-040UT, 09VES) 
T7VES: F (P8VES, XB7VES) 
XB7VES= F (-XA8VES, -09VES) 
P8VES: F (G3IN, -OSOUT, L7VES, -09VES) 
T8VES: F (P8VES, -XA8VES) 
XA8VES= F (XA3IN, 09VES) 
09VES: F (G1IN, -T1IN, -XA8VES, P8VES) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
v 040UT HI: L7VES NONE 
V 060UT SOME: P8VES LO 
V G31N REV: P8VES LO 
V 040UT REV: L7VES HI, P8VES HI 
V OSOUT REV: P7VES HI 
V 060UT REV: P8VES HI, XD8VES HI 
V L7VES HI: T20UT HI, 09VES LO 
V L7VES LO: T20UT LO, 09VES HI 
V L7VES NONE: T20UT LO, P8VES LO, 09VES HI 
V P8VES HI: G31N NONE, R31N NONE, G31N REV, R31N REV 
V P8VES NONE: 040UT REV, P40UT REV, OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV 
V P8VES NONE: 060UT REV, P60UT REV 
V 09VES NONE: L7VES LO, P8VES HI 
F EXT-HEAT: U1IN HI, T20UT HI, T7VES HI, P8VES HI, T8VES HI 
F EXT-COLD: U11N LO, T20UT LO, T7VES LO, P8VES LO, T8VES LO 
F LK-LP-EN: L7VES LO, L7VES NONE, P8VES LO 
F INT-LK: G11N LO, G11N NONE, G11N REV, R1IN LO, R11N NONE, R11N REV 
F INT-LK: 020UT HI, P20UT HI 
F INT-LK: L7VES LO, P8VES LO 
F INT-LK: U11N HI, T20UT HI, T7VES LO, T8VES LO 
F INT-LK: YA11N HI, YB11N HI, XA20UT HI, XB20UT HI 
FPART-BLK: G11N LO, R11N LO, 020UTLO, P20UTLO 
F PART-BLK: U11N HI, T20UT HI, T7VES HI, T8VES HI 
F FOULING: U11N LO, T20UT LO, T7VES HI, T8VES HI, 09VES LO, 09VES NONE 
F FROTHING: U11N LO, T20UT LO, T7VES HI, T8VES HI, 09VES LO 
F VAP-BLKT: U11N LO, T20UT LO, T7VES HI, T8VES HI, 09VES LO 
0-5 
S NORMAL: G31N SOME, 040UT SOME, OSOUT SOME, OSOUT NONE, R31N SOME 
S NORMAL: P40UT SOME, PSOUT SOME 
S IMPOSS: 020UT REV, P20UT REV, 09VES REV 
5) DECISION TABLES 
V U40UT HI V 040UT REV T T7VES HI 
V U40UT LO V 040UT REV T T7VES LO 
V U50UT HI V 050UT REV T TSVES HI 
V U50UT LO V 050UT REV T TSVES LO 
V USOUT HI V OSOUT REV T TBVES HI 
V USOUT LO V OSOUT REV T TBVES LO 
V YA40UT HI V 040UT REV T XB7VES LO 
V YA40UT LO V 040UT REV T XB7VES HI 
V YB40UT HI V 040UT REV T XB7VES HI 
V YB40UT LO V 040UT REV T XB7VES LO 
V YA50UT HI V 050UT REV T XABVES HI 
V YA50UT LO V 050UT REV T XABVES LO 
V YB50UT HI V 050UT REV T XABVES LO 
V YB50UT LO V 050UT REV T XASVES HI 
V YDSOUT HI V OSOUT REV T XDSVES HI 
V YDSOUT LO V OSOUT REV T XD8VES LO 
S) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1, 2, 3, 4 AND 5. 
MODEL IS MULTI-COMPONENT 
0-6 
0.3 Total Reboiler 
1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
202 HEAT EXCHANGER (TOTAL REBOILER, FRAME & PLATE) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 15 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 31 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 28 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 12 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
FRAME AND PLATE HEAT EXCHANGER WITH COLD FLUID IN THE FRAME SIDE. 
ANY PHASE CHANGE OR PRESSURE EFFECTS IN THE PLATE SIDE IS IGNORED. 
A COMPLETE PHASE CHANGE TAKES PLACE IN THE FRAME SIDE. 
THE PLATE SIDE IS AT THE SAME PRESSURE AS THE FRAME SIDE. 
PLATE SIDE. 
PORT 1: INLET STREAM, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 2: OUTLET STREAM, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 3: RELIEF PORT, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
FRAME SIDE. 
PORT 4: INLET STREAM, NO PRESSURE EFFECTS, NO REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 5: OUTLET STREAM, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 6: RELIEF PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 7: DRAIN PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 8: VESSEL PORT RELATING TO THE FRAME SIDE 
PORT 9: VESSEL PORT FOR LIQUID TO VAPOUR FLOW IN THE FRAME SIDE. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
G1IN= F (QlIN, Q20UT) 
RlIN= F (R20UT) 
UlIN= F (U20UT, -G4IN, T8VES) 
YlIN= F (Y20UT) 
Q20UT= F (GlIN, G20UT) 
P20UT= F (PlIN) 
T20UT= F (GlIN, T1IN, -G4IN, T8VES) 
X20UT = F (Xl IN) 
Q30UT= F (G30UT, PlIN) 
P30UT = F (PlIN) 
T30UT= F (GlIN, TlIN, -G4IN, T8VES) 
X30UT= F (Xl IN) 
G4IN= F (Q4IN) 
R4IN= F (-P8VES) 
QSOUT = F (GSOUT, P8VES) 
P50UT = F (P8VES) 
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TSOUT = F (TBVES) 
XSOUT = F (XBVES) 
OSOUT= F (GSOUT, PBVES) 
PSOUT = F (PBVES) 
TSOUT = F (TBVES) 
XSOUT = F (XBVES) 
070UT= F (G70UT, PBVES) 
P70UT = F (PBVES) 
TrOUT = F (TBVES) 
X70UT = F (XBVES) 
LBVES= F (G4IN, -09VES) 
PBVES: F (-OSOUT, LBVES, 09VES) 
TBVES= F (PBVES, -09VES) 
XBVES: F (X4IN) 
09VES= F (GlIN, T1IN, -PBVES) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V 030UT SOME: GllN HI, 020UT LO, 020UT NONE, 020UT REV, RllN HI 
V 030UT SOME: P20UT LO, P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
V 060UT SOME: PBVES LO 
V 070UT SOME: LBVES LO, LBVES NONE, PBVES LO 
V OSOUT REV: PBVES HI 
V030UT REV:GlIN LO,GlIN NONE, GllN REV, 020UTHI, RllN LO 
V 030UT REV: RllN NONE, RllN REV, P20UT HI, YllN HI, X20UT HI 
V OSOUT REV: PBVES HI, XBVES HI 
V 070UT REV: L8VES HI, PBVES HI, X8VES HI 
V L8VES HI: T20UT LO, 09VES HI 
V L8VES LO: T20UT HI, 09VES LO 
V L8VES NONE: T20UT HI, T8VES LO, PBVES HI, 09VES NONE 
V P8VES HI: G41N NONE, R41N NONE 
V P8VES NONE: OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV, 060UT REV, PSOUT REV 
V P8VES NONE: 070UT REV, P70UT REV 
V 09VES NONE: L8VES HI, P8VES LO 
F EXT-HEAT: UllN HI, T20UT HI, PBVES HI, TBVES HI 
F EXT-COLD: U11N LO, T20UT LO, PBVES LO, TBVES LO 
F LK-LP-EN: LBVES LO, L8VES NONE, PBVES LO 
F PART -BLK: GllN LO, RllN LO, 020UT LO, P20UT LO 
F PART-BLK: G41N LO, R41N LO, OSOUT LO, PSOUT LO 
FPART-BLK: UllN LO, T20UTLO, TBVES LO 
F FOULING: UllN HI, T20UT HI, TBVES LO, 09VES LO, 09VES NONE 
F FROTHING: UllN HI, T20UT HI, TBVES LO, 09VES LO 
F VAP-BLKT: U11N HI, T20UT HI, TBVES LO, 09VES LO 
S NORMAL: 030UT NONE, G41N SOME, OSOUT SOME, 060UT NONE, 070UT NONE 
S NORMAL: R41N SOME, PSOUT SOME 
S IMPOSS: G41N REV, R41N REV, 09VES REV 
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5) DECISION TABLES 
V U50UT HI V 050UT REV T T8VES HI 
V U50UT LO V 050UT REV T T8VES LO 
V USOUT HI V OSOUT REV T T8VES HI 
V USOUT LO V OSOUT REV T T8VES LO 
V U70UT HI V 070UT REV T T8VES HI 
V U70UT LO V 070UT REV T T8VES LO 
V Y50UT HI V 050UT REV T X8VES HI 
V Y50UT LO V 050UT REV T X8VES LO 
V YSOUT HI V OSOUT REV T X8VES HI 
V YSOUT LO V OSOUT REV T X8VES LO 
V Y70UT HI V 070UT REV T X8VES HI 
V Y70UT LO V 070UT REV T X8VES LO 
S) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1,2,4 AND 5. 
NO MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES 
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0.4 Total Condenser 
1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
203 HEAT EXCHANGER (TOTAL CONDENSER, SHELL & TUBE) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 15 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 31 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 30 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: a 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGER WITH HOT FLUID IN THE TUBE SIDE. 
ANY PHASE CHANGE OR PRESSURE EFFECTS IN THE SHELL SIDE IS IGNORED. 
A COMPLETE PHASE CHANGE TAKES PLACE IN THE TUBE SIDE. 
THE SHELL SIDE IS AT A LOWER PRESSURE THAN THE TUBES SIDE. 
SHELL SIDE. 
PORT 1: INLET STREAM, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 2: OUTLET STREAM, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 3: DRAIN PORT, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
TUBE SIDE. 
PORT 4: INLET STREAM, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 5: OUTLET STREAM, NO PRESSURE EFFECTS, NO REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 6: RELIEF PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 7: DRAIN PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 8: VESSEL PORT RELATING TO THE TUBES SIDE 
PORT 9: VESSEL PORT FOR VAPOUR TO LIQUID FLOW IN THE TUBES SIDE. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
GlIN= F (QlIN, Q20UT) 
RlIN= F (R20UT) 
Q20UT= F (GlIN, G20UT) 
P20UT- F (PlIN) 
T20UT- F (-GlIN, T1IN, G4IN, T8VES) 
X20UT - F (Xl IN) 
Q30UT E F (G30UT, PlIN) 
P30UT = F (PlIN) 
T30UT. F (-GlIN, TlIN, G4IN, T8VES) 
X30UT= F (Xl IN) 
G4IN- F (Q4IN, -paVES) 
R4IN= F (-P8VES) 
U4IN. F (T8VES) 
Y4IN. F (XaVES) 
Q50UT= F (G50UT) 
P50UT = F (P8VES) 
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TSOUT = F (T8VES) 
XSOUT. F (X8VES) 
OSOUT. F (GSOUT, P8VES) 
PSOUT = F (P8VES) 
TSOUT = F (T8VES) 
XSOUT = F (X8VES) 
070UT. F (G70UT, P8VES) 
P70UT = F (P8VES) 
T70UT = F (T8VES) 
X70UT = F (X8VES) 
L8VES= F (-QSOUT, 09VES) 
P8VES. F (G4IN, L8VES, ·09VES) 
T8VES= F (P8VES, ·09VES) 
X8VES= F (X4IN) 
09VE8- F (G1IN, ·T1IN, P8VES) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V OSOUT HI: L8VES NONE 
V 030UT SOME: G11N HI, 020UT LO, 020UT NONE, R11N HI, P20UT LO, P20UT NONE 
V OSOUT SOME: P8VES LO 
V 070UT SOME: L8VES LO, L8VES NONE, P8VES LO 
V G41N REV: P8VES LO 
V 030UT REV: G11N LO, R11N LO, GlIN NONE, R11N NONE, 020UT HI, P20UT HI 
V 030UT REV: X20UT HI 
V OSOUT REV: P8VES HI, X8VES HI 
V 070UT REV: L8VES HI, P8VES HI, X8VES HI 
V L8VES HI: T20UT HI, 09VES LO 
V L8VES LO: T20UT LO, 09VES HI 
V L8VES NONE: T20UT LO, P8VES LO, 09VES HI 
V P8VES HI: G41N NONE, R41N NONE, G41N REV, R41N REV 
V P8VES NONE: OSOUT REV, PSOUT REV, 070UT REV, P70UT REV 
V 09VES NONE: L8VES LO, P8VES HI 
F EXT·HEAT: T20UT HI, P8VES HI, T8VES HI 
F EXT·COLD: T20UT LO, P8VES LO, T8VES LO 
F LK·LP·EN: G11N HI, 020UT LO, 020UT NONE, R11N HI, P20UT LO, P20UT NONE 
F INT·LK: G11N LO, G11N NONE, RlIN LO, R11N NONE, 020UTHI, P20UTHI 
F INT·LK: L8VES LO, P8VES LO 
F INT·LK: T20UT HI, T8VES LO, X20UT HI 
F PART·BLK: G41N LO, R41N LO, OSOUT LO, PSOUT LO 
F PART·BLK: T20UT HI, T8VES HI 
F FOULING: T20UT LO, T8VES HI, 09VES LO, 09VES NONE 
F FROTHING: T20UT LO, T8VES HI, 09VES LO 
F VAP·BLKT: T20UT LO, T8VES HI, 09VES LO 
S NORMAL: 030UT NONE, G41N SOME, OSOUT SOME, OSOUT NONE, 070UT NONE 
S NORMAL: R41N SOME, PSOUT SOME 
S IMPOSS: G11N REV, R11N REV, 020UT REV, P20UT REV, OSOUT REV 
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S IMPOSS: P50UT REV, Q9VES REV 
5) DECISION TABLES 
V U60UT HI V 060UT REV T TaVES HI 
V U60UT LO V 060UT REV T TaVES LO 
V U70UT HI V 070UT REV T TaVES HI 
V U70UT LO V 070UT REV T TaVES LO 
V Y60UT HI V 060UT REV T XaVES HI 
V Y60UT LO V 060UT REV T XaVES LO 
V Y70UT HI V 070UT REV T XaVES HI 
V Y70UT LO V 070UT REV T XaVES LO 
6) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1, 2, 4 AND 5. 
NO MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES 
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0.5 Heater Unit 
1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
204 HEAT EXCHANGER (HEATER, SHELL & TUBE) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 14 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 28 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 29 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 0 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGER WITH COLD FLUID IN THE SHELL SIDE. 
ANY PHASE CHANGE OR PRESSURE EFFECTS IN THE TUBE SIDE IS IGNORED. 
NO PHASE CHANGE TAKES PLACE IN THE SHELL SIDE. 
THE TUBE SIDE IS AT A HIGHER PRESSURE THAN THE SHELL SIDE. 
TUBE SIDE. 
PORT 1: INLET STREAM, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 2: OUTLET STREAM, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 3: RELIEF PORT, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 4: DRAIN PORT, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
SHELL SIDE. 
PORT 5: INLET STREAM, NO PRESSURE EFFECTS, NO REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 6: OUTLET STREAM, NO PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 7: RELIEF PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 8: DRAIN PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
G1IN. F (Q1IN, Q20Ul) 
R1IN= F (R20Ul) 
Q20UT. F (GlIN, G20Ul) 
P20UT= F (P1IN) 
T20UT" F (G1IN, T1IN, -G5IN, T5IN) 
X20UT. F (X1IN) 
Q30UT & F (G30UT, P1IN) 
P30UT. F (P1IN) 
T30UT- F (G1IN, T1IN, -G5IN, T5IN) 
X30UT= F (X1IN) 
Q40UT.F (G40UT, P1IN) 
P40UT= F (P1IN) 
T40UT- F (G1IN, T1IN, -G5IN, T5IN) 
X40UT. F (X1IN) 
G5IN= F (Q5IN, QSOUl) 
R5IN= F (RSOUl) 
QSOUT. F (G5IN, GSOUl) 
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PSOUT K F (PSIN) 
TSOUTm F (GlIN, T1IN, -GSIN, TSIN) 
XSOUT = F (XSIN) 
070UT = F (G70UT, PSIN) 
P70UT m F (PSIN) 
T70UT= F (GlIN, TlIN, -GSIN, TSIN) 
X70UT = F (XSIN) 
080UT= F (G80UT, PSIN) 
P80UT = F (PSIN) 
T80UT= F (GlIN, TlIN, -GSIN, T5IN) 
X80UT = F (X5IN) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V 030UT SOME: GllN HI, 020UT LO, 020UT NONE, 020UT REV, RllN HI 
V 030UT SOME: P20UT LO, P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
V 040UT SOME: GllN HI, 020UT LO, 020UT NONE, 020UT REV, RllN HI 
V 040UT SOME: P20UT LO, P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
V 070UT SOME: GSIN HI, OSOUT LO, OSOUT NONE, OSOUT REV, R51N HI 
V 070UT SOME: PSOUT LO, PSOUT NONE, PSOUT REV 
V 080UT SOME: GSIN HI, OSOUT LO, OSOUT NONE, OSOUT REV, RSIN HI 
V 080UT SOME: PSOUT LO, PSOUT NONE, PSOUT REV 
V030UT REV: GllN LO, GllN NONE, 020UTHI, R1IN LO, RllN NONE, P20UTHI 
V 030UT REV: X20UT HI 
V 040UT REV: GllN LO, GllN NONE, 020UT HI, RllN LO, R1IN NONE, P20UT HI 
V 040UT REV: X20UT HI 
V 070UT REV: G51N LO, G51N NONE, OSOUT HI, R51N LO, R51N NONE, PSOUT HI 
V 070UT REV: XSOUT HI 
V 080UT REV: GSIN LO, GSIN NONE, OSOUT HI, R51N LO, R51N NONE, PSOUT HI 
V 080UT REV: XSOUT HI 
F EXT-HEAT: T20UT HI, TSOUT HI 
F EXT-COLD: T20UT LO, TSOUT LO 
F LK-LP-EN: G51N HI, R51N HI, OSOUT LO, OSOUT NONE 
F LK-LP-EN: OSOUT REV, PSOUT LO, PSOUT NONE, PSOUT REV 
F INT-LK: G1IN HI, RllN HI, 020UT LO, 020UT NONE, 020UT REV, P20UT LO 
F INT-LK: P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
F INT-LK: G51N LO, G51N NONE, R51N LO, R51N NONE, OSOUT HI, PSOUT HI 
F INT-LK: T20UT LO, TSOUT HI, XSOUT HI 
F PART-BLK: GllN LO, R1IN LO, 020UTLO, P20UTLO 
F PART-BLK: T20UT LO, TSOUT LO 
F FOULING: T20UT HI, TSOUT LO 
S NORMAL: 030UT NONE, 040UT NONE, 070UT NONE, 080UT NONE 
S IMPOSS: GllN REV, RllN REV, G51N REV, RSIN REV 
5) DECISION TABLES 
N/A 
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6) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1,2,5 AND 6. 
NO MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES 
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0.6 Cooler Unit 
1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
205 HEAT EXCHANGER (COOLER, SHELL & TUBE) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 14 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 29 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 28 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 0 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
SHELL AND TUBE HEAT EXCHANGER WITH HOT FLUID IN THE SHELL SIDE. 
ANY PHASE CHANGE OR PRESSURE EFFECTS IN THE TUBE SIDE IS IGNORED. 
NO PHASE CHANGE TAKES PLACE IN THE SHELL SIDE. 
THE TUBE SIDE IS AT A LOWER PRESSURE THAN THE SHELL SIDE. 
TUBE SIDE. 
PORT 1: INLET STREAM, NO REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 2: OUTLET STREAM, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 3: RELIEF PORT, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
PORT 4: DRAIN PORT, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED 
SHELL SIDE. 
PORT 5: INLET STREAM, NO PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 6: OUTLET STREAM, NO PRESSURE EFFECTS, NO REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 7: RELIEF PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW 
PORT 8: DRAIN PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
G1IN= F (QlIN, Q20UT) 
R1IN= F (R20UT) 
Q20UT= F (G1IN, G20UT) 
P20UT= F (P1IN) 
T20UT= F (-G1IN, TlIN, G5IN, T5IN) 
X20UT = F (X1IN) 
Q30UT ~ F (G30UT, P1IN) 
P30UT = F (P lIN) 
T30UT= F (-G1IN, TlIN, G5IN, T5IN) 
X30UT = F (X1IN) 
Q40UT _ F (G40UT, P1IN) 
P40UT - F (P1IN) 
T40UT= F (-GlIN, T1IN, G5IN, T5IN) 
X40UT = F (X1IN) 
G5IN= F (Q5IN, Q60UT) 
R5IN= F (R60UT) 
U5IN= F (-GlIN, T1IN) 
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a60UT= F (GSIN, G60UT) 
P60UT. F (PSIN) 
T60UT= F (·G1IN, T1IN, GSIN, TSIN) 
X60UT. F (XSIN) 
a70UT: F (G70UT, PSIN) 
P70UT = F (PSIN) 
T70UT= F (-G1IN, T1IN, GSIN, TSIN) 
X70UT. F (XSIN) 
aSOUT = F (GSOUT, PSIN) 
PSOUT = F (PSIN) 
TSOUT= F (-G1IN, T1IN, GSIN, TSIN) 
XSOUT = F (XSIN) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
v aSOUT SOME: G11N HI, a20UT LO, a20UT NONE, a20UT REV, R11N HI 
V aSOUT SOME: P20UT LO, P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
V a40UT SOME: G11N HI, a20UT LO, a20UT NONE, a20UT REV, R11N HI 
V a40UT SOME: P20UT LO, P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
V a70UT SOME: G5IN HI, aSOUT LO, a60UT NONE, RS1N HI, P60UT LO, P60UT NONE 
V aSOUT SOME: GS1N HI, a60UT LO, a60UT NONE, RS1N HI, P60UT LO, P60UT NONE 
V aSOUT REV: G11N LO, G11N NONE, a20UT HI, R11N LO, R11N NONE, P20UT HI 
V aSOUT REV: X20UT HI 
va40UT REV: G11N LO, G11N NONE, a20UTHI, R11N LO, R11N NONE, P20UTHI 
V a40UT REV: X20UT HI 
V a70UT REV: GS1N LO, GS1N NONE, GS1N REV, a60UT HI, RS1N LO, RS1N NONE 
V a70UT REV: RS1N REV, PSOUT HI, YS1N HI, X60UT HI 
V aSOUT REV: GS1N LO, G5IN NONE, GS1N REV, a60UT HI, R5IN LO, RS1N NONE 
vaSOUT REV: RS1N REV, P60UT HI, YS1N HI, X60UT HI 
F EXT·HEAT: T20UT HI, US1N HI, T60UT HI 
F EXT·COLD: T20UT LO, U5IN LO, T60UT LO 
F LK·LP·EN: G5IN HI, R5IN HI, a60UT LO, a60UT NONE, P60UT LO, P60UT NONE 
F INT·LK: G11N LO, G11N NONE, R11N LO, R11N NONE, a20UT HI, P20UT HI 
F INT·LK: GS1N HI, RS1N HI, a60UT LO, a60UT NONE, P60UT LO, P60UT NONE 
F INT·LK: T20UT HI, T60UT LO, X20UT HI 
FPART·BLK: G11N LO, R11N LO, a20UTLO, P20UT LO 
F PART·BLK: T20UT HI, US IN HI, T60UT HI 
F FOULING: T20UT LO, US1N HI, T60UT HI 
S NORMAL: a30UT NONE, a40UT NONE, a70UT NONE, aSOUT NONE 
S IMPOSS: G11N REV, R1IN REV, aSOUT REV, P60UT REV 
5) DECISION TABLES 
N/A 
6) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
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NORMAL STATE: FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS 1,2,5 AND 6. 
NO MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES 
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0.7 Heat Exchanger Model Generation Subroutine 
SUBROUTINE HEXCHMOD 
e; ••••..••..•••••••••••••••••••••.•.•..•••••••••••..••••••••.....••••••••••••.••••••••••••••••...•••••••••••• 
e; This subroutine is called if the automatic heat exchanger model 
e; generation is specified. It automatically generates the propagation 
e; equations, event statements and decision tables for the model. 
e; 
e; N.B. Use is made of common block TWELVE from the vessel model generation 
e; routines, the variables INLET and VES have been renamed PHASE and GRAD. 
e; ••••...••••••••••..••••••••••••••••.••.••••••••••••.••.••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••• 
CHARACTE R FU(500)'S.DV{20)'4. VR(20) .PT{1 0) '3,NA '50.AD(25)'SO, 
, FE{ 45) 'SO. FI(50)'SO, NS'60.MC. FA(5)'SO. DT(25) 'SO. TE(200)'12 
INTEGER IL,FL.DL.JL.PV{10.20).PC{1 0.20).PM.CM.KL.LG{10).PHASE, 
, GRAD.NF{1 0).ET{1 0).RF{1 0).FLAG{1 0) 
COMMONlONEIFU.DV.VR.PT,NA.AD.FE,FI.NS.MC.FA,DT.TE 
COMMONfTWO!IL,FL.DL.JL.PV.PC,PM.CM.KL 
COMMONfTWELVElLG.PHASE,GRAD.NF.ET.RF,FLAG 
CHARACTER OP"'4.VESCH(3).POCH{5).PCH.STRING'10.STG1'7,STG2'7 
INTEGER ANSWER.L 1 
FORMAT{!,' ·.A,'? '.$) 
2 FORMAT{",A,' ? '.$) 
3 FORMAT{! .... A) 
4 FORMAT{, ·.A,12,')? '.$) 
5 FORMAT{I,' ',A,' '.12) 
6 FORMAT{!,' ·.A.A) 
7 FORMAT{, ·,A.A.A.A.A.A.A.A,')? '.$) 
e; ...•••••••••......•.•••••••••.•.....•.••••••••••....... -.•••••••••••••. ---•••••••• -••••••••• -•.. -•••••••••• 
e; The FLAGS set by this subroutine are: 
e; FLAG(l )=1 for no checking of event statements from the GENEV routine. 
e; FLAG(2) is used by the vessel model generation routine. 
e; FLAG(3) set to 1 for a first side relief or drain port, 
e; set to 2 for first side relief and drain ports. 
e; FLAG(4) set to 1 if extra first side port is to relief, 
e; set to 2 if extra first side port is to drain. 
e; FLAG(5) set to 1 for a second side relief or drain port, 
e; set to 2 for second side relief and drain ports. 
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C FLAG(6) set to 1 if extra second side port is to relief, 
C set to 2 if extra second side port is to drain. 
C FLAG(7) set to the last flow port on the second side. 
C FLAG(8) the total number of ports use including vessel ports. 
C FLAG(9) set to 0 for outer side Is second side, 
C set to 1 for outer side is first side. 
C FLAG(10) set to 0 for shell and tube exchanger, 
C set to 1 for frame and plate exchanger. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
30 
FLAG(I)=1 
MC='N' 
PRINT3: HEAT EXCHANGER MODEL GENERATION ROUTINE' 
PRINT': ....... _--_._ .. _--.... _ ... _ ........ _ .. __ ......... _----_ ... 
PRINT3:0UESTIONS REFER TO NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS.' 
PRINT':NO DISTINCTION IS MADE BETWEEN COUNTER-CURRENT AND' 
, If CROSS-CURRENT FLOW.' 
C -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Detennine the type of heat exchanger to be modelled. 
C Set FLAG(10) to 0 for shelVtube or 1 for frame/plate. 
C Set up the type strings, STG1 for the first side or no phase change and 
C STG2 for the second where a phase change is possible 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINTl :IS THIS A SHELLlTUBE (S) OR FRAMElPLATE (F) HEAT EXCHANGER, SlF' 
OPTa'SF' 
FLAG(10)=ANSWER(OPT) 
STGla' TUBES' 
STG2=' SHELL' 
IF (FLAG(10).EO.l) THEN 
STG1=' PLATE' 
STG2=' FRAME' 
END IF 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Print information about phase changes. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT3:PHASE CHANGES CAN ONLY BE HANDLED ON ONE SIDE OFTHE HEAT EXCHANGER: 
PRINT':IF A PHASE CHANGE TAKES PLACE ON BOTH SIDES CHOOSE THE MORE IMPORTANT 
PRINT','ONE AND THE OTHER WILL BE IGNORED.' 
PRINT3:IF A PARTIAL PHASE CHANGE OCCURS WHERE THERE IS MORE THAN ONE' 
, If COMPONENT 
PRINT':IT IS NECESSARYTO SPECIFY MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES,IN ALL OTHER CASES' 
PRINT':THEY ARE NOT REOUIRED.' 
0-20 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C Determine if a phase change takes place. PHASE=O for no phase change, 
C 1 for complete phase change or 2 for a partial phase change. 
C •.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••.•••••••••••••••••..•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
PRINT1 ,'IS THERE A COMPLETE OR PARTIAL PHASE CHANGE OR NO PHASE CHANGE, C/PJN' 
OPT='NCP' 
PHASE=ANSWER(OPT) 
C .......................................................................................................... . 
C If there is a phase change determine in which side it occurs. 
C Also set FLAG(9) to 1 to indicate that the side where a leak may 
C occur is the first side if this is the case. 
C .......................................................................................................... . 
. IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
PRINT7,'DOES THE PHASE CHANGE OCCUR IN THE',STG2,'SIDE ("STG2(2:2),') OR THE', 
• STG1,'SIDE ("STG1(2:2) 
OPT =STG2(2:2)IISTG1 (2:2) 
IF (ANSWER(OPT).EO.1) THEN 
FLAG(9):1 
STG1=STG2 
STG2=' TUBES' 
IF (FLAG(10).EO.1) STG2=' PLATE' 
END IF 
C •.•••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••..•••••••••••••••••.•••••••••..•••••••••.••••••••..•••••••••.•••••...•• 
C If there is a partial phase change determine if there is more than 
C one component. Change MC from 'N' to 'Y' accordingly. 
C •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - ••••••••• - ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
IF (PHASE.EO.2) THEN 
PRINT2,'IS THERE MORE THAN ONE COMPONENT IN THIS SIDE' 
OPT='NY' 
IF (ANSWER(OPT).EO.1) MC='Y' 
END IF 
END IF 
C .•..•••••....••• _ .••.•••••.•..••••...••••••••......••••••..•••••••..••••••••.•••••••••.•••••••••.••••••••• 
C Determine the first side characteristics, no phase change occurs. 
C ••••••..••••••..••••••....••••••..•••••••. _ ..••••••...•.•••••....••••••••..•••••••..••••••••...•••••...••• 
PRINT6,STG1,'SIDE CHARACTERISTICS' 
PRINT·" -----------, 
C ••••..••••.•••••••••••..•••••••••••••••...••••••••••...••••••••.••••••••••••••••••••••••••••..•••••••..•••• 
C Notify user of the first side assumptions. 
C .......................................................................................................... . 
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PRINT3,'IT IS ASSUMED THERE IS ONLY ONE INLET AND ONE OUTLET FLOW PORT AND' 
PRINT",' ANY PRESSURE EFFECTS ARE NEGLlGABLE.' 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Determine if there is a first side relief port. 
e ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT1,'IS THERE A RELIEF PORT FOR THIS SIDE, Y/N' 
OPT='NY' 
I=ANSWER(OPl) 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Determine if there is a first side drain port. 
e --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT2,'IS THERE A DRAIN PORT FOR THIS SIDE, Y/N' 
OPT='NY' 
J=ANSWER(OPl) 
e --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Set FLAG(3) to 1 for a single relief or drain port, 2 for both. 
e Set FLAG(4) to 1 if extra port is to relief or 2 if to drain, 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FLAG(3H+J 
IF (FLAG(3).EO.1) THEN 
FLAG(4)=1 
IF (J.EO.1) FLAG(4)=2 
END IF 
e --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Set NF(port number) for the normal flow characteristics for 
e the relief/drain port(s) to 1'for normally no flow. The array 
e was zeroed at the start of the program for the other ports. 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (FLAG(3).NE.0) NF(3)=1 
IF (FLAG(3).EO.2) NF(4)=1 
e -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Set ET(port number) for the flow characteristics for the flow 
e ports to 1 for no pressure effects. If there is a relief/drain 
e port(s) there will be pressure effects so set to O. 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ET(1)=1 
ET(2)=1 
IF (FLAG(3).NE.0) ET(3)=0 
IF (FLAG(3).EO.2) ET(4)=0 
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e: .........................................................•........................••....................... 
e: Determine if reverse flow is to be allowed, set RF(port number) 
e: to 1 for no reverse flow. Any relief/drain port(s) is left as O. 
e: ..................••...................................•................•..............•................... 
PRINT1,'IS REVERSE FLOW TO BE ALLOWED FOR THE INLET, VIN' 
OPT.'VN· 
RF(l )=ANSWER(OPT) 
PRINT2,'IS REVERSE FLOW TO BE ALLOWED FOR THE OUTLET, V/N' 
OPTm'VN' 
RF(2)=ANSWER(OPT) 
e: ..............................................................•.... -............................•......... 
e: Determine the temperature gradient in the heat exchanger. 
e: GRAD is 0 if this is the hot side or 1 for the cold side. 
e: •.......................................................................................................... 
PRINT1,'IS THIS SIDE FOR THE HOT OR COLD FLUID, HlC' 
OPT.·HC' 
GRAD=ANSWER(OPT) 
e: .......................................................................................................... . 
e: Set NF(1 0) to 0, for the same, 1 for higher or 2 for lower, for 
e: the pressure difference between the first side and the second. 
e: ........................................................... -............................................. . 
PRINT2,'ISTHIS SIDE AT THE SAME, HIGHER OR LOWER PRESSURE THEN THE OTHER, SIHIL' 
OPT='SHL' 
NF(10)=ANSWER(OPT) 
e: ........................... -............ -.-....................................•........................ 
e: Determine the second side characteristics, a phase change is 
e: possible 
e: ..............................................................................•............................ 
PRINT6,STG2,'SIDE CHARACTERISTICS' 
PRINT",' ----------------, 
e: ... -..................... ---.-...... --... -........... --.. -........ -•............ --.. --.................... . 
e: If there is no phase change then pressure effects are negligable. 
e: ... -..... -........... -..... -... -.. -.......... -............. -............. -............ -........... --.. . 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
PRINT3,'PRESSURE EFFECTS ARE NEGLlGABLE AND WILL BE IGNORED.' 
END IF 
e: ... -.... --....... -...... -.-.. --...... --..... --.. -..... -....... -..............•.••....... -.............. -.-
e: Determine if there is a second side relief port. 
e: ............... --........ --......... -.. -............... -... --...... --.--........ -.-............ -....... . 
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PRINT1 ,'IS THERE A RELIEF PORT FOR THIS SIDE, Y/N' 
OPT.'NY' 
I=ANSWER(OPT) 
e: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e: Determine if there is a second side drain port. 
e: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT2,'IS THERE A DRAIN PORT FOR THIS SIDE, Y/N' 
OPT='NY' 
J=ANSWER(OPT) 
e: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e: Set FLAG(5) to 1 for a relief or drain port, 2 for both. 
e: Set FLAG(6) to 1 if extra port is to relief or 2 if to drain. 
e: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FLAG(5)=I+J 
IF (FLAG(5).EQ.1) THEN 
FLAG(6)=1 
IF (J.EQ.1) FLAG(6)=2 
END IF 
e: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e: Set FLAG(7) to the last flow port on the second side. 
e: e:alculate the total number of ports FLAG(8). This is the sum of the two 
e: first side ports plus any relief/drain port(s), plus the two second side 
e: ports plus any relief/drain port(s), if there is a complete phase change 
e: then two vessel ports are required if and a partial phase change occurs 
e: then an additional flow port is required and three vessel ports. 
e: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FLAG(7)=4+FLAG(3)+FLAG(5) 
FLAG(8)=FLAG(7) 
IF (PHASE.EQ.1) FLAG(8)=FLAG(8)+2 
IF (PHASE.EQ.2) THEN 
FLAG(7)=FLAG(7)+1 
FLAG(8)=FLAG(8)+4 
END IF 
e: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e: e:heck number of ports, if it exceeds 9 report the error and start again. 
e: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (FLAG(8).GT.9) THEN 
PRINT5,'THE TOTAL NUMBER OF PORTS EXCEEDS 9 BY',FLAG(8)-9 
PRINT",'IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO MODEL THIS PIECE OF EQUIPMENT ON FAUL TFINDER: 
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PRINT','THE SPECIFICATION WILL HAVE TO BE CHANGED.' 
GOT030 
END IF 
e .......................................................................................................... . 
e Set NF(port number) for the normal flow characteristics for 
e the relief/drain port(s) to 1 for normally no flow. 
e ....... -............................................................ -.--.---.... -................ . 
IF (FLAG(5).NE.O) NF(FLAG(7)=1 
IF (FLAG(5).EO.2) NF(FLAG(7)·1)=1 
e ..................... -... -.............................................. -.............................. . 
e If there Is no phase change set ET(port number) to 1. 
e .......................................... -..................... -..... -..... -.-............. -...... . 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
ET(FLAG(3)+3)=1 
ET(FLAG(3)+4)=1 
e ...... -...... -.................................................... -................ -................. . 
e For no phase change, determine If reverse flow Is to be allowed, 
e set RF(port number) to 1 for the no reverse flow. 
e ...... -..................................... -........................ - .... --................... -.. . 
PRINTl ,'IS REVERSE FLOW TO BE ALLOWED FOR THE INLET, YIN' 
OPT='YN' 
RF(FLAG(3)+3)=ANSWER(OPT) 
PRINT2,'IS REVERSE FLOW TO BE ALLOWED FOR THE OUTLET, Y/N' 
OPT='YN' 
RF(FLAG(3)+4)=ANSWER(OPT) 
ELSE 
e ......................................................................................................... . 
e For a phase change, determine if the flow is pumped for each 
e second side flow port. 
e ......................... --..... -................... -............... -..................... -.... -.. . 
KEFLAG(7)·FLAG(5) 
J=FLAG(3)+3 
DO 50,I=J,K 
IF (I.EO.J) THEN 
STRING='INLET' 
ELSE 
IF (PHASE.NE.2) THEN 
STRING='OUTLET' 
ELSE 
IF (I.NE.I<) THEN 
STRING='UOUID OUTLET' 
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ELSE 
STRING='V APOUR OUTLET' 
END IF 
END IF 
END IF 
L 1 =LENGTH(STRING) 
STRING=STRING(1:L 1)1f PORT: IS FLOW POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT OR' 
PRINT3,STRING 
PRINT2,'CENTRIFUGALL Y PUMPED OR BACK PRESSURE FED, P/C/G' 
OPT='GCP' 
ET(I)=ANSWER(OPT) 
C ••••••.. _ •••..••••••.••• _ •..•••••••.••••••• _ .••••••• _-••••.•.••••••••••••••••....•••••.••••• _ •••••• 
C For a positive displacement pumped flow determine if reverse flow is 
C allowed. Set RF(port number) to 1 for no. 
C All other port types allow reverse flow. 
C •••..• _ •••..•••••••••••••..••••••. _ •••••••...••••••..••••••..•••••••..•••••••••.••••••.•••••••.•••••••• 
IF (ET(I).EO.2) THEN 
PRINT2,'IS REVERSE FLOW TO BE ALLOWED IN THIS CONNECTION, Y/N' 
OPT='YN' 
RF(I)=ANSWER(OPT) 
END IF 
C ........................................................................................................ . 
C If the inlet flow is centrifugally pumped determine if it Is 
C high pressure which implies no pressure effects. 
C _ ••••...••••••..•••••••..••••••.•••••••••.•.••••••.•••••••...•••••••••••••••••.•.••••••..••••••..••••••• 
IF (I.EO.J.AND.ET(I).EO.1) THEN 
PRINT2,'IS THE PUMP A HIGH PRESSURE PUMP, YIN' 
OPT='NY' 
ET(I)=ANSWER(OPT) 
END IF 
C ........................................................................................................ . 
C If flow is positive displacement pumped set ET(port number) 
C to 1 for no pressure effects. 
C ••••••••••••.. _ •••••..•••••...•••••••...•••••••..•••••••.••••••••••.•••••••....••••••...••••••.••••••••• 
50 IF (ET(I).EO.2) ET(I)=1 
END IF 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• _ •• _.-•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C For any relief/drain port(s). ET and RF were zeroed at the 
C start of the program. Set RF to 1 for the vessel ports. 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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DO 60,I.FLAG(7)+1,FLAG(8) 
60 RF(I):l 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the assumptions and description array for the heat exchanger. 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AD(l )_'SHELL AND TUBE' 
IF (FLAG(10).EO.1) AD(l)='FRAME AND PLATE' 
L1=LENGTH(AD(1)) 
AD(1)=AD(1)(1:L1)1f HEAT EXCHANGER WITH' 
L l=LENGTH(AD(l)) 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
AD(l)=AD(l)(l:L l)1f COLD' 
ELSE 
AD(1)=AD(1)(1:L1)1f HOT' 
END IF 
L l=LENGTH(AD(l)) 
AD(l )_AD(l)(l:L l)1f FLUID IN THE'IISTG2//SIDE.' 
AD(2).'ANY PHASE CHANGE OR PRESSURE EFFECTS IN THE'/ISTG1//SIDE IS IGNORED.' 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
AD(3)='NO' 
ELSE IF (PHASE.EO.1) THEN 
AD(3)='A COMPLETE' 
ELSE 
AD(3)='A PARTIAL' 
END IF 
L 1 =LENGTH (AD(3)) 
AD(3)=AD(3)(1:L l)1f PHASE CHANGE TAKES PLACE IN THE'IISTG2//SIDE.' 
AD(4):'THE'IISTG1IfSIDE IS AT' 
IF (NF(l O).EO.O) THEN 
AD(4)=AD(4)(1 :20)1f THE SAME PRESSURE AS' 
ELSE IF (NF(10).EO.1) THEN 
AD(4)=AD(4)(1 :20)lf A HIGHER PRESSURE THAN' 
ELSE 
AD(4)=AD(4)(1 :20)// A LOWER PRESSURE THAN' 
END IF 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(4)) 
AD(4)=AD(4)(1:L l)1f THE'IISTG2//SIDE.' 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the first side characteristics. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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AD(5)=STG1IfSIDE.' 
AD(5)=AD(5)(2:) 
STRING='REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED.' 
IF (RF(1).EO.1) STRING='NO '/lSTRING 
AD(6)='PORT 1: INLET STREAM, '/lSTRING 
STRING='REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED.' 
IF (RF(2).EO.1) STRING='NO '/lSTRING 
AD(7)='PORT 2: OUTLET STREAM, '/lSTRING 
IL=7 
IF (FLAG(3).NE.O) THEN 
IL=IL+1 
IF (FLAG(3).EO.2.0R.FLAG(4).EO.1) THEN 
AD(IL)='PORT 3: RELlEP 
ELSE 
AD(IL)='PORT 3: DRAIN' 
END IF 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :L1)1f PORT, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED.' 
IF (FLAG(3).EO.2) THEN 
IL=IL+1 
AD(IL)='PORT 4: DRAIN PORT, REVERSE FLOW ALLOWED.' 
END IF 
ENDIF 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Generate the second side characteristics. 
c: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IL=IL+1 
AD(IL)=STG2IfSIDE.' 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(2:) 
IL=IL+1 
WRITE(POCH(1),'(11)')FLAG(3)+3 
AD(IL)='PORT '1IPOCH(1)1f: INLET STREAM,' 
IF (ET(FLAG(3)+3).EO.1) AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :21)1f NO' 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
AD(IL)-AD(IL)(1:L1)1f PRESSURE EFFECTS,' 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+3).EO.1) AD(IL):AD(IL)(1 :L 1)1f NO' 
L 1 :LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
AD(IL):AD(IL)(1 :L1)1f REVERSE FLOW.' 
IL=IL+1 
WRITE(POCH(2) ,'(11 )')FLAG(3)+4 
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IF (PHASE.NE.2) THEN 
AD(IL)='PORT 'IIPOCH(2)1f: OUTLET STREAM: 
ELSE 
AD(IL)='PORT '1IPOCH(2)1f: LlOUID OUTLET STREAM: 
END IF 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
IF (ET(FLAG(3)+4).EO.1) AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f NO' 
L 1=LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :L 1)1f PRESSURE EFFECTS: 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+4).EO.1) AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :L1)1f NO' 
L 1 =LENGTH (AD(IL)) 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L1)1f REVERSE FLOW: 
IF (PHASE.EO.2) THEN 
IL=IL+1 
WRITE(POCH(3):(11 )')FLAG(3)+5 
AD(IL)='PORT '1IPOCH(3)1f: VAPOUR OUTLET STREAM: 
IF (ET(FLAG(3)+5).EO.1) AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :29)1f NO' 
L 1=LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L1)1f PRESSURE EFFECTS: 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+5).EO.1) AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f NO' 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1:L 1)1f REVERSE FLOW: 
END IF 
IF (FLAG(5).NE.O) THEN 
IL=IL+1 
IF (FLAG(5).EO.1) THEN 
WRITE(POCH(4):(11),)FLAG(7) 
ELSE 
WRITE(POCH(4),'(11)')FLAG(7)·1 
END IF 
WRITE(POCH(5):(11),)FLAG(7) 
IF (FLAG(5).EO.2.0R.FLAG(6).EO.1) THEN 
AD(IL)='PORT '1IPOCH(4)1f: RELIEF' 
ELSE 
AD(IL)='PORT 'IIPOCH(5)If: DRAIN' 
END IF 
L 1 =LENGTH(AD(IL)) 
AD(IL)-AD(IL)(1:L1)1f PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW: 
IF (FLAG(5).EO.2) THEN 
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IL=IL+1 
AD(IL)='PORT '/IPOCH(5)1f: DRAIN PORT, PRESSURE EFFECTS, REVERSE FLOW: 
END IF 
ENDIF 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Generate the vessel port characteristics, 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (PHASE.EO.1) THEN 
IL=IL+1 
WRITE(VESCH(1) ,'(11 )')FLAG(7)+1 
WRITE(VESCH (2),'(11 )')FLAG(7)+1 
AD(IL)='PORT '/NESCH(1)1f: VESSEL PORT RELATING TO THE'/ISTG2/fSIDE: 
ELSE IF (PHASE.EO.2) THEN 
IL=IL+1 
WRITE(VESCH (1), '(11 )')FLAG(7)+1 
AD(IL)='PORT '/NESCH(1)1f: VESSEL PORT FOR LlOUID IN THE'/ISTG2/fSIDE: 
IL=IL+1 
WRITE(VESCH (2),'(11 )')FLAG(7)+2 
AD(IL)='PORT '/NESCH(2)1f: VESSEL PORT FOR VAPOUR IN THE'/ISTG2/fSIDE: 
END IF 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
IL=IL+1 
WRITE(VESCH(3),'(11 )')FLAG(8) 
AD(IL)='PORT '/NESCH(3)1f: VESSEL PORT FOR' 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :23)1f LIOUID TO VAPOUR' 
ELSE 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :23)1f VAPOUR TO LlOUID' 
END IF 
AD(IL)=AD(IL)(1 :40)lf FLOW IN THE'/ISTG2/fSIDE: 
END IF 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Display the model description for the user. 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT3,'THE MODEL HAS BEEN DEFINED AS;' 
PRINT',' , 
DO 70,1=1,IL 
70 PRINT',AD(I) 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Generate the propagation equation, 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-30 
CALL HEXCHPROP(VESCH,POCH) 
C; -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C; Generate the event statements. 
C; -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT3,'GENERATING THE EVENT STATEMENTS - PLEASE WAIT: 
CALL HEXCHSTATE(VESCH,POCH) 
C; ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C; Generate the decision tables. 
C; -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CALL HEXCHTABLE(VESCH,POCH) 
C; -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C; Determine the supplimentary information. 
C; The normal state lists the ports where flow normally exists. 
C; -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NS='FLOW IS NORMAL THROUGH PORTS' 
DO 100,1=1 ,FLAG(7) 
IF (NF(I).EQ.O) THEN 
WRITE(PCH,'(11 )')1 
L 1=LENGTH(NS) 
NS=NS(1 :L 1)1f '/IPCHIf,' 
ENDIF 
100 CONTINUE 
NS=NS(1:LH)If AND '/IPCHIf: 
C; ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C; The generation of the model is complete. 
C; ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RETURN 
END 
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SUBROUTINE HEXCHPROP(VESCH,POCH) 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Subroutine to generate prop. equations for the heat exchanger model. 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHARACTER FU(5OO)'S,DV(20)'4,VR(20),PT(10)'3,NA'5O,AD(25)'80, 
, FE(45)'SO,FI(50)'SO,NS'60,MC,FA(5)'SO,DT(25)'SO,TE(200)'12 
INTEGER IL,FL,DL,JL,PV(10,20),PC(10,20),PM,CM,KL,LG(10),PHASE, 
, GRAD,NF(10),ET(10),RF(10),FLAG(10) 
COMMONlONEIFU,DV,VR,PT,NA,AD,FE,FI,NS,MC,FA,DT,TE 
COMMONfTWOIIL,FL,DL,JL,PV,PC,PM,CM,KL 
COMMONfTWELVElLG,PHASE,GRAD,NF,ET,RF,FLAG 
CHARACTER VESCH(3),POCH(5),PCH,TEMPFE(45)'SO,STRING'6 
INTEGER L1 
3 FORMAT(/,' ',A,12,A) 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Initialize the temporary storage strings. 
c: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 50,1 .. 1,45 
50 TEMPFE(I)=FE(I) 
c: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Generate the first side Inlet port flow, standard flow equation. 
c: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEMPFE(1)='G1IN=F(OlIN,020UT)' 
c: -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Generate the first side inlet port relief. 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEMPFE(2)='R1IN=F(R20UT)' 
FL=2 
c: ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Generate the first side inlet port temperature. The equation depends on 
c: the relative first side temperature and if vessel ports are present. The 
c: liquid vessel port is used for a hot first side and the vapour one for a 
c: cold first side. 
c: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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IF (RF(1).EO.O) THEN 
IF (RF(2).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(3)='U1IN=F(U20UT: 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(3)='U1IN=F(' 
END IF 
STRING='G'/IPOCH(1)1fIN: 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) STRING='-G'/IPOCH(1 )/fIN: 
L 1=LENGTH(TEMPFE(3)) 
TEMPFE(3)= TEMPFE(3)(1:L 1)IISTRING 
-STRING=T /IPOCH(1 )/fIN)' 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
STRING=T/NESCH(1)1fVES)' 
IF (PHASE.EO.2.AND.GRAD.EO.1) STRING(2:2)=VESCH(2) 
END IF 
L 1 =LENGTH(TEMPFE(3)) 
TEMPFE(3)= TEMPFE(3)(1:L 1)IISTRING 
FL=3 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the first side inlet port composition use the mUlti-component 
C term 'C' if necessal)', 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (RF(2).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(4)='Y1IN=F(Y20UT)' 
IF (MC.EO:Y') TEMPFE(4)='YC1IN=F(yC20UT)' 
FL=4 
ENDIF 
END IF 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the first side outlet port flow, standard flow equation, 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEMPFE(FL+1 )='Q20UT =F(G1IN,G20UT)' 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the first side outlet port pressure, 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEMPFE(FL+2)='P20UT =F(P1IN), 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the first side outlet port temperature. The equation depends on 
C the relative first side temperature and if vessel ports are present. The 
0-33 
C liquid vessel port is used for a hot first side and the vapour one for a 
C cold first side. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
STRING='GlIN,' 
IF (GRAD.EQ.l) STRING='-GlIN,' 
TEMPFE(FL+3)='T20UT=F('IISTRING 
STRING='G'IIPOCH(I)IfIN,' 
IF (GRAD.EQ.O) STRING='-G'IIPOCH(I)1fIN,' 
L 1 zLENGTH(TEMPFE(FL+3)) 
TEMPFE(FL+3)= TEMPFE(FL+3)(I:L I)1fTlIN,'/lSTRING 
STRING='r/IPOCH(I)IfIN), 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
STRING:'r/NESCH(I)/fVES), 
IF (PHASE.EQ.2.AND.GRAD.EQ.l) STRING(2:2)=VESCH(2) 
END IF 
L lzLENGTH(TEMPFE(FL+3)) 
TEMPFE(FL+3)= TEMPFE(FL+3)(I:L 1)/lSTRING 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the first side outlet port composition use the mUlti-component 
C term 'C' if necessary. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEMPFE(FL+4)='X20UT =F(XlIN)' 
IF (MC.EQ.'Y') TEMPFE(FL+4)='XC20UT =F(XC1IN)' 
FL=FL+4 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C " any exist, generate the first side relil/drain port(s). Use the 
C inlet pressure in the flow and pressure equations. Use the same 
C temperature and composition equations as the outlet port. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 70,1=I,FLAG(3) 
WRITE(PCH,'(ll )')1+2 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )_'Q'IIPCHIfOUT =F(G'IIPCHIfOUT,PIIN), 
TEMPFE(FL+2)='P'IIPCHIfOUT =F(PlIN), 
TEMPFE(FL+3)= TEMPFE(FL-l) 
TEMPFE(FL+3)(2:2)=PCH 
TEMPFE(FL+4)= TEMPFE(FL) 
IF (MC.EQ.'N') THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+4)(2:2)=PCH 
ELSE 
0-34 
TEMPFE(FL+4)(3:3)=PCH 
END IF 
70 FL=FL+4 
e ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Generate the second side inlet port flow. For no phase change use 
e the standard flow equation, else use a pressure term, if necessary. 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )='G'IIPOCH(1)1f IN=F(O'IIPOCH(1 )lfIN' 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+1)= TEMPFE(FL+1)(1 :11 )If,O'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT)' 
ELSE IF (ET(FLAG(3)+3).EO.0) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+1)= TEMPFE(FL+1)(1 :11)1f ,-P'INESCH(2)1fVES), 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL+1)= TEMPFE(FL+1)(1 :11)1f)' 
END IF 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Generate the second side inlet port relief. 
e -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TEMPFE(FL+2):'R'IIPOCH(1)1f IN=F(R'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT)' 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+2):'R'IIPOCH(1)1fIN=F(-P'INESCH(2)1fVES)' 
END IF 
FL=FL+2 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Generate the second side inlet port temperature, use flow and 
e temperature terms or the vessel temperature which may be taken 
e at the liquid or vapour vessel port. 
e -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+3).EO.0) THEN 
FL=FL+1 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='U'IIPOCH(1)1fIN=F(G1 IN,T1 IN)' 
L1=16 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)='U'IIPOCH(1)1fIN=F(-G1IN,T1IN)' 
L1=17 
END IF 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+4).EO.0) TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1 :L 1)1f ,U'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT)' 
ELSE 
0-35 
TEMPFE(Fl)='U'IIPOCH(l)1fIN=F(T'INESCH(l)IfVES)' 
IF (GRAD.EO.l) TEMPFE(Fl)(9:9)=VESCH(2) 
ENDIF 
c: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Generate second side inlet port composition. This may be the exit or 
c: the vessel composition. For a partial phase change multi-components may 
c: be necessary and either the liquid or vapour vessel port may be used. 
c: --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fl=Fl+l 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+4).EO.0) THEN 
TEMPFE(Fl).'Y'IIPOCH(l)1fIN=Ff'{'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT)' 
END IF 
ELSE IF (PHASE.EO.l) THEN 
TEMPFE(Fl)='Y'IIPOCH(l)1fIN=F(X'INESCH(l)1fVES)' 
ELSE 
IF (MC.EO.'N') THEN 
TEMPFE(Fl)='Y'IIPOCH(l)1fIN=F(X'INESCH(l)1fVES)' 
IF (GRAD.EO.l) TEMPFE(Fl)(9:9)=VESCH(2) 
ELSE 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(Fl)='Y A'IIPOCH(l )IfIN=F(-XB'INESCH(l )lfVES)' 
TEMPFE(Fl+ 1 )='YB'IIPOCH (1 )lfIN=F(XB'INESCH(l )/rvES)' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(Fl)='Y A'IIPOCH(l )IfIN=F(XA'INESCH(2)1fVES)' 
TEMPFE(Fl+l)='YB'IIPOCH(l)1fIN=F(-XA'INESCH(2)IfVES)' 
END IF 
Fl=Fl+l 
END IF 
END IF 
END IF 
c: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: Generate the second side outlet port(s) flow, This may be the single 
c: outlet or either the liquid or vapour outlet port for a partial phase 
c: change. For no phase change use the standard flow equation, else use a 
c: pressu re term, If necessary. 
c: ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (PHASE.EO.2) J=2 
DO 100,1=1 ,J 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
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TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )z'O'/IPOCH(2)!fOUT =F(G'/IPOCH(1 )!fIN,G'/IPOCH(2)!fOUT)' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )='O'/IPOCH(I+ 1 )//OUT =F(G'/IPOCH (1+1 )!four 
IF (ET(FLAG(3)+1+3).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1)= TEMPFE(FL+ 1)(1: 13)/f ,P'INESCH (2)!fVES)' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1)= TEMPFE(FL+ 1)(1: 13)//)' 
END IF 
END IF 
e: ...........................................................................•.............................. 
e: Generate the second side outlet port relief. This may be the 
e: inlet pressure or the vessel pressure. 
e: ... -..................... -..................................... -.... -................................ . 
TEMPFE(FL+2)='P'/IPOCH(I+1)//OUT =F(P'/IPOCH(1)/fIN)' 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+2)='P'/IPOCH(I+1)!fOUT=F(P'/NESCH(2)!fVES)' 
END IF 
e: ... -... -....................... -...................................................................... . 
e: Generate the second side outlet port temperature, use flow and 
e: temperature terms or the vessel temperature which may be taken 
e: at the liquid or vapour vessel port. 
e: ......................................................................................................... . 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+3)=T IIPOCH(2)!fOUT =F(G1IN, T1IN,-G'/IPOCH(1)!f IN ,r IIPOCH (1 )/fIN)' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL+3)=T IIPOCH(2)1fOUT =F(-G 11N ,T1IN,G'IIPOCH(1)/f IN ,r IIPOCH(1)!f IN)' 
END IF 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL+3)=T/IPOCH(I+1)!fOUT=F(rINESCH(I)!fVES)' 
END IF 
e: .................................................................................•.........•.............. 
e: Generate second side outlet port composition. This may be the exit or 
e: the vessel composition. For a partial phase change multi·components may 
e: be necessary and either the liquid or vapour vessel port may be used. 
e: .....................................................................•.........•.................•........ 
FL=FL+4 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='X'/IPOCH(2)!fOUT=F(X'/IPOCH(1)!fIN)' 
ELSE IF (MC.EO.'N') THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='X'/IPOCH(I+ 1 )!fOUT =F(Y: INESCH(I)!fVES), 
0·37 
ELSE 
IF (I.EO.1) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='XA'/IPOCH(2)1fOUT=F(-XS'/NESCH(1)IfVES)' 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )='XS'/IPOCH (2)1fOUT =F(XS'/NESCH(1 )/fVES)' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)='XA'/IPOCH(3)/fOUT =F(XA'/NESCH(2)trVES)' 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )='XS'/IPOCH(3)IfOUT =F(-XA'/NESCH(2)trVES)' 
END IF 
FL=FL+1 
END IF 
100 CONTINUE 
c: .......................................................................................................... . 
c: If there is a second side relief and/or drain port, generate the 
c: necessary equations, Use the Inlet or vessel pressure 
c: in the flow equation. 
c: .......................................................................................................... . 
DO 130,1=1,FLAG(S) 
J=S 
IF (I.EO.1.AND.(FLAG(S).EO.2.0R.FLAG(6).EO.1» J=4 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )='O'/IPOCH(J)IfOUT =F(G'/IPOCH(J)/fOUT,P' 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+1)= TEMPFE(FL+1)(1 :1S)/IPOCH(1 )IfIN)' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL+1)= TEMPFE(FL+1)(1 :1S)/NESCH(2)/fVES)' 
END IF 
c: ......................................................................................................... . 
c: Use the Inlet or vessel pressure In the pressure equation, 
c: ............................................•............................................................. 
TEMPFE(FL+2)='P'/IPOCH(J)IfOUT =F(P'/IPOCH(1 )/fIN)' 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+2)='P'/IPOCH(J)IfOUT =F(P'/NESCH(2)/fVES)' 
END IF 
c: .................................................. -.................................................. _ .. 
c: Use the same outlet port temperature equation. 
c: ......................................................................................................... . 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL+3)=T /IPOCH(J)/fOUT =F(G1IN, T1IN, -G'IIPOCH(1 )/fIN ,r IIPOCH(1 )/fIN)' 
ELSE· 
TEMPFE(FL+3)=T /IPOCH(J)/fOUT =F(-G1IN, T11N, G'/IPOCH( 1)/fIN, r /IPOCH(1 )IfIN)' 
END IF 
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ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL+3)=T IIPOCH(J)lfOUT =F(T INESCH(l )lfVES)' 
IF (J.EO.4) TEMPFE(FL+S)(10:10)=VESCH(2) 
END IF 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••...••••••.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••.•••• 
C Use the same outlet port composition equation(s). 
C •• - •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - •••••••••••••••••• 
FL~FL+4 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='X'IIPOCH(J)lfOUT =F(X'IIPOCH(l)1f1 N)' 
ELSE IF (PHASE.EO.l) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='X'IIPOCH(J)lfOUT =F(X'INESCH(l )/NES)' 
ELSE 
IF (MC.EO.'N') THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='XA'IIPOCH(J)/fOUT =F( ·XB'INESCH(1 )lfVES), 
IF (J.EO.4) TEMPFE(FL)(10:10)=VESCH(2) 
ELSE 
IF (J.EO.4) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='XA'IIPOCH(4)1fOUT =F(XA'INESCH(2)1fVES)' 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )='XB'IIPOCH(4)lfOUT =F(·XA'INESCH(2)1fVES), 
. ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)='XA'IIPOCH(5)1fOUT =F(·XB'INESCH(l)1fVES), 
TEMPFE(FL+ 1 )='XB'IIPOCH(5)1fOUT =F(XB'INESCH(1 )lfVES)' 
END IF 
FL=FL+1 
END IF 
END IF 
1S0 CONTINUE 
C - ••.••••••..•••••..••••••..••••••...•••••..••••• - ..••••••...•••••...••••••..••••••...••••••.•••••••.••••• 
C Vessel ports are only necessary if phase changes occur. Generate 
C the level term, as a balance of the inlet and outlet liquid flows 
C and the flow from liquid to vapour or vice versa. 
C •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
FL=FL+l 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='L'INESCH(1)1fVE5=F(G'IIPOCH(1)1fIN: 
IF (PHASE.EO.2) TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(l :lS)If-Q'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT: 
L 1 =LENGTH(TEMPFE(FL)) 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1)1f -Q'INESCH(S)lfVES)' 
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ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)='L'INESCH(1)1fVES=F(-O'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT,O'INESCH(3)1fVES), 
END IF 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the pressure term if there Is a complete phase change, 
C this Is a balance of the inlet and outlet vapour flows and the 
C flow from liquid to vapour of vice versa. 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (PHASE.EO.1) THEN 
FL=FL+1 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='P'INESCH(1)1fVES=F(-Q'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT,' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)='P'INESCH(1)1fVES=F(G'IIPOCH(1)IfIN: 
END IF 
L 1 =LENGTH(TEMPFE(FL» 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1 )lfL'INESCH(1)1fVES: 
L1=L1+6 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1)1fO'INESCH(3)1fVES), 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1)1f-Q'/IVESCH(3)1fVES)' 
END IF 
END IF 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the temperature term. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FL=FL+1 
IF (MC.EO.'N') THEN 
IzPHASE 
TEMPFE(FL)=TINESCH(1)lfVES=F(P'INESCH(I)lfVES,-O'INESCH(3)1fYES), 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)=TINESCH(1 )lfVES=F(P'INESCH(2)1fVES,XS'INESCH(1 )/NES)' 
END IF 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the composition term. 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FL=FL+1 
IF (MC.EO.'N') THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='X'INESCH(1 )lfVES=F(X'IIPOCH(1 )IfIN)' 
ELSE 
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IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)_'XS'INESCH(1)/fVES=F(XS'IIPOCH(1)1fIN,O'/IVESCH(3)/fVES)' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)='XS'/IVESCH(1)/fVES=F(-XA'INESCH(2)/fVES,-O'INESCH(3)1fVES)' 
END IF 
END IF 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C For a partial phase changes, an additional vessel port is required, 
C Generate the pressure term. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (PHASE.EO.2) THEN 
FL~FL+1 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='P'INESCH(2)1fVE5=F(-Q'IIPOCH(3)lfOUT,' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)='P'INESCH(2)1fVE5=F(G'IIPOCH(1)1fIN,-O'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT" 
END IF 
L 1:LENGTH(TEMPFE(FL)) 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1 )lfL'INESCH(1)lfVES: 
L1=L1+6 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1 )lfO'INESCH(3)1fVES)' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1 )/f-Q'INESCH(3)1fVES)' 
ENDIF 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the temperature term, for single components use the 
C pressure and flow else use the pressure and composition. 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FL=FL+1 
IF (MC.EO.'N') THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)=TINESCH(2)1fVE5=F(P'INESCH(2)1fVES,-O'INESCH(3)1fVES), 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)=TINESCH(2)lfVE5=F(P'INESCH(2)1fVES,-XA'INESCH(2)IfVES)' 
END IF 
C ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the composition term. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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FL=FL+1 
IF (MC.EQ.'N') THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='X'INESCH(2)/fVE5=F(X'I/POCH(1)1fIN)' 
ELSE 
IF (GRAD.EQ.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='XA'INESCH(2)1fVES=F(-XB'INESCH(1)1fVES,-Q'INESCH(3)1fVES)' 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)z'XA'INESCH(2)IfVES=F(XA'IIPOCH(1)1fIN,Q'INESCH(3)1fYES)' 
END IF 
END IF 
END IF 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the vessel port equation used to model the flow of liquid 
C to vapour or vice verse. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FL=FL+1 
IF (GRAD.EQ.O) THEN 
TEMPFE(FL)='Q'INESCH(3)1fVES=F(G1 IN,T1 IN,' 
IF (MC.EQ.'Y') TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1 :18)1f-XB'INESCH(1)"VES,' 
L 1 =LENGTH(TEMPFE(FL)) 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1)1f -P'INESCH(2)1fVES), 
ELSE 
TEMPFE(FL)='Q'INESCH(3)1fVES=F(G1IN.-T1IN,' 
IF (MC,EQ.'Y') TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1 :19)1f-XA'INESCH(2)"VES,' 
L 1=LENGTH(TEMPFE(FL)) 
TEMPFE(FL)= TEMPFE(FL)(1:L 1)1fP'INESCH(2)1fVES), 
END IF 
END IF 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Completion of propagation equations, now check, 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PRINT3,'THE FOLLOWING ',FL,' PROPAGATION EQUATIONS HAVE BEEN CREATED:' 
CALL CHECK(TEMPFE,FL) 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Take prop, eqns, from the temporary array and place in the FE array, 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
K=FL 
FL=O 
DO 200,1=1 ,K 
IF (TEMPFE(I)(1 :1).NE.' 1 THEN 
FL=FL+1 
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L l=INDEX(TEMPFE(I),' ') 
IF (L 1.EQ.0) L 1 =SO 
FE(FL)= TEMPFE(I)(l:L 1) 
END IF 
200 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE HEXCHSTATE(VESCH,POCH) 
c -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Subrouitine to generate event statements for the heat exchanger model. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHARACTER FU(SOO)'S,DV(20)'4,VR(20),PT(10)'3,NA'SO,AD(2S)'SO, 
, FE(4S)'SO,FI(SO)'SO,NS'60,MC,FA(S)'SO,DT(2S)'SO,TE(200)'12 
INTEGER IL,FL,DL,JL,PV(l O,20),PC(1 O,20),PM,CM,KL,LG(1 O),PHASE, 
, GRAD,NF(l O),ET(l 0),RF(10),FLAG(1 0) 
COMMON/ONEIFU,DV,VR,PT,NA,AD,FE,FI,NS,MC,FA,DT,TE 
COMMONfTWOIIL,FL,DL,JL,PV,PC,PM,CM,KL 
COMMONfTWELVE/LG,PHASE,GRAD,NF,ET,RF,FLAG 
CHARACTER VESCH(3), POCH(S), PCH, TEMPFI(SO)'SO,BASICF'l 0, TEMPEV(2S)'12,Sl'3,S2'3 
INTEGER L1,FAUPOR(SO,12) 
3 FORMAT(/,' ',A,12,A) 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Initialize the temporary storage strings. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 50,1=l,SO 
TEMPFI(I)=FI(I) 
SO FAUPOR(I,l )=0 
JL=O 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Set up S1 and S2 character arrays for heating or cooling of second side. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-43 
IF (GRAO.EO.O) THEN 
S1=' HI' 
S2='LO' 
ELSE 
S1.' LO' 
S2='HI' 
END IF 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C For the second side liquid outlet port, enter the effect of High flow on 
C the level if there is a phase change. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (PHASE.EO.2.0R.(PHASE.EO.1.ANO.GRAO.EO.1)) THEN 
JL,.JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'/IPOCH(2)1fOUT HI:L'/NESCH(1)1fVES NONE' 
END IF 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C For each of the relief and/or drain port(s) generate the effects of SOME 
C flow through the port. These are High inlet flows and relief, LOw, NONE 
C and possibly REVerse outlet flows and pressure. If there Is a phase 
C change only LOw vessel pressure is considered for relief outlets but also 
C LOw and NO level for drain outlets. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 70,1=1,FLAG(3) 
JL=JL+1 
WRITE(PCH,'(11 )')1+2 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'/IPCHIfOUT SOME:G 11N HI,Q20UT LO,020UT NONE' 
IF (RF(2).EO.0) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1 :40)lf,020UT REV,R11N HI,P20UT LO' 
JL-JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL-1)(1 :13)1fP20UT NONE,P20UT REV' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1:40)lf,R1IN HI,P20UT LO,P20UT NONE' 
END IF 
70 CONTINUE 
DO 75,1=1,FLAG(5) 
JL,.JL+1 
IF (FLAG(5).EO.1) THEN 
J=FLAG(7) 
ELSE 
J=FLAG(7)·2+1 
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END IF 
WRITE(PCH ,'(ll)')J 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPCHI!OUT SOME:' 
Lls13 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l :13)1fG'IIPOCH(l)1fIN HI,O'IIPOCH(2)I!OUT LO,O' 
IIPOCH(2)IfOUT NONE' 
IF (RF(4+FLAG(3».EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)-TEMPFI(JL)(l :40)lf ,O'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT REV,R'IIPOCH(l)IfIN HI,P' 
IIPOCH(2)1fOUT LO' 
JL=JL+l 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL-l)(l :13)1fP'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT NONE,P'IIPOCH(2)IfOUT REV' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l :40)lf ,R'IIPOCH(l )!fIN HI,P'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT LO,P' 
IIPOCH(2)1fOUT NONE' 
END IF 
ELSE 
IF «FLAG(5).EO.2.AND.I.EO.2).OR.(FLAG(5).EO.l.AND.FLAG(6).EO.2» THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)-TEMPFI(JL)(l :13)!fL'/NESCH(l)1fVES LO,L'INESCH(l)IfVES NONE,' 
Ll-33 
END IF 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L 1)!fP'INESCH(2)!fVES LO' 
END IF 
75 CONTINUE 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Consider the effect of REVerse flow through the Inlet flow port of a 
C phase change situation. The others are modelled by the propagation 
C equations, These are LOw vessel pressure and for a cold side LOw and 
C No level. 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+3).EO.O) THEN 
JL...JL+l 
TEMPFI(JL)='V G'IIPOCH(l)IfIN REV:' 
Ll-ll 
IF (GRAD.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)1fL'INESCH(l)IfVES LO,L'INESCH(l)1fVES NONE,' 
L1=31 
END IF 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)!fP'INESCH(l)1fVES LO' 
END IF 
0-45 
C --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Consider the effect of REVerse flow through the outlet flow port of a 
C phase change situation. The others are modelled by the propagation 
C equations. These are High vessel pressure and for a hot side High level. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+4).EO.0) THEN 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)-'V O'IIPOCH(2)/fOUT REV:' 
11=12 
IF (GRAD.EO.1.0R.PHASE.EO.2) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)IfL'INESCH(l)/fVES HI,' 
L1=21 
END IF 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)IfP'INESCH(l)/fVES HI' 
END IF 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+5).EO.0.AND.PHASE.EO.2) THEN 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPOCH(3)/fOUT REV:P'INESCH(2)IfVES HI' 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C For each of the relief and/or drain port(s) generate the effects of 
C REVerse flow through the port. These are lower Inlet and higher outlet 
C flows and pressure. 
C -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 80,1=1 ,FLAG(3) 
JL=JL+1 
WRITE(PCH,'(11 )')1+2 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPCHIfOUT REV:G1IN LO,G1IN NONE,' 
IF (RF(l ).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)=TEMPFI(JL)(1:30)IfGlIN REV,020UT HI,R1IN LO' 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPCHIfOUT REV:R1IN NONE,R1IN REV,P20UT HI,' 
IF (MC.EO.'N') THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)-TEMPFI(JL)(l :40)/fY1IN HI,X20UT HI' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l :40)/fYD1IN HI,XD20UT HI' 
ENDIF 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1:30)1f020UT HI,R1IN LO,R1IN NONE,P20UT HI' 
JL=JL+1 
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IF (MC.EQ.'N·) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPCHIfOUT REV:X20UT HI' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)-'V O'IIPCHlfOUT REV:XD20UT HI' 
END IF 
END IF 
80 CONTINUE 
• 
DO 85,1=1 ,FLAG(S) 
JL=JL+1 
IF (FLAG(S).EO.1) THEN 
J=FLAG(7) 
ELSE 
J=FLAG(7)-2+1 
END IF 
WRITE(PCH:(11),)J 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPCHIfOUT REV:' 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1 :12)IfG' IIPOCH(1)1f IN LO,G'IIPOCH(1)1f1 N NONE: 
IF (RF(3+FLAG(3».EO.0) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1 :30)lfG'IIPOCH(1)1fIN REV,O'IIPOCH(2)IfOUT HI' 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL-1)(1 :12)1fR'IIPOCH(1)1fIN LO,R'IIPOCH(1)1fIN NONE,R' 
IIPOCH(1)1fIN REV,Q'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT HI' 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='V O'IIPCHIfOUT REV:Y'IIPOCH(1)IfIN HI,X'IIPOCH(2)IfOUT HI' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)=TEMPFI(JL)(1:30)lfO'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT HI,R'IIPOCH(1)1fIN LO,R' 
IIPOCH(1)/fIN NONE,P'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT HI' 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='V Q'IIPCHIfOUT REV:X'IIPOCH(2)IfOUT HI' 
END IF 
ELSE 
IF ((FLAG(S).EO.2.AND .I.EQ.2) .OR .(FLAG(S).EO.1.AND.FLAG(6).EO.2» THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1 :12)1fL'INESCH(1)1fVES HI,P'INESCH(2)1fVES HI: 
IF (MC.EQ.'N') THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1 :30)lfX'INESCH(1)1fVES HI' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1 :30)lfXD'INESCH(1)1fVES HI' 
END IF 
ELSE 
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TEMPFI(JL)-TEMPFI(JL)(l :12)1fP'INESCH(2)1fVES HI: 
IF (MC,EQ:N') THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)-TEMPFI(JL)(l :21)1fX' INESCH(2)1fVES HI' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)=TEMPFI(JL)(1:21)1fXD'INESCH(2)IfVES HI' 
END IF 
END IF 
END IF 
85 CONTINUE 
c: ....•...................................................................................................... 
c: If there is a phase change generate effects of High, LOw and NO level. 
c: .......................................................................................................... . 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='V L'INESCH(l)1fVES HI:T20UTIIS2If,Q'INESCH(3)/fVES'//s1 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)-'V L'INESCH(l)1fVES LO:T20UTIIS1/f,Q'INESCH(3)1fVES'IIS2 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='V L'INESCH(l)1fVES NONE:T20UTIIS1 
L1=21 
IF (GRAD.EQ.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)1f ,TlNESCH(2)1fVES HI' 
L1=L1+9 
END IF 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)1f ,P'INESCH(2)1fVES LO,Q' 
L1=L1+1 
IF (GRAD.EQ.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L 1)/NESCH(3)1fVES NONE' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L 1)/NESCH(3)1fVES HI' 
END IF 
c: ...................... _ ................ _ .......................... _ ................. _ ...•............ 
c: If there Is a phase change then generate the effects of High and LOw 
c: pressure, Use the EVSTAT routine. 
c: ......................................................................................•................... 
BASICF='V P'/NEXCH(2)1fVES HI' 
NDEV=O 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)-'G'/IPOCH(l)1fIN NONE' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='R'/IPOCH(1)IfIN NONE' 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+3).EQ.O) THEN 
0-48 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='G'IIPOCH(1)trIN REV' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='R'IIPOCH(1)/fIN REV' 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
END IF 
CALL EVSTAT(TEMPEV,BASICF,NDEV,TEMPFI,JL) 
BASICF='P'INEXCH(2)1fVES NONE' 
NDEV=O 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+4).EQ.0) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='Q'IIPOCH(2)/fOUT REV' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='P'IIPOCH(2)/fOUT REV' 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
END IF 
IF (PHASE.EQ.2.AND.RF(FLAG(3)+S).EQ.0) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+ 1 )='Q'IIPOCH(3)/fOUT REV' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='P'IIPOCH(3)/fOUT REV' 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
END IF 
IF (FLAG(S).NE.O) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='Q'IIPOCH(4)/fOUT REV' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='P'IIPOCH(4)/fOUT REV' 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
END IF 
IF (FLAG(S).EQ.2) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='Q'IIPOCH(5)/fOUT REV' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='P'IIPOCH(S)/fOUT REV' 
NDEV=NDEV+2 
ENDIF 
IF (NDEV.NE.O) THEN 
J=JL+1 
CALL EVSTAT(TEMPEV,BASICF,NDEV,TEMPFI,JL) 
DO 90,I=J,JL 
90 TEMPFI(I)='V'IITEMPFI(I) 
END IF 
C; ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C; Generate the effects of NO vapour-liquid flow, 
C; --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='V Q'INESCH(3)trVES NONE:L'INESCH(1)/fVES'IIS11f,P'INESCH(2)/fVES'IIS2 
END IF 
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C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Initialize the FAUPOR array for the basic faults EXT-HEAT, EXT-COLD 
C and LK-LP-EN. Use GENEV for these. 
C For EXT-HEAT and EXT-COLD define the first side inlet and outlet ports 
C for all cases. For no phase change add the second side inlet and outlet 
C ports, for a complete phase change add the vessel port and for a partial 
C phase change add the liquid and vapour vessel ports. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 100,1=1,2 
FAUPOR(I,l )=1+4 
J=O 
IF (RF(l ).EO.O) THEN 
J=J+l 
FAUPOR(I.2+J)=1 
END IF 
J=J+l 
FAUPOR(I.2+J)=2 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+3).EO.0) THEN 
J=J+l 
FAUPOR(I,2+J)=FLAG(3)+3 
END IF 
J=J+l 
FAUPOR(I.2+J):FLAG(3)+4 
ELSE 
J=J+l 
FAUPOR(I.2+J)=FLAG(7)+1 
IF (PHASE.EO.2) THEN 
J=J+l 
FAUPOR(I.2+J)=FLAG(7)+2 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
FAUPOR(I.2)=J 
100 CONTINUE 
CALL GENEV(FAUPOR.TEMPFI) 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C For LK-LP-EN use FLAG(9) to determine which side has the leak. 
C Define the inlet and outlet ports for no phase change or the vessel 
C port(s) for a phase change. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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FAUPOR(2,1)~O 
FAUPOR(1,1)=1 
IF (FLAG(9).EO.O) THEN 
FAUPOR(1,2)=2 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
FAUPOR(1,3)=FLAG(3)+3 
FAUPOR(1,4)=FLAG(3)+4 
ELSE 
FAUPOR(1,3)=FLAG(7)+1 
FAUPOR(1,4)=FLAG(7)+2 
IF (PHASE.EO.1) FAUPOR(1,2)=1 
END IF 
ELSE 
FAUPOR(1,2)=2 
FAUPOR(1,3)=1 
FAUPOR(1,4)=2 
END IF 
CALL GENEV(FAUPOR,TEMPFI) 
C; •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• --••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C; Generate the INT·LK fault, the result depends on the pressure difference 
C; between the first and second side. Use the GENEV routine but the 
C; composition and temperature effects have to be generated separately. 
C; ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• --•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
IF (NF(10).NE.O) THEN 
C; •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• --••••••••••••••••••••• --•••••••• _ •••••••••• --••• --•• --••••••• 
C; Deal with the first side first. 
C; ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• --••••••• 
FAUPOR(1,1)=9 
IF (NF(10).EO.2) FAUPOR(1,1)=10 
FAUPOR(1,2)=2 
FAUPOR(1,3)=1 
FAUPOR(1.4)=2 
C; •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C; Now deal with the second side. 
C; ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• --••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• --•••••••••••••••• 
FAUPOR(2,1)=10 
IF (NF(1 O).EO.2) FAUPOR(2,1)=9 
C; •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C; For no phase change use the inlet and outlet ports, otherwise use the 
C; vessel ports. 
C; •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
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IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
FAUPOR(2,2)=2 
FAUPOR(2,3)=FLAG(3)+3 
FAUPOR(2,4)=FLAG(3)+4 
ELSE 
FAUPOR(2,2)=2 
FAUPOR(2,3)=FLAG(7)+ 1 
FAUPOR(2,4)=FLAG(7)+2 
END IF 
CALL GENEV(FAUPOR,TEMPFI) 
FAUPOR(l,l)=O 
FAUPOR(2,1)=0 
C •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
C Now generate the temperature and composition effects. 
C ••••••••••••••..••••••..••••••••••••••.••••••••..•••••••.••• _ •.••• _ •••.•••••••••••••••••••••••.• _._ ••• 
• 
JL.,JL+1 
IF (NF(10).EO.1) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)='F INT·LK:T20ur/1S2 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
L1=17 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+3).EO.0) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l :17)" ,U'IIPOCH(l )!fIN'IIS1 
L1=25 
END IF 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L 1)!f ,r IIPOCH(2)!fOUr 11S1 
L1=L1+9 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+3).EO.0) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L 1)!f ,Y'IIPOCH(l)!fIN HI' 
LlmL 1+8 
END IF 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L 1)!f ,x'/IPOCH(2)1fOUT HI' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL) (1 :17)" ,rINESCH(l )lfVES'IIS1 
IF (MC.EO.'N') THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l :26)" ,X'INESCH(l)1fVES HI' 
IF (PHASE.EO.2) TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l :35)1f ,X'INESCH(2)1fVES HI' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l :26)" ,rtNESCH(2)lfVES'IIS1 If ,XC'/IVESCH(l) 
IfVES HI''',XC'INESCH(2)1fVES HI' 
END IF 
END IF 
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ELSE 
IF (RF(l ).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)='F INT-LK:U1IN'IIS2If,T20UT'IIS2 
L1~5 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)='F INT-LK:T20UT'IIS2 
L1=17 
END IF 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L 1)/f ,T'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT'IIS1 
L1=L1+9 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)1f,rlNESCH(l)1fVES'IIS1 
L1=L1+9 
IF (PHASE.EO.2) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)1f ,T'INESCH(2)1fVES' IIS1 
L1=L1+9 
END IF 
ENDIF 
IF (MC.EO.'N') THEN 
IF (RF(l).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)1f ,Y1IN HI' 
L1 =L1 +8 
END IF 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)1f ,X20UT HI' 
ELSE 
IF (RF(l ).EO.O) THEN 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='YA1IN HI,YB1IN HI,XA20UT HI,XB20UT HI' 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)a TEMPFI(JL)(l:L l)1f ,XA20UT HI,XB20UT HI' 
END IF 
END IF 
END IF 
END IF 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the PART-BLK fault using the GENEV routine, This is concerned 
C with the tubes for a shell and tube exchanger or both sides for a frame 
C and plate but the temperature effects have to be generated separately. 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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FAUPOR(1,1)=3 
IF (FLAG(1 O).EO.O) THEN 
FAUPOR(1,2)=2 
IF (FLAG(9).EO.O) THEN 
FAUPOR(1,3)=1 
FAUPOR(1,4)=2 
ELSE 
FAUPOR(1,3)=FLAG(3)+3 
FAUPOR(1,4)=FLAG(3)+4 
ENDIF 
ELSE 
FAUPOR(1,2)=4 
FAUPOR(1,3)z1 
FAUPOR(1,4)=2 
FAUPOR(1,5)=FLAG(3)+3 
FAUPOR(1,6):FLAG(3)+4 
IF (PHASE.EO.2) THEN 
FAUPOR(1,2)=5 
FAUPOR(1,7)=FLAG(3)+5 
END IF 
END IF 
CALL GENEV(FAUPOR,TEMPFI) 
JL=JL+1 
IF (RF(1 ).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)z'F PART -BLK:U1IN'/IS2/f ,T20UT' IIS2 
l1=27 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)='F PART-BLK:T20UT'IIS2 
L1=19 
END IF 
IF (PHASE.EO.O) THEN 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+3).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)1f,U'IIPOCH(1 )lfIN'/IS2 
L1=L1+8 
END IF 
TEMPFI(JL)~ TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)1f ,T'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT'IIS2 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)1f ,T'INESCH(1)IfVES'/IS2 
IF (PHASE.EO.2) TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1+9)1f ,T'INESCH(2)1fVES'IJS2 
END IF 
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c -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the basic faults that effect the heat transfer rate, 
C FOULING, FROTHING andVAP-BLKT, 
C -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
JL=JL+1 
IF (RF(1 ),EO,O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)='F FOULlNG:U1IN'IIS11f ,T20urlls1 
L1=26 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)='F FOULlNG:T20ur IIS1 
L1=18 
END IF 
IF (PHASE,EO,O) THEN 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+3).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)1f ,U'IIPOCH(1 )lfIN'/IS2 
L1=L1+8 
END IF 
TEMPFI(JL)z TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)1f ,T'/IPOCH(2)1fOUr IIS2 
ELSE 
TEMPFI(JL)-TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)1f ,T'INESCH(1 )lfVES'IIS2 
L1 =L1 +9 
IF (PHASE,EO.2) THEN 
TEMPFI(JL)-TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)1f ,T'INESCH(2)1fVES'IIS2 
L1=L1+9 
END IF 
TEMPFI(JL)= TEMPFI(JL)(1:L 1)1f ,O'INESCH(3)1fVES LO,O'INESCH(3)1fVES NONE' 
END IF 
L1=L1+9 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
JL-JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='F FROTHING:'lfTEMPFI(JL-1)(11:L 1) 
JL=JL+1 
TEMPFI(JL)='F VAP-BLKT:'lfTEMPFI(JL-1 )(12:) 
END IF 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Create the NORMAL state event statement. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BASICFc'S NORMAL' 
NDEV=O 
DO 150,1=3,FLAG(7) 
IF (PHASE.EO.0.AND.(I.EO.FLAG(3)+3.0R.I.EO.FLAG(3)+4» GOTO 150 
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NDEV=NDEV+1 
WRITE(PCH:(11),)1 
IF (I.EO.FLAG(3)+3) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV)='G'/IPCHIf IN SOME' 
ELSE 
IF (NF(I).EO.O) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV)='O'/IPCHIfOUT SOME' 
ELSE 
TEMPEV(NDEV)='O'/IPCH/fOUT NONE' 
END IF 
ENDIF 
150 CONTINUE 
DO 170,1=3,FLAG(7) 
IF (PHASE.EO.O.AND.(I.EO.FLAG(3)+3.0R.I.EO.FLAG(3)+4)) GOTO 170 
WRITE(PCH:(11),)1 
IF (I.EO.FLAG(3)+3) THEN 
NDEV=NDEV+1 
TEMPEV(NDEV)='R'/IPCHIfIN SOME' 
ELSE 
IF (NF(I).EO.O) THEN 
NDEV=NDEV+1 
TEMPEV(NDEV)='P'/IPCH/fOUT SOME' 
END IF 
END IF 
170 CONTINUE 
IF (NDEV.NE.O) CALL EVSTAT(TEMPEV,BASICF,NDEV,TEMPFI,JL) 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
c: C:reate the I MPOSS state event statement. 
c: -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
BASICF='S IMPOSS' 
t-!DEV=O 
DO 200,1=1,FLAG(7) 
IF (RF(I) .EO.1) THEN 
WRITE(PCH:(11),)1 
IF (I.EO.1.0R.I.EO.FLAG(3)+3) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='G'/IPCHIfIN REV' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='R'/IPCHIfIN REV' 
ELSE 
TEMPEV(NDEV+1)='O'/IPCHIfOUT REV' 
TEMPEV(NDEV+2)='P'/IPCHIfOUT REV' 
END IF 
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NDEV=NDEV+2 
END IF 
200 CONTINUE 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
TEMPEV(NDEV+ 1 )='O'/NESCH(3)1fVES REV' 
NDEV=NDEV+1 
END IF 
IF (NDEV.NE.O) CALL EVSTAT(TEMPEV,BASICF,NDEV,TEMPFI,JL) 
c: .......................................................................................................... . 
c: Completion of event statements, now check. 
c: ......................... -... -..............••.... --............................... -.... -.......... . 
PRINT3:THE FOLLOWING ',JL: EVENT STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED:' 
CALL CHECK(TEMPFI,JL) 
C ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• - •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
c: Take event statements from the temporary array and place in the FI array. 
c: .......................................................................................................... . 
K=JL 
JL=O 
DO 250,1=1,K 
IF (TEMPFI(I)(1 :1).NE.' ') THEN 
JL=JL+1 
L 1 =INDEX(TEMPFI(I): ') 
IF (L 1.EO.0) L 1 =80 
FI(JL)= TEMPFI(I)(1 :L 1) 
ENDIF 
250 CONTINUE 
RETURN 
END 
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SUBROUTINE HEXCHTABLE(VESCH,POCH) 
~ .•............•.......................................................•.................................... 
~ Subroutine to generate the decision tables for the heat exchanger model. 
~ ....... _ ................•................................................................................. 
CHARACTER FU(500)'S,DV(20)'4,VR(20),PT(10)'3,NA'SO,AD(25)"80, 
• FE(45)'SO,FI(50)'SO,NS'SO,MC,FA(5)'SO,DT(25)'SO,TE(200)'12 
INTEGER IL,FL,DL,JL,PV(10,20),PC(10,20),PM,CM,KL,LG(10),PHASE, 
• GRAD,NF(l O),ET(l O),RF(l O),FLAG(l 0) 
COMMON/ONEIFU,DV,VR,PT,NA,AD,FE,FI,NS,MC,FA,DT,TE 
COMMONfTWonL,FL,DL,JL,PV,PC,PM,CM,KL 
COMMONfTWELVElLG,PHASE,GRAD,NF ,ET,RF,FLAG 
CHARACTER VESCH(3),POCH(5),PCH,TEMPDT(25)'SO 
INTEGER L1 
3 FORMAT(I,' ',A,12,A) 
~ •.......•.•.............................................................................................•.. 
~ Initialize the temporary storage strings. 
~ ..................... _ ........... _ ........................................... _ ................. _ ..... . 
DO 50,1=1,25 
50 TEMPDT(I)=DT(I) 
DL=O 
~ ............•..................... _ ....................................................... _ ............. . 
~ Generate the causes of vessel temperature deviation as reverse flow 
~ through the second side outlet port. 
~ .......................................................................................................... . 
IF (PHASE.NE.O) THEN 
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+4).EO.0) THEN 
TEMPDT(DL+1 )='V U'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT HI V O'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT REV T r INESCH(l)1fVES HI' 
TEMPDT(DL+2)='V U'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT LO V O'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT REV T rtNESCH(l)trVES LO' 
DL=DL+2 
END IF 
IF (PHASE.EO.2.AND.RF(FLAG(3)+5).EO.0) THEN 
TEMPDT(DL+1 )='V U'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT HI V O'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT REV T r INESCH(2)IfVES HI' 
TEMPDT(DL+2)='V U'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT LO V O'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT REV T rINESCH(2)trVES LO' 
DL=DL+2 
END IF 
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e ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Generate the causes of vessel temperature deviation as reverse flow 
e through the second side additional port(s). 
e --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 70,1=1 ,FLAG(S) 
J=S 
IF (.EQ.1.AND.(FLAG(S).EQ.2.0RFLAG(6).EQ.1» J=4 
TEMPDT(DL+1):'V U'IIPOCH(J)!fOUT HI V Q'IIPOCH(J)!fOUT REV Tr/IVESCH(2)1fVES HI' 
IF (J.EQ.S) TEMPDT(DL+1)(27:27)=VESCH(1) 
TEMPDT(DL+2)='V U'IIPOCH(J)lfOUT LO V Q'IIPOCH(J)!fOUT REV T TINESCH(2)!fVES LO' 
IF (J.EQ.S) TEMPDT(DL+2)(27:27)=VESCH(1) 
70 DL=DL+2 
e ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e Generate the causes of vessel composdition deviation as reverse flow 
e through the second side outlet port. 
e ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (RF(FLAG(3)+4).EQ.0) THEN 
IF (MC.EQ:N')THEN 
TEMPDT(DL+1)='V Y'/IPOCH(2)!fOUT HI V Q'IIPOCH(2)!fOUT REV T X'INESCH(l)1fVES HI' 
TEMPDT(DL+2)='V Y'/IPOCH(2)1fOUT LO V Q'IIPOCH(2)!fOUT REV T X'INESCH(l)1fVES LO' 
DL=DL+2 
ELSE 
TEMPDT(DL+1)='V YA'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT HI V Q'IIPOCH(2)!fOUT REV T XB'INESCH(l)1fVES LO' 
TEMPDT(DL+2)='V YA'IIPOCH(2)trOUT LO V Q'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT REV T XB'INESCH(l)1fVES HI' 
TEMPDT(DL+3)='V YB'IIPOCH(2)/fOUT HI V Q'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT REV T XB'INESCH(l)1fVES HI' 
TEMPDT(DL+4)='V YB'IIPOCH(2)/fOUT LO V Q'IIPOCH(2)1fOUT REV T XB'INESCH(l)lfVES LO' 
DL=DL+4 
ENDIF 
ENDIF 
IF (PHASE.EQ.2.AND.RF(FLAG(3)+S).EQ.0) THEN 
IF (MC.EQ:N')THEN 
TEMPDT(DL+1)='V Y'/IPOCH(3)!fOUT HI V Q'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT REV T X'INESCH(2)1fVES HI' 
TEMPDT(DL+2)='V Y'/IPOCH(3)1fOUT LO V Q'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT REV T X'INESCH(2)1fVES LO' 
DL-DL+2 
ELSE 
TEMPDT(DL+1)='V YA'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT HI V Q'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT REV T XA'INESCH(l)1fVES HI' 
TEMPDT(DL+2)='V YA'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT LO V Q'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT REVT XA'INESCH(l)lfVES LO' 
TEMPDT(DL+3)='V YB'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT HI V Q'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT REVT XA'INESCH(l)1fVES LO' 
TEMPDT(DL+4)='V YB'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT LO V Q'IIPOCH(3)1fOUT REV T XA'INESCH(l)1fVES HI' 
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DL=DL+4 
END IF 
END IF 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Generate the causes of vessel composition deviation as reverse flow 
C through the second side additional port(s). 
C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DO 80,1=1 ,FLAG(5) 
J=5 
IF (I.EO.1.AND.(FLAG(5).EQ.2.0RFLAG(6).EO.1» J=4 
IF (MC.EO.'N·)THEN 
TEMPDT(DL+1)='V V'/IPOCH(J)/fOUT HI V Q'IIPOCH(J)/fOUT REV T X'INESCH(2)1!VES HI' 
IF (J.EO.5) TEMPDT(DL+1)(27:27)=VESCH(1) 
TEMPDT(DL+2)='V V'/IPOCH(J)/fOUT LO V Q'IIPOCH(J)I!OUT REV T X'INESCH(2)1!VES LO' 
IF (J.EO.5) TEMPDT(DL+2)(27:27)=VESCH(1) 
ELSE 
TEMPDT(DL+1 )='V YD'IIPOCH(J)/fOUT HI V O'IIPOCH(J)I!OUT REV T XD'INESCH(2)1fVES HI' 
IF (J.EO.5) TEMPDT(DL+1)(29:29)=VESCH(1) 
TEMPDT(DL+2)='V YD'IIPOCH(J)/fOUT LO V O'IIPOCH(J)/fOUT REV T XD'INESCH(2)1fVES LO' 
IF (J.EO.5) TEMPDT(DL+1)(29:29)=VESCH(1) 
ENDIF 
80 DL=DL+2 
END IF 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Completion of decision tables, now check. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IF (DL.EO.O) THEN 
PRINT",' , 
PRINT",'NO DECISION TABLES ARE REQUIRED FOR THE MODEL.' 
ELSE 
PRINT3,'THE FOLLOWING ',DL,' DECISION TABLES HAVE BEEN CREATED:' 
CALL CHECK(TEMPDT,DL) 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
C Take decison tables from the temporary array and place in the DL array. 
C ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
K=DL 
DL=O 
DO 150,1=1,K 
IF (TEMPDT(I)(l:l ).NE.' ') THEN 
DL=DL+1 
L l=INDEX(TEMPDT(I),' ') 
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IF (L1.EO.O) L 1 =80 
DT(DL)= TEMPDT(I)(1 :L 1) 
ENDIF 
150 CONTINUE 
END IF 
RETURN 
END 
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Appendix E 
Divider. Header And Closed Valve Models 
E.1 Divider Model 
1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
116 DIVIDER (2 OUTPUTS) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 3 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EOUATIONS: 12 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 14 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 13 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
A UNIT TO SPLIT A STREAM INTO 2 OUTPUT STREAMS. 
PORTS 2 & 3 ARE THE OUTPUT STREAM PORTS. 
NO PIPE TYPE FAULTS. 
3) PROPAGATION EOUATIONS 
GlIN= F( 011N, 020UT, 030U1) 
RlIN= F( R20UT, R30U1) 
UlIN= F( U20UT, U30U1) 
YllNz F( Y20UT, Y30U1) 
020UT= F( G20UT, G1INt030U1) 
T20UT = F( TlIN) 
X20UT= F( XlIN) 
P20UT = F( P1IN, -R30U1) 
030UT = F( G30UT, GliNt 020U1) 
T30UT = F( TlIN) 
X30UT = F( Xl IN) 
P30UT= F( P1IN, -R20U1) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V GllN HI : 020UT SOME, 030UT SOME 
V RllN HI : P20UT SOME, P30UT SOME 
V 020UT HI : 030UT REV, 030UT NONE 
V 020UT NONE: GllN LO, 030UT HI 
V 020UT REV: GllN LO, GllN NONE, 030UTHI, 030UT SOME 
V 030UT HI : 020UT REV, 020UT NONE 
V 030UT NONE: GllN LO, 020UT HI 
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V 030UT REV: G11N LO, G11N NONE, 020UT HI, 030UT SOME 
V R20UT HI : P30UT NONE, P30UT REV 
V R20UT NONE: R11N LO, P30UT HI 
V R20UT REV: R11N LO, R11N NONE, P30UT HI, P30UT SOME· 
V R30UT HI : P20UT NONE, P20UT REV 
V R30UT NONE: R11N LO, P20UT HI 
V R30UT REV: R11N LO, R11N NONE, P20UT HI, P20UT SOME 
5) DECISION TABLES 
V 020UTNONE V 030UTNONE T G11NNONE 
V R20UT NONE V R30UT NONE T R11N NONE 
V R20UT NOP V R30UT NOP T R11N NOP 
V P11N NOR V R30UT NONE T P20UT NOR 
V P11N NOR V R20UT NONE T P30UT NOR 
V U30UT LO V 030UT REV T T20UT LO 
V U30UT HI V 030UT REV T T20UT HI 
V Y30UT LO V 030UT REV T X20UT LO 
V Y30UT HI V 030UT REV T X20UT HI 
V U20UT LO V 020UT REV T T30UT LO 
V U20UT HI V 020UT REV T T30UT HI 
V Y20UT LO V 020UT REV T X30UT LO 
V Y20UT HI V 020UT REV T X30UT HI 
6) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: N/A 
NO MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES 
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E.2 Header Model 
1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
117 HEADER (2 INPUTS) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 3 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 12 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 16 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 7 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
HEADER COMBINING TWO INPUT STREAMS TO GIVE ONE OUTPUT STREAM. 
PORTS 1 AND 3 ARE THE INLETS, PORT 21S THE OUTLET. 
THERE IS NO SPARE INLET CAPACITY. THERE ARE NO PIPE TYPE FAULTS. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
GlIN= F( Q1IN, Q20UT, -G3IN) 
RlIN= F( R20UT, -P3IN) 
UlIN= F( U20UT, T3IN) 
YlIN= F( Y20UT, X3IN) 
Q20UT = F( GlIN, G20UT, G3IN) 
T20UT = F( TlIN, T3IN) 
X20UT = F( Xl IN, X3IN) 
P20UT= F( P1IN, P3IN) 
G3IN= F( Q3IN, 020UT, -GlIN) 
R3IN= F( R20UT, -PlIN) 
U3IN= F( U20UT, TlIN) 
Y3IN= F( Y20UT, Xl IN) 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
V GllN HI : G31N NONE, G31N REV 
V GllN NONE: G31N HI, Q20UT LO 
V GllN REV: G31N HI, G31N SOME, Q20UT LO, Q20UT NONE 
V G31N HI : G1IN NONE, GllN REV 
V G31N NONE: GllN HI, 020UT LO 
V G31N REV: GllN HI, GllN SOME, Q20UT LO, Q20UT NONE 
V PllN HI : R31N NONE 
V PllN NONE: P20UT LO 
V PllN REV: P20UT LO, P20UT NONE, R31N HI, R31N SOME 
V P31N HI : R1IN NONE 
V P31N NONE: P20UT LO 
V P31N REV: RllN HI, RllN SOME, P20UT LO, P20UT NONE 
V Q20UT HI: GllN SOME, G31N SOME 
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V 020UT LO: GllN REV, G31N REV 
V P20UT HI : RllN SOME, R31N SOME 
V P20UT LO : RllN REV, R31N REV 
5) DECISION TABLES 
V GllN NONE V G31N NONE T 020UT NONE 
V PllN NONE V P31N NONE T P20UT NONE 
V PllN NOR V P31N NOR T P20UT NOR 
V R20UT NONE V P31N NOR T RllN NONE 
V R20UT NONE V PllN NOR T R31N NONE 
V R20UT NOP V P31N NONE T RllN NOP 
V R20UT NOP V PllN NONE T R31N NOP 
6) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: N/A 
NO MULTI-COMPONENT FEATURES 
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E.3 Closed Valve Model 
1) MODEL NUMBER NAME 
3 HAND VALVE (CLOSED) 
NO. OF ENG. ASSUMPTIONSIDESCRIPTIONS: 2 
NO. OF PROPAGATION EQUATIONS: 0 
NO. OF EVENT STATEMENTS: 7 
NO. OF DECISION TABLES: 16 
NO. OF FAILURE MODES: 1 
2) ENGINEERING ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTIONS 
A VALVE CLOSED DURING NORMAL OPERATION. 
A(DUMMY) REPRESENTS THE VALVE BEING OPEN. 
3) PROPAGATION EQUATIONS 
N/A 
4) EVENT STATEMENTS 
F HV-F-OP : A(DUMMY) 
o HV-D-OP : A(DUMMY) 
S NORMAL: G11N NONE, Q20UT NONE, R11N NONE, R1IN NOP, P20UT NONE, P20UT NOR 
V Q11N SOME: G11N SOME 
V Q11N REV:G1IN REV 
V G20UT SOME: Q20UT SOME 
V G20UT REV: Q20UT REV 
5) DECISION TABLES 
I A(DUMMY) V Q20UT SOME T Q11N SOME 
I A(DUMMY) V Q20UT REV T Q11N REV 
I A(DUMMy) V U20UT LO T U11N LO 
I A(DUMMY) V U20UT HI T U11N HI 
I A(DUMMY) V Y20UT LO T Y11N LO 
I A(DUMMY) V Y20UT HI T Y11N HI 
I A(OUMMY) V R20UT SOME T R11N SOME 
I A(OUMMY) V R20UT REV T R11N REV 
I A(OUMMY) V G11N SOME T G20UT SOME 
I A(OUMMY) V G11N REV T G20UT REV 
I A(OUMMY) V T11N LO.r T20UTLO 
I A(OUMMY) V T1IN HI T T20UT HI 
I A(OUMMY) V X11N LO T X20UTLO 
I A(OUMMY) V X11N HI T X20UT HI 
I A(OUMMY) V P11N SOME T P20UT SOME 
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I A(DUMMY) V P11N REV T P20UT REV 
6) SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
NORMAL STATE: CLOSED· NO FLOW THROUGH UNIT. 
NO MULTI·COMPONENT FEATURES 
E-6 

